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ABSTRACT 
 
The evaluation of a large infrastructure project is a critical activity for bidders and 
governments under traditional procurement or through Public Private Partnership. When 
a project requires huge capital investment, public-private partnership (PPP) is often 
sought as an alternative in cases of shortage of public funds. Nevertheless, the 
complexity of the PPP arrangement has constituted a dilemma for government 
authorities to balance the interests between the public and the private parties 
(stakeholders). High capital burdens in terms of PPP bidding cost, construction cost, and 
operation and maintenance cost are part of the major challenges for private sponsors to 
get involved in PPP projects. Meanwhile, PPP scheme projects, believed to deliver 
better value for money, have been criticised by many as the product of highest influence 
level from either political patronage or corporate political power.  
 
There is an apparent need for a tool to help the government agency evaluate the delivery 
of value for money on PPP projects while still sustaining the interests of private parties. 
The aim of this research is to assist government agencies in evaluating bids and making 
decision efficiently for PPP seaport development projects through the use of an 
integrated project evaluation tool (IPET). A computer (MS excel program) based tool 
was developed to evaluate the project financial viability and negotiate the risk sharing 
mechanism of PPP Seaport Project at five different project stages. The stakeholders’ 
expectations, financial indicators, financial risks, and mitigation measures are 
considered and developed into the following modules: (1) Financial viability module; 
(2) Financial risk analysis module; and (3) Financial risk mitigation module. 
 
A triangulation strategy was justified with caution due to the possibility of error. A 
qualitative method (i.e. literature review and interview to explore stakeholders’ 
expectation and preferred indicators of PPP financial models) was undertaken prior to 
performing a quantitative technique (i.e. questionnaire survey to narrow down the 
preliminary findings). Then, the proposed tool was validated by comparing the results 
with secondary data and interviewing experts regarding their opinion on its 
applicability. 
 
The findings from the statistical analysis indicate that an efficient negotiation is possible 
if: (1) PPP financial models were used at the pre-proposal stage to examine the project’s 
ability in generating enough cash flow; (2) All stakeholders know the most important 
expectations and the most preferred financial indicators of other stakeholders; and (3) 
IRR, NPV, Revenue, Operating Cost, and Principal Payback are not considered as the 
only financial indicators for evaluating PPP projects. By knowing the mutual agreement 
among stakeholders, any conflicting expectations can also be identified early and it may 
be possible to accommodate such expectations in the negotiation process. 
 
The IPET has been confirmed that it has several implications: (1) possibility to facilitate 
an efficient negotiation and effective evaluation process; (2) applicability in evaluating 
PPP seaport projects; and (3) potentially to be extended to other sectors. However, the 
IPET is designed to be used with financial model, hence it will require an actual PPP 
financial model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 DEDICATION 
 
To 
PALESTINA DORA 
My soulmate, teacher, wife and mother of two little angles: 
 
Muhammad Ghaza Al-Farabi Kurniawan 
My son, the inspired striver  
and 
Nasyamah Azka Eydin Kurniawan 
 My daughter, the purified soul 
 
 
and 
 
 
 
For the use of mankind 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
A L L  T H A N K S  A N D  P R A I S E  T O  A L L A H  T H E  A L M I G H T Y ,   
T H E  C H E R I S H E R  A N D  S U S T A I N E R  O F  T H E  W O R L D ,   
M O S T  M E R C I F U L ,  M O S T  G R A C I O U S .  
 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude and thanks to my first supervisor Prof. 
Stephen Ogunlana for his support, encouragement, and patience in dealing with my 
frustrations throughout the course of this research. Special appreciation is also extended 
to my second supervisor, Dr. Ibrahim Motawa, for teaming up with my first supervisor 
to provide guidance. 
I would express my gratitude to the Directorate General of Higher Education, Ministry 
of Education, Republic of Indonesia which has provided full scholarship funds for my 
PhD. I would like to extend my appreciation to Dr. Ivan Wing-Hong Fung and all my 
colleagues and friends for their contributions, comments, and support. I owe very 
special thanks to Mr. Hussain Akhtar not only for offering me a flexible part-time job as 
a Marketing Manager at Silicon Edinburgh, but also helping me and my family during 
my study. Special thanks and gratitude are addressed to my parents Prof. Dr. Sadjijono 
and Mrs. Luluk Wigati who have bestowed ceaseless love, support and understanding. 
This acknowledgement will be incomplete without appreciating my soul mate Palestina 
Dora and our beloved children for motivating and cheering me up whenever I was 
down. Your moral and spiritual support all added up in making the entire program a 
success. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DECLARATION STATEMENT 
 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
LISTS OF TABLES ........................................................................................................ v 
LIST OF FIGURES ..................................................................................................... viii 
GLOSSARY .................................................................................................................... xi 
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS ......................................................................................... xiii 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 2 
1.2 Background ......................................................................................................... 2 
1.3 Problem statement ............................................................................................... 4 
1.4 Motivations ......................................................................................................... 6 
1.5 Research questions .............................................................................................. 6 
1.6 Aim and objectives ............................................................................................. 7 
1.7 Scope of the study ............................................................................................... 8 
1.8 Research design and methodology...................................................................... 9 
1.9 Structure of the thesis........................................................................................ 11 
CHAPTER TWO: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP: THEORIES, DEBATES, 
AND ANALYSES .......................................................................................................... 15 
2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 16 
2.2 Exploring the partnership concept .................................................................... 16 
2.3 PPP approaches ................................................................................................. 19 
2.4 Theories in Public-Private Partnerships ............................................................ 20 
2.5 Evaluating the financial viability of large infrastructure projects .................... 23 
2.6 Problems in evaluating a large infrastructure project ....................................... 26 
2.7 Project evaluation tools and techniques ............................................................ 27 
2.8 Risk management in PPP projects .................................................................... 33 
2.9 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................. 37 
CHAPTER THREE: PPP FINANCIAL MODEL AND THE EXPECTATIONS 
OF ITS STAKEHOLDERS .......................................................................................... 39 
 ii 
3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 40 
3.2 Financial Model ................................................................................................ 40 
3.3 Developing the best practice of PPP financial models ..................................... 42 
3.4 Stakeholders and their expectations in utilising PPP financial models ............ 43 
3.5 PPP financial models as tool for evaluation and negotiation ............................ 45 
3.6 Stakeholders’ expectations in using PPP financial models at pre-proposal stage
 46 
3.7 Stakeholders’ expectations in using PPP financial models at contract 
negotiation stage ............................................................................................... 51 
3.8 Stakeholders’ expectations in using PPP financial models at finance-raising 
stage .................................................................................................................. 59 
3.9 Stakeholders’ expectations in using PPP financial models at the construction 
stage .................................................................................................................. 64 
3.10 Stakeholders’ expectations in using PPP financial models at the operation stage
 65 
3.11 Chapter Summary ............................................................................................. 69 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY .................... 70 
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 71 
4.2 Understanding research methodology: research design, strategy, and method 71 
4.3 Research design and methodology decision ..................................................... 76 
4.4 Research Strategy.............................................................................................. 79 
4.5 Data Collection Method .................................................................................... 83 
4.6 Data Analysis .................................................................................................... 89 
4.7 Model development .......................................................................................... 97 
4.8 Verification and validation ............................................................................. 101 
4.9 Chapter Summary ........................................................................................... 102 
CHAPTER FIVE: CASE STUDY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION ..................... 104 
5.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 105 
5.2 Public private partnership seaports in India .................................................... 105 
5.3 Procedure for evaluating PPP seaport projects in India .................................. 109 
 iii 
5.4 Case Studies .................................................................................................... 121 
5.5 Chapter Summary ........................................................................................... 133 
CHAPTER SIX: INTERVIEW ANALYSIS – EXPLORING STAKEHOLDERS’ 
EXPECTATIONS ....................................................................................................... 134 
6.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 135 
6.2 Research Approach and Technique ................................................................ 136 
6.3 Content Analysis: PPP Stakeholders Identification ........................................ 136 
6.4 Content Analysis: Stakeholders expectations from PPP financial modelling 140 
6.5 Content analysis findings ................................................................................ 152 
6.6 Chapter summary ............................................................................................ 157 
CHAPTER SEVEN: QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY ANALYSIS .......................... 158 
7.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 159 
7.2 Sampling Adequacy Test ................................................................................ 159 
7.3 Principal component analysis ......................................................................... 161 
7.4 Validity Analysis ............................................................................................ 164 
7.5 Internal consistency reliability test ................................................................. 170 
7.6 Agreement analysis one-way ANOVA test, post hoc test and means plot ..... 172 
7.7 Discussion of research findings ...................................................................... 194 
7.8 Chapter summary ............................................................................................ 200 
CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION AND FRAMEWORK CONSTRUCTION .. 203 
8.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 204 
8.2 The approach used in developing IPET .......................................................... 204 
8.3 The financial viability module ........................................................................ 206 
8.4 Comparison of PPP financial models ............................................................. 209 
8.5 Financial risk analysis module ........................................................................ 225 
8.6 Financial Risk Mitigation Module .................................................................. 234 
8.7 Chapter summary ............................................................................................ 275 
CHAPTER NINE: VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION ................................... 276 
9.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 277 
 iv 
9.2 Verification ..................................................................................................... 277 
9.3 Validation ........................................................................................................ 289 
9.4 Summary ......................................................................................................... 302 
CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ..................... 303 
10.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................... 304 
10.2 Research background ...................................................................................... 304 
10.3 Methodology ................................................................................................... 305 
10.4 Achievement of the aim and objectives .......................................................... 306 
10.5 Limitations of the research .............................................................................. 312 
10.6 Value of the findings ....................................................................................... 313 
10.7 Originality of the proposed IPET and contribution to knowledge .................. 315 
10.8 Recommendations for further research ........................................................... 317 
APPENDICES ............................................................................................................. 337 
Appendix 1: Pilot Questionnaire Survey and Interview ............................................... 338 
Appendix 2: Questionnaire Survey ............................................................................... 346 
Appendix 3: Systematic Statistical Analyses of the Survey Responses ....................... 355 
Appendix 4: Validation Survey ..................................................................................... 401 
  
 
 v 
LISTS OF TABLES  
Table 2.1 Risk analysis tools and techniques............................................................... 27 
Table 2.2 Methods for evaluating competitive tenders................................................ 29 
Table 2.3 Summary of previous works on financial analysis and risk  
management...................................................................................30 
Table 2.4 Summary of risk classification in PPP projects............................................ 34 
Table 2.5 Risk attitude in PPP projects.............................................................35 
Table 3.1 Stakeholders who are utilising financial models in PPP projects................. 44 
Table 3.2 Key issues in the project economic feasibility.....................................52 
Table 4.1 Fundamental beliefs of research paradigms in social sciences................75 
Table 4.2 Various forms of research methods....................................................80 
Table 4.3 Three selected PPP seaport projects in Indian case studies....................82 
Table 4.4: Case study tactics for four design tests..............................................82 
Table 4.5 Research problems, limitations and necessary actions................................. 87 
Table 5.1 Financial and economic viability checklist.................................................. 114 
Table 5.2 Main stakeholders in the PPP seaports projects in India............................ 122 
Table 5.3 Post facto VFM analysis of Gangavaram port project................................. 126 
Table 6.1 Participating institutions for interviews in India..................................136 
Table 6.2 Experts participants of PPP projects............................................................ 136 
Table 6.3 Participants’ expectations at the pre-proposal stage................................... 140 
Table 6.4 Participants’ expectations at the contract negotiation stage...................... 142 
Table 6.5 Participants’ expectations at the finance-raising stage.............................. 143 
Table 6.6 Participants’ expectations at the operation stage........................................ 145 
Table 6.7a The expectation of major participants at the pre-proposal stage................ 152 
Table 6.7b The expectation of major participants at the contract negotiation stage.... 153 
Table 6.7c The expectation of major participants at the finance-raising stage............ 154 
Table 6.7d The expectation of major participants at the construction stage................ 155 
Table 6.7e The expectation of major participants at the operational stage.................. 155 
Table 6.8 Participants’ preferred financial indicators................................................. 156 
Table 7.1 Participating respondents and their organisations........................................ 159 
Table 7.2 KMO measure of sampling adequacy........................................................ 160 
Table 7.3 Total variance explained at the pre-proposal stage................................... 161 
Table 7.4 Rotated component matrix.......................................................................... 162 
Table 7.5 Summary of PCA at all stages...................................................................... 163 
 vi 
Table 7.6 Stakeholders’ expectations correlations at the pre-proposal stage............. 165 
Table 7.7 Reliability statistics...................................................................................... 169 
Table 7.8 Item-total statistics of stakeholders’ expectations and financial indicators at 
the contract negotiation stage.......................................................................170 
Table 7.9 Test of homogeneity of variances at the pre-proposal stage……...……... 174 
Table 7.10 ANOVA test at the pre-proposal stage………………………………… 174 
Table 7.11 Robust tests of equality of means at the pre-proposal stage……...…... 175 
Table 7.12 ANOVA test at the contract negotiation stage……………….……….. 177 
Table 7.13 Robust tests of equality of means at the contract negotiation stage...... 178 
Table 7.14 Post hoc tests of stakeholders’ expectations at the contract negotiation 
stage……………………………………………………………………. 179 
Table 7.15 ANOVA test at the finance-raising stage…………………………….... 181 
Table 7.16 Robust tests of equality of means at the finance-raising stage………... 182 
Table 7.17 ANOVA test at the construction and operation stages……………….. 184 
Table 7.18 Robust tests of equality of means at the construction and operation 
stages………………………………………………………………….... 185 
Table 7.19 Post hoc tests of stakeholders’ expectations at the construction and operation 
stages……………………………………………………….... 185 
Table 7.20 ANOVA test of stakeholders’ preference on input assumptions…….... 187 
Table 7.21 Robust tests of equality of means of stakeholders’ preference on input 
assumptions.............................................................................................. 188 
Table 7.22 Post hoc tests of stakeholders’ preference on input assumptions.......... 188 
Table 7.23 ANOVA test of stakeholders’ preference on financial model output.... 190 
Table 7.24 Robust tests of equality of means of stakeholders’ preference on financial 
model output............................................................................................. 190 
Table 7.25 Post hoc tests of stakeholders’ preference on financial model 
output........................................................................................................ 191 
Table 7.26 Comparison of the top rank preferred input assumptions...................... 193 
Table 7.27 Comparison of the top rank preferred financial model outputs............. 194 
Table 8.1 Comparison of four input financial model................................................. 210 
Table 8.2 Comparison of four output financial model............................................... 211 
Table 8.3 Financial risk variables of financial viability module............................. 213 
Table 8.4 Input assumptions and financial risks........................................................... 228 
Table 8.5 Output indicators and financial risks............................................................ 230 
Table 8.6 Input assumptions and probability distribution.......................................... 233 
 vii 
Table 8.7 Financial risks and mitigation measures.......................................................233 
Table 8.8 DSCR strength criteria................................................................................. 272 
Table 9.1 Sample of output consistency between financial viability module and La Paz 
container financial model........................................................................... 278 
Table 9.2 Mean and standard deviation of the applicability category......................... 292 
Table 9.3 Mean and standard deviation of the comprehensiveness category............... 292 
Table 9.4 Mean and standard deviation of the practical relevance category................ 293 
Table 9.5 Mean and standard deviation of the intelligibility category......................... 293 
Table 9.6 Respondent’s designation and organisation................................................. 300 
Table 10.1a Summary of the findings from authority perspective............................... 317 
Table 10.1b Summary of the findings from consultant perspective............................. 317 
Table 10.1c Summary of the findings from sponsor perspective................................. 318 
Table 10.1d Summary of the findings from lender perspective................................... 320 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1 The top 10 countries with the highest number of seaport..............................2  
Figure 1.2 Intensity of world shipping routes in 2004 and Indonesia (Inset).................3 
Figure 1.3 Summary of sub-chapter 1.1 up to 1.8..........................................................10 
Figure 1.4 Outline of the study.......................................................................................11 
Figure 2.1 conceptual framework of public-private partnership in chapter 2.............. 18 
Figure 2.2 conceptual framework of evaluating large infrastructure projects.............. 24 
Figure 2.3 Decision support framework (DSF) in the planning stage of a BOT 
project...........................................................................................................33 
Figure 2.4 A life-cycle risk management framework for PPP infrastructure 
projects......................................................................................................... 36 
Figure 3.1 Current use of PFI financial modelling....................................................... 41  
Figure 4.1 Research design framework...................................................................... 72 
Figure 4.2: The relationship among research design, methodology, theory, question, and 
context.......................................................................................................... 73 
Figure 4.3 The Research Pyramid............................................................................ 74 
Figure 4.4 Research design and methodology framework........................................... 78 
Figure 4.5 Research process framework....................................................................... 81 
Figure 4.6 Qualitative data analysis continuum......................................................... 92 
Figure 5.1 Indian map seaport..................................................................................... 106 
Figure 5.2 Indian major seaports capacity and traffic (in million tonnes).............. 107 
Figure 5.3 The PPP process and decision tools......................................................... 110 
Figure 5.4 Typical structure and information flows in Indian PPP financial 
model......................................................................................................... 117 
Figure 5.5 PPP projects process management in India............................................... 120 
Figure 5.6 Important milestones of three PPP seaport projects in India...................... 121 
Figure 6.1 The triangle of major actors in a PPP project......................................... 139 
Figure 7.1 Participating respondents by percentage..................................................... 159 
Figure 7.2 Scree plot for principal component analysis............................................. 161 
Figure 7.3 Means plots of stakeholders’ expectations at the pre-proposal stage....... 176 
Figure 7.4 Means plots of stakeholders’ expectations at the contract negotiation 
stage............................................................................................................. 180 
Figure 7.5 Means plots of stakeholders’ expectations at the finance-raising stage... 183 
 ix 
Figure 7.6 Means plots of stakeholders’ expectations at the construction and operation 
stages............................................................................................................ 186 
Figure 7.7 Means plots of stakeholders’ preference on input assumptions..................189 
Figure 7.8 Means plots of stakeholders’ preference on financial model output...........192 
Figure 7.9 Systematic statistical analyses..................................................................... 200 
Figure 7.10 The links between stakeholders and financial indicators..........................201 
Figure 8.1 Integrated project evaluation tool framework............................................ 204 
Figure 8.2 An integrated view of the capital budgeting process.................................. 206 
Figure 8.3 Architecture of a financial model.............................................................. 207 
Figure 8.4 BOT financial flows................................................................................... 209 
Figure 8.5 Correlation framework for financial viability module at the pre-proposal 
stage............................................................................................................. 215 
Figure 8.6 Correlation framework for financial viability module at the contract 
negotiation stage......................................................................................... 217 
Figure 8.7 Correlation framework for financial viability module at the finance-raising 
stage............................................................................................................. 218 
Figure 8.8 Correlation framework for financial viability module at the construction 
stage............................................................................................................. 221 
Figure 8.9 Correlation framework for financial viability module at the operation 
stage............................................................................................................. 223 
Figure 8.10 Hierarchy diagram of financial risk variables........................................... 225 
Figure 8.11 Influence diagram notation and conventions: (a) notation;                          
(b) relationships........................................................................................... 227 
Figure 8.12 Influence diagram of project costs, risks, and mitigation measures......... 238 
Figure 8.13 Influence diagram of traffic, risk, and mitigation measures..................... 241 
Figure 8.14 Influence diagram of revenue forecast, risk, and mitigation measures..... 244 
Figure 8.15 Influence diagram of operating and maintenance cost, risk, and mitigation 
measures..................................................................................................... 247 
Figure 8.16 Influence diagram of loan repayment schedule, risk, and mitigation 
measures....................................................................................................................... 249 
Figure 8.17 Influence diagram of financing cost, risk, and mitigation measures.........250 
Figure 8.18 Influence diagram of project time lines, risk, and mitigation 
measures.................................................................................................... 252 
Figure 8.19 Influence diagram of capital structure, risk, and mitigation measures.... 253 
Figure 8.20 Influence diagram of interest and fees, risk, and mitigation measures..... 255 
 x 
Figure 8.21 Influence diagram of IRR, risk, and mitigation measures........................ 257 
Figure 8.22 Influence diagram of net cash flow, risk, and mitigation measures......... 259 
Figure 8.23 Influence diagram of EBITDA, risk, and mitigation measures................ 260 
Figure 8.24 Influence diagram of CADS, risk, and mitigation measures.................... 262 
Figure 8.25 Influence diagram of LLCR, risk, and mitigation measures..................... 264 
Figure 8.26 Influence diagram of Interest Covering Ratio, risk, and mitigation 
measures....................................................................................................... 266 
Figure 8.27 Influence diagram of repayment period, risk, and mitigation measures... 267 
Figure 8.28 Relationship between the concession period and NPV............................ 269 
Figure 8.29 Influence diagram of NPV, risk, and mitigation measures....................... 270 
Figure 8.30 Influence diagram of ROE, risk, and mitigation measures....................... 271 
Figure 8.31 Influence diagram of DSCR, risk, and mitigation measures.................... 273 
Figure 9.1 Screenshot of integrated project evaluation tool cover........................... 277 
Figure 9.2 Screenshot of introduction of integrated project evaluation tool............ 279 
Figure 9.3 Screenshot of financial viability module and stakeholders’ 
expectations................................................................................................ 281 
Figure 9.4 Screenshot of second part of financial viability module: financial viability 
analysis........................................................................................................ 282 
Figure 9.5 Screenshot of financial risk analysis module: risk identification......... 283 
Figure 9.6 Screenshot of financial risk analysis module: input simulation............. 284 
Figure 9.7 Screenshot of financial risk analysis module: output simulation.......... 285 
Figure 9.8 Screenshot of project synthesis: base case vs. single random simulated 
scenario......................................................................................................... 286 
Figure 9.9 Screenshot of project synthesis: a single random simulated scenario result in 
a graph........................................................................................................... 287 
Figure 9.10 Screenshot of financial risk mitigation module..........................................289 
Figure 9.11 Concept rating for integrated project evaluation tool........................... 291 
Figure 9.12 Frequency of the applicability category.................................................... 292 
Figure 9.13 Frequency of the comprehensiveness category......................................... 292 
Figure 9.14 Frequency of the practical relevance category.......................................... 293 
Figure 9.15 Frequency of the intelligibility category................................................... 293 
Figure 9.16 Screenshot of respondents’ background.................................................... 299 
Figure 9.17 Distribution of respondent’s country origin.............................................. 300 
Figure 10.1 Research objectives in relation to thesis chapters..................................... 305 
 
 xi 
GLOSSARY 
AHP Analytic Hierarchy Process  
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
BOO Build Own Operate 
BOOT  Build Own Operate Transfer 
BTO Build Transfer Operate 
BOT Build Operate Transfer  
CADS Cash Available for Debt Service 
CAPEX Capital Expenditure 
DBFO Design, Build, Finance and Operate  
DEA Department of Economic Affairs 
DEA Data Envelopment Analysis 
DSC Discounted Cash Flow 
DSF Decision Support Framework  
DSCR Debt Service Cover Ratio 
EBITDA Earnings before Interest, Tax, Depreciation, and Amortisation 
FAST  Flexible Accurate Structured and Transparent 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
GoAP Government of Andhra Pradesh 
GPL Gangavaram Port Limited 
IDA International Development Association  
IIFCL India Infrastructure Finance Company 
ISPL International Seaports Pte Limited 
IPET Integrated Project Evaluation Tool 
IRR Internal Rate of Return 
JNPT Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust 
LLCR Loan Life Cover Ratio 
KDWP Kakinada Deep Water Port 
KMO Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin 
KSPL Kakinada Sea Ports Ltd 
MAC Material Adverse Change 
MCDM Multi-criteria decision making 
MCS Monte Carlo Simulation 
MGA Minimum Guaranteed Amount 
 xii 
MIRR Modified Interest Rate of Return 
MRG  Minimum Revenue Guarantee 
NPC Net Present Cost 
NPV Net Present Value 
NSICT Nhava Sheva International Container Terminal 
OPEX Operational Expenditure 
PCA Principal Component Analysis 
PERT Program Evaluation and Review Technique 
PFI Private Finance Initiative 
PLCR  Project Life Coverage Ratio 
PPP Public-Private Partnership  
PPIAF Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility 
PSC Public Sector Comparator 
RCP Revenue Cap  
RFP Request for Proposal 
RFQ Request for Qualification 
ROA Return on Asset 
ROE Return on Equity 
SLR Self-Liquidation Ratio 
SPC Special Purpose Company 
SPV Special Purpose Vehicle 
TAMP Tariff Authority for Major Ports 
TCE Transaction Cost Economics 
TEU  Twenty-feet Equivalent Unit 
VFM  Value for Money 
VGF Viability Gap Funding 
 xiii 
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS 
 
Kurniawan, F, Ogunlana, S and Motawa, I (2013) "Stakeholders’ expectations in 
utilising financial models for public private partnership projects”. Built Environment 
Project and Asset Management, 2013, (Accepted). 
Kurniawan, F, Ogunlana, S, Motawa, I, and Dada, M (2013) Public-Private Partnership 
Projects Implementation: Three Case Studies of Seaport Projects in India, International 
Conference on PPP Body of Knowledge, Preston, 18-19 March 2013. 
Kurniawan, F. (2010) "A Review: Exploring Stakeholders’ Expectations from PFI 
Financial Modelling at Different Stages", paper presented at PMI India Conference 
2010, Mumbai, 19-21 November 2010 . 
Kurniawan, F, Ogunlana, S and Motawa, I (2010) An integrated project evaluation tool 
for PFI seaport projects. In: Egbu, C. (Ed) Procs 26th Annual ARCOM Conference, 6-8 
September 2010, Leeds, UK, Association of Researchers in Construction Management, 
1317-1327.  
 1 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Read! In the Name of your Lord, Who has created (all that exists).  
He has created man from a clot (a piece of thick coagulated blood).  
Read! And your Lord is the Most Generous.  
Who imparted knowledge by means of the pen. 
He has taught man that which he knew not.”  
(Quran 96: 1-5) 
 
 2 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the background and the problem statements which motivate this 
research to be undertaken. Research questions are addressed in this chapter, together 
with research aim, objectives, scope of the study, and a brief overview of the thesis 
structure. 
1.2 Background 
Government has the responsibility of providing public services; including infrastructure 
facilities. Various types of infrastructure constitute essential public services, for 
instance: transportation, energy, telecommunications, water, waste disposal, hospital, 
school, and housing facilities. In the context of the transportation sector, and 
especifically in the seaport sector, Kakimoto and Seneviratne (2000); Bichou and Gray 
(2005); Kulkarni and Prusty (2007) have meticulously described the role of port 
infrastructure as economic catalysts, promoter of seaborne trade activity and generator 
of benefits and socio-economic wealth in developing countries.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 The top 10 countries with the highest number of seaport  
Sources: World Port Source (2008) and CIA (2004)  
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Indonesia is the largest archipelago country in the world. It has 17,508 islands which are 
mainly connected only by 100 seaports (World Port Source, 2008). Thus, it is very 
important for Indonesia to develop her seaport infrastructure since Indonesia is one of 
the countries with the lowest export and import capacities among top 10 countries with 
the highest number of seaports (see figure 1.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Intensity of world shipping routes in 2004 and Indonesia (Inset) 
Source: World Bank (2009) 
 
The number of ports in each country will foster the development process of its country 
significantly.  Figure 1 also shows the top 10 countries with the highest number of ports, 
with the majority having high GDP per capita while Indonesia has the lowest GDP per 
capita. Figure 1.2 shows the intensity of world shipping routes where Indonesia plays an 
important role in world shipping service routes. These facts justify the need for research 
into seaport infrastructure development especially for Indonesia. Seaports have 
contributed wide-ranging economic impacts and have been developed as an important 
transportation service for the world’s transportation industry. For instance, Baird (1999) 
stated that 95% of all trades in UK rely on seaports to international markets. Alderton 
(2005) recorded that the capacity growth of containerisation and bulk carriage has been 
tremendously increased and continued since the 1950s to meet the growing demand.  
 
Seaports, as the engine of the economy, are growing in line with the increasing demand 
on the shipping industries, collectively with up-surging cost of construction and 
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maintenance, uncertain demand and world trade. Consequently, the financial viability of 
seaports should be carefully secured and examined from the preliminary project stage. 
1.3 Problem statement 
When there is lack of infrastructure facilities in a country and national budgets are 
limited, private participation is considered as an alternative strategy thereof. This 
approach is known worldwide as Public-Private Partnership (PPP) which involves a 
long contractual relationship between a public sector authority and a private party. In 
2010, 12 of the 63 developing countries under International Development Association 
(IDA) reached financial or contractual closure for 24 transport, energy, and water 
projects with private investment commitments of US$7.5 billion. PPP provides the 
opportunities for the government such as: (1) provide more public service facilities; (2) 
the fact that the increasing number of PPP projects worldwide with its variants can 
enhance efficient services and value for money to some extent (Grimsey and Lewis, 
2005; and Sadka, 2007). However, PPPs have been criticised by many due to its 
inability to deliver better value for money (VfM) and excessive profits for the private 
companies at the expense of taxpayer (e.g. Newberry and Pallot, 2003; Cartlidge, 2006; 
Shaoul et al., 2006; Coulson, 2008; Shaoul et al., 2010; and Shaoul et al., 2011). 
Moreover, the complexity of project finance arrangement and the uncertainty over long 
term concession period have generated more risks not only to the government but also 
to the private parties (Dey and Ogunlana, 2004; Zhang, 2005a; Jin and Doloi, 2008; 
Fischer et al, 2010). Thus, PPP projects require adequate allocation of the risks, 
associated with the complex financial, legal, organisational and socio-political structure, 
between the public sector authority and the private parties.  
Numerous researches have been conducted to evaluate the PPP project from various 
perspectives (e.g. Grimsey and Lewis, 2005; Demirag at al. 2004; Jin and Zhang, 2011; 
and Alexander, 2011). However, few have concerned on the tendency to rely much on 
consultants in formulating and managing the policy on PPPs, which has been frequently 
practiced by public sector authorities. Shaoul  et al. (2007) addressed this problem by 
using an example from UK’s experience dealing with big four accounting firms such as 
PwC, Deloitte and Touche, KPMG, and Ernst and Young. Conflict of interests was, 
thus, revealed to exist not only within the stakeholder but also among stakeholders. For 
instance, when the firms also have an equity stake and/ or they are hired by the sponsor 
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companies on the same project, they prepare evaluative reports to favour their interest. 
Moreover, in the context of negotiating the project, the conflict of interests among the 
stakeholders predominantly has a tendency to be quasi-monopolistic pricing that 
reduces social welfare (Trailer et al., 2004). Therefore, it is important to study how the 
public sector authority independently decides which PPP strategy is the best choice (if 
proven to have better value for money) based on the type, size and condition of the 
project. 
The complexity of financial evaluation and long bidding process could make the bid 
either uncompetitive or unprofitable. Meanwhile, many government projects have 
suffered from time and cost overruns, quality issues, noneconomic allocation criteria, 
irregular cash flows from budgets, and shortage of competent people (African 
Development Bank, 2008). In this regard, an effective project evaluation tool is 
important to be developed in order to resolve these problems and to facilitate 
negotiation between the bidder or project company members and the government at the 
contract stage. Ozdogan and Birgonul (2000) developed a decision support framework 
(DSF) for helping the project company in the planning stage of a hydropower plant to 
check project viability against several predefined critical success factors. However, a 
further research needs to be undertaken to adopt and modify the previous DSF into an 
integrated project evaluation tool for a PPP seaport project. The proposed project 
evaluation tool also necessitates to be verified whether it can be practically used in 
worldwide seaports or not. Therefore, a research in developing a framework of an 
integrated project evaluation tool, which is combining the evaluation of the financial 
viability of the project and revealing the risks with possible options of financing 
strategies in a computer-based model, is important and beneficial to all of the project 
participants during the bidding period. 
Primary data from several interviews, questionnaires to seaport risk managers, port 
authorities and PPP experts were planned to be conducted in the UK and Indonesia. 
However, the majority of the primary data was gathered in India because it was not 
possible to collect sufficient data about PPP seaport in the UK and Indonesia. 
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1.4 Motivations 
In regard to the necessity of developing infrastructure facilities coupled with the 
national budget pressures, PPP as an alternative procurement strategy shall not be 
overlooked. Even so, the public sector authority must be extra cautious in selecting the 
right strategy among the variance of PPPs for the project. From the background and the 
problem statements described earlier, there are several motivating factors in addition to 
the above for undertaking this research. The factors are as follows: 
 Since all risks of the PPP projects could affect the financial viability of the 
project, the evaluation of the project from the perspective of financial 
implications is a very important subject to study. 
 Project financing arrangements for PPP projects involve many participants with 
complex transactions and involve diverse interests. In order to accommodate all 
key interests of the stakeholders, financial model is one of the most common 
tools used for evaluating a new project and facilitating negotiations among the 
lenders, the sponsor(s) and the public sector authority (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
Therefore, it is important to study how financial models are used for 
negotiations between the public sector authority and the other stakeholders 
within reasonable time.  
 Rigorous studies on how to evaluate the project financial viability and how to 
manage the risks in PPP projects have been carried out. However, there are no 
specific studies on how to use financial model not only as a tool for evaluating 
the project financial viability but also as a tool for negotiating the risk sharing 
mechanism and monitoring the PPP project over a long term concession period. 
1.5 Research questions 
Developing large infrastructure projects either by using traditional procurement method 
or PPP strategy, the projects still encounter many risks in several aspects. Since the 
existence of risk cannot be eliminated, alternatively the expected risks can be mitigated 
by managing them. The main challenge of this research was to find out the best strategy 
on how the stakeholders manage the risks by using PPP financial models. This 
challenge was addressed with the following research questions: 
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 Who are the stakeholders who are going to manage those risks? The 
identification of the stakeholders in this study is limited to the user and 
developer of the PPP financial models. 
 Since a PPP financial model is not only a tool for evaluating the project but also 
a tool for negotiating and monitoring the project over concession period, what 
are the most important stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP financial 
models? 
 As the exploration of the risks in this study was attributed to the identification 
financial risk variables. The subsequent research question was “What are the 
financial risk variables within PPP financial models?”  
 In order to ensure that the stakeholders’ expectation can be effectively 
reconciled through a PPP financial model, with reference to the Nash 
Equilibrium Theory (Gibbsons, 1992), it is important to identify the risk related 
to financial risk variables that should be managed by each stakeholder. 
Therefore, the next research question was “What are the possible risks related to 
the financial risk variables (input and output of PPP financial models)?” 
 When the term “managing the risks” means identify, evaluate, and respond to 
the risks by using PPP financial models, how are those risks managed?  
1.6 Aim and objectives 
This research aims to ascertain the rationale of the public sector authority in evaluating 
PPP projects through an integrated project evaluation tool (IPET). This tool is expected 
to assist stakeholders in utilising PPP financial models at different project stages. The 
objectives set to achieve this aim are: 
 To explore the concept of PPP and the use of PPP financial models.  
 To explore risks and their mitigation measures in PPP projects.  
 To develop an integrated project evaluation tool (IPET) fitted to PPP seaport 
project.  
 To ensure that the IPET is valid in terms of applicability, comprehensiveness, 
practical relevance, and intelligibility through the evaluation process by 
academics and expert practitioners.  
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1.7 Scope of the study 
The scope of the study is limited in order to allow the undertaken study completed 
within reasonable time and budget constraints. In the context to the partnership, there 
are many interpretations and an over use of partnership term for public-private 
partnership (PPP). Weihe (2008) identified that there are four approaches of partnership 
concept between public and private with different interpretations: 1) the urban 
regeneration approach; 2) the policy approach; 3) the infrastructure approach; and 4) the 
development approach. This research is limited to the infrastructure approach, where 
private investment is involved, and where different elements such as construction, 
operation and maintenance are integrated. In conjunction with previous descriptions, the 
study of PPP projects concentrates on the financial implications. Financial models are 
selected as the object of the study for identifying, evaluating, and managing the risks in 
PPP projects. Hence, the context of managing risks in this study is limited to the 
quantitative perspective.  
Although this research benefits from previous case studies on the identification of 
various risks in general PPP projects (e.g. Bing et al., 2005; Schaufelberger and 
Wipadapisut 2003; Wang et al., 2000; Xenidis and Angelis, 2005; Askar and Gab-
Allah, 2002; Zhang, 2005c; etc.), it specifically reviews financial indicators of PPP 
financial model which are associated with the risks especially for PPP seaport projects.  
The exploration of the risks is attributed to the identification financial risk variables 
from PPP seaport financial models. Nevertheless, in order to gain different perspective 
over seaport development project, this research is not limited only to PPP seaport 
projects. By considering this approach, the risk sharing mechanism among the 
stakeholders can be determined comprehensively in any financial negotiation. 
In this study, the definition of stakeholders is also limited to the actors (e.g. sponsor(s), 
lenders, government authority, consultant companies, insurance company, contractor, 
operator, etc.) who are using financial models as a tool for project evaluation, contract 
negotiation, appraisal report, tariff adjustment, and project performance monitoring.      
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1.8 Research design and methodology  
A research can be defined as a set of activities for the advancement of knowledge. In 
order to justify the truth to be believed as knowledge, a sound research should be 
designed in such a way through constant reasoning.  Jonker and Pennink (2010) 
suggested that the first and foremost step in setting up a research is to determine the 
research paradigm of how the researcher views ‘reality’. It was perceived that the 
problem (ontologically) belongs to nominalism reality. Meanwhile, the method 
employed to solve the problem was based on objectivist epistemology. As results, both 
positivism and interpretivism approaches were considered. This combination is called a 
pragmatic paradigm, which utilises combination of qualitative and quantitative 
techniques or triangulation technique (Jupp, 2006). A triangulation strategy has been 
adopted to meet the research objectives.  
A literature review has been undertaken to identify previous research and gaps which 
needed to be studied and filled. A pilot study was conducted in India through a series of 
semi-structured interviews for shaping and validating the preliminary findings. Then, 
from the recommendations concluded from the pilot study, a structured questionnaire 
survey of international expert opinions was carried out to identify the most important 
stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP financial model and the most important 
financial indicators. Based on the results from the survey, an integrated project 
evaluation tool (IPET) was developed to model the best PPP strategy based on 
stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP financial model at different stages, and to 
produce the information needed for decision making, such as the most important 
financial risk variables, mitigation measures and its alternatives. The applicability of the 
proposed IPET was validated by using experts’ opinion. The summary of sub-chapter 
1.1 up to 1.8 is illustrated in figure 1.3. 
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Figure 1.3 Summary of sub-chapter 1.1 up to 1.8 
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1.9 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis consists of ten chapters, which is outlined in figure 1.4 below, and the 
chapters’ overviews are structured as follows:  
- Research Paradigm: 
  Pragmatic Approach (Nominalist Ontology  
  and Objectivist Epistemology)
- Research Methodology: 
  Triangulation approach (Quantitative and 
  Qualitative Method)
Survey An
al
ys
is
Testing and 
Implementation
Literature 
review 
In
tro
d
u
ctio
n
 
Research me
tho
do
log
y 
C
o
n
clu
sio
n
 
- Aim: To explore the concept of PPP and
            the use of PPP financial models
- Sample:  3 PPP Seaports in India
- Technique: Cross case analysis 
-  Aim: To validate the findings from interview 
            and literature review
- Sample:  73 respondents from 38 countries 
- Technique: Systematic statistical analysis 
- Sample: 15 experts 
- Technique: Prototype  
                     Presentation  
                     and Online                  
                     Survey
Public-Private Partnership: Theories, Debates 
and Analyses
PPP financial model and the expectations of 
its stakeholders
Model
De
ve
lop
me
nt
-  Aim: To develop an integrated project 
            evaluation tool fitted to PPP
            seaport project
- Sample: 3 financial model spreadsheets
Case Study A
na
lys
is
- Aim: To shape the preliminary findings
- Sample: 10 PPP Stakeholders India
- Technique: Content analysis 
Interview an
aly
sis
 
 Figure 1.4 Outline of the study 
Chapter One: Introduction to the thesis 
This chapter introduces an overview to the background, the problem statements, the 
motivations, the scope of the study, the research questions, the aim and objectives, the 
research design and methodology, the research findings, and the structure of the thesis. 
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Chapter Two: Public-Private Partnership: Theories, Debates, and Analyses 
This chapter reviews the concept of Public-Private Partnership (PPP), discusses the 
rationale for PPP projects, reviews several theories underlying the partnership approach 
and addresses the debate on PPP. This chapter also deliberates on the important aspects 
and the problems in evaluating large infrastructure projects. A review of the risk 
management literature in terms of project evaluation tools and techniques used in the 
construction industry is presented as well. 
Chapter Three: PPP financial model and expectations of its stakeholders 
 
This chapter explores stakeholders who utilise financial models in PPP projects and 
their expectations from PPP financial models are then presented. This chapter also 
highlights and discusses the most important ones. 
Chapter Four: Research Design and Methodology 
This chapter presents the approach to discover a suitable research design and 
methodology (including research method, data collection, and data analysis) in 
answering the research questions and problems addressed in the literature review. This 
chapter also provides further emphasis and description of the data needed and the 
methodology selected for this research. 
Chapter Five: Case Study Analysis and Discussion 
Chapter five reports the findings of cross case analysis of three PPP seaport projects in 
India. The primary aim of this chapter is to study the implementation of PPP seaport 
projects. In order to achieve the aim of this chapter, this chapter identifies typical 
procedures used for evaluating PPP seaport projects in India.  
Chapter Six: Interview Analysis – Exploring Stakeholders’ Expectations 
This chapter provides information about the stakeholders’ expectations and then 
presents several analyses that are divided into two major parts: 1) PPP Stakeholders; 2) 
Stakeholders’ Expectations. The first part analyses the actor and the influence of PPP 
stakeholders who are identified from literature and interviews. Then, the next part 
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analyses the importance of the pre-determined 44 expectations, which are identified 
through literature and verified through semi-structured interview with key participants 
of PPP projects in India.  
Chapter Seven: Questionnaire Survey Analysis 
This chapter follows up the findings from literature review, cross case analysis, and 
interview analysis. As part of the triangulation process, a structured questionnaire 
survey was also considered to be the second validation process of the preliminary 
findings from literature review and interview. The questionnaire aims to answer the 
second and third research questions: “what are the most important stakeholders’ 
expectations in utilising PPP financial models?” And “what are the financial risk 
variables within PPP financial models?” (see 1.6). To answer these questions, this 
chapter presents a systematic statistical analysis of the collected data. 
Chapter Eight: Discussion and Framework Construction 
This chapter discusses the findings obtained from chapters six and seven. An integrated 
project evaluation tool (IPET) is developed based on the findings from literature review, 
interview, and questionnaire survey. This chapter also highlights the concept and 
development of the model framework.  
Chapter Nine: Verification and Validation 
This chapter will verify and validate the proposed IPET into framework that can be 
generalised to the construction industry. This chapter begins with discussion of the 
deployed methods to verify and validate the research findings. Then, the verification 
and validation of IPET by using a hypothetical data of PPP financial model and online 
survey are presented in this chapter. 
Chapter Ten: Conclusions and Recommendations 
The last chapter synthesises the research findings and the influence of the IPET in 
evaluating and negotiating projects effectively and efficiently. It concludes the research 
and the achievements of the research objectives. Limitation of this research and 
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recommendations for future research are presented in this chapter. This chapter also 
highlighted the contributions to the body of knowledge at the end of this chapter. 
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Chapter 2: Public-Private Partnership: Theories, Debates, and 
Analyses 
"Make things easy for the people and do not put hurdles in their way, and give them 
glad tiding, and don't let them have aversion (i.e. to make people to hate good deeds) 
and you both should work in cooperation and mutual understanding" 
Muhammad (570 – 632) 
2.1 Introduction 
Public-private partnership (PPP) has been widely adopted by governments to finance 
the acquisition of infrastructure assets and the operation of their facilities (Xu et al., 
2012; Auriol and Picard, 2011). PPP is an alternative procurement strategy that can 
enhance efficient services supplied before solely by government authorities (Sadka, 
2007). Nevertheless, the implementation of efficient partnership concept between 
government authorities and private entities in PPP projects was not always necessarily 
delivered in practice (Diamond, 2006; Friend, 2006; and Jacobson and Choi, 2008). 
Several unsuccessful PPP projects
1
 in many countries, especially in developing 
countries, have been recorded by many (e.g. Handly, 1997; Hayllar and Wettenhall, 
2010; Bernardino et al., 2010). These failures are a consequence of the complex 
arrangements and incomplete contracting in PPP projects, which have led to increased 
risk exposure for both public and private partners. Since the core of PPP is based on a 
partnership concept between public and private entities, this chapter reviews the 
rationalisation for PPP projects including several theories underlying the partnership 
concept, addresses the debate on PPP, and deliberates on important aspects in 
evaluating PPP projects.  
2.2 Exploring the partnership concept 
Various interpretations of partnership concept between public and private can be 
categorised into four approaches such as (1) the urban regeneration approach; (2) the 
policy approach; (3) the infrastructure approach; and (4) the development approach 
                                                 
1
 E.g. Pakistan’s Hub Power Project, Thailand’s Mass Transit System Project, India’s 
Telecommunications and Power Project, China’s Power Project, Thailand’s Power Project, Indonesia’s 
Power Project, Malaysia’s Power project, England’s National Health Service (NHS), Sydney Cross-City 
Tunnel PPP, Britain’s Channel Tunnel Rail Link, etc. 
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(Weihe, 2008). As described in the earlier chapter, this research is limited to the 
infrastructure approach, where private finance is involved, and where different elements 
such as construction, operation and maintenance are integrated. Figure 2.1 shows the 
conceptual framework of PPP that will be discussed in this chapter. Private involvement 
in developing public infrastructures implies contractual relationship between the 
government and the special purpose vehicle (SPV) company.  
This contractual relationship is regarded as risks sharing mechanism and roles exchange 
between government authorities and private parties in delivering public services over 
long-term concession period. Furthermore, the partnership concept of PPP differs from 
traditional procurement in construction projects; PPP as partnership method denotes an 
equal power relationship between public and private parties, where majority of the 
project risks is transferred to the private parties. Traditional procurement entails a top-
down relationship, where the private companies (e.g. contractors, operators, suppliers, 
etc.) work for and earn from the government with limited liability. 
The term PPP is often mainly overlooked as a method of procurement. Cartlidge (2006) 
argued that PPP can also be seen as a method to raise finance off balance sheet, a 
strategy to achieve greater efficiency, and a politically motivated tool to drive a social 
change. However, PPP projects do not always demonstrate an efficient partnership 
concept into practice (Diamond, 2006; Friend, 2006; and Jacobson and Choi, 2008). 
The failure of the implementation of PPP projects is either contributed by the 
government authorities or private parties. Government authorities of the host country 
have jurisdiction over project initiation, construction process, and concession period, 
play a significant role in the success of PPP projects. 
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Figure 2.1 Conceptual Framework of Public-Private Partnership addressed in chapter 2 
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In the history of PPP development, the policy initiatives undertaken by the government 
authorities do not always favour the private parties (Bing et al., 2005; Schaufelberger 
and Wipadapisut, 2003; and Wang et al,. 2000). On the other hand, the influence from 
corporate political power towards government roles in delivering public services is 
prioritizing maximum profit for their business initiatives (Heald and Georgiou, 2000; 
Crane and Matten, 2003; Johnston, 2010; Beh, 2010; Siemiatycki, 2010; and Wilks, 
2013). Commercialisation of public services is obvious evidence that ‘partnership’ is 
overly turned into a new business opportunity. Thus, the effectiveness of PPP as an 
alternative procurement strategy to deliver better value for money is open to question. In 
order to evaluate the effectiveness of the partnership concept, the next section briefly 
discusses how PPP approaches are used worldwide. 
2.3 PPP approaches 
Though the involvement of private investment in public infrastructure can be traced 
back to the 18
th
 century in European countries, there is no definite information about the 
exact period of time when the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) term was initially 
launched. Kumaraswamy and Morris (2002) stated that the earliest private investment 
was concession contracts to supply drinking water to Paris in 18
th
 century. Nevertheless, 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) as a type of PPP was introduced into the United 
Kingdom in 1992. Furthermore, numerous acronyms (such as BOT, BOOT, BTO, BRT, 
BLT, BOOM, DBOM, and DBFO) also have been used to describe PPP as its 
variations. Although PPP has various types of partnerships, each partnership concept is 
not always implemented effectively in every country. 
In order to illustrate the effectiveness of the partnership concept, it is worth giving 
examples of PPP projects across the world. There are two approaches to PPP projects 
worldwide (Aziz, 2007): (1) Service-based approach; and (2) Finance-based approach. 
The first approach is private finance initiative (PFI). Design, Build, Finance and 
Operate (DBFO) is a variation of partnership strategy mostly used in the UK under PFI. 
PFI allows private parties to undertake the same activities like other PPP projects. 
However, the difference lies in the concept that the private company receives payment 
from the government based on the annual unitary charges for both the initial capital 
spent and the on-going maintenance and operation costs. This partnership approach has 
been criticised by many because of its ability to deliver better value for money and 
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excessive profits for the private companies at the expense of taxpayers (e.g. Newberry 
and Pallot, 2003; Cartlidge, 2006; Shaoul et al., 2006; Coulson, 2008; Shaoul et al., 
2010; and Shoul et al, 2011). 
The second approach is Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Project Delivery and its 
variance. The BOT and its variance allow private companies to build and manage the 
project with private funds and collect revenue during the operation period to the users 
directly through tolls and/or other charges as a reward over their capital investment. 
Since the government is not obliged to pay the private companies for developing 
infrastructure projects, this partnership approach is mostly used in developing countries 
such as India, China, Thailand, Korea, etc. However, Algarni et al. (2007), investigated 
why some government authorities in United States avoided using BOT in their large 
projects. The main reasons were the availability of proven alternatives and enough 
funds, the existence of political barriers, and resistance to change both on the part of 
government agencies and private sponsors.  
Based on the two major approaches of PPP projects worldwide, the selection of each 
approach should be customised according to the situation and condition of the host 
country. Therefore, it is essential to review partnership theories before selecting the best 
PPP approach. This will be discussed in the next section. 
2.4 Theories in Public-Private Partnerships 
This section will discuss several theories underlying the partnership concept. 
2.4.1 Agency Theory and Compounded Agency Theory 
Ross (1973) introduced a theory in the agency relationship, in which an efficient 
alignment of principal and agent’s interests will be ensured by selecting appropriate 
governance mechanisms between principal and agents. The main objective is to ensure 
that agents serve the interests of the principal, e.g. maximising firm Net Present Value, 
so that agency costs are minimised through an efficient contract mechanism. The 
essence of agency theory assumes that there is goal conflict between principal and 
agent-called an agency problem. Trailer et al. (2004) proposed a compounded agency 
view to add a new dimension to the agency theory applied to PPPs. They discovered 
that the agency problems exist in PPPs because the private companies as an agent 
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received residual revenues, which triggered conflict of interest with the public interest 
of maximising consumer surplus
2
.  
2.4.2 Stakeholder Theory 
In conjunction with agency problems, there is another theory that reviews the conflict of 
interests in different theoretical perspectives. In 1984, Freeman introduced stakeholder 
theory which addresses morals and value in managing an organization (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995).  Donaldson and Preston (1995) argued that “the ultimate managerial 
implication of the stakeholder theory is that managers should acknowledge the validity 
of diverse stakeholder interests and should attempt to respond to them within a mutually 
supportive framework, because that is a moral requirement for the legitimacy of the 
management function”. Despite of the fact that agency and stakeholder views are being 
seen as opposing ideological frameworks, Shankman (1999) argues that stakeholder 
theory is a logical conclusion of agency theory when: 1) recognition of stakeholders is 
included; 2) a moral minimum to be upheld; 3) consist of contradictory assumptions 
about human nature which give rise to the equally valid assumptions of trust, honesty 
and loyalty to be embedded in the agency relationship.  While the implications for 
practice of agency theory in PPPs are to align interests between private parties and 
government agencies (i.e. taking actions to maximise the project’s NPV, and using 
efficient contracting mechanism to minimise agency costs), the practice’s implication of 
stakeholder theory is to balance the agency problems (i.e. adjusting its development 
strategies and management activities under the guidance of the national policies so that 
the interests or claims of all relevant stakeholders will be in conformity with rules and 
regulations). 
2.4.3 Transaction Cost Economics Theory and Positive Theory Perspective of PPPs 
The other theory related to the agency problems which can be viewed based on the 
transaction cost economics (TCE) is positive theory perspective of PPPs. Here, it is 
worth explaining the definition of TCE before discussing a positive theory perspective 
of PPPs. TCE is a theory that not only concerns the economisation of transaction costs, 
but is also related to the governance of ongoing contractual relations (Williamson, 
2007). Transaction costs are the total costs of doing a transaction or making an 
                                                 
2
 Consumer surplus is an economic measure of consumer satisfaction, which is the difference between 
what consumers are willing to spend more for a good or service than the current market price 
(Investopedia, 2012). 
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economic exchange, which consider energy and effort to evaluate and finalise the 
transaction. There are three kinds of transaction costs (Dahlman, 1979): search and 
information costs, bargaining costs, and policing and enforcement costs. These then, 
represent the initial estimate to practicable concept of transaction costs. 
Vining and Boardman (2008) developed a positive theory perspective on PPP 
transaction costs recognizing that partners have conflicting goals. Accordingly, the PPP 
project is likely to incur high contract bargaining costs, opportunistic behaviour by one 
or both sides, failure to achieve goals, and partnership dissolution. Further, Jin (2010) 
identified the other possible resultant transaction costs stem from the divergence of 
goals such as additional costs for: (1)  government authority of a higher contingency (or 
premium) included in the bid price from contractors; (2) government authority of more 
resources for monitoring the risk management work; (3) government authority and/or 
sponsor company of recovering lower quality work (i.e. the materialized or deteriorated 
risk) for a given price; (4) sponsor company of increasing safeguards (both ex ante and 
ex post) are against any opportunistic exploitation of one's own risk management 
service-specific assets by other parties; (5) sponsor company of the resources is 
dedicated to lodging claims related to the misallocated risk; (6) for both parties of 
dealing with the disputes or litigation related to the misallocated risk. Therefore, it is 
imperative to ‘organise transactions so as to economise on bounded rationality3 while 
simultaneously safeguarding them against the hazards of opportunism’ (Williamson, 
1985). Based on a positive theory perspective on PPPs, Vining and Boardman (2008) 
proposed eight rules for government: 1) Establish a jurisdictional PPP constitution; 2) 
separate the analysis, Evaluation, Contracting/ Administrating and oversight agencies; 
3) ensure that the bidding process is reasonably competitive;  4) be wary of projects that 
exhibit high asset-specificity, are complex or involve high uncertainty, and where in-
house contract management effectiveness is low; 5) include standardised, low-cost 
arbitration procedures in all PPP contracts; 6) avoid stand-alone private sector shells 
with limited equity from the real private sector principals; 7) prohibit the private-sector 
contractor from selling the contract too early; and 8) have a direct conduit to debt 
holders. 
                                                 
3
 Bounded rationality means limited cognitive capabilities due to the limited information and the finite 
amount of time in the decision-making that make people seek a satisfactory solution rather than the 
optimal one (Selten, 2001). 
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2.4.4 Incomplete Contract Theory 
Furthermore, there is another theory called theory of incomplete contracts, which is a 
specific part of transaction cost economics. Incomplete contract theory was pioneered 
by Hart and Moore (1988). Tirole (1999) summarises three main reasons of generating 
incomplete contracts. The first reason is not all future event or circumstance can be 
foreseen when the contract is signed. Secondly, even if both parties could anticipate all 
contingencies that should be included in the contract, they have to exchange the benefit 
of having a more comprehensive contract with extra time and cost of writing new 
clauses. Finally, the contract cannot be enforceable unless the contingent occurrences 
could be verified by a third party (e.g. an arbitration commission or a Regulatory 
Agency in the context of infrastructure "privatization" contracts). Furthermore, Solino 
and De Santos (2010) also addressed that the contractual arrangements of PPPs are 
inevitably incomplete in many relevant respects due to a long-term partnership (e.g. 25 
or more years). Therefore, according to the incomplete contract theory, PPP should be 
preferred if the quality of service can be well specified in the initial contract while the 
quality of construction is difficult to specify (Hart, 2003). 
These theories may help the stakeholders to understand the nature of PPP projects and 
to manage them properly. Thus, the evaluation of PPP projects can be undertaken 
efficiently. Since PPP projects generally are implemented in large infrastructure 
projects, the next section discusses the important aspects and the problems in evaluating 
large infrastructure project. 
2.5 Evaluating the financial viability of large infrastructure projects 
Emerging from the theoretical review of PPP projects and its criticism in the preceding 
sections is that apparently managing a large infrastructure project is not an easy task. 
Proper project evaluation by each stakeholder is not enough to guarantee that the project 
can be successfully executed. Large infrastructure projects involve many stakeholders 
with their own interests and motivations towards the project. Nevertheless, in order to 
succeed and reconcile their objectives, a comprehensive project evaluation has to be 
well undertaken before embarking on detailed project planning. The rest of this chapter 
is summarised in figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2 Conceptual Framework of Evaluating Large Infrastructure Projects 
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Before a large infrastructure project is managed, an extensive evaluation should be 
carried out during the bidding or preliminary stage of the project life-cycle. Since the 
implementation of a large infrastructure project needs robust financial support
4
, a sound 
financial evaluation is likely to be the most important part among other project 
evaluations. In this respect, Angelides and Xenidis (2009) summarized the critical 
issues with regard to financing successful PPP projects as follows: (1) lack of strong 
domestic capital markets; (2) limited raising of institutional funds; (3) non-dependable 
project revenue streams; and (4) improper assessment of the value of government 
guarantees. 
The evaluation of the financial viability of a large infrastructure project is usually a very 
long and complex process. Generally, project finance assessment requires banks or 
other financial institutions to conduct full risk analysis, including technical/ engineering 
assessment of the project. Thus, the entire financing process is prone to take an 
extensive period before reaching financial closure. On the other hand, pre-transaction or 
contingent exposure during the preliminary project stage can be dangerous to the bidder 
or the company which proposes a new project to the government authority.  
According to the African Development Bank (2008), this exposure results in change in 
prices or rates before the bidder knows the exact nature of the commitment (size and 
timing). Long bidding process and uncertain economic conditions could lead to the bid 
either being uncompetitive or unprofitable because the bidder sets a price for a new 
contract and makes certain assumptions in terms of exchange and interest rates and 
commodity prices. 
Meanwhile, the bidder may or may not be successful with the bid which makes the 
bidding process time consuming and very costly. Considering the aforementioned risks, 
financial evaluation should be made to minimize the effect of these risks by 
incorporating risk analysis in the management process (RAMP, 2005). A sound 
financial evaluation can only be achieved if all important financial aspects have been 
analysed adequately. Meanwhile, another issue emerges when not all stakeholders 
                                                 
4The supports’ availability from both private sectors (e.g. Loan, Equity, Bank guarantees, etc.) and 
government authority (e.g. Guarantee, Subsidy, Subsidised subordinated debt, etc.) to the project will 
affect the financial viability of the project (Demirag, et al, 2010; Wibowo, 2006). 
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identify all important financial aspects properly due to the knowledge gap between 
bidder and government authority. 
2.6 Problems in evaluating a large infrastructure project 
The knowledge gap between bidder and government authority, sometimes, leads to 
misconception in the result of financial evaluation (Chiang and Cheng, 2009). This 
takes place because government authorities usually employ consultants to help in 
making decisions without having sufficient expertise to use the results of financial 
evaluation effectively. Additionally, bidders are concerned regarding the confidentiality 
of the financial evaluation process. Thus, the results of financial evaluations are mostly 
lack transparency in explaining the output of the analysis. This situation creates various 
interpretations. Wrong interpretation of given information leads to a bad decision. In 
order to minimize misjudgement, sufficient explanation should be given along with 
output data. Whitelaw-Jones (2010) introduced FAST modelling standard for financial 
models in order to keep models flexible, accurate, structured, and transparent. Project 
evaluation tools should be able to reveal the hidden risks and assist project participants 
in choosing appropriate risk mitigation strategies (Ozdogan and Birgonul 2000). 
Although a project evaluation tool can be used to help in making decision faster and 
effectively, Alberdi et al. (2009) suggested that a decision should not merely rely on the 
result of an evaluation tool due to the possibility of tool errors. In the context of general 
financial model, Panko (2010) stated that 88% of 113 financial model spread sheet 
audited since 1995 contains errors due to formula inconsistency. The possibility of 
“garbage in garbage out” error can be minimized by giving more attention to the input 
data and the analysis process. 
After exploring the general problems in evaluating a large infrastructure project, it is 
worth mentioning that a financial model utilizes several tools and techniques to evaluate 
a new project and facilitate negotiations among stakeholders. Therefore, the next sub-
chapter reviews current researches in the context of project evaluation tools and 
techniques employed in the construction industry. 
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2.7 Project evaluation tools and techniques 
Researchers have proposed numerous project evaluation tools and techniques to help 
companies or government agencies in making decisions. The main purpose of 
evaluating a project is to figure out the best strategy in managing the project based on 
the project’s objectives and possibility of any threat or opportunity (RAMP, 2005). 
Project evaluation tools used for risk management can be classified into three evaluation 
stages: (1) risk identification and classification; (2) risk analysis; and (3) risk attitude 
and risk response (or risk allocation). A summary of various risk analysis tools and 
techniques for PPP projects have been made by Dey and Ogunlana (2004) as listed in 
the table 2.1.  
Table 2.1 Risk Analysis tools and techniques. 
Application and previous study 
Method Keynotes Who and when Topic 
Influence diagram Risk identification Ashley and Bonner 
(1987) 
Identification of political risks in 
international project 
Brain storming and 
Delphi Technique 
Yingsutthipun 
(1998)  
Identification of risks in 
transportation project in Thailand 
Monte Carlo 
simulation 
(MCS) 
Distribution form, 
Variables’ correlation 
Songer et al. (1997) Debt cover ratio (project cashflow) 
in a tollway project 
Chau (1995) Distribution form for cost estimate 
Wall (1997) Distribution form and correlation 
between variables in building 
costs 
Dey and Ogunlana 
(2001) 
Project time risk analysis through 
Monte Carlo simulation 
Program 
evaluation & 
review 
technique 
(PERT) 
Distribution form, 
Variables’ correlation, 
Network scheduling 
Hatush and 
Skitmore (1997) 
Contractor’s performance estimate 
for contractual purpose 
Sensitivity 
analysis 
Deterministic, 
Variables’ correlation 
Yeo (1990)  
Yeo (1991) 
Probabilistic element in sensitivity 
analysis for cost estimate 
Woodward (1992) Survey on use sensitivity analysis 
in BOT project in UK 
Multi-criteria 
decision making 
(MCDM) 
Multi-objective, 
Subjectivity 
Moselhi and Deb 
(1993) 
Project alternative selection under 
risk 
Dozzi et al. (1996) Bid mark-up decision making 
Analytic 
hierarchy 
process (AHP) 
Systematic approach to 
incorporate 
subjectivity, 
Consistency judgement 
Dey et al. (1994) Risk analysis for contingency 
allocation 
Mustafa and Al-
Bahar (1991) 
Risk analysis for international 
construction project 
Zhi (1995) Risk analysis for overseas 
construction project 
Nadeem (2003) Risk analysis for BOT project in 
Pakistan 
Fuzzy set Vagueness of Kangari and Riggs Risk assessment by linguistic 
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approach (FSA) subjective judgement (1989) analysis 
Diekmann (1992) Combination of influence diagram 
with fuzzy set approach 
Lorterapong and 
Moselhi (1996) 
Network scheduling by fuzzy set 
approach 
Paek et al. (1993) Risk pricing in construction project 
through fuzzy set approach 
Neural network 
approach 
(NNA) 
Implicit relationship of 
variables 
Chua et al. (1997) Development of budget 
performance model 
Boussabaine and 
Kaka (1998) 
Cost flow prediction in 
construction project  
Decision tree Expected value Haimes et al. (1990) Multi-objective decision tree 
Fault tree analysis Accident analysis, 
Safety management 
Tulsiani et al. 
(1990) 
Risk evaluator 
Risk checklist From experiences Perry and Hayes 
(1985) 
Risk and its management in 
construction project 
Risk mapping Two dimensionality of 
risk 
Williams (1996) Two dimensionality of project risk 
Cause/effect 
diagram 
Risk identification Dey (1997) Symbiosis of organizational 
reengineering and project risk 
management for effective 
implementation of projects 
Delphi technique Subjectivity Dey (1997) Same as above 
Combined AHP 
and decision 
tree 
Probability, severity 
and expected 
monitory value 
Dey (2001) Decision support system for risk 
management 
Source: Adapted from Dey and Ogunlana (2004) 
Zhang (2004) also identified competitive tender evaluation methods that are commonly 
used in PFI projects such as Net present value method, Simple scoring method, Multi-
attribute analysis, and Kepner-Tregoe decision analysis technique (see table 2.2). The 
identification of tools and techniques is important. However, knowing how and when to 
use them properly is considered to be more essential. 
Research works in financial implications of PPP projects can be categorized into three 
major groupings: (1) Financial model analysis group, (2) Financial risk analysis group, 
and (3) Financial mitigation analysis group. These groups are detailed in table 3.3. The 
financial modelling group [e.g. Chang and Chen (2001) and Zhang (2005b)] is only 
concerned with financial feasibility of projects and addresses some risks in its financial 
parameters but they do not consider risk mitigation issues. The financial risk analysis 
group [e.g. Chee and Yeo (1995); Javid and Seneviratne (2000); Kakimoto and 
Seneviratne (2000); Seneviratne and Ranasinghe (1997) and Han et al.(2004)] 
emphasized on assessing the types and levels of financial risks from financial planning 
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through to the operation stage without introducing any mitigation measures. In the 
financial mitigation analysis group [e.g. Bing et al. (2005); Schaufelberger and 
Wipadapisut (2003); and Wang et al. (2000a)] recommended financial strategies for 
specific types and levels of risk but they do not evaluate the financial viability of a 
project.  
Table 2.2 Methods for evaluating competitive tenders  
No. Methods Remarks 
1 Simple scoring method Determining the evaluation criteria and possible maximum 
scores with each assumed criterion to have equal 
importance. Each bidder is rated according to these criteria 
and the bidder with the highest total score is awarded the 
project. 
2 Net present value (NPV) method Selecting the bidder who offers the lowest NPV for the 
concession period (i.e. the lowest cost to the public). This 
method only considers the financial and economic aspects 
of each tender. 
3 Multi-attribute analysis Deciding the criteria in same way as for the simple scoring 
method, but each of these factors is divided into sub-
categories with relative importance weights assigned. After 
multiplying the weights and the assigned scores of each 
bidder, the bidder with the highest maximum score is 
selected. 
4 Kepner-Tregoe decision analysis 
technique 
Evaluating proposals based on criteria identified as ‘musts’ 
and ‘wants’. The ‘musts’ are the mandatory needs for the 
project and are expressed in the form of ‘yes/no’ questions. 
Bidders satisfying the musts’ are then evaluated based on 
the ‘wants’ using a simple scoring or multi-attribute 
scoring method. 
5 Two envelope method Bidders are expected to submit two different envelopes; the 
first providing technical information with the second 
providing cost information. Initially the technical offers are 
evaluated and then, for those approved, the financial 
envelope is opened. If the cost is within the acceptable 
range as defined by the client, that bidder is chosen. 
6 NPV and scoring method Two different evaluations are undertaken. NPV is used for 
financial evaluation and the scoring method is then used 
for evaluation of any unquantifiable information. 
7 Binary and NPV method Bidders are first evaluated with ‘musts’ criteria and those 
passing this step are then evaluated according to their 
NPVs. 
Source: Adapted from Zhang  (2004) 
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Table 2.3 Summary of Previous Works on Financial Analysis and Risk Management 
Group Author(s) and Key Areas Remarks 
Financial 
Model 
Analysis 
Moreau (1986) studied financial planning model through case study of 
publicly-owned water and sewer utilities with several possibilities of 
objective functions.   
The author discussed the efficiency of a financial planning model with a 
detail description in terms of a set of cash flow equations, parameters for 
projecting of demands, parameters for operating costs, matrix of 
coefficients in linear programming model. But, no risk analysis is 
presented. 
Crosslin (1991) developed and demonstrated a structured methodology, 
including quantitative simulation models for financial planning, evaluation, 
and cost justification through a case study for marina and golf course PPP 
development projects 
The author focused on Pro forma financial statements, life-cycle cost 
models, and simulation and sensitivity analysis of management control 
and exogenous parameters. However, no risk analysis is presented.  
Chang and Chen (2001) introduced the financial model used by the Bureau 
of Taiwan High Speed Rail for its BOT projects. They conducted a 
scenario analysis to establish the relationships between changes of 
parameters and the results of evaluation. 
The authors evaluated the financial planning with self-financing ability 
analysis and scenario analysis. However, actual risk analysis is not 
presented.  
Zhang (2005b) developed a methodology for capital structure optimization 
and financial viability analysis that reflects the characteristics of project 
financing, incorporates simulation and financial engineering techniques, 
and aims for win–win results for both public and private sectors. 
The author introduced a framework and a solution algorithm that optimizes 
the capital structure and evaluates the financial viability of a project when 
the project is under construction risk, bankruptcy risk, and various 
economic risks. No risk mitigation is presented. 
 Yun, et. al. (2009) introduced an optimised capital structure model for 
creditors and operators to achieve an agreement on a balanced capital 
structure that synchronise profitability and repayment capacity.   
The authors developed a model with Monte Carlo simulation and multi-
objective generic algorithm for drawing an optimal level of equity ratio. 
This model is limited to financial feasibility and risk analysis. 
Financial Risk    
  Analysis 
Chee and Yeo (1995) employed a Monte Carlo simulation for risk analysis 
of a BOT power project. In analysing risks, three techniques are employed: 
probability analysis, sensitivity analysis and variance analysis. 
The authors used probability analysis, sensitivity analysis and the variance 
analysis for risk analysis. However, no risk mitigation analysis is 
presented. 
 31 
Javid and Seneviratne (2000) focused on sources of investment risk in 
airport parking infrastructure development and discussed the application of 
Monte Carlo simulation to estimate and understand the impacts of cash 
flow uncertainties on project feasibility. 
The authors presented a framework for defining benefits and costs in the 
presence of uncertainty. Typical sources of risk are identified at the outset, 
and a financial model is constructed to evaluate NPV using Monte Carlo 
simulation. No risk mitigation analysis is presented. 
Kakimoto and Seneviratne (2000) demonstrated the application of Monte 
Carlo simulation for scrutinizing sources of uncertainty and their impact on 
investment risk using the Port of Colombo development project.  
The authors demonstrated that Monte Carlo simulation permits financial risk 
of port infrastructure development to be readily assessed in relation to two 
measures: 1. the traditional probability measure of IRR being less than 
MARR, 2. a new measure introduced here termed risk elasticity. But, no 
risk mitigation analysis is presented. 
Seneviratne and Ranasinghe (1997) employed Monte Carlo simulation for 
financial viability and investment analysis of Colombo-Katunayake 
Expressway (CKE) under different financing options. 
The authors tested the sensitivity of the project's financial returns and risk to 
variables governing cash flows under the four options using Monte Carlo 
simulation. No risk mitigation analysis is presented. 
Seung, et al (2004) focused on a financial portfolio risk management for 
international projects to integrate the risk hierarchy of both individual 
projects and at the corporate level, which applies a MCDM method to 
maximize the total value of firms.  
The authors evaluated financial risk factors such as currency exchange, 
interest, and inflation rates. No risk mitigation analysis is presented. 
Financial Risk 
Mitigation 
Bing, et al (2005) identified three levels preferred risk allocations in PPP/PFI 
projects in the UK such as macro level risks; meso level risks and micro 
level risks.  
The authors provided guideline for public sector clients in preparing a 
practical risk allocation framework and matrix for use in tendering 
documents, thus saving time in negotiation and contract transaction. No 
financial risk analysis is presented. 
Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut (2003) developed a decision model for 
BOT project financing which addresses three major challenges facing a 
prospective sponsor such as: estimation of project costs, projection of 
revenues during the concession period, and selection of an appropriate 
financing strategy. 
The authors identified and examined the important considerations and 
financing strategies. A decision model was developed that can be used by 
BOT project sponsors in selecting appropriate financing strategies. No 
financial risk analysis is presented. 
Wang, et al (2000) identified list of unique or critical risks associated with 
BOT projects and mitigating measures for these risks on power projects in 
China. 
The authors discussed the criticality of foreign exchange and revenue risks 
which include exchange rate and convertibility risk, financial closing risk, 
dispatch constraint risk and tariff adjustment risk. Although measures for 
mitigating each of these risks were discussed, no financial risk analysis 
was presented. 
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Regarding seaport projects in particular, it is important to understand how a port 
investment project is assessed in respect of port-investment decisions and processes. 
The evaluation should consider the increasing flexibility and speed in investment 
decisions with comprehensive analyses in response to the rapid transformations of the 
market. The position of a seaport in the competitive market is also an important issue to 
be evaluated by using techniques such as: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) technique 
(Cullinane and Wang, 2007). DEA
5
 model is a technique for evaluating the efficiency of 
a seaport among the other seaports in the world. The results of DEA model provide 
important information for port managers or policy makers to decide on the scale of 
production and estimate the efficiency of a container port at the beginning of any 
analysis. 
Among all researches into project evaluation tools, only few researchers’ combined 
financial feasibility, risk analysis and mitigation measures (e.g. Özdoganm and Birgönül, 
2000; and Fischer et al., 2010). Özdoganm and Birgonul (2000) appeared to develop a 
decision support framework (DSF) as a comprehensive project evaluation tool to help 
the project company in the planning stage of a hydropower plant. DSF model evaluates 
project viability against several predefined critical success factors within risk 
management perspective. DSF also defines the risk sharing scenarios under which a 
project becomes viable, by incorporating risks into cash flow analysis and risk 
mitigation strategies (see figure 2.3). However, not all stakeholders have the same 
attitude on risks in PPP projects. Fischer et al. (2010) developed an integrated risk 
management system (IRMS), which serves all stakeholders needs to conduct effective 
and successful risk management in PPP projects. In order to fully understand how risks 
are managed, the next section provides a brief rationalisation for risk management in 
PPP projects. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a technique to measure the holistic efficiency of a firm by 
comparing the DMU (Decision Making Unit) with other homogenous units that transform the same group 
of measurable positive inputs into the same types of measurable positive outputs (Cullinane and Wang, 
2007). 
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Figure 2.3 Decision support framework (DSF) in the planning stage of a BOT 
project  
Source: Ozdogan and Birgonul (2000) 
 
2.8 Risk management in PPP projects 
Dey and Ogunlana (2004) recognized that PPP projects are prone to risk. PPP projects 
require effective management of risks associated with the complex financial, legal, 
organizational and socio-political structure of the model. They also require adequate 
allocation of risks between government authority and members of Concessionaire 
Are scenarios reliable or not? 
(Critical Success Factor) 
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Company who have different perceptions and objectives (Ozdogan and Birgonul, 2000).  
Fischer and Alfen (2009) also asserted that the enforcement of contract terms related to 
control mechanisms (e.g. planning implementation, requests for approval, construction 
works, start-up and delivery of facility management services by the private contractors) 
has to be managed as well. Therefore, risk allocation requires certain abilities and 
knowledge by the project stakeholders. 
Table 2.4 Summary of risk classification in PPP projects 
No. Risk classification in BOT Projects Perspective 
Author(s)  and 
Year 
1 Construction risks, operation and maintenance risks, 
financial risks, force majeure risks, legal and contractual 
risks. 
Tollway project Abednego and 
Ogunlana (2006) 
2 Engineering, finance, political and social. Risk 
characteristics 
Lam and Chow 
(1999) 
3 Political risks, construction completion risks, operating 
risks, finance risks, and legal risks. 
General category Dey and Ogunlana 
(2004) 
4 (a) Macro level risks: political and government policy, 
macroeconomic, legal, social, natural; (b) Meso level 
risks: project selection, project finance, residual risk 
design, construction, operation; (c) Micro level risks: 
relationship, and third party. 
Risk meta-level 
 
 
  
Bing et al (2005) 
5 Political risks, construction risks, operating risks, market 
and revenue risks. 
Risk factors Askar and Gab-
Allah (2002) 
6 Political, financial, revenue and market, promoting, 
procurement, developmental, construction, and 
operating. 
Main risks areas Zayed and Chang 
(2002) 
7 Political risks, construction risks, operating risks, market 
and revenue risks, financial risks, and legal risks. 
General category Wang et al. 
(2000a) 
8 Legal risks, construction risks, and operation risks. General category Ozdoganm and 
Birgonul (2000) 
9 Construction cost overrun, operation risks, market risks, 
currency risks, and regulatory/approval risks. 
General category Zhang (2005c) 
10 Total investment risks: project risk, competitive risk, 
market risk. 
Financial category Seneviratne and 
Ranasinghe 
(1997) 
11 Investment planning and preparation, asset creation, 
operation, and close-down. 
Investment stage RAMP (2005) 
12 All sectors, power, transport: road, tunnel and bridge, rail, 
airport and port, process plant, telecommunication. 
Infrastructure 
sector 
Wang et al. 
(2000b) 
13 State-rooted financial risks, concessionaire-rooted 
financial risks, and market-rooted financial risks. 
Financial risks Xenidis and 
Angelis (2005) 
 
Before allocating risks, there are several stages in risk management that should be 
undertaken. Dey and Ogunlana (2004) divided the risk management process into four 
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stages: (1) Risk identification; (2) Risk classification; (3) Risk analysis (4) Risk attitude 
and risk response (or risk allocation). Numerous researches have been conducted to 
identify risks in PPP projects. Therefore, a summary of categorization with various 
perspectives of predefined risks in PPP projects is shown on table 2.4. However, the 
identification of risks should be followed by appropriate selection of mitigation 
measures. In responding the risks, appropriate mitigation measures or financing 
strategies should be evaluated to anticipate the upcoming risks. 
A perception of risks in a PPP scheme is different from traditional method of 
contracting. In a PPP project, almost all the technical and financial risks are borne by 
the private promoter. Thus, the risk attitude in PPP projects is influenced by the 
perception of main participants. Dey and Ogunlana (2004) described the risk attitude in 
PPP projects from the perspectives of government, contractor or Concession Company, 
and bankers (as summarized in table 2.5). 
Table 2.5 Risk attitude in PPP projects  
PFI Participants Risk Attitude Issue for concern 
Government Expecting the private sector to take as many risks as 
possible and a ‘cargo cult’ mentality (i.e. PPP 
projects as a cost-less solution which happens 
without major government effort). 
Additional cost of risk 
transfer 
Contractor or 
Concession 
company 
Achieving higher levels or return, a quick pay-back or 
achieving other spin-off benefits (development gains 
or business for other companies within their 
organisation). 
Government willingness 
to take a positive 
stance on the subject. 
Bankers Maintaining a proactive role to the contractors or 
concession company not to be as the prime movers. 
Availability of risk 
capital 
Source: Adapted from Dey and Ogunlana, (2004) 
 
Besides considering the nature of different risk attitudes, the risk management process 
should be carefully understood to facilitate good decision making.  Fischer et al. (2006) 
confirmed that risk management process throughout its life-cycle could contribute a 
win–win-situation with cost savings and better services for the public sector and more 
earnings for the private partner. Zou et al. (2008) developed a life-cycle risk 
management framework for PPP infrastructure projects (illustrated in figure 2.4) 
comprising of three stages: (1) Preliminary risk allocation stage at feasibility study; (2) 
Detail risk allocation stage at bidding and negotiation; (3) Risk monitoring and 
reallocation stage at construction, operation and transfer. Though this framework helps 
stakeholders in managing the risks in PPP projects, the efficiency of evaluating the PPP 
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projects is still open to question. Hence, financial models are the only evaluation tool 
that can be used to facilitate risk sharing negotiations. In theory, evaluation based on 
win-win solution should be emphasised in order to achieve an effective negotiation.  
Practically, the evaluations of projects tend to be quasi-monopolistic pricing
6
 that 
reduce social welfare (Trailer et al., 2004).  
 
Figure 2.4 A life-cycle risk management framework for PPP infrastructure projects 
Source: Zou et al., (2008) 
                                                 
6
 Quasi-monopoly is a sort of monopoly which has similar competition nature of service/pricing offered to 
the customers (D'Aspremont and Gabszewicz, 1985). 
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2.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has answered half of the first objective of this research by exploring 
Public-Private Partnership from the perspective of infrastructure approach. The roles 
exchange and risk sharing mechanism between public and private over long-term 
concession period have been debated and criticised by some researchers. The public 
expects that PPP is preferred due to efficient services promised by the private party. 
Meanwhile, a private company is mostly motivated by profit maximisation. Therefore, 
the public authority has to choose the best approach based on their policy and economic 
conditions. This suggestion raises a research question, which is also the knowledge gap 
that needs to be addressed in this study. Since the effectiveness of PPP as an alternative 
procurement strategy to deliver better value for money is still open to question, what 
then is the best PPP approach and how is the effectiveness of the partnership concept 
evaluated?   
To determine the best approach, two main PPP approaches and some theories related to 
PPPs have been discussed. The PPP approaches can be viewed from the revenue 
mechanism. The first approach is the service-based approach, and the second is the 
finance-based approach. While revenue mechanism of the service-based approach is 
derived from annual unitary charge, the revenue mechanism of the finance-based 
approach is generated from tariff operation and ancillary revenues. Finding the best 
approach for a particular PPP project requires an extensive evaluation process. Since the 
revenue of PPP seaport project is generated from tariff ancillary revenues, the data used 
to develop IPET is based on the finance-based approach. This chapter has contributed 
several considerations related to large project evaluation (e.g. problems in evaluating 
large project, project evaluation tools and techniques, and risk management in PPP).  
Agency theory addresses goal conflict between the agent and the principal i.e., the 
agency problem. The agency problem exists in PPPs because the private company as an 
agent receives residual revenues, which trigger conflict of interest with the public 
interest of maximising consumer surplus. Other theories (e.g. Stakeholder Theory, 
Incomplete Contract Theory, Transaction Cost Economics Theory and Positive Theory 
Perspective of PPPs) have been reviewed in order to mitigate the problems related to the 
Agency Theory. Awareness of the aforementioned considerations and theories related to 
PPP has helped this study in developing IPET. In order to find an answer for second 
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part of the first objective, the next chapter focuses on the introduction of PPP financial 
models and the identification of stakeholders’ expectation in utilising PPP financial 
models. 
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CHAPTER THREE: PPP FINANCIAL MODEL AND THE 
EXPECTATIONS OF ITS STAKEHOLDERS 
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Chapter 3: PPP Financial Model and the Expectations of its 
Stakeholders 
“Seek first to understand, then to be understood.” 
Stephen R. Covey (1932 – 2012) 
3.1 Introduction 
Project financing arrangements for PPP projects involve many participants with 
complex transactions and involve diverse interests. Therefore, negotiations between the 
public sector authority and the other stakeholders should be carefully undertaken within 
reasonable time. Since financial model is one of the most common tools used for 
evaluating a new project and facilitating negotiations among lenders, sponsor(s) and a 
government agency, this chapter begins with an introduction of financial model and 
continues to explore best practice of financial model. The stakeholders who utilise 
financial models in PPP projects and their expectations from PPP financial models are 
then presented. This chapter will highlight and discuss the most important ones. 
3.2 Financial Model 
The financial decision making model (often called as ‘financial model’) is one of the 
most common tools used for evaluating a new project and facilitating negotiations 
among lenders, sponsor(s) and a government authority. A financial model is a tool 
employed by lenders to conduct negotiations with the sponsor(s) and to prepare project 
appraisal report. Furthermore, a financial model can be used for preliminary due 
diligence, negotiations, and project performance monitoring. 
In PPP projects, sponsor(s) generally organise a special purpose vehicle (SPV) or a 
concessionaire company to deal with lenders, investors, insurance providers, contractor 
and other parties especially government authority. Generally, a successful PPP project 
has mutual agreement and balance of risk sharing between government authority and 
sponsor(s) prior to financial close. Therefore, financial models are not only used as tools 
to win bids but also to assist in the risk sharing negotiation between government 
authority and sponsor(s). 
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A consultant firm can be appointed as a financial advisor by both or either, the 
government authority and/or the SPV Company for developing and utilising financial 
models. In developing a financial model, a financial advisor depends on other parties to 
specify all relevant data needed for the model (see figure 3.1). 
Since the core aim of financial modelling is to forecast the performance of a project 
under uncertainty, economic and financial assumptions are made to predict the project 
performance. The government authority might provide policy initiatives data such as 
fiscal incentives scheme, retained responsibilities for the delivery of core services, 
governmental loan guarantee, royalty, tariff cap, etc. (Chang and Chen, 2001; Khan and 
Parra, 2003; Zhang, 2005; Kulkarni and Prusty, 2007; and Government of India, 2009). 
The SPV Company supplies initial cost of the project and its management cost. The 
Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) Contractor gives construction cost 
and also Life Cycle Cost (LCC) on a monthly basis. Operation and maintenance costs 
data is provided by the operator company or facilities management contractor. The 
lenders will provide financial information related to the project financing. These inputs 
are adjusted in coordination and negotiation with the parties who provide the data. The 
financial advisor assembles all project costs estimation, and feeds them into model 
together with adjustments to the forecasted traffic volume and variable rates to 
correspond with the SPV target (Kaka and Al-sharif, 2009). Figure 3.1 also shows how 
the stakeholders can influence the development of PFI financial modelling at different 
stages. 
 
Figure 3.1 Current use of PFI financial modelling 
Source: Modified from Kaka and Al-Sharif (2009) 
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Kulkarni and Prusty (2007) suggested that sophisticated financial model and sensitivity 
analysis, which incorporate all external post-bid factors as inputs and support mutual 
revenue-sharing, need to be developed. In addition, a successful bidder's strategy must 
be able to convince lenders for the project financial viability and the ability to generate 
cash flow to service the debt. According to the World Bank and PPIAF (2007), all 
scenarios of financial modelling must also be commensurate with the risk factors 
involved in port sector projects such as: construction risks, hand-over risks, operating 
risks, procurement risks, financial risks, and social risks (Kulkarni and Prusty, 2007). 
Thus, it is expected that financial modelling can help the government authority to 
measure the financial viability of projects by identifying the best bidder's strategy and 
facilitating risk sharing negotiation. 
 
However, the elements and assumptions of a seaport financial model depend on the 
seaport objectives. Brooks and Cullinane (2007) summarised that there are three groups 
of seaports objectives: (1) the first group is solely non-economic objectives, including 
wider economic benefits (e.g. local economic development, cluster development, etc.); 
(2) the second group that has strictly economic objectives (e.g. profit maximisation 
and/or maximisation of return on investment); (3) and the third group has a mixture of 
both economic and non-economic objectives. Since PPP projects involve private parties 
in project finance, the elements and assumptions of the financial model are focused on 
the third group of objectives.  
 
In conjunction with economic objectives, most developing countries need to promote 
their economic growth through infrastructure development
7
. While for the non-
economic one, the authority should comfort the private parties in securing their interests 
related to the project. Therefore, a PPP financial model is needed to reconcile both 
objectives.  
 
3.3 Developing the best practice of PPP financial models 
The complexity of project financing transactions and the diversity of stakeholders’ 
interests are the major reasons that make financial models hard to understand and error 
prone. Hence, it is essential to learn the best practice of PPP financial models and audit 
                                                 
7
Lack of infrastructure facilities has been a major hurdle to boost the economic growth. 
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the model for error possibilities. In the context of general financial model, Panko (2008) 
stated that 88% of 113 financial model spreadsheet audited since 1995 contains errors 
due to formula inconsistency.  
There are two methods of developing a financial model such as: bottom-up and top-
down approaches. Siersted (2010) argued that input identification of financial model can 
help to find out where the variables can change the calculation process. The input 
identification can be done by mapping those variables and putting them into specific 
areas, so that most people can figure them out easily. This identification is a basic for 
formula consistency. Furthermore, transparency of the calculation formula can help the 
auditor and lender or other parties to keep the calculation flow and links on the right 
track. The majority of modellers adopts this strategy as bottom-up approach, whereby 
the input identification of the raw data along with basic calculations is a priority. 
Meanwhile, Swan (2008) suggested that a good financial model is started by designing 
the output first, and then identifying the output rather than input. This approach is called 
top-down approach. The purpose or objective of the financial model first is initially 
identified, followed by a consideration of the usage of the financial model. Without a 
clear plan or set of objectives, it is often quite complicated for the stakeholders to 
understand the model. In the absence of the model builder, it can also be roughly 
impossible to have full confidence that the model is really doing what it is supposed to 
do, and because the users or sponsors have not been involved in the development 
process, the results themselves may be unsatisfactory. In order to mitigate the 
aforementioned problems, the next part of this sub-chapter will identify the 
stakeholders’ interests in utilising PPP financial models. 
3.4 Stakeholders and their expectations in utilising PPP financial models 
Different stakeholders from diverse socio-economic and cultural backgrounds have their 
own motivation to accomplish project objectives (Toor and Ogunlana, 2008). In case of 
PPP projects, the uncertainties with long-term agreement and the complexity of the 
project financing arrangement generate more risks to all stakeholders (Zhang, 2005b). 
Therefore, the performance of a PPP project should be cautiously forecasted. It means 
that a PPP financial model should be well developed in representing the forecasted 
performance without creating additional problems as described in chapter 2.7. 
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In order to learn how to develop a comprehensive financial model, it is important to 
understand the use of financial model at different stages, and to know who the parties 
(stakeholders) involved in using financial model are. There are five stages when the 
model is used with different purposes; they are pre-proposal stage, contract negotiation 
stage, finance-raising stage, construction stage, and operation stage. Table 3.1 shows the 
use of financial model with the stakeholders in PPP Projects. 
Table 3.1 Stakeholders who are utilising financial models in PPP projects 
Stakeholder Description Stage 
Authority Evaluate the estimated cost of two procurement 
either PPP or public sector comparator (PSC). 
Pre-proposal stage 
Negotiate the risk sharing mechanism with the 
bidders and evaluate the competitive bidders’ 
proposal. 
Bidding and contract 
negotiation stage 
Evaluate a new tariff Operation stage 
Sponsor Facilitate the submission of proposal Pre-proposal stage 
Negotiate the risk sharing mechanism and capital 
structure of the project with other potential 
sponsor(s), lenders and the government authorities. 
Bidding and contract 
negotiation stage 
Monitor and track the performance of the project. Construction stage and 
operation stage. 
Negotiate a new tariff with the government authority Operation stage 
Lender Modify the initial model into lender base case 
financial model in order to test the project’s 
financial viability. 
Finance-raising stage 
Maintain the financial model and monitor the project 
costs 
Construction stage. 
Assess the impact of any annual operations budget 
submitted by the project vehicle to lenders 
Operation stage 
Consultant Develop and audit the financial models. Proposal stage, contract 
negotiation stage, finance-
raising stage, construction 
and operation stage. 
Assist the sponsor, the lender and the government 
authority in evaluating the project. 
Source: Adapted from Khan and Parra (2003); Hucknall (2010); and Kurniawan (2010). 
Their expectations are mostly concerned about the ability of the project to generate 
enough cash flow over the concession period in order to attract or to comfort the 
investors towards their capital investment (Kurniawan, 2010). Meanwhile, the PPP 
scheme projects, which are believed to deliver better value for money, have been 
criticised by many as the highest influence level from either political patronage or 
corporate political power (Heald and Georgiou, 2000; Crane dan Matten, 2003; Beh, 
2010; and Siemiatycki, 2010). Therefore, the reconciliation of their expectations is 
anticipated to control the achievement of value for money in PPP projects by utilizing 
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PPP financial models. The next section discusses how PPP financial models can be used 
to facilitate stakeholders for evaluating and negotiating projects efficiently. 
3.5 PPP financial models as tool for evaluation and negotiation 
Since the main purpose of negotiation in a PPP project is trying to achieve consensus on 
the combination of tariff scheme, concession period, and rate of return of a PPP project 
(Ngee  et al., 1997; and Liou and Huang, 2008), a financial model is utilised as a tool 
for project evaluation and negotiation. Therefore, it is important to assure that the 
utilisation of PPP financial models engages an effective evaluation and efficient 
negotiation.  
In conjunction with efficient negotiations, Schoop et al. (2010) argued that the quality 
of negotiation process should be measured by both its economic outcome (e.g. in terms 
of Pareto efficiency
8
 and Nash equilibrium
9
) and communication quality.  It means that 
an efficient negotiation is not only indicated by the agreed combination of financial 
scenarios but also shown by mutual understanding of the PPP concept. Consequently, in 
addition to conducting an effective evaluation, it is an imperative that the expectations 
of other stakeholders in utilising PPP financial models are to be understood in order to 
achieve an efficient negotiation. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that negotiated 
procedure in PPPs is proven to be more expensive and lengthy (Solino and De Santos, 
2010). To anticipate high bidding cost and long bidding process, the exploration of 
stakeholders’ expectations covers both the financial model and the process of using 
financial model itself. 
Many researches mostly concentrate on identification of general expectations of the 
stakeholders in PPP project and how stakeholders’ interests in PPP projects are 
managed. For instances, El-Gohary et al. (2006) presented the major concerns expressed 
by stakeholders in PPP projects; Fischer et al.(2010) developed a process model for risk 
management for each stakeholder; Jin and Doloi (2008) studied how public and private 
partners in PPP projects allocate risks between them. However, there is no specific 
research on identification of stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP financial 
                                                 
8
 Pareto efficiency (or Pareto optimal) is an allocation concept that makes at least one individual 
(stakeholder) better off without making any other individual worse (Wibowo, 2005a). 
9
 Nash Equilibrium is a solution concept of a (negotiation) game involving two or more players (or 
stakeholders), in which its success taking into account the decisions of the others (Gibbsons, 1992). 
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models. Next section explores the stakeholders’ expectations predominantly at pre-
proposal stage. 
3.6 Stakeholders’ expectations in using PPP financial models at pre-proposal 
stage 
At the pre-bid or pre-proposal stage, the sponsor initially develops a financial model to 
facilitate the submission of a convincing proposal or unsolicited proposal for securing 
the rights to build and operate a project. The sponsor also uses financial model as a tool 
to negotiate with other potential sponsor(s), investors and the government authority. The 
negotiation process will be faster if all expectations can be met proportionally.  
Furthermore, Khan and Parra (2003) identified that the purpose of financial model at 
pre-bid stage may incorporate a few relatively “soft” information elements, which are 
from the assumptions made by the sponsors without due diligence verification. The soft 
information elements are as follows:  
(i) Determination of an acceptable hurdle rate for the project, including a 
reasonable margin to compensate for the “what could go wrong” scenario, 
(ii)  “Rule-of-thumb” criteria for estimating construction and operating cost, perhaps 
amended to fit site and host country conditions,  
(iii) A capital structure consistent with the type of facility being built and fully 
reflective of the operating risks are to be assumed,  
(iv) Assumptions regarding the identity of the lenders, loan amounts, tenors, interest 
rate, grace period, upfront fees and payback structure. 
The expectations of major participants, which are focusing on utilising financial models 
at pre-proposal stage, are as follows: 
3.6.1 Avoiding winning unprofitable contract 
Kulkarni and Prusty (2007) evaluate the optimal revenue sharing figure to ensure proper 
assessment of the bidder’s strategy for an Indian case. In a Build-Operate-Transfer 
(BOT) project, the bidder with the highest revenue share is likely to win the project. 
Therefore, before identifying the optimal revenue share figure, bidders shall employ the 
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financial model to estimate the project bankability based on various scenarios. By doing 
so, the chance of winning unprofitable contract is minimised. Furthermore, the sponsor 
always looks at the profitability ratios such as: ROA, IRR, ROE, etc. 
3.6.2 Competitive Pricing 
Financial model is not only used to reduce risk but also to evaluate the competitiveness 
of the bidding and to price a competitive tariff. Tiong (1996) observed that both the 
governments and the sponsors agree that the most important factor of winning a PPP 
contract is strength of consortium, which is indicated by preservative and financial 
strength for protracted negotiations. Furthermore, a competitive tariff depends on 
demand of the project. When the project revenue is driven by the demand, an imbalance 
of the project capacity within a region will influence the level of competition during the 
operation period. For example, an excess of project capacity will cause the sponsor 
company to aggressively compete for market share (e.g. Ports, Tolls). Sometimes this 
can lead to destructive pricing (World Bank and PPIAF, 2007). 
Based on this expectation, a financial model at this stage should address tariff, royalty 
to Government / revenue share, market share / demand (traffic), revenue forecast 
(including ancillary revenue), project time lines, project cost, and economic 
assumptions related to global and domestic inflation or foreign exchange parity.   
3.6.3 Reflect the project and the financing terms 
Although a financial model eventually needs to be audited by the model auditor, the 
financial model audition process will be much efficient if the financial model provides 
relevant extracts from project and financing documentation, which are precisely 
described in the project agreements with an offering memorandum. This will help the 
stakeholders understand how to extract the relevant information from the financial 
model (Hucknall, 2010). There is also a need for assuring that the financial model 
reflects the project and financing terms such as "usual clauses relating to increased 
costs, gross up, market disturbance, illegality, reimbursement of stamp duties and legal 
and other out of pocket expenses (including as referred to in the Lead Arranger's 
mandate letter), breakage costs, etc." (Khan and Parra, 2003). Hence, at the pre-
proposal stage, a financial model should provide initial assumptions related to funding 
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and financing terms such as: financing options, loan amounts, tenors, interest rate, grace 
period, upfront fees, payback structure, etc. 
3.6.4 Time and cost of bidding  
The complexity of PPPs raises the cost and duration of bidding process (Solino and De 
Santos, 2010). Therefore, it is essential to minimise these impediments through 
effective evaluation and negotiation. In order to speed up the negotiation process, PPP 
financial models should be used effectively to evaluate project and communicate their 
expectations. Thus, at the pre-proposal stage, a financial model should comprise the 
details of project time lines and transaction costs such as: duration of bidding process 
(or project evaluation) up to financial close, sponsor’s staff costs and travel, advisory 
fees, and other fees related to the process of preparing bid or unsolicited proposal. 
3.6.5 Transparency of the award process  
Financial transparency should be applied to all legislative proposals on the financing of 
infrastructure project and the award process (World Bank and PPIAF, 2007). Therefore, 
the evaluation by using financial models must be transparent in order to determine 
whether the PPP is the best value for money to the project or not. In addition, Coulson 
(2008) discussed on how the financial model at pre-proposal stage evaluates VFM in six 
key areas: ‘the treatment of tax’; ‘ transaction costs’; ‘ lifecycle and residual costs ’; ‘ 
cost of capital’; ‘returns to holders of equity’; and issues relating to the discount rate. 
3.6.6 Attractive IRR  
Since the rate of return of a PPP project is one of the main considerations in the 
negotiation process (Ngee et al., 1997; Liou and Huang, 2008; and Yuan  et al., 2010), a 
PPP financial model is utilised to run sensitivity analysis based on the given project’s 
assumptions. If a PPP project demonstrates an attractive IRR (i.e. IRR is higher than 
corporate hurdle rate), the sponsor prefers to submit a proposal, or to bid, for the project 
(Khan and Parra, 2003). 
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3.6.7 Competitive tender evaluation 
According to HM Treasury (2003), “The proper evaluation of bids for PFI projects is 
essential in securing value for money”. Therefore, it is imperative that the authority use 
a financial model to evaluate bids in a competitive tender. Lamb and Merna (2004) 
suggest that sufficient competition should be encouraged to attract robust financing. 
Furthermore, Tiong (1996) verifies that a strong consortium will be able to provide a 
sound and competitive proposal, which is determined by five cost drivers: 1) low 
construction costs; 2) acceptable tolls/tariff levels; 3) reasonably high equity to debt 
ratio; and 4) short concession period; 5) realistically high royalty or revenue share. 
3.6.8  Generate enough cash flow 
Since PPP projects are long-term contractual relationships funded by private finance, 
the project viability is determined by the ability of the project to generate enough cash 
flow for covering both the initial capital spent and the on-going maintenance and 
operation costs. Zhang (2005b) researched that economic viability is the most important 
factor for assessing the concessionaire’s financial capability, which is indicated by long-
term demand for the products/ services to be offered by the project. It means that 
concession period, tariff, demand (traffic), and any other indicators influenced by the 
long-term demand should be considered carefully.  
3.6.9 Bankable 
Sponsor(s) must convince lenders that the project has a stable revenue stream and 
generates enough cash flow within fair and bankable contract agreements. The project 
must also generate enough cash flow so as to give lenders a margin of safety with 
respect to its debt service obligations (Khan and Parra, 2003). Therefore, financial 
model should contain debt cover ratios such as DSCR, LLCR, repayment cover ratio, 
drawdown cover ratio, etc. Lamb and Merna (2004) identified that the measurement 
ratios of bankability used in financial models are debt-service coverage ratio (DSCR) 
and loan-life coverage ratio (LLCR). Many planned PPP projects fail because their 
terms are negotiated without taking into account whether the project is bankable or not 
(World Bank and PPIAF, 2007). However, from the perspective of public expectation, a 
financial model should not be used merely to evaluate project bankability but also, most 
importantly, is to find the greatest overall benefits (Andersen and Enterprise LSE, 
2000). 
 50 
3.6.10 Unsolicited proposal 
Sponsor(s) prefer unsolicited proposals with important innovations (e.g. a new type of 
project, or new solution to known problem, or new ways of defining performance 
standards) to solicited proposals. This is because they also provide more scope to 
participate in defining technical and commercial outlines of projects (Khan and Parra, 
2003). Meanwhile, government authorities are forced by the public to use bidding to 
demonstrate fairness (Kurniawan, 2010). Thus, the proposed financial model should be 
able to prove that the idea contained in an unsolicited proposal is the best value for 
money. 
3.6.11 Value for money  
Financial model is used to compare the best value for money (VFM) between Public 
Sector Comparator (PSC) and PPP (Lamb and Merna, 2004). According to HM 
Treasury (2004), “VFM is the optimum combination of whole life cost and quality (or 
fitness for purpose) to meet the user’s requirement, and does not always mean choosing 
the lowest cost bid. It should not be chosen to secure a particular balance sheet 
treatment”. However, value for money is a relative concept. Shaoul (2005) expressed 
concern about the reliance on the complex financial modelling required for the value for 
money appraisal. The accuracy of the initial financial comparison is questionable. Either 
an estimate is showing the PSC cheaper than the PFI deal or PSC becoming slightly 
higher than the PFI price, the decision based on value for money might well have 
jeopardized the case (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). 
Value for money should not be the only consideration for selecting PPP option. In 
addition, Scott and Robinson (2009) argued that the VFM case for PFI in the UK cannot 
be truly tested before operational stage because payment to PFI contractors (or called 
unitary charge) usually referred to as capital expenditure (CAPEX) and operating 
expenditure (OPEX). Yet, the effectiveness of the payment mechanism cannot be 
assessed in terms of risk allocation and as an incentive to improve service delivery.  
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3.6.12 Project’s ranking under capital rationing 
Since a PPP project requires a huge capital investment, the sponsor with limited budget 
uses a financial model to determine project ranking under capital rationing or restricted 
amount for new project (Baker and Powel, 2005). 
3.7 Stakeholders’ expectations in using PPP financial models at contract 
negotiation stage 
Once the proposal is submitted to the government authority, the sponsor or the bidder 
quotes a percentage of their revenue to be shared with the government authority. 
Generally, the proposal with the highest percentage will be selected and continued for 
contract negotiation process (Kulkarni and Prusty, 2007). Nonetheless, the government 
authority also expects a reduced level of risk for the government and flexibility of 
national budget expenditure. 
During this stage, the inputs of financial model will be amended due to negotiation and 
agreement among the involved stakeholders. The amendment of the inputs is a process 
of reconciling the conflict interests among the stakeholders. There are some reasons 
why inputs’ alterations need to be done, such as: the lenders deem the project’s capital 
structure too aggressive, the lenders determine the project’s borrowing power, etc. 
However, the model’s revenues are made consistent according to the advance market 
study. 
By the end of contract negotiation stage, all project agreements are fully negotiated and 
initialled, and the project offering memorandum is completed and ready for distribution. 
The sponsor(s) should have developed fairly sophisticated and accurate models that 
portray the economic and financial feasibility of a project under a variety of scenarios 
and assumptions. For the economic feasibility, the best perspective is viewed from host 
government that seek ‘value for money’ in relation to government expenditure. The key 
issues that need to be concerned by three major parties in the economic feasibility of the 
project are described in table 3.2.  
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Table 3.2 Key issues in the project economic feasibility (Adapted from Khan and Parra, 2003) 
Major 
participants 
Key issues Remarks 
Public sector Financing costs Balance between ROE & shorter debt tenor may result in a 
higher tariff for the users. 
Development costs Legal fees, development fees and costs of conducting due 
diligence. 
Insurance Costly insurance policies to mitigate construction, operation 
and certain specialised risks. 
Taxes  In many countries, the public sector does not pay taxes, or 
pays at a lower rate than the private sector does. 
Construction costs The public sector rarely uses turnkey construction contracts in 
some cases and specifications. 
Operating & 
Management (O&M) 
The private sector relies on very strict O&M practices. 
Sponsor(s) 
and 
Lenders 
Tariff or tolls of the 
infrastructure facility 
Tariffs should be reviewed as reasonable over the longer term 
by the consumer serviced by the facility, given the 
foreseeable effects of future deregulation, sector 
reorganisation, competition, new technology and other 
similar factors. 
While for the financial feasibility, the developers will focus on the level of projected 
distributions, their pace and timing, and the acceptability of the project’s resulting 
internal rate of return (IRR). However, the lenders are concerned more on: (a) Projected 
revenues, operating expenses, CADS and distributions are consistent with project 
agreements; (b) Realistic estimates of future project revenues are sufficient to cover 
operating expenses and repay project debt with an acceptable margin of safety. 
A brief description of stakeholders’ expectations, which focuses on utilising financial 
models at contract negotiation stage are as follows: 
3.7.1 Knowing how much senior debt that the project is able to carry 
Before entering the finance-raising stage of project development, the lenders have to 
determine the project’s borrowing power; which is based on the results of negotiation 
and project agreements along with the financial model.  Once, the project’s borrowing 
power is deemed to be sufficient, a mandate letter will be issued by an agent acting on 
behalf of several lenders to acknowledge their interest in supporting the project with a 
specified level of debt (Khan and Parra, 2003).  
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3.7.2 Credit Committee requirement for approving the sponsor’s credit application 
When the winning bidder is selected, the sponsor submits a credit application to the 
bank’s credit committee for approval. This credit application includes a financial model 
with the base case and the results from the sensitivity analysis (Asenova and Beck, 
2003). Further, the financial model is used to investigate different scenarios. These 
scenarios include anything from an increase in operational costs and rising inflation
10
, to 
construction delays and pessimistic life-cycle scenarios. In connection with the 
utilisation of financial model as a tool for evaluating the project, Arndt (2000) revealed 
that internal credit committees tend to focus on key risk issues and worst case events 
through spreadsheet-based scenario analyses rather than detailed numerical risk 
modelling. 
3.7.3 Reaching an agreement on forecast for CADS 
Sponsor(s) utilise the financial model for negotiating project agreements. During the 
contract negotiation stage, sponsor(s) makes various preliminary approaches to several 
lenders for testing their interest to participate in the project and seeking information 
related to market terms and conditions for debt (Khan and Parra, 2003). Since the 
lenders’ main concern lies upon the project’s borrowing power, it is essential to comfort 
lenders in the initial negotiation with sponsor(s). Moreover, investors commonly favour 
a company with a high Cash Available for Debt Service (CADS) ratio
11
 as well. 
Therefore, the sponsor’s expectation in utilising PPP financial model is to assist in 
reaching an agreement with the lender on the forecast for CADS. 
3.7.4 Transparency during the negotiation process 
Transparency and accountability are an integral part of PPP processes especially in the 
UK (Demirag and Khadaroo, 2011). The government authorities should maintain 
transparency during and after PPP procurement. At the contract negotiation stage, the 
sponsor and the government authority negotiate the project agreements; which normally 
                                                 
10
 It generally assumes the price inflation in the financial model by 10%, 20%, or 30%. When the worst 
case indicates that the payment of senior debt could be affected by the inflation, the sponsor(s) will be 
required to increase its equity contribution (Asenova and Beck, 2003). 
11“The higher the ratio, the more of a cash cushion the company has to fund its upcoming debt service 
payments. In other words, the higher a company's CADS ratio, the less likely the company will be to 
default on its debts, making owning its shares much safer for shareholders” (Investopedia, 2011). 
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include a concession and/or implementation agreement (IA), site purchase or lease 
agreement, EPC contract, operation and maintenance (O&M) agreement and possibly an 
input supply contract (Khan and Parra, 2003). These documents will affect the input 
assumptions of PPP financial models. In the context of utilising PPP financial model 
transparently, HM Treasury (2004) stipulated that “The conclusions of the assessment, 
and the proposed project flow for the spending period should be summarised in 
existing, publicly available, documents such as departmental investment strategies”. 
However, not all information is available due to either commercial confidentiality or 
prejudicing the public sector’s negotiating position. Further, the closed nature of the PFI 
decision making process opposes the principle of transparency and accountability. 
Therefore, the ability of the PPP financial model to reflect the provisions made and 
reached at in the project agreements, which also contains reasonable accurate 
assumptions with regards to cost financing, is open to question. 
3.7.5 Risk allocation through all project agreements 
PPP projects entail complex mechanisms under great uncertainties over long term 
concession period. For instance, uncertain changes in project’s cash flow or revenue, 
unexpected inflation, fluctuation of currency exchange, or maybe unexpected activities 
that could threaten the project’s viability.  Although project agreements are prepared to 
anticipate these uncertainties, the proposed strategy in mitigating them does not always 
qualify the requirement of “fit for purpose”. Thus a PPP financial model can be used to 
evaluate the risk allocation strategies proposed in the project agreements.  
The example of PPP financial model application in evaluating the risk allocation 
strategies is evaluating the financial impact of Minimum Revenue Guarantee (MRG) 
and Revenue Cap (RCP) agreements. Jun (2010) stated that the contingency level of 
MRG and RCP agreements in PPP projects can be best specified when the financial 
impact of these agreements are identified through proper financial evaluation; which 
can be based on the IRR (Internal Rate of Return), revenue, or traffic volume. This level 
would be fixed through the negotiation process between the government authority and 
the sponsor.  
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3.7.6 An attractive IRR 
In the contract negotiation stage, both the public and the private parties expect a high 
internal rate of return (IRR) of the project over concession period. However, the 
attractiveness of IRR of the project should be properly examined due to the uncertainty 
factors. High IRR is not necessarily important, as long as IRR is still higher than interest 
rate of debt, then the project is still considered financially viable. At this stage, a PPP 
financial model should be able to assist the stakeholder in determining the attractiveness 
of IRR without undermining the impact of higher IRR. For an example, when the 
negotiated terms of the contract are dominated by excessive expectations, the proposed 
tariff rate will be above the normal rate (Zou et al., 2008). Thus, the competitiveness of 
PPP project is questionable. 
3.7.7 Securing the project cash flows from the risks 
Since PPP projects are mainly structured on a nonrecourse basis where the debt 
investors or the lenders rely solely on the project cash flows and its assets for debt 
repayment (Wibowo, 2006), they utilise PPP financial model at the contract negotiation 
stage to exercise their right in the event of default (Kong et al., 2008). 
3.7.8 Assurance that the lenders are only lending a reasonable amount (Debt 
Sizing). 
As the host authority, they need to secure the equity level that could satisfy the interests 
of equity holders, lenders, and the general public. However, if the authority failed to 
comfort the sponsor(s) and the lenders, the investment opportunity could be withdrawn 
by both or either parties. Debt financing is a common strategy used in PPP projects 
(Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut, 2003). Hence, the lenders need to assure that they are 
only lending a reasonable amount that the project can carry (Hucknall, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the company’s success depends on investment decisions instead of the 
structure of the project capital (i.e. with equity only, or with equity and debt). 
3.7.9 Knowing whether the project needs a subordinated lender or not 
Besides determining how much senior debt that the project is able to carry, lenders also 
want to know whether the project needs a subordinated lender or not (Khan and Parra, 
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2003). Once the lenders are able to determine the maximum debt that can be provided 
by senior lenders based on PPP financial modelling effort, the sponsor will be informed 
about the required level of equity and the requirement of a subordinated lender. At this 
point, the sponsor will negotiate the level of equity required by the lenders. The 
discussion between the sponsor and the lenders will be related to revenues, expenses, 
CADS, upfront fees, interest rates, price of an interest rate swap and discount rate used, 
and the LLCR selected to determine the project's borrowing power. The sponsor, 
however, may argue successfully that if the project is able to secure the interest of a 
subordinated lender, which is recruited by the sponsor, they should contribute less 
equity accordingly. 
3.7.10 High equity level to minimise the debt repayment risk 
In contrary to sponsors, lenders require high equity level in order to minimise the debt 
repayment risk. Another important reason why lenders require a high equity level is the 
need of strong commitment of the sponsor to ensure the financial viability of the project 
(Zhang, 2005b). Due to its risky nature from the lender’s viewpoint, government 
regulation also stipulates that the level of equity ratio should not be less than 20% (Yun 
et al., 2009). Furthermore, government authority in Turkey favours high equity because 
more equity means less total project cost (Bakatjan et al., 2003). Therefore, a PPP 
financial model plays an important role to assist in negotiating the best equity level for 
the project at contract negotiation stage. Nevertheless, the requirement of high equity 
ratio can be lowered if the credit rating of the host country is upgraded. 
3.7.11 Fiscal incentive or tax benefits from the government authority 
Since PPP is an alternative procurement used by government authority in cases of a 
shortage of public funds, fiscal incentives or guarantees are often given to attract private 
participations (Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). The government authority utilises PPP 
financial model to exercise the fiscal incentives. Kulkarni and Prusty (2007) stated that 
the government authority in India offers various fiscal incentives to private investors 
such as a ten-year tax holiday on port development, operation, and maintenance. Khan 
and Parra (2003) also addressed a range of commercial and fiscal incentives offered by 
government under concession agreement such as:  
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(a) An exclusive right to service a particular area 
(b) Tax holidays 
(c) Political palatability of the tariff structure 
(d) Reduction in host country taxes, duties and levies 
However, the financial impact of the fiscal incentives, or elimination, has to be 
considered in the contract negotiation so that tax or duty benefits extend to the 
contractor, operator and other main participants. Otherwise, such benefits of the fiscal 
incentives will not be equally enjoyed by all stakeholders. 
3.7.12 Anticipating project cost overrun 
There is a risk of both construction and operation cost overrun stemming from 
underestimating the project costs in the bid proposal (World Bank and Public-Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility, 2007). The common range of cost overrun is from 5% 
to even 300% of estimated costs (Tiong, 1990). Obviously, lenders need to be secured 
from this kind of risk by addressing mitigation measures such as fixed price turnkey 
contract, liquidated damages provision, performance and completion guarantees in EPC 
contract, stand-by loan arrangements, insurance provision, etc (Özdoganm and Birgönül, 
2000). The risk allocation to right party should be clear as well, whether government or 
contractor or operator or SPV company. Therefore, at the contract negotiation stage, 
PPP financial model is employed not only to quantify the impact of cost overrun, but 
also to trace the source of cost overruns. Consequently, the risk sharing negotiation, 
which is based on the financial impacts, can be effectively achieved.  
3.7.13 High risk premiums for a low equity level 
Meersman et al. (2010) argued that a successful PPP for a government is indicated by a 
greater cost efficiency in providing infrastructure, not so much at owning and managing 
the assets directly. In a PPP scheme, the sponsor(s) are allowed to “own” and manage 
the project over long term concession period within value for money concept. Andersen 
and Enterprise LSE (2000) meticulously described six determinants of value for money 
for evaluating a PPP project, such as: (1) risk transfer, (2) competition, (3) private sector 
management skills, (4) long-term nature of contracts (including whole-of-life cycle 
costing), (5) performance measurement and incentives, and (6) the use of an output 
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specification. Obviously, risk transfer and competition are deemed to be the most 
important factors in determining value for money (Grimsey and Lewis, 2005). 
 
Once the most competitive bidder is selected, the next issue discussed at contract 
negotiation will be talking about risk transfer. As risk transfer is one of the major 
motives in adopting the PPP strategy, government authority intends to lower the project 
risks linked to building a new infrastructure. The higher the risk perceived by the 
government, the higher risk premium required by the private partner will be expected 
from the government. Meanwhile, lenders may require high risk premiums for a low 
equity level provided by the sponsor (Zhang, 2005b). Eventually that high risk premium 
will increase the cost of the project. Therefore, PPP financial model is expected to assist 
in determining the risk premiums at the contract negotiation stage. 
 
3.7.14 Committing the lowest level of equity possible 
Sponsor(s) tends to contribute less equity level because the main objective is to achieve 
highest profit with minimum investment. By committing the lowest equity level, 
sponsor will gain better profitability ratios such as increased project IRR, ROA and 
ROE (Khan and Parra, 2003). Nevertheless, lenders are concerned more on the safety 
and return of their money, which is reflected by a prudent and self-sustaining project 
capital structure. Kulkarni and Prusty (2007) stated that the debt-equity ratio of the 
project depends on the financial strength of the sponsor in arranging debt funding from 
financial institutions. Lower level of equity financing does not guarantee that the profit 
generated by the project can be higher. The discussions and negotiations on these issues 
are time consuming and arduous. Therefore, it is important to utilise PPP financial 
model to assist in finding an appropriate ratio between equity and debt.  
3.7.15 Insurance for any material error in the model resulting in the debt not being 
repayable 
At the contract negotiation stage, the stakeholders expect that any financial losses 
attributed to the financial modeller’s negligence, such as misrepresentation, violation of 
good faith and fair dealing, and inaccurate advice, should be insured and stipulated in 
the contract. Hucknall (2010) stated that lenders require an insurance that there is 
someone to sue if a material error in the financial model resulting in the debt not being 
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repayable. However, current professional indemnity insurance is not sufficient to ensure 
that there will be someone to pay out any future claim. Furthermore, professional 
indemnity insurance is not always available and likely to be very expensive (HM 
Treasury, 2007). Therefore, government authority in UK acknowledges that this 
insurance should not be included as a required insurance in the Standardisation of PFI 
Contract (SoPC 4).  
3.8 Stakeholders’ expectations in using PPP financial models at finance-raising 
stage 
The finance-raising stage is initiated when an underwriter or a club of lenders expresses 
an interest through a mandate letter to the sponsor(s) because the project is sufficient to 
cover the debt needs. At this stage, government authority reviews and approves broad 
financing terms of the project. Since the sponsor’s main objective is to achieve financial 
closing on acceptable terms and construction start, from the initial model, the sponsor(s) 
and the lenders (modelling bank) develop a Lender Base Case financial model in order 
to undertake due diligence of the project’s financial viability. After all, due diligence 
procedure for PPP projects, with a relative high investment volume, is a time consuming 
process (Daube et al., 2008). By knowing what and how the lenders’ main concerns are 
allocated properly, the due diligence process can be shortened.  
A brief description of stakeholders’ expectations, which focuses on utilising financial 
models at finance-raising stage are as follows: 
3.8.1 Conducting sensitivity analysis for key commercial issues as needed 
After issuing a mandate letter to the sponsor, the lenders receive the initial PPP financial 
model, the operation and maintenance (OM) agreement and also the project agreements 
from the sponsor. Following their receipt, the lenders conduct due diligence for 
evaluating key technical, legal, insurance, environmental, market, modelling and other 
similar issues. During due diligence phase, sensitivity analysis is used for evaluating 
key commercial issues based on the project documents through the PPP financial model 
(Woodward, 1995). Although each project is different, there are generic concerns 
common to all projects in a series of sensitivity tests such as: (a) cost overruns, based 
on unanticipated change orders or delays in commissioning; (b) adequacy of delay and 
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performance-based liquidated damages (LDs) in EPC; (c) rise in short-term interest 
rates as well as forward yield curve before financial close; (d) unanticipated rise in 
operating costs; and (e) interruption of construction or operations due to force majeure 
(FM). Once due diligence is launched, the sponsor’s PPP financial model can be 
converted into a lenders base case model (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
3.8.2 Achieving financial closing on acceptable terms and construction start 
Stakeholders, at the finance-raising stage, utilise the model with an expectation of 
achieving financial close on acceptable terms and construction start (Khan and Parra, 
2003). However, there is a tendency of the lenders to revisit issues previously agreed by 
sponsor and government authority for securing their interest on risk management 
(Cartlidge, 2006). Consequently, the lenders’ influence might annoy the other 
stakeholders in PPP projects. The sponsor will have to manage the expenditure and the 
timing of payments, which could have a substantial effect on the working capital 
arrangements. Besides that, the sponsor faces the risks of the availability of finance in 
the markets, and/or the dramatically shifting terms required to access loans. The 
project’s capital structure is also affected by the current situation of financial market 
environment (World Bank and Ministry of Construction Japan, 1999). Moreover, the 
sponsor cannot commence the construction until all the financing required by lenders 
are fully mobilised to commission the facility. Thus, lenders base case financial model 
is a very important tool to assist in achieving an agreement between sponsor and 
lenders. Once the lenders are satisfied, the project proceeds to financial close and the 
construction can be started soon. 
3.8.3 Amending the model to reflect the results of the negotiation of commercial 
issues 
Upon the receipt of initial PPP financial model from the sponsor, the lenders identify 
any discrepancies in information provided by the sponsor such as the operation and 
maintenance (OM) agreement and also the project agreements. Therefore, the lenders’ 
expectation in utilising PPP financial model is amending the model inputs, calculation 
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and output worksheets in order to reflect the results of the negotiation of commercial 
issues
12
 affecting the model’s output (Khan and Parra, 2003).  
This expectation becomes more prominent as any changes in design and capacity might 
have significant impact not only on the project’s funding requirements, but also on the 
calibration of the payment and performance mechanism. Accordingly, the sponsor and 
the lenders should satisfy themselves that the changes within the PPP financial model 
are realistic, consistent with the results of negotiation of commercial issues (HM 
Treasury, 2007). 
3.8.4 Verifying the accuracy of formulae used in the model in collaboration with 
the model auditor 
Hucknall (2010) argued that the stakeholders should not only rely upon professional 
indemnity insurance to ensure that there will be someone to pay out any future claim. 
Since professional indemnity insurance is very expensive and not always available, it is 
more essential to assure that the PPP financial model reflects the project and the 
financing terms. Consequently, collaboration between the stakeholders and model 
auditor is needed in verifying the accuracy of formulae used in the model in accordance 
with a scope of work to be agreed before financial close (Khan and Parra, 2003).    
3.8.5 Assessing the issues that affect tariff, availability, quality, or transportation 
thereof 
A competition among transportation infrastructure facilities such as airports, ports, 
bridges, tunnels, etc. provides a balance between consumer affordability and project’s 
financial viability. However, Mols (2010) addressed that PPP procurement often takes 
place in which there is limited competition. Whilst government authority is challenged 
to increase competition in markets, lenders and sponsor(s) are likely to secure the 
project cash flow through limited competition facilities. Thus, at the finance-raising 
stage, lenders expect that the lender base case financial model can be used to assess the 
competitiveness of the project relative to local, regional or international competing 
                                                 
12
 There are three commercial issues negotiated by using financial model, such as: (1) capital structure; 
(2) loan profiling; and (3) quantitatively driven covenants (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
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facilities, which affects tariff, availability, quality, or transportation thereof (Khan and 
Parra, 2003). 
3.8.6 Having joint control with the modelling bank over amended inputs and 
outputs of financial model transformation. 
Since initial PPP financial model is developed by sponsor(s), in the process of 
transforming financial model to lender base case financial model, sponsor(s) is 
expecting to have a joint control with the modelling bank over amended inputs and 
outputs of the PPP financial model. Khan and Parra (2003) described that the activities 
involved in this effort may be characterized as follows: 
- Familiarisation. The modelling bank, as a part of lenders’ roles in transforming 
the model into the lenders base case, examines the initial financial model in 
order to determine what changes are needed to assist in negotiations or 
completion of a formal due diligence. During the development of a lender base 
case financial model, the modelling bank examines the architecture of the 
model, the accuracy of inputs, integrity of the formula used in the calculation 
worksheets, loan profiling assumptions (e.g. loan commitment, schedule of 
disbursement, loan repayment schedule, interest and fees, assumptions related to 
the interest rate hedge).  
- Updating. Some of the model’s inputs will be modified during the due diligence 
process as a result of : 
(a) The recommendations of expert opinion, such as: project costs, agreed 
capital structure, revenues and expenses forecasts (if too optimistic or 
unrealistic), and erroneous formulae in the calculation worksheets, etc. 
(b) Or changing circumstances, such as: fees, interest or swap costs associated 
with the debt, economic assumptions related to global and domestic inflation 
or foreign exchange parity. 
- Testing sensitivity as part of due diligence. The purpose of the sensitivity 
analysis is to measure the impact on some, or all, of the cover ratios [e.g. Project 
Life Cover Ratio (PLCR), Loan Life Cover Ratio, (LLCR), Drawdown Cover 
Ratio (DCR), Historic Debt Service Cover Ratio (HDSCR), Projected Debt 
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Service Cover Ratio (PDSCR)] of certain events that have adverse potential for 
the facility. 
- Incorporating agreements. Eventually, any changes related to the financial 
model have to be negotiated with the sponsor in order to reach agreement on a 
series of specific issues such as: (a) the project’s capital structure; (b) loan 
profile; (c) cost overrun mitigation; (d) resolution of quantitative covenants that 
are to govern the ability on the part of the lenders to declare an event of default 
(EOD) as well as on the part of the borrowers to pay dividends).  
3.8.7 Studying market of the product or service 
As part of due diligence process, lenders employ PPP financial model to assess the 
proposed current and future tariff structure of the facility and the corresponding tariff 
sensitivities of its consumers, including a fairly detailed study of demand and tariff 
elasticity (Khan and Parra, 2003). Meanwhile, the attractiveness of the project, for the 
investors in the global capital markets to ensure ample funding, also needs to be 
assessed as well. By considering both consumers and investors in the due diligence 
analysis of the project’s future cash flows, it shall foresee realistic market values of 
project securities (e.g. project bonds and preferred stocks) with varying claims on future 
cash flows (Chen and Kubik, 2007). 
3.8.8 Expanding the project input, calculation and output worksheet 
Since the initial PPP financial model is used for submitting and evaluating the 
competitive bids, the project input assumptions made by the sponsor and the 
government authority have to be expanded and verified by lenders (modelling bank)  in 
order to determine an accurate project’s borrowing power based on the outcome of 
negotiations. Furthermore, the modelling bank usually is the prime candidate to take 
over the role of an inter-creditor agent to monitor the project during construction and 
operation periods. Hence, the architecture of PPP financial model based on lender’s 
perspective is also meant to monitor and report the progress of the project during 
construction (e.g. cost overruns and other events that may have a material and adverse 
effect on DSCR or LLCR) and track its compliance with the loan covenants during 
operations (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
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3.9 Stakeholders’ expectations in using PPP financial models at the construction 
stage 
Once the lenders are satisfied, the project proceeds to financial close and the 
construction can be started soon. During the construction stage, the government 
authority manages and adjusts regulatory structure to create stable market conditions, 
and participate in commissioning tests of facility. The sponsor(s) use the financial 
model to monitor and track the performance of the project. The lenders appoint an inter-
creditor agent, usually the modelling bank, for maintaining the financial model and 
monitoring the project costs and other issues such as:  
(1) Disbursements of debt and equity by the stakeholders;  
(2) All financing costs, including the upfront fees, hedging costs, funding of required 
reserves, and interest roll-up due to loan disbursement. 
A brief description of stakeholders’ expectations, which are focusing on utilising 
financial models at construction stage, follows. 
3.9.1 Ensuring the impact of cost overrun and other events does not have adverse 
effect on DSCR or LLCR. 
Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut (2003) stated that cost overruns will increase the 
financing costs, thus, bring an impact to the profitability of the project. However, since 
cost overruns commonly take place in the public projects (ranging from 5% to even 
300% of estimated costs
13
), the inter-creditor agent and Independent Engineer (IE) will 
see carefully the impact of cost overrun on the DSCR or LLCR (Khan and Parra, 2003).  
Furthermore, the government authority in the UK is required to pay a higher premium in 
order to ensure that the PFI projects is built to budget and on time (Shaoul et al., 2006). 
Therefore, the main purpose of calculating DSCR and LLCR through PPP financial 
model is to ensure that no defaults have taken for failure to meet debt service cover and 
that the project vehicle is entitled to pay dividends to the sponsor, if other conditions for 
doing so are met.  
                                                 
13
 Studies were undertaken by many (e.g. Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; MacDonald, 2002; and HM Treasury, 
2003). 
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3.9.2 Anticipating to claim the declaration of the loan agreement breaching 
Since construction risks are primarily related to delays in completion and cost overruns, 
the sponsor needs to select an appropriate financing strategy to mitigate any 
construction risks. The selection of financing strategy has to be agreed by the 
government authority and the lenders as well. However, Schaufelberger and 
Wipadapisut (2003) reminded that many lenders are reluctant to take the construction 
risks.  Thus, in some cases, the sponsor cannot obtain a long-term nonrecourse debt 
financing before completing the major construction. Accordingly, the sponsor possibly 
will use equity to fund the major construction costs.  
Since the sponsor’s interest is about keeping the equity level as low as possible, the rest 
of total project costs are covered by debt. Obviously, without loan withdrawal at the 
construction period, equity will be exhausted before the end of construction. However, 
it is common that the sponsor withdraws the debt during loan availability period
14
. In 
order to comfort the lenders that the contractor will not abandon the project and enforce 
all commitments to complete the project, the lenders require sponsor to provide between 
30% and 40% of its total equity obligation prior to first loan draw. In that case, the 
inter-creditor agent on behalf of lenders utilise PPP financial model
15
 to monitor the 
project and anticipate any potential material adverse effect at the construction period. A 
failure of the project to maintain DSCR above a certain level (in practice is set a level 
that is greater than 1.0), lenders may be able to claim the declaration of loan agreement 
breach, which is based on a material adverse change (MAC) or some other similar 
covenant (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
3.10 Stakeholders’ expectations in using PPP financial models at the operation 
stage 
Once satisfactory completion of the facility is achieved, the sponsor will be able to 
generate revenue from the operating facilities. The sponsor also commences to pay 
capital gains taxes and repayments to lenders (Shen et al., 2002). The lenders, generally, 
will opt for the first scheduled repayment date to the next six months. However, at times 
the revenues collected until (or even after) the sixth month may be insufficient to meet 
debt service (Khan and Parra, 2003). Thus, it is imperative to utilise PPP financial 
                                                 
14
 Loan availability period starts at financial closing and ends at the initial operation stage. 
15
 This version should be agreed by the stakeholders in any case of declaring a breach. 
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model in order to follow up the mitigation measures, or declare a clause breach, which 
are agreed in the concession contract and/or the other agreements (i.e. grace period, tax 
holiday, tariff adjustment, concession period extension, etc.). 
A brief description of stakeholders’ expectations, which are focusing on utilising 
financial models at operation stage, follows: 
3.10.1 Securing the operational cash flow 
Unlike traditional procurement project, where lenders have recourse to the assets of the 
project sponsor, a PPP project is non-recourse financing, which relies only on 
operational cash flow to repay its debt. An optimum trade-off between limited recourse 
and credit support are needed to satisfy lenders with the credit risk and operation risk 
(Farrell, 2003). On the other hand, PPP project should be able to demonstrate value for 
money throughout the delivery of services (Robinson and Scott, 2009). Therefore, 
performance monitoring is very important in PPP projects as it ensures (a) value for 
money; and (b) credit and operational risks are anticipated earlier, so that the risks will 
be kept manageable. In this regard, the purposes of a PPP financial model during the 
operation stage for the stakeholders (e.g. government authority, sponsor, and lenders) 
are to assist in ensuring that no defaults have taken place for failure to meet 
performance standards, debt service cover and dividend’s obligations.  
3.10.2 Making the financial model to represent reality 
Derman (2009) stated that financial models are merely models that fall short of 
reflecting the complex reality of the projects. The failure of financial models is mainly 
resulted from taking the models
16
 too seriously without considering the humans behind 
the equations. Nevertheless, an effort has to be made to model the PPP project, which is 
a complex procurement option. Of course, it is only a simplified statement for 
representing a complex reality of the project.  
                                                 
16
 Financial models are built with assumptions, which at times can be wrong and enormously inaccurate 
(Derman, 2011).  
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Since all assumptions are made prior to the operation stage, it is important to update 
those assumptions
17
 in order to allow the financial model to represent reality and track 
the performance expected from initial design. It is also worth noting that a successful 
financial model must have limited scope with simple analogies (Derman, 2011).  
3.10.3 Understandable financial model for stakeholders 
In conjunction with simplification attempt of developing PPP financial model, it is 
imperative to allow the stakeholders understand the mechanism of the financial model 
utilisation at the operation stage. Tjia (2009) suggested that a financial model should be 
built from the user’s point of view, which is accurate, robust, fast, easy to debug, and 
easy to use. Thus it implicitly defines that the stakeholders do not have to think about 
how to run it, but simply use it in order to get the desired results. Moreover, government 
authority needs to understand where public money is going, how it is being used, and 
the extent of future commitments and liabilities, through the PPP financial model at the 
operation stage. The essential information needed (e.g. unitary charges, any 
performance deductions in each service area, public entity’s costs of monitoring the 
project and an explanation of why actual cost differs from that expected and set out the 
previous year), is necessary to understand the full cost of the project and compare the 
actual cost as planned in the case for selecting PPP (Shaoul et al., 2010). 
3.10.4 Assessing the impact of annual operations budget 
Lenders use PPP financial model during operation period as a tool to approve/ 
disapprove the annual operational budget
18
 submitted by the SPV Company for next 
fiscal year, if its implementation otherwise may possibly be anticipated to lead to a 
problem (Khan and Parra, 2003). It is vital that the lenders oblige the SPV Company to 
maintain the project and to meet the projected operating budget. Therefore, PPP 
financial model is also employed to review the proposed operations whether sufficient 
funds have been allocated properly, for the operations and maintenance, or not 
(UNESCAP, 2011). 
                                                 
17
 There are three major concerns for the operation assumptions: (a) supply of an input; (b) demand for 
the product or service; and (c) the delivery of the product or service (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
18
 Annual operating budget is a proposed projection of all estimated income and expenses based on 
annual forecasted revenue (BusinessDictionary.com, 2011). 
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3.10.5 Monitoring the ability of the SPV to meet conditions related to the payment of 
dividends 
Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut (2003) stated that lenders and investors consider the 
revenues generated from the project as the source of dividends on equity and repayment 
of debt. Accordingly, the stakeholders expect that PPP financial model can be used to 
monitor the ability of the SPV to meet conditions related to the payment of dividends 
and repayment of debt. However, there is a question concerning how to assure both 
investors and lenders that their dividends and money will be remitted. Proper mitigation 
measures should be considered and negotiated before reaching financial closure. 
3.10.6 Easy to update the financial model 
When it comes to the operation stage, all assumptions have to be updated based on the 
real information of project input. It means that the stakeholders do not have to think 
about how to update the model, but simply replace the input assumption with the real 
information in order to get the desired results. Once all information replaced with the 
newest version, it is crucial to ensure that all numbers are recalculated before reviewing 
the results (Tjia, 2009). Otherwise, it will lead to wrong judgement based on misleading 
information. And thereupon, PPP financial model should not be overly used in making 
decision. Instead, it should be used with cautions because anything can be wrong. 
Derman and Wilmott (2009) warned that financial model should be questioned due to 
its failure to make accurate forecasts. Further they asked the following questions about 
any model “What does it ignore, and how wrong is it likely to be?” 
3.10.7 Reasonable tariff 
HM Treasury (2004) addressed that a reasonable tariff charged by SPV company is 
imperative to a PPP scheme. The importance of a reasonable tariff for a PPP project is 
proven by many through questionnaire surveys (e.g. Ng et al., 2010; Zhang, 2005d; 
Tiong, 1996). Thus, an adjustment of a new tariff proposed by Sponsor Company 
should permit the project not only to recover eventually the unanticipated investment, 
but also to take into account the user’s affordability. However, there is a question in 
determining the reasonable tariff when the actual revenue is far below the initial 
projection. To what extent the user’s affordability is determined? A PPP financial model 
should be able to assist in anticipating this risk and address its mitigation measures. 
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3.11 Chapter Summary 
Evaluating a large infrastructure project requires extensive collaboration among project 
stakeholders. A financial model has been identified in this chapter as one of the most 
common tools used for evaluating a new project and facilitating negotiations among 
lenders, sponsor(s) and a government agency. However, the complexity of project 
financing transactions and the diversity of stakeholders’ interests are major reasons that 
make financial models hard to understand and error prone. These problems have been 
discussed to identify the knowledge gaps on PPP financial models and the stakeholders 
who are using them. Although the following research questions,  “Who are the 
stakeholders using PPP financial models? How can understandable financial model be 
developed with minimum error?” and  “What are the most important stakeholders’ 
expectations in utilising PPP financial models?” were addressed and discussed in 
attempt to fill the knowledge gaps, further research investigation is still needed to 
confirm its validity. The findings of this chapter have contributed clear information 
about the users of the proposed IPET, and the expectations of the stakeholders in 
evaluating PPP seaport projects. For instance, the stakeholders’ expectations from PPP 
financial models that have been explored in this chapter were validated by using 
triangulation approach. The rationale of research design and methodology employed in 
this study will be presented in next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Research Design and Methodology 
“’Google' is not a synonym for 'research'.” 
(Dan Brown 1964 - ) 
4.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter discussed the concept of Public-Private Partnership (PPP), 
rationalisation for PPP projects, several theories underlying the partnership approach, 
and critical points in evaluating large infrastructure projects. A review of the risk 
management literature in terms of project evaluation tools and techniques used in the 
construction industry was presented as well. Then, this chapter elaborates on the 
research design and methodology. Since the research methodology is selected in 
accordance with the nature of the problem being addressed in this study, this chapter 
presents the approach to derive a suitable research design and methodology (including 
research method, data collection, and data analysis) in answering the research questions 
and problems addressed in the literature review. This chapter also provides further 
emphasis and description of the data needed and the methodology selected for this 
research. Given the aim and the objectives of this research, the process of developing an 
integrated project evaluation tool (IPET) and its validation will be described in this 
chapter as well. 
4.2 Understanding research methodology: research design, strategy, and method  
A research can be defined as a set of activities for the advancement of knowledge. In 
order to justify the truth to be believed as knowledge, a sound research should be 
designed in such a way through a constant reasoning. Thus, a research design is 
important to be justified before conducting a research project. Research design has been 
defined by some as follows: 1) “A research design is a grand plan of approach to 
research topic” (Greener, 2008); and  2) “a design that describes a (flexible) set of 
assumptions and considerations leading to specific contextualised guidelines, which 
connect theoretical notion and elements to dedicated strategy of inquiry supported by 
methods and techniques for collecting empirical material” (Jonker and Pennink, 2010). 
In order to justify the research design, it is also important to define the elements of 
research design  as shown in figure 4.1: purpose(s), theories, research questions, 
research strategy, and research methods and techniques (Robson, 2002).  
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Figure 4.1 Research Design Framework  
Source: Robson (2002). 
Research questions are derived from the purpose of research (e.g. exploratory, 
descriptive, and explanatory) and the underlying theories from literature review. Once 
the research questions have been determined, decision of an appropriate research 
strategy can be made such as case study, survey, or experiment strategy. The sampling 
methods (e.g. observation, questionnaire survey, interview, and data review) are also 
selected according to the research questions and selected research strategy.  
There are two major categories of research design that are justified based on the nature 
of research situation, circumstances, or experience of participants (manipulation); 
subsequently they are experimental and non-experimental research designs. The first 
category (experimental research design) is also called fixed research design because all 
experiments are fixed before collecting data. A researcher needs to find the best way to 
measure the variables that can be used in examining the cause and effect relationship; or 
to find which method will be the most appropriate to answer the research question; or to 
test existing theories or new hypotheses under specified situation and circumstances. 
The second category (non-experimental research design) is the opposite of the first 
category. In order to identify the relation of one variable to another, non-experimental 
research design does not manipulate the situation, circumstances or experience of 
participations. Therefore, non-experimental research, which is also called as flexible 
research design, allows much flexibility during data collection. It is worth noting that 
fixed designs do not have to be quantitative while flexible designs need not be 
qualitative. These are further discussed in the research methodology decision section, 
where mixed design was used in this research. 
Research Design 
Purpose(s) Theories 
Research 
strategy 
Sampling 
Methods 
Research 
Questions 
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Figure 4.2: The relationship among research design, methodology, theory, question, 
and context 
Source: Jonker and Pennink (2010)  
According to Jonker and Pennink (2010), a research design covers theory, questions and 
its context, and selected methodology to undertake scientific research (as illustrated in 
figure 4.2). Since the theoretical background, research questions and its context have 
been discussed earlier, it is also important to justify the selection of research 
methodology. A methodology is defined as a guideline system for solving a problem or 
answering the question based on a set of premises, (theoretical) considerations and 
practical conditions. Jonker and Pennink (2010) remarked that a ‘methodology’ is 
(often) incorrectly associated with drawing up a research plan. A methodology should 
be presented as a form of thinking and acting, rather than limited as a form of writing a 
questionnaire, collecting a limited set of data and learning to apply some simple 
statistics. It implies that a researcher should be able to justify the reasons for the choice 
of a specific (research) approach and make sensible choices based on different 
requirements of a particular question. 
A research is started by identifying the research question, which is translated from the 
problem ‘created’ by people through their interpretation of a reality that they are 
operating in. Therefore, a problem should be defined as the interpretation of a 
(empirically) ‘labelled’ situation, condition, phenomenon or function of an organisation 
which is problematically experienced by those involved (stakeholders) that it requires 
(some) research to determine a (possible) solution. 
A proper methodology is reflected by transparent activities in showing comprehensible 
alternatives, providing arguments and demonstrating the reasons for what have been 
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done. In order to justify the transparency of a guideline system, Jonker and Pennink 
(2010) introduced four research action levels called research pyramid, as shown in 
figure 4.3. This pyramid is a (logical) chain of interconnected events ranging from an 
abstraction (on the paradigm level) to very concrete data collection instruments (on the 
technique level).  
 
Figure 4.3 The Research Pyramid 
Source: Jonker and Pennink (2010)  
The first and foremost step in setting up a research is to determine the research 
paradigm of how the researcher views ‘reality’. The researcher should decide on which 
ontological (what knowledge is) and epistemological (how we know it in order to 
believe it to be true) perspectives when a reality is discovered as something that really 
exists. In the construction management research, there are three methodological 
paradigms such as: positivist, interpretivist, and pragmatic approach (Falqi, 2011). 
According to Johnson et al. (1984), positivist paradigm perceives that a reality exists 
independently of human consciousness and cognition (realist ontology) through ’the 
eyes of the researcher’ or based on individual experience and test results (objectivist 
epistemology). Whereas interpretivist (constructivist) paradigm refers to nominalism 
reality (nominalist ontology), which is simply a product of our minds, a projection of 
our consciousness and cognition, with no independent status. Interpretivist paradigm 
believes that a reality is perceived in different ways through the eyes of someone else 
(subjectivist or idealist epistemology). Pragmatic approach combines both positivism 
and interpretivism. 
Research  
Paradigm 
Research Design and 
Methodology 
Research Strategies 
Research Methods 
Research Techniques 
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The second step is to specify a research design and methodology or ‘a way’ in 
conducting the research that is tailored to the philosophical research paradigm as 
illustrated in table 4.1.  
Table 4.1 Fundamental Beliefs of Research Paradigms in Social Sciences (adapted from Wahyuni, 2012)  
 Research Paradigms 
Fundamental 
Beliefs 
Positivism (Naïve 
Realism) 
Post positivism 
(Critical Realism) 
Interpretivism 
(Constructivism) 
Pragmatism 
Ontology: the 
position on 
the nature of 
reality 
External, 
objective, and 
independent of 
social actors 
Objective, exist 
independently of 
human thoughts 
and beliefs of 
knowledge of their 
existence, but is 
interpreted through 
social conditioning 
(critical realist) 
Socially 
constructed 
subjective, may 
change, multiple 
External, multiple, 
view chosen to best 
achieve an answer 
to the research 
question 
Epistemology: 
the view on 
what 
constitutes 
acceptable 
knowledge 
Only observable 
phenomena 
can provide 
credible data, 
facts. Focus on 
causality and 
law-like 
generalisations
, reducing 
phenomena to 
simplest 
elements 
Only observable 
phenomena can 
provide credible 
data, facts. Focus 
on explaining 
within a context or 
context 
Subjective 
meanings and 
social 
phenomena. 
Focus upon the 
details of 
situation, the 
reality behind 
these details, 
subjective 
meanings and 
motivating 
actions 
Either or both 
observable 
phenomena and 
subjective 
meanings can 
provide acceptable 
knowledge 
dependent upon the 
research question. 
Focus on practical 
applied research, 
integrating 
perspective to help 
interpret the data 
Axiology: the 
role of values 
in research 
and the 
researcher’s 
stance 
Value-free and 
etic 
Research is 
undertaken in 
a value-free 
way, the 
research is 
independent of 
the data and 
maintain an 
objective 
stance 
Value-laden and etic 
Research is value 
laden; the 
researcher is biased 
by world views, 
cultural  
experiences and 
upbringing 
Value-bond and 
emic 
Research is value 
bond, the 
researcher is 
part of what is 
being 
researched, 
cannot be 
separated and so 
will be 
subjective 
Value-bond and etic-
emic 
Values play large 
role in interpreting 
the results, the 
researcher adopting 
both objective and 
subjective points of 
view 
Research 
Methodology: 
the model 
behind the 
research 
process 
Quantitative Quantitative or 
qualitative 
Qualitative Quantitative and 
qualitative (mixed 
or multi method 
design) 
Based on Saunders et al. (2009, p.119), Guba and Lincoln (2005), and Hallebone and Priest (2009) 
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While a research design administers a framework for collecting and analysing data 
(Bryman, 2012); Cobuild (1987) described the definition of methodology, in more 
everyday language, as a system of methods and principles for doing something. Thus, 
the selected methodology should be constructed in such a way that it can be applied in 
all possible situations. It is not only about a direction of using specific methods, but also 
more on how the researcher justifies the selection of alternative methods in order to 
achieve the research goal. In other words, methodology is all about defining and 
defending the justification of research methods and techniques in a reasonable way.  
Identifying the specific steps or actions (research methods) which needs to be 
undertaken in a certain (rigorous) order is the third step of research action levels. It is 
essential to define a logical order of specific steps to be taken during the research. For 
instance, the researcher should consider the best way to collect the data prior to the 
analysis. Therefore, it is impossible to analyse data before it is available. 
The last step is identifying the research techniques as practical ‘instruments’ or ‘tools’ 
for generating, collecting and analysing data. Since research techniques concern the way 
in which data is generated, collected, classified and analysed, the selection of research 
techniques depends on the nature of the data.  Data can be classified, based on its 
nature, into four: (1) linguistic data (e.g., transcription of a conversation), (2) numerical 
(in figures) data (e.g., a company’s profit and loss account), (3) textual data (e.g. 
document), and (4) visual data (e.g., drawings, pictures, photos, rich pictures, etc.).  
4.3 Research design and methodology decision 
Before justifying an appropriate research design and methodology, it is necessary to 
review the philosophical concepts related to research in construction management. 
Runeson (1997) argued that construction management is a set of functions where 
various scientific theories and techniques are employed. The main cause is a lot of 
research into construction management is scientifically directed towards finding better 
work practices or improving decision making (i.e. finding causal relationships, 
establishing general relationships, verification, etc.). From the philosophical concept, 
Runeson’s argument falls under positivist paradigm. However, Seymour et al. (1998) 
contended that construction management is a sub-branch of management studies. 
Hence, management is the study of human activities, which is fundamentally different 
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from the study of physical phenomena. It implies that construction management can be 
sought from the interpretivist paradigm, 
In order to justify the selection of research paradigm, the main problem has been 
identified to be the knowledge gap between the private and government representatives. 
To minimise the knowledge gap in evaluating project financial viability, a proper 
guideline system (or methodology) with relevant tools and techniques should be 
determined. Among the tools and techniques used in evaluating PPP projects, a 
financial model (due to its rigorous combination
19
) is the only evaluation tool that can 
be employed to facilitate risk sharing negotiation. Since an efficient risk sharing 
negotiation reflects minimum knowledge gap, PPP financial model was selected as the 
object of this study. Therefore, the select research paradigm should be able to 
accommodate the reality that the knowledge gap (as a problem) may be minimised if 
PPP financial model is properly utilised. This problem (ontologically) belongs to 
nominalism reality because knowledge gap is related to human cognitive ability. In this 
context, knowledge gap is caused by different interpretation of every person. 
Meanwhile, the proposed strategy in minimising the knowledge gap through proper use 
of financial model has to be verified and validated. A knowledge is assumed to be valid 
(or true) when empirical evidence is provided (Larraín, 1979). This assumption refers to 
positivist paradigm which adopts objectivist epistemology in obtaining and verifying 
the knowledge.  
Instead of forcing one paradigm in construction management research, both paradigms 
(positivist and interpretivist) can be applied in one piece of research.  This combination 
is called pragmatic paradigm. It utilises combination of qualitative and quantitative 
techniques or triangulation technique (Jupp, 2006). Hence, pragmatic paradigm is 
considered the best approach for this study, as illustrated in figure 4.4. 
Since the underlying philosophical paradigm of this study requires qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, this research adopts a non-experimental research design that 
                                                 
19
 A financial model comprises a rigorous combination of evaluation methods and techniques which 
provides a sound financial evaluation, such as: NPV method, financial ratio method (e.g. DSCR and 
LLCR), cash flow analysis (e.g. FCF and CADS), Monte Carlo simulation, Score Index (e.g. IRR and 
ROI), Sensitivity analysis, etc. (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
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combines both approaches. The aim of this research is to ascertain the rationale of the 
public sector authority in evaluating PPP projects (as discussed in the chapter 1).  
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Figure 4.4 Research design and methodology framework 
The research decided to explore the problems occurred in practice through a qualitative 
approach (case study strategy). Although some researchers (positivists
20
) argue that 
qualitative methods fail to provide scientific explanations and rather vague (e.g. Mays 
and Pope, 1995; Field, 2009), other groups (interpretivists
21
) recognise that qualitative 
methods (e.g. interviews, pilot study) suit best for understanding the meanings, which  
contextualise human experience attached to phenomena (e.g. values, beliefs, actions, 
decisions, etc.) within their social worlds (e.g. Snape and Spencer, 2003; Seidman, 
2006). Furthermore, a qualitative method, which is often equated to a grounded 
theory
22
, gives flexibility in undertaking data collection and analysis. 
Besides the foregoing, a quantitative approach (questionnaire survey strategy) was also 
deemed essential to be undertaken because the development of an integrated project 
evaluation tool (IPET) requires an empirical data that support the research questions. 
Therefore, a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches, which is referred to 
as triangulation strategy (Harden and Thomas, 2005), provides a holistic analysis
23
 that 
enhance the validity and applicability of the proposed tool. Mason (2002) revealed that 
it is common in observation-based research studies to use a range of other methods 
(including quantitative) to generate cross-referential data. Nevertheless, a precautionary 
measure was considered in implementing a triangulation strategy because it is possible 
that the findings of quantitative and qualitative methods will conflict in some way 
(Perlesz and Lindsay, 2003).  
4.4 Research Strategy  
Since the research paradigm of this study uses pragmatic approach, this research is 
designed to use more than one research strategy. Table 4.2 below illustrates that there 
                                                 
20
 Positivists generally assume that an objectivity should be able to be hypothesised and tested (Wiggins, 
2011). 
21
 Interpretivists assume that reality is formed by interpretation and it only be known by attending to 
interpretive meanings. For further discussion about qualitative and quantitative methods see Wiggins 
(2011).  
22
 Grounded theory is an inductive research to generate a theory from a variety of data sources such as: 
interviews, review of records, observation and surveys (Martin and Turner, 1986). 
23
 Financial models involve human as modeller (to develop quantitative equations based on assumptions) 
and user (to use qualitative interpretations based on experiences). Therefore, a combination of both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches is essential for the analysis. 
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are five research strategies available based on the nature of research questions, control 
of behavioural events, and contemporary events (Yin, 2003). 
This research focuses much on identifying the stakeholders’ expectations toward PPP 
financial model, so that the knowledge gap can be minimised between stakeholders. 
Thus, case study and survey research strategies are employed because they do not 
require control over the stakeholders’ expectations and focus on contemporary events.  
Table 4.2 Various Forms of Research Methods (Adapted from Yin, 2003) 
Research Strategy Form of Research Question 
Requires control 
of behavioural 
events 
Focuses on 
contemporary events 
Experiment  How? Why?  Yes Yes 
Case Study  How? Why?  No Yes 
History How? Why?  No No 
Survey  
Who, what, where, how much, how 
many?  
No Yes 
Archival Analysis 
Who, what, where, how much, how 
many?  
No No/Yes 
The attention of this topic has also been gained from the study of phenomenon 
addressed in construction management literature. A literature review, as the first 
research step, does not only help to understand the concept of PPP especially in the PPP 
financial modelling within a risk management framework, but also to address accurate 
research questions related to the utilisation of PPP financial model. It gives a clear 
direction of the study and the chosen research strategies (case study and survey). A 
framework of research process has been designed in a logical order to allow the research 
to be undertaken within a realistic time span as illustrated in figure 4.5. The next section 
discusses the two research strategies employed in this research, case study and survey 
strategies. 
4.4.1 Case Study Strategy 
Among three types (exploratory, descriptive, or explanatory) of case study (Amaratunga 
et al., 2002), this research employs an exploratory case study type due to the fact that 
little information is available on how stakeholders use financial models to evaluate PPP 
projects, and why financial closure delay is likely to happen to most PPP projects. 
Therefore, the case study strategy aims to study the implementation of PPP seaport 
projects in India through an in-depth analysis of three case projects via published 
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materials such as newspapers, magazine articles, websites, journal papers, government 
releases, etc.  
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Unlike single exploratory case study, multiple exploratory case studies are preferred 
because it facilitates deep investigation of a real-life contemporary phenomenon in its 
natural context by using replication logic (Yin, 2003). Three cases, which are: Nhava 
Sheva International Terminal (NSIT), Gangavaram Port, and Kakinada Deep Water Port 
(KDWP) are selected to investigate a contemporary phenomenon of typical procedures 
used for evaluating PPP projects. They are selected because they are three of the most 
phenomenal PPP projects in India which were available online (see table 4.3).  
Table 4.3 Three selected PPP Seaport Projects in Indian case studies (DEA, 2012) 
Case 
Study 
No. 
Project Sector 
PPP Project 
Structure 
State / Year 
Contract 
Signed 
Project 
Cost 
Concession Period 
1 Nhava Sheva 
International 
Container 
Terminal 
Ports (Major) BOT (includes 
Design and 
Finance) 
Maharashtra 
(1997) 
Rs. 733 crores 30 years 
2 Gangavaram Port Ports (Minor) BOOT (includes 
Design and 
Finance) 
Andhra Pradesh 
(2003) 
Rs. 1,696 
crores 
30 years (extendable 
by additional 2 
periods of 10 years 
each) 
3 Kakinada Deep 
Water Port 
Ports (Minor) OMST/BOT 
(includes 
sharing of 
revenue with 
Govt) 
Andhra Pradesh 
(1998) 
Rs. 330 crores 
(4th Berth 
including 
offshore 
jetty) 
20 years (extendable 
by l 2 periods of 5 
years each). Later  
extended to 30 years 
(extendable by 2 
periods of 10 years 
each) 
 
Although a case study has its own limitations that should be tackled such as time 
consuming, result in lengthy documents, subjectivity and bias in the research 
interpretation and presentation. Consequently, this research considers four standard 
tests, as shown in table 4.4 below. 
Table 4.4 Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests (Adapted from Yin, 2003) 
Tests Case Study Tactic 
Construct validity:  
Tests whether the research measures 
what is intended to measure 
Use multiple sources of evidence 
Establish chain of evidence 
Have key informants review draft case study report 
Internal validity:  
Examines the extent to which a research 
finding is valid 
Do pattern-matching 
Do explanation-building 
Address rival explanations 
Use logic models 
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External validity:  
Defines the domain to which a study’s 
findings can be generalised. Looks at 
whether the research results can be 
applied to settings of interest. 
Use theory in single-case studies 
Use replication logic in multiple-case studies 
Reliability:  
Demonstrates repeatability 
Use case study protocol 
Develop case study database 
4.4.2 Survey Strategy 
Since the underpinning questions of survey research strategy are who, what, where, how 
much, how many (Yin, 2003), It is important to know who the stakeholders are, what 
the expectations are, and how much stakeholders differ in their expectations. The survey 
strategy also helps to explore the relationship between stakeholders’ expectations and 
financial risk variables. A survey research strategy is a non-experimental research 
design that has its limitations. There is no causal relationship which can be identified in 
the relation of one variable to another because there is no manipulation of the situation, 
circumstances or experience of participants. In addition, there are also four types of 
errors related to statistical analysis that should be anticipated as follows: Type I error 
"rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true"; Type II error "accepting the null 
hypothesis when it is false"; Type III error "correctly rejecting the null hypothesis for 
the wrong reason"; Type IV error "the incorrect interpretation of a correctly rejected 
hypothesis" (Betz and Gabriel, 1978). The research will make effort to avoid the errors. 
4.5 Data Collection Method 
According to the research methodology decision, a triangulation research method was 
selected to accomplish the aim and the objectives of the research. Since a triangulation 
approach has its limitation (as addressed by Perlesz and Linday, 2003), qualitative data 
collection was undertaken earlier. By combining primary data (e.g. interview) and 
secondary data [e.g. financial models which are derived from World Bank and PPIAF 
(2007), Khan and Parra (2003), and Kulkarni and Prusty (2007)] in the qualitative 
approach, this approach has helped in understanding the problems encountered by the 
stakeholders in evaluating PPP projects especially through a PPP financial model. In 
addition, qualitative approach provides experts’ insight in the field and the variety of 
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stakeholders’ understanding about financial model utilisation and its features24, and 
uncovers a contemporary phenomenon of typical procedures used for evaluating PPP 
projects through detailed stories and descriptions (e.g. case study).  
Moreover, in conjunction with the purpose of developing an integrated project 
evaluation tool (IPET), which is to assist in evaluating the project and negotiating the 
risk sharing mechanism, it is essential to explore the reconciliation of variables from 
PPP financial models. The stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP financial models 
at contract negotiation stage are in Nash Equilibrium if each stakeholder is making the 
best decision they can, taking into account the other stakeholders’ decision. Their 
decisions are reflected in the preferred indicators of PPP financial models. These 
indicators are also useful to test its Pareto efficiency, which represents the risk-sharing 
arrangement among the stakeholders. Therefore, these preferred indicators were 
identified from interviews, review of records, and surveys. 
It was revealed that qualitative data is not enough to develop an applicable project 
evaluation tool. Hence, a quantitative technique was employed to enhance the validity 
and the applicability of the proposed tool. The qualitative data
25
 gathered was analysed 
and categorised into several groups of variables. These variables were pilot tested 
during the field study in India. Then, a structured questionnaire survey of international 
expert opinions was carried out to validate the preliminary findings. Once systematic 
statistical analyses were applied to the validation process, the proposed integrated 
project evaluation tool (IPET)
26
 was developed and ready to be tested. The last step of 
data collection was intended to seek feedback from the experts on its applicability. The 
detailed data collection process and its administration will be explained in the next sub-
chapters. 
                                                 
24
 The features of financial model are determined by the strategy of developing a financial model. There 
are two strategies in building a financial model: (1) bottom-up approach; and (2) top-down approach. 
Both approaches use either input or output of financial model to start developing the model (Swan, 2008). 
25In this research, the qualitative data covers the stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP financial 
models and the preferred indicators of PPP financial models, as described briefly in the literature review.  
26
 An integrated project evaluation tool (IPET) is based on the combination between qualitative data and 
validated survey findings. 
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4.5.1 Qualitative Data Collection Method 
4.5.1.1 Literature review 
Literature review is not only as a means of gathering information but also reviewing in 
greater detail about a specific array of previous studies directly related to the topic of 
study, method and data source. A rigorous literature review must be subsequently able 
to demonstrate a researcher’s mastery over the literature (Yin, 2011). In order to 
conduct a rigorous literature review, reliable sources of information have been 
meticulously selected such as peer-reviewed journal papers, textbooks, guidelines and 
government reports, theses and papers published in conferences and scientific meetings. 
However, any other sources (e.g. magazines, newspapers, blogs, internet database, and 
other self-published sources) were considered with caution because its content is not 
always properly tested nor independently reviewed. It is worth noting that "no testimony 
is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its 
falsehood would be more miraculous, than the fact, which it endeavours to establish; 
and even in that case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only 
gives us an assurance suitable to that degree of force, which remains, after deducting 
the inferior" (Hume and Millican, 2007). 
In conjunction with David Hume’s statement about the perception of fact, Henkel and 
Mattson (2011) conducted a research about the importance of using reliable sources in 
order to prevent people from believing falsehoods. Their study concluded that there is 
no significant effect of source reliability (whether it is reliable or not) on validity or 
recognition. It means that “the more often people are exposed to falsehoods, the more 
likely they are to believe them, even if they believe the source is not reliable” (Henkel 
and Mattson, 2011). 
By considering the fact that reading means believing, there was a problem which had 
been encountered during the literature review especially when there was lack of reliable 
sources in a new topic (i.e. literatures upon stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP 
financial models). Of course, this is a generic problem in the research. Yin (2011) stated 
that the challenge of starting a research is to come up with a new topic that will collect 
and use primary data. In other words, an original study means a study that has not been 
done before. Accordingly, the aim of collecting data from literature was to study the 
implementation of PPP seaport projects in India with the view of offering suggestions 
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for the improvement of the PPP process – especially the stakeholders’ expectations and 
financial evaluation of such projects. In order to assure the validity of the other sources 
used in the literature review, the preliminary findings were discussed with the experts 
and tested in a pilot study and further validated through a structured questionnaire 
survey.  
4.5.1.2 Interview and pilot study 
To validate the findings of literature review, several interviews were conducted prior to 
and during the pilot study
27
 in India. Literature review is aimed to collect secondary 
data pertaining to stakeholder expectations in utilising PPP financial model. McNamara 
(2006) stated that interview as a method for qualitative technique is particularly useful 
for obtaining primary data such as the story behind a participant’s experiences (in 
utilising PPP financial models including their preferred financial indicators). The 
preliminary results from literature review were formulated into the list of questions for 
the interviews (see appendix 1). There was no requirement for the interviewees to 
answer all of the questions. Hence, a semi-structured interview could give flexibility in 
addressing the questions but still in the right direction. There were also several informal 
discussions undertaken at various occasions (e.g. Port of Liverpool in the UK, PPP/PFI 
Financial Modelling Conference in the UK, PMI India Conference in India, etc.) with 
the experts in PPPs, financial modelling, and seaports. These discussions have benefited 
this study especially in shaping the research direction and anticipating the research 
problems and limitation as shown in table 4.5. 
Although the research problems, and limitations, and necessary actions have been taken 
to minimise their impact, there was another problem in conducting interviews and pilot 
study in India. Before going to India, all participants were contacted through e-mails 
and postal letters. However, due to confidentiality issues and lack of access to 
information, only few responded at the last minutes. This problem was resolved by 
seeking diplomatic help from the embassy of Indonesia to contact the key participants in 
India. Finally, several government bodies and private institutions could be approached 
for an interview. Interviews ended when all of the information have been collected. This 
was indicated by only little information from the interviewee could contribute more to 
                                                 
27
 The purpose of pilot study is to validate the preliminary findings and to prepare a questionnaire survey. 
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the research topic. With a reduced number of the stakeholders’ expectations and the 
preferred financial indicators, a structured questionnaire was ready to be distributed 
worldwide in order to validate the preliminary findings from literature review and pilot 
study.  
 
Table 4.5 Research problems, limitations and necessary actions  
No. Problems Actions Taken 
1 The confidentiality of data (e.g. financial 
model) of PPP seaport projects. 
Using risk management documents which cover risk 
management process plan, risk register, risk 
response strategy, risk response plan, and risk 
review plan for financial implications of PPP 
seaport projects. Sought permission and 
confirmation from the authority which provided the 
data. 
2 The availability of data (e.g. financial 
model, concession agreement, etc.) of PPP 
seaport projects. 
Using free port reform tools from the World Bank 
(World Bank and Public-Private Infrastructure 
Advisory Facility, 2007), an example financial 
model from reference book (Khan and Parra, 2005), 
and official government websites (Department of 
Economic Affairs, 2011).  The concession 
agreement was given by Mumbai Port Authority in 
India. 
3 Selecting a PPP seaport project as case study 
for developing comprehensive integrated 
project evaluation tool.  
Gathering sufficient information from seaport 
authorities and seaport operator companies through 
interviews and document analyses. 
4 Verifying the proposed tool before 
validating it with the user and the experts. 
Sending the questionnaire, about the importance of 
variables used in the proposed tool, to the experts 
and the relevant parties. 
No. Limitations Actions Taken 
1 Different original purpose (e.g. wording, 
categories, motives in evaluating project, 
project procurement policy) documents as 
seaport authorities and seaport operator 
companies prepared the documents for 
their own purposes. 
Confirmation and clarification with the selected 
seaport authorities and seaport operator companies. 
2 Definitional categories in risk management, 
project evaluation tools (e.g. financial 
model) and project procurement policy 
documents may be inconsistent or 
compromised. 
Defining the stakeholders’ expectations and financial 
indicators in PPP seaport projects, the mitigation 
measures based on type and source of risk and etc. 
3 Inherent measurement problems (identify the 
benchmark of financial indicators upon 
PPP financial model and effective project 
evaluation process). 
Setting out type of project evaluation process 
involves in embodied standardization of financial 
indicators, and common practices in project 
evaluation. 
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4 Access and analysis problems to risk 
management information 
Using appropriate spread sheet or data sheet or 
software / to access and analyse the proposed 
project evaluation tool. 
 
4.5.2 Quantitative Data Collection Method 
4.5.2.1 Questionnaire survey and Hypotheses 
Once the recommendation obtained from a pilot study in India, the next data collection 
process was a structured questionnaire survey instrument for opinions of experts 
worldwide and practitioners from government authorities, sponsor companies, 
consultant companies and financing institutions. As part of the triangulation process, a 
structured questionnaire survey was considered to be the second validation process
28
 for 
the preliminary findings. The survey was meant to find out the most important 
stakeholders’ expectations and the most important indicators of PPP financial models. 
Since the expectation and the indicators’ preference of each stakeholder are not always 
the same to the other stakeholder, the questionnaire survey was designed to test the 
following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: All stakeholders agree on the importance of expectations in utilising PPP 
financial model. 
Ho: The mean significance of each expectation is equal between two stakeholder 
groups and within stakeholder groups. 
Ha: The mean significance of each expectation is different between two 
stakeholder groups and within stakeholder groups. 
Hypothesis 2: Stakeholders’ preference on indicator of PPP financial model is equal. 
Ho: The mean significance of each indicator is equal between two stakeholder 
groups and within stakeholder groups. 
Ha: The mean significance of each indicator is different between two stakeholder 
groups and within stakeholder groups. 
                                                 
28
 The first validation was interviews and pilot study in India. 
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If the significant variance of p value is at some critical level (less than 0.05), it means 
that the null hypothesis (Ho) should be rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis 
(Ha). 
A structured questionnaire survey (see Appendix 2) of international expert opinions was 
carried out from May 2011 through July 2011. The respondents were selected based on 
their expertise in managing PPP projects and/or have been involved in using PPP 
financial models.  
Although only the important expectations were included in the questionnaire survey 
based on the recommendation from pilot study, problems were still encountered during 
the survey. A problem that surfaced during the questionnaire distribution was that only 
2 respondents participated in the survey in spite of the fact that 66 online questionnaires 
were initially sent out individually to email addresses. Subsequently, more 
questionnaires were completed after using Linkedin.com, a social network for 
professionals to contact potential respondents. Survey invitations were sent to several 
groups which provided an open access to communicate with the experts and 
professionals in PPP projects, such as ‘PPPs IN EMERGING MARKETS’; ‘Project 
Finance International (PFI)’; ‘Public Private Partnership Research’; ‘Global 
Infrastructure & Project Finance’; etc. 
It is worth noting that PPP projects have several characteristics in common such as long 
term concession period, funding by equity and debt financing, non-recourse financing, 
service provided by private parties, etc. Moreover, the architecture of PPP financial 
models is also relatively identical (Khan and Parra, 2003), including pro forma financial 
statements (e.g. income statement, balance sheet and cash flow statement) in any type of 
PPP projects. The only distinction between one to another type of PPP projects is the 
details on project revenues and expenses. Therefore, in order to explore the 
stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP financial models and the preferred indicators 
of PPP financial models, the respondents’ experiences were not limited into a specific 
type of PPP project.  
4.6 Data Analysis 
Since the rationale for selecting research methods is based on the literature reviewed in 
the previous chapters, it is imperative to ensure that the link between the findings of the 
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literature review and the choice of research design is clearly defined. Thus, several 
research questions and the research strategies were identified prior to the data collection 
stage.  
(a) Who are the stakeholders going to manage the risks related to developing large 
infrastructure projects? The identification of the stakeholders in this study is 
limited to the user and the developer of PPP financial models. 
 
Tool(s) and approach(es): 
This research question was addressed by conducting literature review and 
interviews on evaluation of large infrastructure project and PPP projects. 
(b) Since a PPP financial model is not only a tool for evaluating the project but also 
a tool for negotiating and monitoring the project over concession period, what 
are the most important stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP financial 
models? 
Tool(s) and approach(es): 
The stakeholders’ expectations were identified by undertaking literature review, 
verified by a pilot study, and validated through a structured questionnaire 
survey.  
(c) Since the exploration of the risks in this study concerns the identification of 
financial risk variables, the subsequent research question was “What are the 
financial risk variables within PPP financial models?”  
Tool(s) and approach(es): 
This study focused on the most critical risks. Hence, the most important 
indicators of PPP financial models were defined as financial risk variables. The 
importance of financial risk variables were identified from the literature review 
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and then consolidated into five most important indicators of each input and 
output of PPP financial model (according to each stakeholder’s point of view).  
(d) In order to ensure that the stakeholders’ expectation can be effectively 
reconciled through a PPP financial model, with reference to the Nash 
Equilibrium Theory, it is important to identify the risk related to financial risk 
variables that should be managed by each stakeholder. Therefore, the next 
research question was “What are the possible risks related to the financial risk 
variables (input and output of PPP financial models)?” 
 
Tool(s) and approach(es): 
Since financial risk variables were identified after collecting the data, the 
identified financial risk variables were further analysed by conducting another 
additional literature review to identify the related risks. 
(e) Since the term”managing the risks” means identify, evaluate, and respond to the 
risks by using PPP financial models, the last research question was “How are 
those risks managed?”  
Tool(s) and approach(s): 
This question was addressed through further literature review, interviews, 
discussions, and document analysis. 
4.6.1 Qualitative Data Analysis 
In order to answer the abovementioned research questions, data analyses were 
undertaken. Literature review was conducted from the beginning of the study up to the 
end of thesis write-up. The collected data has been verified by reviewing in greater 
detail about a specific array of previous studies directly related to the topic of study, 
method and data source. In addition, the materials that were believed to show a true 
reflection of the situation on the three selected case studies were also retrieved and 
analysed through pattern matching analysis. Pattern matching analysis is one of five 
techniques (e.g. pattern matching, explanation building, time-series analysis, logic 
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models, and cross-case synthesis) that were used for analysing across the case studies 
(Yin, 2003). Pattern matching was selected in this study because it does not require 
experiment (as needed in time series analysis), a series of iterative process of the case 
(for explanation building), sequential stages (as required in logic models), and a strong 
argumentative interpretation on large numbers of individual case studies (as for cross-
case synthesis). The findings and conclusions from the analysis of the case studies are 
presented and discussed in chapter 5. 
While literature review (including an in-depth analysis of three case projects) aimed to 
collect secondary data pertaining to stakeholders’ expectations and project evaluation by 
using PPP financial models, interview was employed for obtaining primary data such as 
the story behind a participant’s experiences (in utilising PPP financial models). The next 
step was analysing the gathered data from interviews and a pilot study in India. 
 
Figure 4.6 Qualititative data analysis continuum 
Source: Dawson (2007) 
In order to facilitate ease of data analysis, the recorded interviews were transcribed. 
Dawson (2007) advocates five types of qualitative data analyses as positioned on 
continuum, e.g. thematic analysis, comparative analysis, discourse analysis, 
conversational analysis, and content analysis (see figure 4.6). The themes / categories 
are not set in the four qualitative data analyses techniques, and the number of themes is 
not predetermined. Unlike other qualitative data analysis techniques, content analysis 
requires predetermined categories to be analysed to see what the data from various 
participants says about each of the categories. Fellows and Liu (2008) defines that 
content analysis is an analytical approach involving a scrutiny of discussions to 
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establish meanings and intentions of the data. Therefore, content analysis was used to 
study the stakeholders’ expectations on PPP financial models. The content analysis 
approach has also been used in construction research by some, e.g. Chinyio and 
Akintoye (2008), Holzmann and Spiegler (2011), and Edkins et al. (2007). Since 
financial models involve human as modeller and user, it is regarded important to study 
their views of the financial model utilisation and its financial risk variables. 
Accordingly, additional information (including the opposing information) was found to 
be helpful for developing an integrated project evaluation tool. Any additional 
information and/or discrepancy between the findings of literature review and the pilot 
study would be a very interesting issue to explore further. 
However, not all discrepancies were analysed and discussed. Any discrepancies on 
stakeholders’ expectations considered to be unimportant (based on pilot study) were 
removed from the study. Seidman (2006) advocated that content analysis technique is 
connecting threads and patterns among the excerpts within the predetermined 
categories. Content analysis organises and compresses excerpts from the transcripts into 
fewer content categories based on explicit rules of coding (Stemler, 2001). Contents 
regarding different aspects of stakeholders’ expectations and PPP financial indicators 
were interpreted and corroborated in a similar and progressive fashion where construct 
validity was used to ground the findings (Chinyio and Akintoye, 2008). Then, they were 
selected for structured questionnaire survey. Furthermore, the case study findings (from 
cross case and interview analyses) are also useful for supporting the findings of 
quantitative analysis This strategy was adopted in response to the triangulation 
problems addressed by Perlesz and Linday (2003).  
4.6.2 Quantitative Data Analysis 
The last step is applying systematic statistical analyses of the survey responses by using 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software. Adapted from Zhang (2005), 
these can be done through five analyses: (1) Sampling adequacy test of the 
questionnaire survey by using Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO); (2) Principal Component 
Analysis (PCA) to find the important stakeholders’ expectations and to classify them 
based on similar dimension of variance; (3) Validity analysis (Pearson bivariate 
correlations) and reliability analysis (Cronbach alpha) to examine the quality of the 
questionnaire survey and the soundness of the principal component  analysis; (4) One-
 94 
Way ANOVA test and Post Hoc test to find the significant variance and compare mean 
significance indexes as rated by each stakeholder to determine the agreement level in 
the rating of the importance of stakeholders’ expectations; (5) Analysis of the 
significances of the expectations to identify the most important ones in different 
dimensions of stakeholders’ expectations. The survey analysis is discussed in chapter 6 
and the analyses’ results of SPSS software are attached in appendix 3.  
4.6.2.1 Sampling adequacy test with kaiser-meyer-olkin (KMO) test 
Sampling adequacy test is needed to decide whether the sample is sufficient for factor 
analysis or principal component analysis (PCA). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) is 
chosen to examine the sampling adequacy of the questionnaire survey. This 
examination was tested in every stage. The KMO values for the stakeholders’ 
expectations at five stages and financial indicators (Input and Output) are shown in table 
7.2 (the details in SPSS are shown in appendix 3). These values indicate that the data is 
adequate for principal component analysis because it is greater than 0.5 (see Field, 
2009).  
4.6.2.2 Principal component analysis (PCA) 
To determine the important stakeholders’ expectations and to classify them based on 
similar dimension of variance, principal component analysis (PCA) was selected in this 
study. PCA is more appropriate analysis than factor analysis when the primary goal is to 
reduce the number of data (Field, 2009). PCA extracts highly correlated expectations 
into a small number of key components (dimensions) of financial model utilisation. 
There are two main results of PCA: (1) the total variance explained by the extracted 
components, and (2) the rotated component matrix. Since the stakeholders’ expectations 
in utilising PPP financial models are not always identical at every stage, the PCA was 
conducted for each stage.  
4.6.2.3 Validity analysis 
When the emergent components are derived from PCA, the relationships between 
stakeholders’ expectations should be examined to ascertain whether they are positively 
correlated with the other expectations or not. In this analysis, the importance of 
stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP financial models and the preferred financial 
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indicators is measured by using a Likert scale. Although the categorisation of Likert 
scale remains debatable (Norman, 2010)
29
, previous researches in the same area assume 
it as an interval scale (e.g. Chan et al., 2001; Zhang, 2005; Zhang and Jia, 2009; and 
Chan et al., 2009).  
Since the exploration of the relationship between stakeholders’ expectations and 
financial indicators is also included in the analysis, both Pearson bivariate correlation 
(parametric) and Spearman’s rank correlation (non-parametric) analyses are selected for 
this analysis. Therefore, all valid correlations among stakeholders’ expectations and 
relationship between stakeholders’ expectations and financial indicators are entirely 
covered
30
. A two-tailed test is also selected because the nature of the relationship is 
unknown. When the coefficient of correlation is very low (close to zero), there is no 
relationship between variables. However, low coefficient value (r > 0.1) should not be 
undermined because it is lower when more samples are gathered (Field, 2009).  
To figure out the significance of the stakeholders’ expectations relationship31, the p 
value of each correlation (within each principal component) must be less than 0.05.  
When all stakeholders’ expectations are significantly correlated within each component, 
they contain valid stakeholders’ expectations. 
4.6.2.4 Internal consistency reliability analysis 
After validating the relationship between stakeholders’ expectations and the preferred 
financial indicators, the internal consistency or the repeatability of the agreement scale 
should be ensured at certain level. If the agreement scale (ranging from 1-6) for 
measuring the importance of each expectation and financial indicator yields relatively 
the same result over time, its measurement consistency is reliable. Cronbach alpha is 
selected to test the internal consistency reliability of the agreement scale.  
                                                 
29
 While a Likert scale is assumed to be ordinal scale (non-parametric test is preferred), parametric tests 
such as the analysis of variance can also be applied by assuming the scale as an interval scale (Norman, 
2010).  
30
 After testing both methods, it is shown that the findings between Pearson bivariate correlation and 
Spearman’s rank correlation analyses are not always identical. 
31
 The relationship means a correlation among stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP financial 
models. However, it should be noted that correlation does not imply causation (Aldrich, 1995; and 
Kothari, 1997).  
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Although the higher value of Cronbach Alpha (above 0.6 or close to 1) is better, yet the 
emergent value should be cautiously interpreted. Field (2009) stated that when the 
number of variables on the scale increases, Cronbach Alpha will also increase. In order 
to test the internal consistency reliability of the agreement scale, multiple tests must be 
applied with one of the variables deleted. When the results are below or slightly above 
the original Cronbach Alpha, and Corrected Item-Total Correlation test is higher than 
0.2 or 0.3, the internal consistency reliability is achieved (Everitt, 2002 and Field, 
2009). 
4.6.2.5 Agreement Analysis One-Way ANOVA test, Post Hoc Test and Means 
Plot  
The survey is intended to test the hypotheses which have been stated earlier. Since there 
are more than two groups of respondents, One-Way ANOVA test is selected to 
determine whether the mean significance of each expectation and each financial 
indicator are equal across all stakeholders in utilising PPP financial models. The 
following procedure was considered before testing the hypothesis: 
- The first step of variance analyses is calculating the number of responses, mean, 
standard deviation, standard error of the mean, minimum, maximum, and 95% 
confidence intervals for each dependent variable for each group. Typically, in 
the comparison procedures such as ANOVA or T-tests, the group sizes are 
assumed equal (or homogeneity of variance is assumed) to make sure that the 
resulting F-test is valid. However, when the homogeneity of group sizes is 
unknown, the homogeneity of group variance should be tested. 
- Therefore, the second step is to test the homogeneity of group variances by using 
the Levene’s test32. This test confirms whether the variances of the group sizes 
are different or not. If Levene test is significant or the population variances are 
unequal (p-value is less than 0.05), alternative modified procedures (Welch and 
Brown-Forsythe) should also be considered . 
- The third step is the ANOVA test to establish significant variance of p values. 
                                                 
32
 Levene's test is frequently employed before conducting ANOVA and T-tests. It tests the equality of 
variances in different samples. 
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At this step, the significance of variance is tested with caution
33
.  
- In the absence of homogeneity, the fourth step is to test the results of the p value 
associated with standard ANOVA F Statistic by using Robust Tests of Equality 
of Means (Brown and Forsythe, 1974). It is noteworthy that, as with the standard 
F statistic, the Welch statistic is more powerful than the standard F or Brown-
Forsythe statistics when sample sizes and variances are unequal. 
- The fifth step is to identify which group differs from another group by using 
Post Hoc Test. When the sample sizes and variances are unequal or equal 
variances are not assumed, Dunnett’s T3 and Games-Howell are multiple 
comparison tests that are mostly used. Note that when the sample sizes are small 
(i.e. fewer than 50 per group), Dunnett’s T3 should be chosen instead of Games-
Howell procedure (Maxwell and Delaney, 2004). 
In order to test the aforementioned hypotheses, this procedure has been implemented in 
every stage of PPP financial model utilisation. Further details of ANOVA tests are 
shown in appendix 3. However, it is worth applying another method (Means Plot) to see 
the means variance of all stakeholders on the variables (stakeholders’ expectations and 
financial indicators). Although the significance of variance is determined in the 
ANOVA tests, the means plot is useful to visually identify which group differs from 
another group. 
4.7 Model development 
In order to assist government agencies in evaluating bids and making decision 
efficiently, an integrated project evaluation tool (IPET) has been developed for PPP 
seaport projects by considering stakeholders’ expectations, financial risk variables, 
financial risks, and mitigation measures with the following modules: (1) Financial 
                                                 
33
 The validity selection of the standard ANOVA F Statistic depends on the homogeneity of group sizes. 
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viability module
34
; (2) Financial risk analysis module
35
; and (3) Financial risk 
mitigation module
36
. These three modules are discussed in detail in Chapter Eight. 
To develop an integrated project evaluation tool (IPET), all stakeholders’ expectations 
have been investigated through literature review and case studies. As a result, IPET can 
be used to assist the stakeholders in evaluating the project at five different PPP project 
stages: (1) Pre-proposal stage; (2) Contract negotiation stage; (3) Finance-raising stage; 
(4) Construction stage; and (5) Operation stage.  
4.7.1 The pre-proposal stage 
The plan is that all preliminary assumptions at pre-proposal stage will be calculated by 
using financial viability module. This module will assess the financial viability of the 
project. While this module can be used by sponsor(s) to facilitate the submission of a 
convincing proposal or unsolicited proposal for securing the rights to build and operate 
a project, the government authority can also use this module to test the ability of the 
project to deliver value for money.  
Once the project’s proposal is deemed to deliver best value for money, the second 
module (financial risk analysis module) can be used to identify risk from the results of 
base case scenario analysis. The link between the financial risk variables and the related 
risks is established by Influence diagram method. The second module also analyses the 
project risk level through Monte Carlo simulation with 500 iterations. The outcome of 
the simulation are the upper and lower values of financial indicators at 95% confidence 
level (e.g. ROA, ROE, NPV, IRR, DSCR min, LLCR min, Interest Covering Ratio, and 
Payback Period). A single simulation with random probability of future events can also 
be used in the second module in order to reveal the possible financial risks. In other 
words, a single simulation randomly creates different combination of financial input 
indicators (i.e. when land acquisition cost is significantly increased while traffic volume 
is also below the projection, it is possible that DSCR min, IRR, and NPV fall below the 
acceptable rates). The last module (financial risk mitigation module) arranges the 
                                                 
34
 The 1
st
 module is developed in the form of a financial model to evaluate project financial viability and 
compare input bidding data associated with financial risk sharing scenario from the bidders.  
35
 The 2
nd
 module utilizes Influence Diagram method to identify risk from the results of base case scenario 
analysis and Monte Carlo Simulation to analyse the risk level. 
36
 The 3
rd
 module provides the information of identified risks along with risk response. This module also 
analyses the possibility of secondary risks with further risk mitigation exercises. 
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alternative mitigation measures toward the identified type of risks based on the financial 
risk variables. 
At the end of the preliminary evaluation with IPET, the financial and economic 
outcomes are accompanied by the information on risks and its mitigation measures. 
When the financial risks and its mitigation measures are linked to the financial 
indicators at the pre-proposal stage, the government authority will be able to determine 
whether PPP is the best option for the project or not. The sponsor(s) will also have 
greater confidence to a convincing proposal or unsolicited proposal. 
4.7.2 The contract negotiation stage 
It is of merit reminding readers that PPP projects require adequate allocation of the risks 
associated with the complex financial, legal, organisational and socio-political structure, 
between the public sector authority and the private parties involved. Negotiation of risk 
sharing mechanism should be effective and efficient because the longer the negotiation 
period, the more transactions or financing costs will be incurred on the project. There 
are four procurement procedures (Open procedure, Restricted procedure, Competitive 
dialogue, and Negotiated procedure) that are different in nature regarding the 
negotiating of the risk sharing mechanism (Solino and De Santos, 2010). Regardless of 
the type of procurement procedure, risk sharing mechanism has to be communicated 
either before or after submitting the proposal. Thus, an integrated project evaluation tool 
(IPET) can be used to assist in negotiating the risk sharing mechanism at the contract 
negotiation stage. 
However, an IPET is limited to facilitating the negotiation for the risks related to the 
financial viability of the project. When both sponsor(s) and government authority have 
their own financial models coupled with risk management strategies, which are 
identified from IPET at the pre-proposal stage, the negotiation process will be much 
efficient in achieving consensus on the combination of several key important 
parameters
37
. In conjunction with efficient negotiations, Schoop et al. (2010) argued 
that the quality of the negotiation process should be measured by both its economic 
outcome (e.g. in terms of Pareto efficiency and Nash equilibrium) and communication 
                                                 
37
 The use of financial model for a negotiation is intended to achieve consensus on the combination of 
tariff scheme, concession period, and rate of return of a PPP project (Ngee et al., 1997; and Liou and 
Huang, 2008). 
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quality.  It means that an efficient negotiation is not only indicated by the agreed 
combination of financial scenarios but also shown by mutual understanding of the PPP 
concept. 
The procedure of employing IPET at the contract negotiation stage is similar to the pre-
proposal stage. The difference is that whilst the sponsor(s) and the government authority 
use IPET to evaluate the project independently at the pre-proposal stage, both parties 
can utilise IPET to evaluate the project together and discuss the risk sharing mechanism 
at the contract negotiation stage. Thus, by using the same evaluation framework through 
IPET, it is expected that a mutual understanding of the PPP concept will be achieved 
before agreeing the combination of financial scenarios. 
4.7.3 The finance-raising stage 
The finance-raising stage is initiated when an underwriter or a club of lenders expresses 
an interest through a mandate letter to sponsor(s) because the project is sufficient to 
cover the debt needs. At this stage, the initial financial model is modified into a Lender 
Base Case financial model in order to undertake due diligence of the project’s financial 
viability. However, due diligence procedure for PPP projects, with a relative high 
investment volume, is a time consuming process (Daube et al., 2008). There is a 
tendency for lenders to revisit issues previously agreed by sponsor and government 
authority for securing their interest on risk management (Cartlidge, 2006). An IPET can 
be employed to assist in shortening the due diligence process because the stakeholders’ 
expectations (including lenders’ expectations) have been considered by using IPET 
since from the pre-proposal stage. For that reason, it should not require very long 
discussion before reaching an agreement between sponsor(s) and lenders. 
The procedure for utilising IPET at finance-raising stage is a little bit different 
compared to the pre-proposal and the contract negotiation stages. At this stage, IPET 
will assist sponsor(s) in collaborating with lenders in the process of transforming the 
initial model to the lender’s base case financial model. IPET provides information about 
some input data (in the financial viability module) linked to the information about the 
possible risks (in the financial risk analysis module) and its mitigation measures (in the 
financial risk mitigation module), which will be modified due to the recommendation of 
expert opinion and/or any changing circumstances.  
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4.7.4 The construction stage 
At the construction stage, an IPET can be employed to assist in monitoring and tracking 
the performance of the construction project. By updating the input data (in the financial 
viability module) based on the schedule of debt and equity disbursements and the 
financing costs, IPET displays information about the possible risks (in the financial risk 
analysis module) and their mitigation measures (in the financial risk mitigation 
module). 
4.7.5 The operation stage 
The first six months after commencing the operation stage is a very critical period for a 
PPP project. At times, the revenues collected until (or even after) the sixth month of the 
operation period may be insufficient to meet debt service obligations (Khan and Parra, 
2003). It is imperative that the operational risks should be clearly anticipated in the 
concession contract and/or the other agreements. Since an integrated project evaluation 
tool (IPET) contains information about all possible risk and its mitigation measures 
related to the important financial indicators (financial risk variables), it is very useful to 
assist the stakeholders in monitoring the operation performance and anticipating the 
operational risks. The procedure for employing IPET at the operation stage is simply 
updating the input data with the real data (in the financial viability module). Then,  
IPET will show the information about the possible risks (in the financial risk analysis 
module) and its mitigation measures (in the financial risk mitigation module). 
4.8 Verification and validation 
An integrated project evaluation tool (IPET) consists of three modules, developed by 
considering the stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP financial models. In order to 
ensure that the proposed tool meets stakeholders’ expectations, it has to be verified and 
validated in a holistic manner. Boehm (1984) succinctly expressed the difference 
between verification and validation. Verification is defined as an enquiry whether the 
product is built in the right way or not. However, an evaluation process to determine 
whether it is the right product is called validation. Therefore, IPET was verified and 
validated in three stages.  
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The first stage was identifying stakeholders’ expectations and preference on the 
financial model variables through literature review. Their expectations are very useful to 
verify the direction of developing IPET. It is also essential to ensure that every 
expectation and preference indicator is valid, and its results can be taken into 
consideration with confidence in the development process. Systematic statistical 
analyses of the survey responses were applied to validate the stakeholders’ expectations 
and their preference indicators by using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences 
(SPSS) software. These analyses are discussed in chapter seven.  
Additionally, the findings were further verified by comparing the input and output 
indicators of financial model with three samples of financial models (Kulkarni and 
Prusty, 2007; World Bank and PPIAF, 2007; Khan and Parra, 2003). The results of 
these analyses are discussed in chapter eight. Once IPET was developed at the third 
stage, the proposed tool was tested and validated. The model testing should be tested by 
using real data. Although numerous attempts were made to access data from real PPP 
projects (i.e. field trip to India, online search, written statement not to disclose any 
confidential information, etc.), the real data anticipated could not be obtained. 
Therefore, hypothetical data was used in the first strategy to test the tool and check the 
output against any error or discrepancies by comparing the output of IPET with a 
sample financial model from Khan and Parra (2003). In this research, only the financial 
viability module was tested separately. The other two modules are complimentary to the 
first module; testing and validation of the proposed tool were done in an integrated 
manner. Subsequently, experts who have experience in the field of PPP projects 
reviewed the effectiveness and the applicability of the tool. Swan (2008) stated that a 
good model is tested by knowing how the users respond to it. The results of these tests 
are discussed in Chapter Nine. 
4.9 Chapter Summary 
The main rationale of the research methods justification was underpinning on how to 
develop an integrated project evaluation tool that can be used effectively to assist in 
evaluating the project and negotiating the risk sharing mechanism for PPP projects. This 
chapter has discussed the selected approach to conduct the research, to collect data, to 
develop and validate the proposed tool. A triangulation strategy was justified with 
caution due to the possibility of error. A qualitative method (to explore stakeholders’ 
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expectation and preferred indicators of PPP financial models) was followed prior to 
performing a qualitative technique (to narrow down the preliminary findings). Then, the 
proposed tool was then validated qualitatively by comparing the results with secondary 
data and asking experts for their opinion regarding its applicability. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CASE STUDY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
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Chapter 5: Case Study Analysis and Discussion 
“Be studious in your profession, and you will be learned. Be industrious and frugal, and 
you will be rich. Be sober and temperate, and you will be healthy. Be in general 
virtuous, and you will be happy. At least you will, by such conduct, stand the be.” 
(Benjamin Franklin 1706 – 1790) 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 reports the findings of cross case analysis of three PPP seaport projects in 
India. The primary aim of this chapter is to study the implementation of PPP seaport 
projects. In order to achieve the aim of this chapter, this chapter identifies typical 
procedures used for evaluating PPP seaport projects
38
 in India. The structure of this 
chapter is divided into five sections. 
The first section is introduction of the chapter. Then, the brief background information 
of the PPP seaport projects in India is presented in the second section. The third section 
discusses the implementation and evaluation procedure of PPP seaport projects in India 
with three case studies. In this section, the cross case analysis finishes off with the 
presentation of the commonality patterns and other factors that influence the 
implementation of PPP seaport projects in India.   
5.2 Public private partnership seaports in India 
Government has the responsibility for providing public services including infrastructure 
facilities. Various types of infrastructure constitute essential public services, for 
instance: transportation, energy, telecommunications, water, waste disposal, hospital, 
school, and housing facilities. Public-Private Partnership (PPP) offers many potential 
advantages for the government in providing infrastructure facilities (Askar and Gab-
Allah, 2002). Although Cheung and Chan (2009) remarked that PPP is not always the 
best option to procure infrastructure projects, 12 of 63 developing countries under 
International Development Association (IDA) reached financial or contractual closure 
for 24 transportation, energy, and water projects with private investment commitments 
of US$7.5 billion in 2010 (Perard, 2011).  
                                                 
38
 The projects were basically selected for practical reasons i.e. their availability. 
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 In the context of the transportation sector, Kakimoto and Seneviratne (2000),  Bichou 
and Gray (2005), and Kulkarni and Prusty (2007) have meticulously described the role 
of port infrastructure as economic catalysts for promoting seaborne trade activity and 
generating benefits and socio-economic wealth in developing countries. India, one of 
the fastest growing among developing countries, has attractive policies in favour of 
private participation in infrastructure provision with varying degrees of success.  
The seaports in India have tremendous scope for international maritime transport both 
for cargo handling and passenger. With 12 major ports (see figure 5.1) and 187 minor 
ports, 7,517 km long, Indian coastline plays a pivotal role in the maritime transport 
serving in the international trade. Since 2010, Department of Economic Affairs 
Infrastructure under the Ministry of Finance, Government of India has been heavily 
involved in PPP research.  The government of India has an innovative program called 
PPP capacity building programme, which developed a PPP toolkit to assist decision-
making for infrastructure PPPs in India and to improve the quality of on-going PPP 
projects. The toolkit was developed under a non-lending technical assistance co-
financed by the World Bank, AusAID South Asia Region Infrastructure for Growth 
Initiative and the Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF). The PPP 
Toolkit was designed with a focus on helping decision-making by Project Officers 
across India at the Central, State and Municipal levels through four phases comprising: 
Project identification, Full feasibility, PPP procurement, and PPP contract management 
and monitoring. 
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Figure 5.1 Indian map seaport 
Some constraints being faced by the Government of India in  promoting PPP, i.e: 
insufficient instruments to undertake long-term equity and financial liability required by 
infrastructure projects, much hindrance in enabling a regulatory framework,  inability of 
the private sector to fit into the risk of investing in diversified projects, lack of 
credibility of bankable infrastructure projects used for financing the private sector, and 
inadequate support to enable greater acceptance of PPPs by the stakeholders (DEA, 
2012). Therefore, next section discusses a brief background of public private 
partnerships in Indian seaport sector. 
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5.2.1 Background of public private partnerships in Indian seaport sector 
The Indian port sector has been plagued by several problems due to inadequate capacity 
and operational inefficiency. The 12 major ports in India had capacity over-utilization, 
which handled about 179.02 million tonnes of traffic in 1993-94 compared to total 
cargo handling capacity of 172.59 million tonnes at major ports, as illustrated in figure 
5.2 (TRW, 2010).  
 
Figure 5.2 Indian major seaports capacity and traffic (in million tonnes) 
Source: Transport Research Wing (TRW, 2010) 
As a  consequence of the capacity inadequacy, the Indian seaport operations also lagged 
behind foreign counterparts (Ray, 2005).The operational inefficiency of Indian seaports 
resulted in higher through-put and sea transport costs, which means that cargo shipped 
from Indian seaports were 45%-50% costlier than the norm, thus becoming non-
competitive in the international market (World Bank, 1995). In order to overcome the 
above problems coupled with need for provision of cost-efficient service to customers, 
especially for the public sector ownership of ports that created the usual problems of 
accountability and inefficiency, the Government of India decided to encourage private 
sector participation. The first guidelines for private sector participation in major 
seaports were announced by the Ministry of Surface Transport in October 1996 (MoST, 
1996). Since then PPPs  have been promoted for implementation of infrastructure 
projects in India (DEA, 2012). The following sections will discuss the detailed 
procedure for evaluating PPP seaport projects in India.  
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5.3 Procedure for evaluating PPP seaport projects in India  
The government of India has an innovative program called PPP capacity building 
programme, which develops a PPP toolkit to assist decision-making for infrastructure 
PPPs in India and to improve the quality of the on-going PPP projects. This program 
has been developed by the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA), Ministry of 
Finance, and Government of India with funding support from the World Bank, AusAID 
South Asia Region Infrastructure for Growth Initiative and the Public Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF). Since this research focuses on how 
stakeholders use PPP financial model in the PPP process, the next section will briefly 
discuss the procedure for PPP financial model utilisation in the Indian PPP toolkit. 
5.3.1   Major activities in the PPP Process 
The procedure for evaluating PPP seaport projects in India is best presented based on 
the major activities of PPP process and also limited to the utilisation of the PPP toolkit. 
The Indian PPP toolkit is a set of tools designed to assist the analysis and decision 
making of potential PPPs. The PPP toolkit comprises six tools as follows: 
 PPP Family Indicator Tool: A starting indication tool for selecting the right PPP 
mode for the particular project in the sector. 
 PPP Model Validation Tool: A risk allocation analysis tool for choosing the best 
PPP model for the project. 
 The PPP Suitability Filter: A PPP suitability test tool is used in Phase 1 for the 
selected project. 
 PPP Financial Viability Indicator Model: A financial analysis tool examines the key 
questions of financial viability and the “what-if” scenarios used in Phase 1, Phase 2, 
and Phase 3. 
 VFM Indicator Tool: A value-for-money (VFM) analysis tool in an extended 
analysis from the outcome of PPP Financial Viability Indicator Model for 
highlighting the uncertainty by using a range of VFM values. This means the 
indicator can incorporate uncertainty into the result and give a better indication of 
how likely the PPP is to deliver VFM. 
 Readiness Filter: A checklist is used in all phases for all the important steps that 
should be followed. 
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Amongst the above 6 components of the PPP toolkit, this research focuses only on two 
financial related tools namely PPP Financial Viability Indicator Model and VFM 
Indicator tool. Since the PPP toolkit was first introduced in 2010, the two financial 
related tools were not available in the three case studies. Nevertheless, the investigation 
of three PPP projects will aid the understanding of the background of PPP toolkit 
development and help in proposing a number of suggestions to improve the quality and 
effectiveness of the evaluation procedure for PPP seaport projects.  
Project stakeholders or PPP practitioners can use the PPP toolkit at four phases in the 
PPP process as illustrated in figure 5.3. 
 Phase 1: PPP identification, covering strategic planning, project pre-feasibility 
analysis, PPP suitability checks, and internal clearance to proceed with PPP 
development 
 Phase 2: Full feasibility, PPP preparation and project clearance, covering project 
appraisal including a full feasibility study, PPP preparation including draft 
documents, and in-principle clearance 
 Phase 3: PPP procurement, covering procurement, final drafts of bidding 
documents, final approval and project award 
 Phase 4: PPP contract management and monitoring, covering project 
implementation and monitoring over the life of the PPP 
The main goal of phase 1 is to identify the project’s quality for development and the 
project’s suitability for PPP.  At phase 1, the Sponsoring Authority (e.g. ministry(s) for 
Central-level projects, sponsoring department(s), Urban Local Body, or other statutory 
or public sector corporate entity as appropriate to the case) will be responsible for 
identifying and testing projects.  
Since the process at phase 2 requires more resources in the form of people, time and 
money, projects must pass phase 1 checks before they enter phase 2. The heart of phase 
2 is a full feasibility study. Preparation for the procurement process also begins in this 
phase, including selection of the best procurement method and first drafts of the bidding 
documents. The Sponsoring Authority (e.g. ministry(s) (Central-level projects), 
sponsoring department(s), or statutory or public sector corporate entity, as appropriate 
to the case) will be responsible for conducting full feasibility study with support from 
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dedicated PPP agencies, such as a PPP Cell or Project Development Agency. The final 
step in phase 2 is an application for In-principle Clearance by the Appraisal/Clearance 
Authority. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 The PPP process and decision tools 
Source: Department of Economic Affairs (DEA, 2012) 
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Projects that are granted In-principle Clearance can move to the Procurement Phase 
(phase 3). The Sponsoring Authority (e.g. ministry(s) for Central-level projects, 
sponsoring department(s), Urban Local Body, or other statutory or public sector 
corporate entities as appropriate to the case) will be responsible for selecting the best 
qualified private sector partner for the PPP and concluding the concession agreement. 
At the completion of this phase, the project will have completed its development as a 
PPP and will be ready to enter the contract management and monitoring phase (phase 4) 
that continues throughout the life of the PPP.  
5.3.2 PPP financial viability indicator model and vfm indicator tool 
The financial viability of a PPP project in India is examined quantitatively by 
addressing the key questions of financial viability and the “what-if” scenarios in three 
phases: phase 1, phase 2, and phase 3. The outcome of PPP financial viability indicator 
model is further analysed by using a value-for-money (VFM) analysis for highlighting 
the uncertainty by using a range of VFM values. Therefore, the indicator can 
incorporate uncertainty into the result and give a better indication of how likely the PPP 
is to deliver VFM. The VFM Indicator tool combines qualitative and quantitative 
approaches in assessing VFM. This tool is used in phase 2 and phase 3. 
To study how Indian government employ a financial model in assessing the project 
financial viability and value for money, the financial model utilisation was explored 
under small number of specific activities to understand which activity involves financial 
analysis. 
 
5.3.2.1 Financial viability indicator model utilisation at phase 1  
Phase 1 is a PPP identification phase, which covers several activities such as: strategic 
planning, project pre-feasibility analysis, PPP suitability checks, and internal clearance 
to proceed with PPP development, as illustrated in figure 4. This research focuses on 
each activity that requires financial analysis such as project pre-feasibility analysis. 
 
The preliminary financial and economic viability of the proposed project is best seen 
from the perspective of private sector (i.e. the analysis looks at after tax returns 
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compared to expected after-tax ROE for a commercial developer), which includes an 
assessment of: 
 The cost recovery/income generation assumptions of the project 
 Likely private sector interest in the project 
 The overall project cost (capital + operations + maintenance costs) 
 Possible financial risks 
 Identification of likely economic benefits generated by the project 
To help the project sponsor in making their own assessment of the PPP project, a 
simplified Financial Viability Indication model is formed in a spreadsheet that runs in 
Microsoft Excel. The Financial Viability Indicator can be used at this stage to make a 
preliminary assessment of the likely viability of the project for the private sector, 
including any requirements for public sector support, and to assess ‘what-if?’ scenarios. 
This tool allows: 
 An assessment of the level of user charges or other payment is needed to make 
the project attractive to the private sector 
 An initial test of whether and how much government support is likely to be 
needed (for example, through VGF funding) 
 ‘What-if?’ tests of different project designs and alternative project outcomes 
 
In order to keep the applicability of the financial viability model across sectors and 
projects, the complexity of the financial viability model has been deliberately reduced. 
Moreover, the reduced level of detail can be helpful as a tool for assisting the Project 
Officers focus on the fundamental issues affecting the project. Nevertheless, all of the 
key financial inputs and variables are still retained to highlight the key project details to 
Project Officers in a way that is most accessible. 
 
The model contains six main sheets as follows: 
Set up and information input sheets: 
1. Set up sheet: It contains background assumptions such as type of PPP, the 
project life and macroeconomic information (e.g., inflation) that should be 
provided by the users.  
2. Demand sheet: The users provide the information about the initial cargo traffic 
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and forecast traffic growth rates on this sheet. 
3. CapEx sheet: If the project has Capital Expenditure, the planned capital 
investment and structure should be filled on this sheet. 
4. Costs sheet: The users provide information about the expected operating 
expenditure (OpEx) and License fees related to the project on this sheet. 
5. Revenue sheet: All charges to port users (e.g., usage fees, annuity payments, 
etc.) are provided on this sheet. 
Output sheet: 
6. Viability analysis sheet: An overall summary of the project’s financial viability 
from a private investors’ perspective shows project cash flows and key financial 
ratios such as NPV, IRR, Debt service coverage, Loan life cover, Net profit 
margin, etc. 
There are three steps in using financial viability model at this stage. The first step is 
setting up the analysis by entering the required data to describe the project. The second 
step is reviewing the results provided on the Viability Analysis sheet. This step should 
be repeated with different combination to find the viable option that meets project 
objectives. This repetition is called ‘what-if’ analysis (the third step). In this analysis, 
some key inputs (e.g., revenue levels, grant funding, concession length, etc) are changed 
with different scenarios. From the output on Viability Analysis sheet, the project’s 
viability can be determined whether it meets the project objectives or not. If it is not 
viable, two options should be made either redesign or to be dropped. 
 
After completing the pre-feasibility analyses and PPP suitability checks, the Sponsoring 
Authority shall obtain a well-defined description of the proposed project such as its 
general scope, identified resettlement and environmental issues and requirements, any 
identified project risks, preliminary cost estimates, income generating opportunities, 
initial financial viability, private sector opportunities, and what further actions are 
required to complete the project preparation and by whom. 
 
The results of the pre-feasibility analysis would be drawn together into the Pre-
Feasibility Report (PFR). The summary of pre-feasibility report checklist for financial 
and economic viability is shown in table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 Financial and economic viability checklist (DEA, 2012) 
Pre-feasibility task 
Completed: 
yes/no? 
D. Financial and economic viability   
1  
Have all major project cost components (capital, operations, maintenance) of 
the technical scope of the project been estimated? 
  
 2 
Are the assumptions on major project cost components reasonable, can they be 
justified based on a rationale? 
  
 3 Has a preliminary market demand analysis been done? (Tariffs, Volume)   
 4 
Are the assumptions on tariff/ prices reasonable, can they be justified based on 
a rationale? Will the users be willing to pay the proposed tariff/ prices? 
  
 5 
Are the assumptions on volume/ quantity of usage reasonable, can they be 
justified based on a rationale? 
  
 6 
Have similar projects that were done in the past been analysed for project cost, 
tariff/ prices and volume/ quantity of usage? 
  
 7 
Are the assumptions in the proposed project comparable to similar projects that 
were done in the past? If not, then can the assumptions be justified on sound 
economic rationale? 
  
 8 
Has a financial analysis model, such as the Financial Viability model in the 
PPP toolkit, been used to assess the financial viability of the project? 
  
 9 Have preliminary financial projections been prepared?   
 10 
For a project that is to be developed with private sector participation, has an 
estimate of required financial support from the public sector been made? 
  
 11 Have the key financial ratios been computed? (e.g., NPV, IRR, etc.)   
 12 Have the major financial and commercial risks to the project been identified?   
 13 
Have the impact and management strategy of the financial and commercial 
risks to the project been prepared? 
  
 14 Has a sensitivity analysis been undertaken?   
 15 
Does the preliminary financial analysis demonstrate that the Sponsoring 
Authority will recover its investments along with a reasonable return under 
reasonable scenarios? 
  
 16 Have the likely economic benefits generated by the project been identified?   
 17 
Based on the preliminary analysis, does the Sponsoring Authority consider the 
Project Concept to be financially and economically viable? 
  
 18 
Has a strong rationale and recommendation been made by the Sponsoring 
Authority in the preliminary assessment? 
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5.3.2.2 Financial viability indicator model and vfm indicator tool utilisation at 
phase 2 
At phase 2, it is assumed that the proposed PPP project is sufficiently developed and 
adequately justified to make the costs of preparing a full Feasibility Study worthwhile. 
The next stage of analysis at Phase 2 incorporates a full feasibility study and PPP due 
diligence. The full feasibility study is an expansion of the preliminary scoping in the 
Pre-Feasibility Report, which enables a more thorough assessment of project costs, 
benefits and risks, and further refines its development as a PPP. The Sponsoring 
Authority will assess and describe the technical, environmental, legal, social, financial, 
economic, and risk characteristics of the project; and produce a project implementation 
schedule. For the projects that require capital expenditure, a more comprehensive 
analysis is required. 
At this stage, Financial Viability Indicator model is updated for a PPP due diligence 
analysis, the impact reassessment of changing parts of the project design, and 
verification of the feasibility study model results. The VFM Indicator Tool is also used 
to test the likelihood of achieving Value for Money that is based on the results of the 
feasibility study and the experience and knowledge of the analytical team. Since India 
currently has limited data on previous project outcomes, qualitative inputs based on the 
Project Team and Advisors’ experience is very important. Thus, the ability to use the 
tool in full may be a subject to availability of past data. 
Although there are three tools (PPP Financial Viability Indicator Model, VFM Indicator 
Model, and Readiness Filter) used in this phase, the results of the Full Feasibility Study 
and VFM analysis would be important inputs to the application for In-principle 
Clearance to procure the project as a PPP. Therefore, the project’s financial viability 
and ratio analysis cover Financial Structure Ratios, Debt to Equity Ratio (DER), Annual 
Debt Service Cover Ratio (ADSCR), Loan Life Coverage Ratio (LLCR), and Project 
Life Coverage Ratio (PLCR). It is also worth describing the general contents of a full 
feasibility study in India as follows: 
 Market analysis and project scope, to assess the need for an appropriate scope 
of the project, and to build on the work already done at the strategic planning 
and pre-feasibility stage. This would include: 
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- Needs analysis – does the project meet an end-user need? Does it contribute 
to meeting the objectives of the sponsoring authority? Who will the users be? 
- Options analysis – what is the best option for meeting the service need: a no-
asset solution, existing assets, or new assets? 
- Define the output – what services will the project provide? 
- Estimate and forecast demand – what level of demand is there for the outputs 
/ services from the project, and how much are users willing to pay (what is 
the value of the demand)? 
 Social and environmental feasibility, including the requirements for impact 
assessments and for the associated mitigations. 
 Technical feasibility and technical parameters based on the market 
analysis, including specification of required facilities and scenarios of project 
size, for use in preliminary project design. 
 Risk studies and refined PPP mode – Assessment of the risks associated with 
the project, study of which party is best able to bear each risk, and refinement of 
the PPP mode selected at the pre-feasibility stage. 
 Preliminary cost assessment, within a sufficient ±% range based on the 
technical specification and assessed project risks. 
 Financial analysis and due diligence, incorporating projected revenue structure 
(e.g. Proposed tariff, required annuity) and assessing any need for financial 
support from the public sector. 
 Economic feasibility – Assessment of overall net economic benefit of the 
project, incorporating estimated project benefits and costs including non-market 
factors such as those from the social and environmental assessment. 
 Other PPP due diligence activities, including value-for money analysis if data 
is available. 
 Project implementation schedule, including an outline of the proposed PPP 
procurement and award process through to technical and financial close, an 
outline of the construction schedule and target operation date, and any phasing 
that is planned for project extensions or on-going development. 
Among the contents of full feasibility study, the financial viability indicator model and 
VFM indicator tool are heavily involved in the financial analysis and due diligence. A 
quantitative analysis of the financial feasibility of the project allows an assessment of 
likely Viability Gap Funding (VGF) or other public-sector financial assistance 
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requirements [e.g., India Infrastructure Finance Company (IIFCL) or state-level PPP 
finance vehicles]. Both financial viability indicator model and VFM indicator tool use 
information gained from the demand forecasts, technical feasibility, and cost estimates 
(including demand and cost scenarios). Figure 5.4 shows a typical structure and 
information flows in a financial model. 
 
Figure 5.4 Typical Structure and information flows in Indian PPP financial model 
Source: Department of economic affairs (DEA, 2012) 
 
In general, the inputs to the detailed financial analysis of Indian PPP financial model 
include the following: 
 The life-cycle costs of the project and their timing. These include the estimated 
capital costs and operating and maintenance (O&M) costs identified in the cost 
assessment and a depreciation schedule for physical assets. 
 Project specifications (e.g. investment timing, lifetime etc.) 
 Revenue options and the associated forecast revenue stream. This will include 
Sensitivity  
tests 
Outputs: 
IRR, NPV, Subsidy (VGF), 
Summary Data 
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tariffs (where user-charges are possible), and secondary revenue sources from 
the project. 
 Forecast demand including scenario ranges from the feasibility study. 
 Assumed capital structure (debt - equity mix) of private sector investment 
vehicle. 
 Debt and repayment schedule. 
 The discount rates for the public sector and private investor consistent with the 
capital structure and allocation of project risks. 
 
The discount rate (or required rate of return) is an important input that is used to 
undertake present value analysis. There are two different discount rates that should be 
used separately. To determine what a commercial investor would require for their 
investment activity, a realistic assessment of commercial discount rate should be used in 
the first analysis.  When the government is willing to participate in obtaining loan from 
the bank, the second discount rate that is used in the second analysis may be lower than 
that applied for private sector investors. However, the discount rates are a subject to the 
borrower’s credit rating. 
It is also important to reduce optimism bias by considering different range of 
sensitivities on its assumption for probable outcomes. The typical outputs of the Indian 
PPP financial model, which are also parts of the quantitative assessment of PPP 
financial viability indicator model as follows: 
 Expected returns from the project illustrated by the NPV and IRR. 
 An assessment of subsidy or viability gap funding requirements where there is a 
viability gap between the revenue requirement and the revenues that can be 
raised from users 
 Summary financial information including ratio analysis 
5.3.2.3 Financial viability indicator model and vfm indicator tool utilisation at 
phase 3 
Once the best-suited procurement method for the project has been decided, PPP 
financial viability indicator model and VFM indicator tool are used by Procurement and 
Evaluation (P&E) team to evaluate the financial components of bids. In order to keep 
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the fairness of the bidding evaluation, an Independent Monitor team is invited to be 
present for all evaluation meetings.  
The bidders that conform to the minimum requirements on the lead member of a bid 
consortium, such as the minimum equity share, are invited to submit their bid. In order 
to be selected for a further financial evaluation, the submitted proposal should pass the 
minimum technical requirements or beat the cut-off score that have been clearly 
specified in the RFP. Then, the financial components of the Indian PPP seaport bids are 
entered into the financial model for the project or into the Financial Viability Indicator 
tool and analysed against the financial criteria. The P&E team provides relatively easy 
bid presentation instructions for the evaluation team to enter the financial details into 
the model. 
The Indian government considers the bidder with the best financial offer (e.g. lowest 
price, highest concession fee payment etc) that will be selected as the preferred bidder. 
The other considerations such as: the whole-of-life costs, payments in the bid, and Net 
Present Value are calculated to enable comparison between bids with different cash 
flow timing. Nevertheless, the submitted financial bid can be categorised as speculative 
bid when the bidder offers a price that is below what they are actually willing to honour. 
Thus, the financial model and the benchmark cost, which were prepared in the phase 1 
and 2, are used to guide an indication of a reasonable range of realistic cost savings. 
 
A realistic cost saving is one of value for money (VFM) indicators for the public sector. 
Generally, when the PPP has been well prepared and well-designed during phase 1 and 
phase 2, the project will have a good chance of delivering value for money. The central 
inputs to the VFM test are the risk acceptances made in the technical bid and the 
financial offers. The challenges of quantifying VFM are the availability of data on past 
cost experiences [e.g. previous project costs, both the budgeted costs and the actual 
costs (including overruns] from similar projects to the one being tendered. Since the 
required data is limited, the P&E team must judge the likelihood of VFM in the 
particular project using a mix of qualitative and quantitative factors. The next section 
will discuss the several case studies to study the implementation of PPP seaport projects 
in India. 
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5.4 Case Studies 
In this section, three PPP seaport projects in India are selected to investigate a 
contemporary phenomenon of typical procedures used for evaluating PPP projects. 
Figure 5.5 shows the PPP project process and initiatives by the Ministry of Finance, 
which may help to identify the involvement of the most influential actors when 
evaluating PPP projects. Hence, the evaluation procedure of PPP process will be 
presented in the form of chronological structure. Figure 5.6 illustrates important 
milestones in the three PPP seaport projects in India, which also demonstrates five PPP 
project stages.  
 
Figure 5.5: PPP projects process management in india 
Source: Department of economic affairs (DEA, 2012) 
5.4.1 The Nhava Sheva International Container Terminal 
The Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT) was established in 1989 and equipped with 
modern container and bulk handling facilities to overcome the existing port’s 
deficiencies and the anomalies characterizing the Indian port sector. However, the JNPT 
failed to live up to the expectations it had generated regarding its performance since its 
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inception right up to 1994.  The JNPT also suffered from some of the drawbacks 
inherent in the Indian port sector in the pre-reforms era, especially in terms of capacity 
that prevented it from achieving world standards of port efficiency and performance.  
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Figure 5.6 Important milestones of three PPP seaport projects in India 
Subsequently, the Port administration soon realized the urgent need to upgrade and 
augment the port’s equipment to ensure larger cargo handling capability. The JNPT 
took the initiative to introduce private participation in ports for the first time in India. In 
January 1994, tender documents were initially prepared for contracting out the container 
terminal at JNPT to private operators. However, in 1995, the proposal was amended and 
it was decided to invite private participation in creating a new container terminal while 
retaining the existing one under government ownership and operation. After issuing a 
global tender, the Nhava Sheva International Container Terminal (NSICT) was 
appointed in 1997 to construct a new two-berth container terminal of 600-meter quay 
length on Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) basis for thirty years. Detailed information 
about the project and the main stakeholders, are shown in table 5.2. 
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Table 5.2 Main Stakeholders in the PPP Seaports Projects in India 
Case 
Study 
No. 
Project 
Stakeholders 
Government / 
Sponsoring 
Authority 
Independent 
Regulator 
Private Sector Promoter 
/ Sponsor / Consortium 
Members 
Lenders 
1 Nhava Sheva 
International 
Container 
Terminal 
Jawaharlal 
Nehru Port 
Trust 
Tariff Authority 
for Major 
Ports (TAMP) 
P&O Australia Ports 
Pty Limited, 
Konsortium 
Perkapalan Berhad 
and Trans Impex 
Private Limited 
(P&O Ports 
subsequently taken 
over by Dubai Ports 
World Limited (DP 
World)) 
A consortium of 
lenders led by 
ICICI Bank, ANZ 
Investment Bank, 
HSBC and 
Standard 
Chartered 
2 Gangavaram 
Port 
Government of 
Andhra 
Pradesh (No 
VGF has been 
provided to 
the project) 
Tariff Authority 
for Major 
Ports (TAMP) 
D.V.S. Raju of 
VisualSoft 
Technology (80% of 
Equity) & Dubai 
Port Authority, was 
later replaced by 
Integrax Berhad 
(20%), Warburg 
Pincus and the 
Andhra Pradesh 
Infrastructure 
Investment Company 
(APIIC) 
A consortium of 13 
Banks (State Bank 
of India, IDBI, 
Punjab National 
Bank, State Bank 
of Hyderabad, 
State Bank of 
Patiala and 
Oriental Bank of 
Commerce) led by 
SBI Capital 
Markets arranged 
term senior & 
subordinate loans 
of Rs.  
3 Kakinada 
Deep Water 
Port 
Government of 
Andhra 
Pradesh 
Tariff Authority 
for Major 
Ports (TAMP) 
Larsen & Toubro Ltd, 
India, Stevedoring 
Services of America, 
USA, Precious 
Shipping Company, 
Thailand, 
Konsortium 
Perkaplan Berhard, 
Malaysia 
Asian Development 
Bank 
 
5.4.1.1 Management of PPP project process 
The preparation for the procurement process of a new container terminal by JNPT Port 
Planning and Development Department took a long time. Earlier involvements of the 
World Bank, Ministry of Surface Transport (MoST) and other ministries, from the 
inception and procurement stages, did not guarantee a smooth evaluation process in 
finalising the bid documents. The procurement process was delayed by about 2 years.  
In December 1995, JNPT finally issued the international tender for a new container 
terminal on “Build, Operate and Transfer” basis for 30 years. Although 30 firms from 
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India and abroad purchased the bid document, of which five consortia submitted 
proposals, the tender evaluation criterion used was too simplistic. The bidder with the 
highest NPV of Royalty payment was selected, which was a consortium led by P&O 
Ports Australia Pvt. Ltd. including DBC Port Management and Konsortium Perkapalan 
Berhad. The royalty was based on Twenty-feet Equivalent Unit (TEU) handled traffic, 
which ranged from about 2% in the initial years to about 50% of the Minimum 
Guaranteed Royalty payment in the terminal year. The concession agreement between 
JNPT and the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) Company led by P&O Ports (now Dubai 
Ports) was finalised and signed in January 1997.  
5.4.1.2 Financial viability analysis 
The cost of terminal project development was Rs. 733 crores, funded without Viability 
Gap Funding (VGF) support from the government. The financial structure proposed by 
the SPV was 50% debt and 50% equity.  A consortium of lenders led by ICICI Bank 
loaned around Rs. 190 crores (26% of project cost) to the SPV under a guarantee 
provided by P&O Ports, Australia. The remaining debt of Rs. 177 crores was raised 
from other financial institutions. The cost of debt is 10.5%. The financial viability 
analysis showed that the estimated project IRR was 18% and the NPV based on the 
winning consortium’s bid was Rs. 224.59 crores.  
Although the project was considered financially viable, the lack of a methodology in 
evaluating the royalty payout to JNPT and the failure to anticipate problems arising 
from the relations of the royalty with the tariff level triggered several issues in the 
following operations phase. There were two interpretations on whether royalty payment 
should be considered as an expense or a share in the profit in the SPV’s accounts while 
determining the port tariff. Eventually, the Tariff Authority of Major Ports (TAMP) 
allowed royalty to be considered as a cost in the tariff computation for bids received 
prior to July 29, 2003. This revision resulted in a reduction in NSICT’s tariff by 12%. 
However, it still imposed excess burden on port users. Therefore, in 2005, TAMP 
recognised the principle that royalty would be paid out of the Operating Surplus (i.e. 
Profit) of the concessionaire in the latest revised guidelines.  
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5.4.1.3 Value for money (VFM) analysis 
In the absence of a database of previous project costs such as budgeted costs and actual 
costs (including overruns), the VfM analysis at the inception phase could not be 
conducted. Nevertheless, the post facto VfM analysis shows that NSICT is a classic 
case of a successful PPP process implementation in terms of time efficiency and cost 
over-runs in public works. 
5.4.2 The Gangavaram Port 
The Gangavaram Port was first conceptualised in 1994 as all weather, multipurpose, 
deep water port, capable of handling Super Cape size vessels of up to 200,000 DWT. 
The first round of bids in 1996 was rejected by Government of Andhra Pradesh (GoAP) 
because the evaluation revealed speculative concerns regarding the validity and 
practicality of the market assumptions (traffic and tariff) and the underlying viability of 
the projections. In order to follow up the initial master plan that has a provision for 29 
berths with a capacity of 200 MTPA to be developed in three phases over 15-20 years, 
the GoAP corrected the shortcomings of the first round and appointed an independent 
consultant to prepare a comprehensive feasibility study and manage the tender process 
in 2001. After conducting an international tender process, the consortium of 
Gangavaram Port Limited (GPL) led by Mr. D.V.S. Raju was selected to develop the 
port on BOOT basis in 2002. Then, concession contract was signed in 2003 (see Table 
4.3). 
5.4.2.1 Management of PPP project process 
The procurement process of Gangavaram port privatisation started with a number of 
shortcomings due to unrealistic traffic projections prior to tendering, vague bid criteria, 
and thus created unsustainable speculative offers. The bid criteria gave separate weights 
for Minimum Guaranteed Amount (MGA), revenue share and investment commitments. 
In consequence, higher scores could be disproportionately achieved by giving larger 
investment commitments, though unrealistic. After much deliberation, the GoAP 
decided to inevitably terminate the bid process in 1996. A second feasibility study with 
robust bidding preparation for the second round of global tender was prepared in 2001. 
Eventually, after the GoAP corrected the shortcomings in the first bidding, the 
concessionaire (GPL) was selected in 2002 through comprehensive evaluation criteria. 
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However, the contract finalisation was a long drawn process that culminated with the 
signing of the concession agreement on Build-Operate-Own-Transfer (BOOT) basis in 
August 2003. 
5.4.2.2 Financial viability analysis 
The total project costs, which were estimated at Rs. 1,696 crores, were funded without 
VGF.  The financial structure of the project comprises 31% equity and 69% debt. A 
consortium of 13 Banks led by SBI Capital Markets arranged term senior & subordinate 
loans of Rs. 1,170 crores for the phase I development. GPL successfully obtained an 
attractive rate of under 9% p.a. for the 14 year loan facility. The financial viability 
analysis showed that the estimated project IRR (post tax) was 22% while the Equity 
IRR was 30%. The project also demonstrated a very strong ability to pay interest and 
principal with an average Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) of 2.2. It is worth 
noting that higher DSCR reduces risks for lenders. Bakatjan, et al. (2003) stated that the 
range of 1.10 to 1.25 for DSCR is bankable, the range between 1.30 and 1.50 is 
satisfactory, and above 1.50 is preferable. 
5.4.2.3 Value for money (VFM) analysis 
The VfM analysis for this project is limited due to the absence of the financial model by 
the private port operator, since this is not in the public domain. Therefore, a post facto 
VfM analysis is presented in the comparison form between what was planned in the 
feasibility study and what has been achieved by the private operator based on publicly 
available information. Table 5.3 shows the summary of post facto VfM analysis of the 
Gangavaram Port project.  
In general, the Gangavaram Port project has demonstrated value for money. Although 
the actual project cost was higher than the estimated cost, the actual unit cost of each 
berth (Rs.340 Cr/berth) is much cheaper than the estimation (Rs.382 Cr/berth). In other 
words, the capital expenditure efficiency achieved in project cost is 11%. Another 
contributing factor to the efficiency in capital expenditure was the ability of the 
concessioner company to negotiate better financing terms with the lenders. Since 
interest rates are a function of prevailing market conditions, a lower interest rate (9% as 
compared to 15.5%) and longer tenor of debt (from 10 years to 14 years) would have 
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been a fortuitous timing in the investment cycle that could have contributed to this 
efficiency. 
Table 5.3 Post facto VFM analysis of Gangavaram Port project (DEA, 2012) 
Variable Feasibility Study Actual Achieved 
Project Cost Rs. 1528 Cr Rs. 1700 Cr 
Berths 4 5 
Maximum vessel size 120,000 DWT 200,000 DWT 
Cargo in Year 1 10 MTPA 8 MTPA 
Interest Rate 15.50% 9% 
Tenure 10 years 14 years 
Efficiency in Project Cost  11% 
[% Savings in Average Capex per Berth Achieved]   
 
5.4.3 The Kakinada Deep Water Port 
The Kakinada Deep Water Port (KDWP) was developed by the Government of Andhra 
Pradesh (GoAP) from 1992 to 1996. The master plan for further development of 3 
existing berths with 15 additional berths required an investment of over Rs. 1,500 
crores. Being under deprived circumstances, such as limited capacity to develop the full 
infrastructure and inefficient operation, the GoAP decided to privatise the port 
operations under the PPP route in 1999. Kakinada Seaports Limited (KSPL) was 
appointed to operate the KDWP with OMST/BOMST (Operate Maintain Share and 
Transfer/Build Operate Maintain Share and Transfer) PPP model (see Table 4.3 and 
5.2). 
5.4.3.1 Management of PPP project process 
The GoAP issued an international competitive bidding for the development of Kakinada 
Deep Water Port (KDWP) in September 1998. Although 14 parties participated in the 
prequalification (RFQ) stage, only four consortia submitted detailed proposals at the 
Request for Proposal (RFP) stage. Since one of the four consortia withdrew their 
proposal because errors had been found in the proposal, only three proposals were 
considered for further evaluation. Three financial parameters were used to evaluate the 
bids across the following parameters: (1) Minimum Guaranteed Share of Income 
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(MGA) for 50% of weight; (2) Percentage Share of Income to be paid to the GoAP with 
30% of weight; and (3) 20% of weight for Investment Planed in phase 1 development.  
The procurement process of KDWP was faster than the previous two case studies. The 
consortium of International Seaports Pte Limited (ISPL) was awarded the contract in 
December 1998. Shortly after the award, the contract on the Operate-Maintenance-
Share-Transfer (OMST)/Build-Operate-Maintenance-Share-Transfer (BOMST) format 
was signed on the 19
th
 of March 1999. The consortium ultimately floated a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV) company, the Cocanada Port Company Ltd (CPCL), which was 
renamed as Kakinada Sea Ports Ltd (KSPL) for managing the port operations.  
5.4.3.2 Financial viability analysis 
The construction costs of three berths at KDWP were Rs. 293 crores, which existing 
project were constructed by GoAP and funded by a loan of Rs. 242 crores from the 
Asian Development Bank. KSPL was responsible for operation and maintenance of the 
three berth facility and for the fourth berth development. The cost of fourth berth 
development including an offshore jetty was Rs. 330 crores. The development 
comprised two phases. Phase 1 of the development, on the existing 3 berths, involved an 
investment of Rs. 175 crores, which had an equity contribution of Rs. 60 crores and 
debt funding of Rs. 115 crores. Infrastructure Development Finance Corporation 
(IDFC) was the lead lender providing Rs. 60 crores of the debt. The loan had tenure of 
11 years. The financial viability analysis showed that the estimated project IRR (post 
tax) for phase 1 and phase 2 was 18.46%. However, the project was not likely to be 
viable due to over-estimated traffic and high component of MGA that the KSPL had to 
pay to the GoAP. Therefore, KSPL was unable to meet the obligation of the MGA. 
Only after KSPL requested the government to withdraw the MGA clause, did KSPL 
achieve financial closure for the phase 1 development in September 2004. 
5.4.3.3 Value for money (VFM) analysis 
Again, due to the limited financial information available in the public domain, post 
facto VfM analysis was carried out on basis of the benefits from this project. The first 
benefit was the ability of KSPL to ensure adequate traffic to take up the development of 
the fourth berth. Secondly, the GoAP enjoyed a steady revenue stream by way of 
revenue share and lease payments from KSPL. Third, KDWP paved the way for other 
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port projects to be taken up on the PPP route. And the last is a substantial improvement 
in terms of port performance. 
5.4.4 Findings from the Case Studies 
This section comprises two main findings which are derived from cross case analysis 
and discussion. Three cases are examined by using cross case analyses with three units 
of analysis analyses: 1) Management of PPP project process; 2) financial viability 
analysis; and 3) value for money analysis. The commonality patterns were identified 
within each unit of analysis in three case studies. In addition, some important factors 
within each pattern will also be discussed. 
5.4.4.1 Cross case analysis 
5.4.4.1.1 Management of PPP project process  
From the three case studies, the implementation of PPP project requires extensive 
project preparation and management in order to achieve an efficient procurement 
process. However, the procurement process for a brownfield project is faster than a new 
project in general. As demonstrated by KDWP, the procurement process was faster than 
in the two other cases because KDWP has an advantage of having historical information 
that could be used for realistic traffic projection. Without comprehensive preparation, 
the procurement process tends to be longer.  
The three case studies also demonstrated that the main stakeholders should consider the 
interests of the other stakeholder’s interest in order to manage the risks in a PPP project. 
The same pattern of these cases is independent regulator (e.g. TAMP) played an 
important role in protecting the interest of lenders by scrutinising the capital 
expenditure on port terminals for the purpose of tariff setting. 
5.4.4.1.2 Financial viability analysis 
The project financial viability is determined by a robust financial model that examines 
the key questions of financial viability and the “what-if” scenarios used from project 
preparation up to operation stages. The three cases demonstrate that PPP financial 
models were utilised in their evaluation. It also emerged that there are several important 
financial indicators that they have been using; such as: Tariff, Royalty, Debt to Equity 
Ratio, NPV, IRR, and DSCR. 
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Two matched patterns from the three cases demonstrated as follows: 
 Unrealistic traffic projections resulted in cancellation of tendering (e.g. first round 
tendering for the Gangavaram Port) and tariff setting issues in the subsequent 
operation phase (i.e. An excess tariff burden on NSICT port users and inability of 
KSPL to meet obligation of the MGA). 
 The concessionaire could not achieve the required financial closure within 180 
days (plus a grace period of 120 days) from the date of the agreement due to poor 
project preparation at the pre-bid stage. 
5.4.4.1.3 Value for money analysis 
Since the spirit of PPP project is based on the ability of the project to deliver VFM, it is 
essential to ensure that the project offers more benefits than the traditional project does. 
The three cases have successfully demonstrated the ability to deliver value for money in 
terms of time efficiency, cost overrun anticipation, traffic performance, attractive 
interest rates and tenor of debt.  
5.4.5 Discussion 
5.4.5.1 Leveraging the roles of the main stakeholders in managing risk 
Initially the host government starts identifying a project that needs private sector 
participation. This process requires pre-feasibility analysis including demand 
assessment, environmental assessment, cost estimates, risk management mechanism and 
financial structuring of the project. Without a comprehensive project preparation, the 
procurement process will be longer than expected or may even be rejected as 
demonstrated in NSICT and Gangavaram Port cases. Once the project is ready for the 
bidding process, private companies are invited to participate in the tender. Given that 
one of the shortlisted bidders of KDWP case had to withdraw their proposal due to 
error, it is of paramount importance that the proposal is double checked before being 
submitted. Then, the prospective bidder is selected. However, it is also important to be 
realistic in accepting the bidder’s proposal. The KDWP case proved that higher MGA 
was not a good parameter in evaluating bidders’ proposals. Consequently, the GoAP 
had to withdraw the MGA clause in favour of KSPL. After signing the concession 
agreement, lenders are invited to participate in funding the project. On the condition that 
lenders are satisfied, financial closure can be achieved. Otherwise, delay in reaching 
 131 
financial closure is likely to happen as shown in all the three cases. Finally the 
construction and operation of the project can be started. In the operation stage, the 
independent regulator plays an important role in balancing stakeholders’ interests. 
TAMP has the authority to scrutinise the capital expenditure of the three cases and 
allow or disallow certain expenditure to be included under the heading of ‘allowable 
expenditure’ for the purpose of tariff setting.  Therefore, these processes need extensive 
evaluation procedures that should be followed by all participants. 
5.4.5.2 Realistic traffic projection 
Although optimism bias is a common phenomenon in most public projects, it is 
essential to be realistic in assessing the market of a project. This is so because traffic 
projection is the key input in tariff setting and it is directly linked to the revenues 
against which cost and returns are set off. In the absence of robust project preparation, 
the three cases faced various problems that are linked to unrealistic traffic projection. 
For instances: TAMP had to cut NSICT’s tariff by 12% because of excessive revenue, 
the GoAP had to withdraw MGA clause in favour of KSPL, and the GoAP had to reject 
speculative offers that were unsustainable. We suggest giving attention to the projection 
of traffic volume and avoidance of unduly optimistic traffic forecasts. 
5.4.5.3 Financial closure period 
Theoretically, a good PPP project is indicated by a short financial closure period. When 
a project has sufficient revenue stream and strong commitment support from the host 
government, the project is financially viable. However, having those criteria is not good 
enough for procuring large infrastructure projects. It is argued that a robust evaluation 
procedure should be present in order to speed up the due diligence process. When 
lenders are convinced of the financial viability of the project, the due diligence process 
becomes faster. Otherwise, financial closure delay is likely to happen as revealed in all 
the three cases. Therefore, one of the indicators of a good PPP project is a short 
financial closing period.  
If we focus on the financial closing period, we cannot overlook the importance of PPP 
financial model as a tool for evaluating a project. PPP financial model is not just a tool 
for evaluating the project but also for negotiating the risk sharing mechanism. Back to 
 132 
the project evaluation at pre-bid phase, PPP financial model is used to assess the 
project’s financial viability in terms of project cost, traffic, tariff, and revenue. When 
proper project evaluation is undertaken, the project will be ready for the next stage. The 
next stage is a contract negotiation between the prospective bidder and the host 
government. Without a comprehensive financial model derived from pre-bid stage, it is 
unlikely that the negotiation process will be undertaken within a short period. A 
comprehensive financial model generally contains all the important information needed 
by both stakeholders. However, there is usually a misconception from the government 
side. They tend to assume that when PPP is used in procuring large infrastructure 
projects, all the risks and the responsibility related to financial viability of the project 
fall on the private parties including the lenders. Unfortunately, this misconception still 
exists, with some government representatives being reluctant to enter into contract 
negotiation with the private parties. From the interviews and the literature on the Indian 
case, they prefer to simplify the process of procuring PPP projects by selecting the 
prospective bidders without considering the prospective lenders who are willing to 
support the project funding. Lenders are part of the private parties that also play an 
important role in achieving a successful PPP project as most PPP projects are funded 
mainly by loans from lenders or financial institutions and with less funding from private 
equity investors. As such, they should be given due consideration in the selection 
process in order to ensure quick closure. 
5.4.5.4 Independent regulator 
Since a PPP project has a long concession period, an independent regulator is needed to 
balance the interests between public and private that are represented by licensor and 
concessionaire. This is considered necessary because the licensors sometimes have an 
authority to manage their own port facilities (e.g. Post Trust). In this case, TAMP is an 
independent regulator for controlling the tariff issued by private ports and port trusts in 
India. In order to do their job, TAMP scrutinises the capital expenditure of the port 
terminals and allows or disallows certain expenditure to be included under the heading 
of ‘allowable expenditure’ for the purpose of tariff setting.  Moreover, TAMP also 
monitors the project’s financial performance and ensures that audited results reflect the 
true performance of the port rather than under-reporting of profits. Such an authority is 
a must for good practice. 
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5.5 Chapter Summary 
The advent of PPP as an alternative procurement strategy offers opportunities and 
challenges to and private sectors. Some common problems such as time and cost 
overruns, low productivity, and operational inefficiency, have been experienced by 
public sector asset managers. Meanwhile, in the same domain, the private sector has 
demonstrated higher productivity and efficiency for the sake of profit maximization. 
Private participation in public projects should be comprehensively evaluated in order to 
achieve successful PPP projects. 
The study shows that there have been major drawbacks in the evaluation and 
implementation process of PPP projects as influenced by some important actors in 
India. With the use of cross case study for in-depth investigation, some commonality 
patterns have emerged from the study. First, the independent regulator played an 
important role in protecting lenders ‘interest by scrutinising the capital expenditure of 
port terminals for the purpose of tariff setting. Second, unrealistic traffic projections 
resulted in cancellation of tendering and tariff setting issues in the operation phase. 
Third, concessionaires could not achieve the required financial closure within 180 days 
(plus a grace period of 120 days) from the date of the agreement due to poor project 
preparation at the pre-bid stage. Therefore, it is suggested that PPP stakeholders devote 
sufficient time to pre-project planning as a means of ensuring success in early project 
closure. And the fourth commonality shows that three cases have successfully 
demonstrated the ability to deliver value for money in terms of time efficiency, cost 
overrun anticipation, traffic performance, attractive interest rates and tenor of debt. 
These lessons can be learned by other developing economies. The study also shows that 
Indian government has successfully developed a PPP toolkit based on the experience 
from previous PPP projects. 
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CHAPTER SIX: INTERVIEW ANALYSIS – EXPLORING 
STAKEHOLDERS’ EXPECTATIONS 
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Chapter 6: Interview Analysis – Exploring Stakeholders’ Expectations 
"When you develop your opinions on the basis of weak evidence, you will have difficulty 
interpreting subsequent information that contradicts these opinions, even if this new 
information is obviously more accurate." 
Nassim Nicholas Taleb (1960 –) 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In order to understand the stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP financial models, 
it was appropriate to conduct exploratory research through a number of case studies, 
interviews, and questionnaire. The previous chapter presents the findings of literature 
cross case study analysis, which allows in depth investigation within the research 
subject (Fellows and Liu, 1997). Such an exploratory research helps to understand the 
nature of a problem in depth and produces fruitful results. It is also important to 
compare the theoretical information as baseline data from the findings of the literature 
case study with the actual expectations of PPP financial models at various project 
stages. The procedure for evaluating PPP seaport projects, which specifically on 
financial model utilisation in India was reported in the previous section.  
Although stakeholders’ expectations in using PPP financial models were identified 
through literature review, the identified expectations need to be further examined for 
veracity. Thus, it was decided to conduct semi-structured interviews in Indian case 
study. This chapter presents analysis and discussion of the stakeholders’ expectations in 
India. Among five research questions (see 1.6), two research questions are addressed in 
this section. The first question is: who are the stakeholders going to manage the risks 
related to developing large infrastructure projects? This question is limited to the 
stakeholders who are using PPP financial models. And the second question is: what are 
the stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP financial models? To answer those 
questions, the following five project stages were investigated: 1) pre-proposal stage; 2) 
contract-negotiation stage; 3) finance-raising stage; 4) construction stage; and 5) 
operation stage. 
This chapter provides information about the stakeholders’ expectations and presents 
several analyses that are divided into two major parts: 1) PPP Stakeholders; 2) 
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Stakeholders’ Expectations. The first part analyses the actor and the influence of PPP 
stakeholders who are identified from literature and interviews. Then, the following part 
analyses the importance of the pre-determined 64 expectations, 26 financial input 
assumptions and 16 output indicators, which are identified through literature and 
verified through semi-structured interview with key participants of PPP projects in 
India.  
6.2 Research Approach and Technique 
Research approach and technique adopted in a research study depend on the nature of 
research problem and research aim. As described earlier in the chapter 4, the aim of this 
research is to ascertain the rationale of the public sector authority in evaluating PPP 
projects. It was also found that knowledge gap between public and private is the 
problem related to human’s cognitive abilities. Hence, a qualitative approach is more 
suitable because it is concerned with processes, rather than outcomes or products (Falqi, 
2011). A qualitative data gathered from interview has to be analysed for PPP financial 
model development. Financial models involve human as modeller and user. Since the 
aim of the interview is to study the stakeholders’ expectations about PPP financial 
models, content analysis was used in this research. Their views of the financial model 
utilisation and its financial risk variables were given coded allocations to categories. 
And groups of stakeholders from whom the data were obtained are fitted to these 
categories, so that a matrix of categorised data against groups could be obtained. 
Seidman (2006) advocated that a content analysis technique is connecting threads and 
patterns among the excerpts within the predetermined categories. Content analysis 
organises and compresses excerpts from the transcripts into fewer content categories 
based on explicit rules of coding (Stemler, 2001). Content analysis technique also 
allows qualitative data to be converted into quantitative data (Erdener and Dunn, 1990). 
Then, they were selected for structured questionnaire survey. Next section will address a 
content analysis related to PPP Stakeholders. 
6.3 Content Analysis: PPP Stakeholders Identification 
In order to carry out a content analysis on a qualitative data gathered from interview, 
PPP stakeholders are divided into two groups: 1) private party; 2) public party. Several 
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key participants of PPP projects from private and public institutions (see table 6.1) were 
approached for an interview.  
Table 6.1 Participating Institutions for Interviews in India 
No Institution Type Location 
1 Beckett Rankine India Pvt Ltd Seaport Consultant 
Company 
Mumbai, India 
2 Gammon Infrastructure Projects Ltd Seaport SPV Company Mumbai, India 
3 Mumbai Port Trust Seaport Authority Mumbai, India 
4 Knowledge Infrastructure System Pvt Ltd Seaport Consultant 
Company 
Mumbai, India 
5 F1F9 Financial Modeller 
Company 
New Delhi, India 
6 Ministry of Shipping  Asian Development 
Bank Representative 
New Delhi, India 
7 Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and 
Highway 
Central Authority New Delhi, India 
8 Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust Seaport Authority Mumbai, India 
9 Indian Port Association Port Association New Delhi, India 
 
The purpose of semi-structured interviews was to complement and corroborate initial 
observations with the findings of the literature review as they arose. The semi-structured 
interviews allow the research to focus on PPP stakeholders’ identification in a timely 
manner.  
Table 6.2 Experts Participants of PPP projects 
No Position 
Years of 
experience 
Highest Academic 
Qualification 
P1 Jr. Accounts Officer (public) 5-10 years Master Degree 
P2 Sr. Vice President (Private) > 10 years Master Degree 
P3 Deputy Manager (Public) > 10 years Master Degree 
P4 Head – Port Development (Private) > 10 years Master Degree 
P5 Finance officer – Port Development 
(Private) 
> 10 years Master Degree 
P6 Under Secretary (Public) > 10 years Master Degree 
P7 Managing Director (Private) > 10 years Master Degree 
P8 CEO (Private) > 10 years Master Degree 
P9 PPP Expert (Public) > 10 years Master Degree 
P10 Senior Manager (public) > 10 years Master Degree 
 
Each interview lasted between 30 and 70 minutes. Notes were recorded during the 
interviews, which were conducted between November and December 2010. Most of the 
participants have experience more than 10 years in PPP projects and hold a master 
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degree qualification (see table 6.2). Therefore, they are deemed to have sufficient 
knowledge in the topic, which is limited to PPP and financial model utilisation. 
6.3.1 Stakeholder’s perception toward PPP financial modelling 
This research highlights the importance of financial model in PPP projects. Since the 
preliminary findings imply that there is a knowledge gap between public and private in 
PPP project, it is vital to see the stakeholder’s perception toward PPP financial 
modelling. The first question was about the perception of the participant toward the 
importance of PPP financial modelling to their projects. Given three alternative answers 
such as: very important, important, and not important; the findings show that all 
participants from private party perceive that PPP financial modelling is very important 
with the following comments:  
P2:” Our kind of work is very complex work, it's not that you want to buy diary and you 
go to market, and you decide that I want to buy diary with so many pages and this 
colour and then you get the cheapest you can buy. In our work, everything cannot just 
be quantified; people have to look holistic manner”. 
P4: “It’s very important because unless you get the modelling right, private party will 
not be attracted. Private party is always looking at the return on the capital. Unless you 
know the project is reliable without a grant or without subsidy, then you always 
shooting in the dark. You can’t only bring viable project in the PPP scheme”. 
P8: “...it's helping the developer raise finance in way that's competitive economical and 
viable, to make the project viable” 
However, some interviewees from public party argued that financial modelling is 
important but not very important. 
P1:”…from Indian prospect, considering seaport and their financial status and 
condition, I think it’s important but not very important…”. 
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P9:”It is important to the extent that we should be able to decide whether project is 
profitable or not, whether it is doable on PPP model or not, how much profitability 
exactly is not much important ...” 
Meanwhile, participants from the public parties, who think that PPP financial modelling 
is very important, argue that a strong financial modelling will be appealing to the 
investors. 
P3:”Financial modelling is very important because unless PPP financial modelling is 
very strong, you cannot attract any investor…” 
P6:”Financial modelling is limitation otherwise the project cannot survive. Most 
institution will not come forward to finance the project. Most projects are financed by 
the public institutions. If the financial modelling cost a lot, they will not come forward 
with the project. We award the project only if IRR minimum is 12% and the threshold 
criteria and NPV are met”.       
It is clear that some stakeholders from public party have mixed opinions regarding the 
importance of PPP financial modelling. The findings confirm that the knowledge gap 
between public and private does exist. 
6.3.2  Stakeholders’ involvement in using PPP financial models 
After knowing the stakeholders’ perceptions upon the importance of PPP financial 
modelling, the next question was intended to figure out the stakeholders who are 
involved in the PPP financial models utilization. Although each participant was given 
option to select the parties involved in using financial model at their project, they were 
allowed to suggest the other relevant participants. Ten participants gave their answer as 
follows: Sponsor, Authority, Other potential sponsor, Investor, Lender, Independent 
Engineer, Advisory Agency, Modelling bank, Inter-creditor Agent, Consultant, and 
Transaction adviser.  
All the respondents also agree with the stakeholders’ involvement in developing PPP 
financial model. For example, the financial model is based on the perspective of the 
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private (e.g. the sponsor) at the pre-bid and contract negotiation stage. And for the 
finance-raising stage, the lender’s perspective is taken into account instead. At last, for 
the operation stage, it is down to the sponsor’s perspective. 
In order to analyse the PPP stakeholders, the participants were also asked to choose the 
most influential parties in making the project successful. Their answers were ranked 
into top three. Overall, the top three influential participants based on individual 
experience of the participants are sponsor, lender and authority. These findings support 
that a successful PPP project is determined by the ability of main stakeholders in 
managing the involved risks in PPP projects under a long-term partnership. This 
partnership is a complex set of relationships that require effective coordination among 
all participants in a PPP project. Cheng (2010a) illustrated the structural relationships of 
the most important participants into three major actors’ triangle in a PPP project (see 
Figure 6.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: The Triangle of Major Actors in a PPP Project  
Source: Cheng (2010a) 
6.4 Content Analysis: Stakeholders expectations from PPP financial modelling  
After reviewing the literature related to stakeholders’ expectations, the preliminary 
results from literature review were formulated in the list of questions for an interview. 
This section will discuss the interview findings by analysing the story behind 
participants’ experiences (in utilising PPP financial models). The questions are divided 
into two sections. The first section is related to the purpose of PPP financial model at 
every stage of PPP project. Afterwards, the second stage is about their expectations 
from PPP financial models. 
 
Host Government 
(Local Authority) 
Lenders 
(Commercial banks) 
Project Companies 
(Strategic alliances) 
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6.4.1 Stakeholders expectations at the pre-proposal stage 
In this section, respondents were asked to confirm whether a PPP financial model was 
used to facilitate the submission of a proposal at the pre-proposal stage. All participants 
agree with the purpose of PPP financial model. 
 P8:“...yes, definitely it is requirement (from the government) to use PPP financial 
model (at the pre-proposal stage); otherwise you could not submit a bid...they want to 
know how much is revenue share, government is having with it, how much capital 
contribution there government have to give, subsidy or how much to be. That is coming 
from financial model”. 
P4:” Correct, before you bid out any project, you have to capture all aspects of the 
project for internal decision making. No company no private company put its money 
unless you have full understanding of the number. They can be some sort of assumptions 
which is basically there risks you make assumption, you always have financial earnings, 
clear financial understanding.” 
Further, when I said that the assumption will be easier if it is reflected in the financial 
model, the participant from SPV Company (P4) confirmed that it had to be quantified. 
The quantified assumptions are discussed in the interview analysis of financial indicator 
section. 
Beside asking the purpose of PPP financial model at the pre-proposal stage, 18 
predetermined expectations from using PPP financial model were presented to the 
interviewees for their opinion. Some participants have chosen the most important 
expectations. Top three of the most expectations were selected in the questionnaire 
survey as shown in table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 Participants’ expectations at the pre-proposal stage 
Stakeholder 
(Participant) 
Expectations 
Sponsor (P4) 1. IRR is higher than the corporate hurdle rate; 
2. Bankable; 
3. Avoiding the sponsor to win a project that makes a loss. 
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Authority (P1) 1. Competitively pricing a bid to assist winning a contract; 
2. Transparency of the award process; 
3. Using a financial model to evaluate the bids in a competitive tender. 
Authority (P9) 1. IRR is higher than the corporate hurdle rate; 
2. Assurance that the financial model reflects the project and the financing 
terms; 
3. The project must generate enough cash flow so as to give lenders a 
margin of safety with respect to its debt service obligations. 
Authority (P10) 1. Competitively pricing a bid to assist winning a contract; 
2. Reducing time and cost of bidding; 
3. Transparency of the award process. 
Consultant (P7) 1. Competitively pricing a bid to assist winning a contract; 
2. Assurance that the financial model reflects the project and the financing 
terms; 
3. IRR is higher than the corporate hurdle rate. 
Consultant (P8) 1. Competitively pricing a bid to assist winning a contract; 
2. Transparency of the award process; 
3. Ensuring the most competitive price based on the required rate of return. 
6.4.2 Stakeholders expectations at the contract negotiation stage 
Since there is no contract negotiation allowed in India, PPP financial model is not 
employed for negotiating the contract. All of our respondents in India confirmed about 
this policy. 
P8: “It is there but not so much in India, contract negotiation is at the UK but not in 
India..“. 
P4:” That one I’m not really sure what you mean by that. To assist in the negotiation of 
project agreements by considering the economic and financial feasibility of a project 
under a variety of scenarios and assumptions. That one I don’t understand…We don’t 
use financial model here”. 
Nevertheless,  participants from concessionaire (P4) and consultant companies (P8) 
agree that pre-bid financial model can be used as a negotiation tool. During this stage, 
the inputs of financial model will be amended due to negotiation and agreement among 
the involved stakeholders. The amendment of the inputs is a process of reconciling the 
conflict interests among the stakeholders. The following comments were provided by 
the interviewees: 
P4:” Yes, to that extent what you are saying, I agree that when you made pre-bid 
model. We have made certain detail assumptions of how much is it we are going cost 
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you. Let say, civil construction we know all those numbers, when we go for negotiation 
we always look back again to those number and said ok this is plus minus 5%.”. 
P8:” So, financial modelling help you to identify the additional condition of concession 
agreement or modify it or modify its condition so it becomes viable calculation ratio for 
whole concession agreement or additional condition”. 
Apart from asking the purpose of PPP financial model at the contract negotiation stage, 
25 expectations from using PPP financial model were presented to the interviewees. 
Top three expectations were selected by some participants as shown in table 6.4. 
Table 6.4 Participants’ expectations at the contract negotiation stage 
Stakeholder 
(Participant) 
Expectations 
Sponsor (P4) 1. Anticipating the cost overrun with the agreed fixed EPC contract 
(Turnkey Contract); 
2. Committing the lowest level of equity possible (less private investment); 
3. IRR is higher than interest rate of debt. 
Authority (P1) 1. Securing the project from the risks (e.g. revenue risk, political risk, 
change in law, etc.) that can jeopardise its cash flow or financial 
viability; 
2. Transparency during negotiation process; 
3. IRR is higher than interest rate of debt. 
Consultant (P7) 1. Reaching an agreement on forecast for cash available for debt service 
(CADS) over project loan life; 
2. Fiscal incentive or tax benefits from the government authority (e.g. tax 
holiday, tax reduction or exemption, etc.); 
3. IRR is higher than interest rate of debt. 
Consultant (P8) 1. Securing the project from the risks (e.g. revenue risk, political risk, 
change in law, etc.) that can jeopardise its cash flow or financial 
viability; 
2. Reaching an agreement on forecast for cash available for debt service 
(CADS) over project loan life; 
3. High equity level to minimise the repayment debt risk (i.e. DSCR is 
higher than the minimum level of annual DSCR). 
6.4.3 Stakeholders expectations the finance-raising stage 
Respondents were asked for their opinion on the purpose of financial model at the 
finance-raising stage such as to facilitate due diligence, negotiation of commercial 
issues, forecast of the financial performance of the project, and project appraisal report. 
Moreover, lender modifies the initial model into lender base case financial model in 
order to test the project’s financial viability. 
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P7: “It’s very important because you have to make a good model to make the project 
bankable”. 
10 alternatives expectations were presented to the participants, only the most important 
expectations were selected for further analysis (as shown in table 6.5). 
Table 6.5 Participants’ expectations at the finance-raising stage 
Stakeholder 
(Participant) 
Expectations 
Sponsor (P4) 1. Achieving financial closing on acceptable terms and construction start; 
2. Having joint control with the modelling bank over amended inputs and 
outputs of financial model transformation; 
3. Amending the model to reflect the results of the negotiation of 
commercial issues affecting the model’s input. 
Authority (P1) 1. Achieving financial closing on acceptable terms and construction start; 
2. Examining great details of all issues at the global or national level that 
affect availability, price, transportation and quality of the input; 
3. Studying market of the product or service, including a thorough 
assessment of its proposed price structure, including elasticity analysis. 
Consultant (P7) 1. Achieving financial closing on acceptable terms and construction start; 
2. Conducting sensitivity analysis for key commercial issues as needed; 
3. Amending the model to reflect the results of the negotiation of 
commercial issues affecting the model’s input. 
Consultant (P8) 1. Achieving financial closing on acceptable terms and construction start; 
2. Conducting sensitivity analysis for key commercial issues as needed. 
Besides selecting the given options, P4 proposed other expectation at the finance-raising 
stage.  
P4:”Interested in getting cheapest finance available, more extended credit period, 
repayment tenor, and a good moratorium period to allow the project to kick start”. 
6.4.4 Stakeholders expectations the construction stage 
At the construction stage, all participants agree that PPP financial model is used for 
ensuring that the impact of cost overrun does not influence debt service cover and the 
ability of the project vehicle to pay dividends to the sponsor. 
P4:” There will be various project review software, primavera is there, a lot people can 
charge in simply tools, you have the budget so you control your budget”. 
P9:”At the construction phase, we rely on financial model prepared by the lender 
because ...it is more realistic and more reliable on performance measurement”.  
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6.4.5 Stakeholders expectations the operation stage 
Although financial model at the operation stage is not the same with the model used at 
the previous stages, respondents were asked for confirming the purposes of PPP 
financial model at this stage.  
P4:” Yes, that is very important. But the financial model will keep on changing, like 
pre-bid proposal and finance proposal will be more or less. The finance proposal will 
be very detail but they broadly the same escalated. When it comes to the construction, 
it’s totally different. When it comes to the operation, it’s totally different”. 
P7:” See once you know, you have done the project, at different stage you have different 
model. The same model cannot work here, so the model that you started initially is not 
used here”. 
Most of respondents agree that PPP financial models are used to monitor and track the 
performance of the project, to assess the impact of any annual operations budget 
submitted by the project vehicle to lenders, to negotiate a new tariff. However, the 
respondent from public party (P9) does not agree with the third purpose of financial 
model. 
P9:”... as a tool to negotiate a new tariff, this is not allowed... we fix the tariff upfront, 
but we allow some inflation rate adjustment changes (to the tariff)”. 
On a different occasion, the other public party (P1), eventually, agree that PPP financial 
model can be used as a tool to set up a reasonable tariff. Among 9 expectations, the 
most important expectations were selected by the participants (as shown in table 6.6). 
Table 6.6 Participants’ expectations at the operation stage 
Stakeholder 
(Participant) 
Expectations 
Sponsor (P4) 1. Easy to update the financial model; 
2. Monitoring and tracking project performance; 
3. Assessing the impact of annual operations budget. 
Authority (P1) 1. Monitoring and tracking project performance; 
2. Reasonable tariff; 
3. Understandable financial model for stakeholders. 
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Consultant (P7) 1. Securing the operational cash flow; 
2. Monitoring and tracking project performance; 
3. Making the model to represent reality. 
Consultant (P8) 1. Monitoring and tracking project performance; 
2. Reasonable tariff. 
 
6.4.6 Content analysis: most important financial indicators of PPP financial model 
in India 
The interview related to stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP financial models 
gave me some insight into the model that should be developed. The next interview was 
asking the stakeholders’ preference on financial indicators of PPP financial model. In 
order to undertake a content analysis, the predetermined financial indicators were 
prepared before the interview. Then, the interviewees’ comments about the 
predetermined financial indicators were transcribed. Some relevant comments from the 
interviewees were highlighted as follows:  
6.4.6.1 Input assumptions 
Input assumptions in a financial model worksheet generally comprise of various 
assumptions (e.g. project timelines, economic assumptions, technical data, capital 
cost, loan commitment, tenor, grace, loan type, interest rate and fees, repayment 
structure, target of equity, ROE, tax information, working capital and reserves, 
etc.), which are derived from the project documents or from other relevant sources. 
These input assumptions were presented to the interviewees for their opinion.  
P7:”Basically all of these input over there (e.g. capital expenditures, operating 
assumptions, capital structure, tax, and working capital) are the fundamental costs 
and the input of calculating the fare, the cash flow, and  the profitability. They also 
help you to describe the cash flow and the return of the project. Maybe some of 
them are not very attractive, and then you integrate your model”  
Comments of some predetermined financial input assumptions were given by 
interviewees. The following are the most important financial input assumptions: 
 Project timelines 
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One of the respondents from government authority (P1) stated that a penalty 
should be imposed when the sponsor could not achieve an agreement within the 
specified time (i.e. concessionaires could not achieve the required financial 
closure within 180 days plus a grace period of 120 days). 
P1:”Prolonged negotiation period ... timeframe should be fixed, if there is a 
delay it should be some penalty”.  
 Capital expenditure (Capex) 
Operating expenditure (OPEX) and capital expenditure (CAPEX) are used in the 
sensitivity analysis to anticipate Operating and Maintenance cost overrun 
(Grimsey and Lewis, 2004). Sponsor (P4) confirmed the importance of CAPEX 
by pointing several key variables to be addressed within CAPEX. 
P4:” Yes, one will be Capex, capital expenditures, capital expenditures will be 
very detail, capital expenditures will have all the detail in term of construction 
that has to be done, in term of mechanical, in term of electrical, power 
distribution, soft cost, environmental management, safety, cost of funding, 
utilities, staff, welfare related issues”. 
 Volume/ traffic 
A port authority or port operator will have higher probability to attract risk 
capital and obtain loans when the prospective investors perceive that the traffic 
and financial forecasts are accurate and reliable (World Bank and PPIAF, 2007). 
That was the reason why authority (P1) preferred to hire some independent and 
reliable consultant. 
P1:”Errors in forecasting the demand ... some independent and reliable 
consultant should be there”. 
However, high degree of uncertainty associated with medium- or long-term 
projections of port activity contributes potential shortfalls in projected traffic. 
P4:”The risk is your estimate, can go sometimes wrong because when you are 
one of the bidder in PPP, you may not have that much time information to spend 
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time and money to assess everything in detail. So you may encounter something 
that you actually start doing, something which is totally out of the water”. 
P4:”...competing facilities, or the demographic change, or the law of the 
country change, or the economic down can happen, all of these have impact on 
your traffic. I think traffic estimate will have the most severe effect and vice 
versa also. You can also announce your project profitability better or not much 
better than your estimate”. 
 Operating cost 
Although unanticipated rise in operating costs is one of the generic concerns that 
are used in a series of sensitivity tests (Khan and Parra, 2003), one of the 
interviewees (P4) thought that there was not much risk with operating cost due 
its nature which was predictable and not much fluctuation.  
P4:”Operating cost is not so much risk because it is more predictable and there 
is no fluctuation”. 
 Financing cost and interest rate 
Financing cost is the cost of raising funds to finance the project; principally the 
cost of interest payments (Kelly, 2009). The sponsor (P4) opined financing cost 
was very important one because it carried interest rate risk. In order to anticipate 
this, government subsidies for the SPV’s interest payment should be set in such 
a way as to keep overall financing costs at the predetermined levels (World Bank 
and Ministry of Construction Japan, 1999) 
P4:”Financing cost carries some amount of risk ... Interest rate risk per se”. 
P4:”Financing cost will have a lot of input, what is your moratorium period to 
be, what are your rate of interest to be at the pre-construction and post 
construction, how much your debt equity is going to be. And you are going to 
decide the leveraging. Then you have possibility of refinancing if you have. You 
will have multiple inputs”.  
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 Inflation rate and revenue share / minimum revenue guarantee 
The inflation rate fluctuation is believed to have impacted the project. The 
interviewee from government authority (P1) confirmed that it had an effect on 
the revenue share. Furthermore, the sponsor (P4) perceived that inflation 
fluctuation below 4 percent would not affect the project. 
P1:”Revenue share, from the government point of view the fluctuation of 
inflation rate is affecting the revenue share”. 
P4:”2 to 4 percent changes will not affect your project but more than five 
percent will have significant effect. Inflation risk is covered by forward 
contract”.  
 Return on equity 
Participant from authority (P1) argued that return on equity should be calculated 
based on annual rate of return. 
P1:”Rate of return restriction, it should be from actual rate of return 
(strategy)”.  
 Tax 
Although Tax holiday has been regulated in Indian PPP project, one of the 
respondents from Indian seaport authority indicated that this policy was not put 
into practice. 
P1:”Tax holiday in Indian PPP seaport project is not yet implemented. In order 
to attract private investors, tax holiday should be there”. 
 Project cost 
Authority (P1) argued that the project cost could be reduced by taking into 
consideration of design cost and bidding cost. 
P1:”High design cost, high bidding cost ... that should be taken care of when 
you’re deciding the bidding document. It will cut the project cost. 
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 Capital structure 
Lenders are concerned more on the safety and return of their money, which is 
reflected by a prudent and self-sustaining project capital structure. Kulkarni and 
Prusty (2007) stated that the debt-equity ratio of the project depended on the 
financial strength of the sponsor in arranging debt funding from financial 
institutions. Nevertheless, government authority in India (P1) did not interfere 
the debt to equity ratio of the project. 
P1:”…Government does not have debt that much; debt and equity are the 
crucial issues in regards to private. Debt and equity are important but not the 
crucial issues for the government”. 
6.4.6.2 Financial output indicators 
An overall summary is shown on output worksheet to help the reader see the 
financial viability of the project, which includes pro forma financial statements (e.g. 
income statement, balance sheet and cash flow statement) and key ratios such debt 
service coverage ratio (DSCR), loan life cover ratio (LLCR), net present value 
(NPV), interest rate of return (IRR) and return on equity (ROE). In order to gain 
more insight of financial output indicators, the interviewees were asked for their 
opinion about the predetermined financial output indicators. The following 
comment is the most important financial output given by one of the participants. 
P7:”Revenue, operating cost, interest rate, CADS, Free cash flow to equity, DSCR, 
IRR, ROE, Payback, and shareholders return are the most important output”. 
Comments of some predetermined financial output indicators were given by 
interviewees. The following are the most important financial output indicators: 
 Project IRR 
Some interviewees strongly agreed that project IRR was one of the most 
important financial output. 
P1:”IRR should be at least 15%”. 
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P7:”IRR should be more than the opportunity cost of the company”. 
Notwithstanding the importance of IRR in evaluation financial viability of PPP 
project, it should used only for evaluating a single project rather than comparing 
mutually exclusive projects. Higher IRR does not guarantee that the project is 
more attractive than the other project is (Kelleher and MacCornack, 2004). 
Further, one of the participants from sponsor (P4) stated that IRR should not be 
used alone in relation to PPP projects.  As supported by Cuthbert and Cuthbert 
(2012), they argued that IRR utilisation understates the true opportunity cost of 
PPP finance to public sector and the potential profit earned by private sector. 
P4:”Then you may end up not securing your project if you only IRR focus and if 
your benchmark of your an IRR is very high”. 
 NPV 
Lohmann (1988) stated that IRR and NPV are the most common and essential 
economic decision measure used in evaluating a project. In a PPP project, NPV 
is used to determine value for money by comparing the NPV between PPP and 
PSC. Thus, it was pertinent that government authority (P1) expected a higher 
NPV. 
P1:”NPV should be the highest value”. 
 DSCR 
DSCR and LLCR are commonly employed by lenders to evaluate the project’s 
ability to meet its debt service (Lamb and Merna, 2004). Consultant (P7) 
suggested that an acceptable DSCR should be more than 1. 
P7:”For the Debt Service Coverage Ratio (DSCR) should be greater than 1”. 
 Payback 
A project is acceptable if its payback is less than the maximum cost recovery 
time established by the analyst (Boussabaine, 2006). Some interviewees 
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revealed that they have different expectation on payback period. Authority (P1) 
expectation was longer than consultant (P7) upon payback period. 
P1: “Payback period should be 15 to 20 years”. 
P7:”shorter payback, ok. But some people depend upon what is the rate, the 
structure, people want coverage ratio, people want so many other things. It’s not 
really matter”. 
P7:”Probably concession given, normally concession year is 30 years. But 
people will expect that payback will be something like from 10 to 15 years”. 
6.5 Content analysis findings 
This section addresses the answers of two research questions stated earlier. The first 
question is: who are the stakeholders going to manage the risks related to developing 
large infrastructure projects? This question is limited to the stakeholders who are using 
PPP financial models. Ten participants gave their answer as follows: Sponsor, 
Authority, Other potential sponsor, Investor, Lender, Independent Engineer, Advisory 
Agency, Modelling bank, Inter-creditor Agent, Consultant, and Transaction adviser. 
And the second question is: what are the stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP 
financial models? To answer the second question, the importance of the pre-determined 
64 expectations in five project stages was analysed, 42 expectations have been selected 
in the questionnaire (see table 6.7). The most important financial input assumptions and 
output indicators were identified (see table 6.8). 
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Table 6.7a The expectation of major participants at the pre-proposal stage  
Major Participants Stakeholders’ Expectations (Critical Success Factors) Literature Interview Questionnaire 
Sponsor(s) and other 
potential sponsor 
Avoiding winning unprofitable contract. √ √  
Competitively pricing a bid to assist winning a contract*. √ √ √ 
Assurance that the financial model reflects the project and the financing terms*. √ √ √ 
Assurance that the financial model can be used to determine the project’s ranking under capital 
rationing. 
√ √  
Reducing time and cost of bidding*. √ √ √ 
Transparency of the award process*. √ √ √ 
Unsolicited proposal with important innovations (e.g. a new type of project, or new solution to 
known problem, or new ways of defining performance standards). 
√ √  
IRR is higher than the corporate hurdle rate*. √ √ √ 
Preferring to submit unsolicited proposal because provide more scope to participate in defining 
technical and commercial outlines of the project. 
√ √  
Bankable* √ √ √ 
Getting involved in the long-term considerations for having a presence in one country. √ √  
Government authority Checking the project’s ability to deliver value for money (VFM). √ √  
Quick process of awarding the unsolicited proposal, due to the urgent demand of the facilities 
provided from the project, with a reduced level of risk for the government.   
√ √  
Robust operational experience and financial strength of the bidder during request for 
qualification (RFQ) process. 
√ √  
Using a financial model to evaluate the bids in a competitive tender*. √ √ √ 
Investors / lenders The project must generate enough cash flow so as to give lenders a margin of safety with respect 
to its debt service obligations*. 
√ √ √ 
Advisory agencies  Ensuring the most competitive price based on the required rate of return. √ √  
Avoiding the sponsor to win a project that makes a loss (e.g. if an error understates costs, thus 
bidding too low a price)*. 
√ √ √ 
* The most important expectations according to interview 
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Table 6.7b The expectation of major participants at the contract negotiation stage  
Major Participants Stakeholders’ Expectations (Critical Success Factors) Literature Interview Questionnaire 
Sponsor(s) Anticipating the cost overrun with the agreed fixed EPC contract (Turnkey Contract)*. √ √ √ 
Committing the lowest level of equity possible (less private investment)*. √ √ √ 
Securing the project from the risks (e.g. revenue risk, political risk, change in law, etc.) that can 
jeopardise its cash flow or financial viability*. 
√ √ √ 
Shorter negotiation process, longer concession period and shorter payback period. √ √  
Fiscal incentive or tax benefits from the government authority (e.g. tax holiday, tax reduction or 
exemption, etc.).  
√ √ √ 
Lower guarantee fee or credit enhancement fee (maximum annual fee rate: 1.5%) paid by the 
sponsor. 
√   
Transparency during negotiation process*. √ √ √ 
IRR is higher than interest rate of debt*. √ √ √ 
Advisory agencies 
(e.g. underwriter) 
Guaranteeing that the debt being sought will be successfully placed. √ √  
Taking the risk of a successful syndication by making up whatever shortfall there is between debt 
being sought and that successfully placed. 
√ √  
Government authority Shorter concession period, low total project life-cycle cost and low equity level. √   
Longer payback period to secure a good project management practices and a long-term 
commitment of the sponsor(s). 
√   
Securing the equity level could satisfy the interests of equity holders, lenders, and the general 
public. 
√   
Securing the government’s affordability in supporting the project. √ √  
Knowing whether the government should provide subsidies in order to promote private 
investment in the project or not, if the self-liquidation ratio (SLR) is less than 1. 
√ √  
Minimizing the level of subsidise or compensation if the project revenue is less than expectation 
or if the contract is terminated. 
√ √  
Lenders High equity level to minimise the repayment debt risk (i.e. DSCR is higher than the minimum 
level of annual DSCR). 
√ √ √ 
High risk premiums for a low equity level. √  √ 
Knowing how much senior debt that the project is able to carry. √  √ 
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Knowing whether the project needs a subordinated lender or not (the minimum range of required 
LLCR for a container port is between 1.50 and 1.90 in order to determine subordinated loan). 
√  √ 
Reaching an agreement on forecast for cash available for debt service (CADS) over project loan 
life*. 
√ √ √ 
Expecting that all project agreements are structured in such way to remove risk from the project 
vehicle and allocate it to someone else in a better position to absorb it. 
√ √  
Assurance that the lenders are only lending the amount the project can support (“Debt Sizing”). √ √ √ 
Insurance that there is someone to sue if there is a material error in the model resulting in the 
debt not being repayable. 
√  √ 
Credit Committee requirement. √ √ √ 
* The most important expectations according to interview 
 
 
   
 
Table 6.7c The expectation of major participants at the finance-raising stage  
Major Participants Stakeholders’ Expectations (Critical Success Factors) Literature Interview Questionnaire 
Sponsor(s) Achieving financial closing on acceptable terms and construction start*. √ √ √ 
Having joint control with the modelling bank over amended inputs and outputs of financial 
model transformation*. 
√ √ √ 
Modelling bank Expanding the project input, calculation and output worksheet. √ √ √ 
Amending the model to reflect the results of the negotiation of commercial issues affecting the 
model’s input*. 
√ √ √ 
Conducting sensitivity analysis for key commercial issues as needed. √ √ √ 
Verifying the accuracy of formulae used in the model in collaboration with the model auditor. √ √ √ 
Independent Engineer Examining great details of all issues at the global or national level that affect availability, price, 
transportation and quality of the input*. 
√ √ √ 
Marketing Expert Analysing global and regional trends affecting the product or service that will be offered. √ √ √ 
Assessing the issues that affect price, availability, quality, or transportation thereof. √ √ √ 
Studying market of the product or service, including a thorough assessment of its proposed price 
structure, including elasticity analysis*. 
√ √ √ 
* The most important expectations according to interview 
 156 
    
 
Table 6.7d The expectation of major participants at the construction stage  
Major Participants Stakeholders’ Expectations (Critical Success Factors) Literature Interview Questionnaire 
Sponsor(s), Inter-
creditor agent and 
Independent 
Engineer 
Ensuring the impact of cost overrun does not influence debt service cover and the ability of the 
project vehicle to pay dividends to the sponsor*. 
√ √ √ 
Lenders Anticipating to claim the declaration of the loan agreement breaching*. √ √ √ 
* The most important expectations according to interview 
    
 
Table 6.7e The expectation of major participants at the operational stage  
Major Participants Stakeholders’ Expectations (Critical Success Factors) Literature Interview Questionnaire 
Sponsor(s) Securing the operational cash flow*. √ √ √ 
Understandable financial model for stakeholders*. √ √ √ 
Useable financial model by SPV managers. √ √  
Easy to update the financial model*. √ √ √ 
Inter-creditor agent Monitoring and tracking the project performance (e.g. cover ratio, outturn shareholder IRRs, 
etc.)*. 
√ √ √ 
Making the model represents a reality. √ √ √ 
Government authority Reasonable tariff*. √ √ √ 
Significant port performance compared to pre-reform and other ports. √ √  
Lenders Assessing the impact of annual operations budget*. √ √ √ 
* The most important expectations according to interview 
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Table 6.8 Participants’ Preferred Financial Indicators 
Stakeholder 
(Participant) 
Most Important Financial Indicators 
Input Output 
Sponsor (P4) 1. Capex 
2. Volume/ traffic 
3. Operating cost 
4. Financing cost 
1. IRR 
2. NPV 
3.Payback 
4. Margin/operation margin 
5. DSCR 
6. Interest covering ratio 
7. EBITDA 
Authority (P1) 1. Project timelines 
2. Inflation rate 
3. Revenue share / minimum revenue 
guarantee 
4. Operating assumptions 
5. Debt 
6. Interest rate 
7. Return on Equity 
8. Tax 
9. Working capital 
1. Revenue 
2. IRR 
3. Payback 
Authority (P9) 1. Project cost 
2. Traffic assumptions 
3. Tariff 
1. PLCR 
2. Revenue 
3. Operating cost 
4. ROE 
Consultant (P7) 1. Capex 
2. Operating assumptions 
3. Capital structure 
4. Tax 
5. Working capital 
1. Revenue 
2. Operating cost 
3. Interest rate 
4. CADS 
5. Free cash flow to equity 
6. DSCR 
7. IRR 
8. ROE 
9. Payback 
10. Shareholders return 
Consultant (P8) 1. Traffic 
2. Tariffs 
3. Interest rate 
4. Capex 
1. IRR 
2. Coverage Ratio 
3. LLCR 
4. PLCR 
5. Revenue Share 
6. Subsidy  
6.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter discusses the findings from the interviews in India. Content analysis 
technique was employed in analysing the interview findings. Contents regarding 
different aspects of stakeholders’ expectations and PPP financial indicators were 
interpreted and corroborated in a similar and progressive fashion where construct 
validity was used to ground the findings. The findings were also prepared for 
questionnaire survey for further analysis. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY ANALYSIS 
- Research Paradigm: 
  Pragmatic Approach (Nominalist Ontology  
  and Objectivist Epistemology)
- Research Methodology: 
  Triangulation approach (Quantitative and 
  Qualitative Method)
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- Aim: To explore the concept of PPP and
            the use of PPP financial models
- Sample:  3 PPP Seaports in India
- Technique: Cross case analysis 
-  Aim: To validate the findings from 
            interview and literature review
- Sample: 73 respondents from 38  
                 countries 
- Technique: Systematic statistical 
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Chapter 7: Questionnaire Survey Analysis 
“Question is the beginning of thought” 
Felix S. Cohen (1907 – 1953) 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter follows up the findings from literature review, cross case analysis, and 
interview analysis. Stakeholders’ expectations and the evaluation procedure by using 
PPP financial model have been identified in the previous chapters (chapter 3 and 
chapter 5 respectively). This was followed by several semi-structured interviews 
whereas face-to-face interviews serve as a crosscheck and, sometimes, unexpected 
information may be given during the interviews (Kothari, 1988). Then, questionnaire 
survey, as one of the most cost-effective ways to involve a large number of people in 
the process, was conducted in order to achieve better results. As part of triangulation 
process, a structured questionnaire survey was also considered to be the second 
validation process of the preliminary findings from literature review and interview. The 
questionnaire aims to answer the second and third research questions: what are the most 
important stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP financial models? And what are 
the financial risk variables within PPP financial models?” (see 1.6). To answer these 
questions, this chapter presents a systematic statistical analysis of the collected data.  
The analysis is divided into main sections: 1) Statistical Analyses (e.g. Sampling 
Adequacy Test, Principal Component Analysis, Validity Analysis, Reliability Analysis, 
and Agreement Analysis); and 2) Summary of chapter.   
7.2 Sampling Adequacy Test 
In total, four hundred questionnaires were distributed. Seventy-three respondents 
completed the whole questionnaire. Many of the respondents were from organizations 
that had rich experience, knowledge, and expertise in PPPs as illustrated in figure 7.1. 
and table 7.1. 
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Figure 7.1 Participating respondents by percentage 
Table 7.1 Participating respondents and their organisations. 
N Respondents Organizations 
29 Financial consultant 
companies 
KPMG, ECORYS, Ernst & Young, CPCS Transcom, Rebel Group 
Advisory, Accenture, PPP Solutions Limited, Global Assimilate, 
G&K Wing-Lun Pty Ltd, Kumar Associates, Moreland Advisors, 
LLC, Instrivas Pte Ltd, Altra Capital, and United Nations 
Development Programme. 
12 Government authorities Egyptian Ministry of Transport , Infrastructure Project Development 
Facility (Pakistan), Public Private Partnership Unit (Pakistan), 
Ministry of Economic Planning & Investment Promotion 
(Zimbabwe), General Secretariat of the Government of Romania, 
National Database & Registration Authority (Pakistan), Egyptian 
Ministry of Investment, and Invest Lithuania. 
12 Financing institutions International Finance Corporation, West LB, Bayern LB, Bank 
Muscat, Zenith International Bank, Bank of Ireland, Macquarie 
Group Limited, Natixis, and Evergreen Investments. 
9 Sponsor companies DP World, APMT, Shanghai International Port Group SHOST, 
Aljabor Group Holdings, Moncada Energy Group, TTS Port 
Equipment, and Kharafi National. 
11 Anonymous Not available 
73 Total respondents from 38 countries 
Sampling adequacy test is needed to decide whether the sample is sufficient for factor 
analysis or principal component analysis (PCA). The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) is 
chosen to examine the sampling adequacy of the questionnaire survey. This 
examination was tested in every stage. The KMO values for the stakeholders’ 
expectations at five stages and financial indicators (Input and Output) are shown in table 
7.2 (the details in SPSS are shown in appendix 3). These values indicate that the data is 
adequate for principal component analysis because it is greater than 0.5 (see Field, 
2009).  
Anonymous 
15% 
Lender 
17% 
Sponsor 
12% 
Authority 
16% 
Consultant 
40% 
Participating Respondents 
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Table 7.2 KMO measure of sampling adequacy 
No. Group of Variables 
KMO Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy 
1 Pre-proposal stage 0.661 
2 Contract negotiation stage 0.602 
3 Finance-raising stage 0.842 
4 Construction and operation stage 0.732 
5 Input 0.827 
6 Output 0.818 
 
7.3 Principal component analysis  
To find the important stakeholders’ expectations and to classify them based on similar 
dimension of variance, principal component analysis (PCA) was selected in this study. 
PCA is more appropriate than factor analysis when the primary goal is to reduce the 
number of data (Field, 2009). PCA extracts highly correlated expectations into a small 
number of key components (dimensions) of financial model utilisation. There are two 
main results of PCA: (1) the total variance explained by the extracted components, and 
(2) the rotated component matrix. Since the stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP 
financial models are not always identical at every stage, the PCA was conducted 
according to each stage.  
7.3.1 An example of pca for stakeholders’ expectations at the pre-proposal stage 
Since PCA is used to extract highly correlated stakeholders’ expectations into a small 
number of key components (dimensions) of the financial model utilisation, the principal 
components are extracted by specifying eigenvalues
39
 greater than a specific value. Here 
is the rule, only principal components have a large percentage of variance with 
Eigenvalue more than 1 (as shown in table 7.3) are selected for further analysis.  
In table 7.3, the eigenvalues are shown in “Total” column. The percentage of 
component’s variance is placed in the “% of variance” column. Thus, three components 
cumulatively explain 61.72 % of the total variance. In addition, there is another way to 
determine how the minimum Eigenvalue should be chosen. The aforementioned 
extraction of principal components can be supported by visual graphic analysis 
                                                 
39
 “Eigenvalues are the variances of the principal components” (Zhang, 2005d). 
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(drawing two regression lines to find the crossed section) as appears in figure 7.2. 
Component 3 is the point of inflexion between imaginary vertical and horizontal (red 
dashed) lines.   
Table 7.3 Total variance explained at the pre-proposal stage 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
 
1 2.800 31.113 31.113 2.800 31.113 31.113 
2 1.649 18.320 49.433 1.649 18.320 49.433 
3 1.106 12.287 61.720 1.106 12.287 61.720 
4 .883 9.811 71.531    
5 .701 7.785 79.317    
6 .649 7.208 86.524    
7 .533 5.919 92.444    
8 .389 4.319 96.762    
9 .291 3.238 100.000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Scree plot for principal component analysis. 
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Table 7.4 Rotated component matrix
a 
Stakeholders’ expectations Component 
 1 2 3 
Generate enough cash flow .750   
Reflect project and financing term .749   
Bankable .712   
Competitive pricing .550   
Avoid winning an unprofitable project .533   
Transparency  .873  
Competitive tender evaluation  .779  
Reducing time and cost  .753  
Attractive IRR   .864 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a. Rotation converged in 4 iterations. 
 
Since the stakeholders’ expectations are assumed to be independent, the Varimax 
method is selected to rotate the principal components. Table 7.4 shows the results of 
orthogonal rotated component matrix, which determines relative importance among the 
stakeholders’ expectations into similar components. Each component indicates the level 
of variance. The first component has the largest variance compared to the other 
components. As shown in table 7.4, the 9 expectations are grouped into three 
components. Furthermore, the number of expectations can be reduced by selecting the 
highest correlation score within each component. Hence, “Generate enough cash flow” 
represents component I (0.750). “Transparency” represents component II (0.873). And 
Component III (0.864) is represented by “Attractive IRR”. However, these results have 
to be further analysed for validity and reliability. 
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7.3.2 The results of PCA for stakeholders’ expectations at all stages 
As described earlier, the process of PCA for determining the total variance is explained 
by the extracted components. The rotated component matrix was identical at all stages. 
The summary of these results are shown in table 7.5. 
Table 7.5  Summary of PCA at all stages 
No. 
Total variance 
explained (%) 
Principal component’s representative Stage 
1 61.720 Generate enough cash flow, Transparency, 
Attractive IRR. 
Pre-proposal stage 
2 64.627 Transparency, project’s borrowing power, 
lowest equity, high equity, subordinated 
lender determination. 
Contract negotiation 
stage 
3 55.859 Details examination at the global or national 
level, formulae verification. 
Finance-raising stage 
4 60.412 Close to reality representation, claim 
anticipation, securing the operational cash 
flow. 
Construction and 
operation stage 
 
Although these results were pertinent for selecting the representative (based on each 
principal component) of stakeholders’ expectations at every stage, its validity40 was 
untested yet. The subsequent section analyses the validity of principal components. 
7.4 Validity Analysis 
When the emergent components are derived from PCA, the relationships between 
stakeholders’ expectations should be examined whether they are positively correlated 
with the other expectations or not. In this analysis, the importance of stakeholders’ 
expectations in utilising PPP financial models and the preferred financial indicators are 
measured by using a Likert scale. Although the categorisation of Likert scale remains 
debatable (Norman, 2010)
41
, previous researches in the same area assume it as an 
interval scale (e.g. Chan et al., 2001; Zhang, 2005; Zhang and Jia, 2009; and Chan et 
al., 2009).  
                                                 
40
 Stakeholders’ expectations are considered valid when they are correlated with the other expectations. 
41
 While a Likert scale is assumed to be ordinal scale (non-parametric test is preferred), parametric tests 
such as the analysis of variance can also be applied by assuming the scale as an interval scale (Norman, 
2010).  
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Since the exploration of relationship between stakeholders’ expectations and financial 
indicators is also included in the analysis, both Pearson bivariate correlation 
(parametric) and Spearman’s rank correlation (non-parametric) analyses are selected in 
this analysis. Therefore, all valid correlations among stakeholders’ expectations and 
relationship between stakeholders’ expectations and financial indicators are entirely 
covered
42
. A two-tailed test is also selected because the nature of the relationship is 
unknown. When the coefficient of correlation is very low (close to zero), there is no 
relationship between variables. However, low coefficient value (r > 0.1) should not be 
undermined because it is lower when more samples are gathered (Field, 2009).  
To figure out the significance of the stakeholders’ expectations relationship43, the p 
value of each correlation (within each principal component) must be less than 0.05.  The 
results, as shown in table 7.6 (the pre-proposal stage), and appendix 3 (the contract 
negotiation, finance-raising, and construction and operation stages), indicate that all 
stakeholders’ expectations are significantly correlated within each component. It means 
that each component contains valid stakeholders’ expectations. 
                                                 
42
 After testing both methods, the findings between Pearson bivariate correlation and Spearman’s rank 
correlation analyses are not always identical. 
43
 The relationship means a correlation among stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP financial 
models. However, it should be noted that a correlation does not imply causation (Aldrich, 1995; and 
Kothari, 1997).  
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Table 7.6 Stakeholders’ expectations correlations at the pre-proposal stage 
Stakeholders’ 
Expectations 
Correlation Tests 
Stakeholders’ 
Expectations 
Input Output 
Generate enough 
cash flow (PP – 8) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
PP – 2 (0.491**); 
PP – 6 (0.465**); 
PP – 1 (0.275*); 
PP – 9 (0.25*). 
Project cost (0.442**); Project time lines (0.267*); Royalty (0.404**); 
Traffic (0.357**); Initial working capital (0.296*); Financing cost 
(0.389**); Refinancing (0.39**); Capital structure (0.25*); Revenue 
forecasts (0.41**); Tariff (0.27*); Loan commitment (0.292*); Schedule 
of disbursement (0.253*); Operating cost (0.376**); Maintenance cost 
(0.367**). 
IRR (0.256*); NPV (0.306*); 
DSCR (0.352**); Interest 
covering ratio (0.286*); CADS 
(0.326**); LLCR (0.271*). 
 Spearman’s rho PP – 2 (0.509**); 
PP – 6 (0.423**); 
PP – 7 (0.247*). 
Project cost (0.474**); Project time lines (0.251*); Royalty (0.375**); 
Traffic (0.404**); Initial working capital (0.322**); Financing cost 
(0.414**); Refinancing (0.373**); Capital structure (0.323**); Revenue 
forecasts (0.445**); Inflation (0.246*); Tariff (0.315*); Loan commitment 
(0.338**); Schedule of disbursement (0.264*); Operating cost (0.406**); 
Maintenance cost (0.407**). 
IRR (0.3*); NPV (0.318*); 
DSCR (0.369**); Interest 
covering ratio (0.316*); ROE 
(0.309*); CADS (0.339**); 
LLCR (0.284*). 
Reflect project and 
financing term (PP 
– 2) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
PP – 8 (0.491**); 
PP – 6 (0.356**); 
PP – 1 (0.302*); 
PP – 9 (0.253*). 
Revenue forecasts (0.287*); Inflation (0.279*); Tariff (0.348**); Interest 
or swap costs associated with the debt (0.328**); Economic assumptions 
related to global and domestic inflation or foreign exchange parity 
(0.31*); Interest rate hedge (0.317*); Maintenance cost (0.453**). 
Interest covering ratio (0.305*); 
PLCR (0.349**). 
 Spearman’s rho PP – 8 (0.509**); 
PP – 6 (0.392**); 
PP – 1 (0.312*); 
PP – 4 (0.260*); 
PP – 9 (0.262*). 
Traffic (0.262*); Capital structure (0.254*); Revenue forecasts (0.336**); 
Inflation (0.295*); Tariff (0.327*); Interest or swap costs associated with 
the debt (0.349**); Economic assumptions related to global and domestic 
inflation or foreign exchange parity (0.278*); Schedule of disbursement 
(0.271*); Interest rate hedge (0.289*); Maintenance cost (0.448**). 
Interest covering ratio (0.261*); 
PLCR (0.336**); LLCR 
(0.283*). 
Bankable (PP – 6) Pearson 
Correlation 
PP – 8 (0.465**); 
PP – 2 (0.356**); 
PP – 1 (0.306**); 
PP – 9 (0.341**). 
Royalty (0.28*); Refinancing (0.327**); Capital structure (0.259*); Loan 
commitment (0.299*); Maintenance cost (0.333**). 
DSCR (0.27*); Interest covering 
ratio (0.346**); ROE (0.263*); 
CADS (0.253*). 
 Spearman’s rho PP – 8 (0.465**); 
PP – 2 (0.356**); 
PP – 1 (0.306**); 
PP – 9 (0.341**). 
Traffic (0.263*); Initial working capital (0.249*); Refinancing (0.336**); 
Capital structure (0.327**); Revenue forecasts (0.255*); Loan 
commitment (0.362**); Maintenance cost (0.369**). 
IRR (0.264*); DSCR (0.293*); 
Interest covering ratio 
(0.344**); Revenue (0.276*); 
ROE (0.282*); CADS (0.266*). 
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Table 7.5 Stakeholders’ expectations correlations at the pre-proposal stage (continued) 
Stakeholders’ 
Expectations 
Correlation Tests 
Stakeholders’ 
Expectations 
Input Output 
Competitive 
pricing (PP – 1) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
PP – 8 (0.423**); 
PP – 2 (0.392**); 
PP – 9 (0.300*). 
Project time lines (0.308*); Royalty (0.384**); Initial working 
capital (0.329**); Inflation (0.310*); Loan commitment 
(0.371**); Maintenance cost (0.330**). 
Net operating cost (0.257*); IRR 
(0.375**); NPV (0.318*); Repayment 
period (0.316**); LLCR (0.265*). 
 Spearman’s rho PP – 3 (0.374**); 
PP – 2 (0.312**); 
PP – 9 (0.376**). 
Project time lines (0.301*); Royalty (0.384**); Initial working 
capital (0.362**); Tax information (0.276*); Capital structure 
(0.258*); Inflation (0.382**); Exchange rate parity (0.248*); 
Tariff (0.327*); Interest or fees (0.258*); Economic 
assumptions related to global and domestic inflation or foreign 
exchange parity (0.271*); Loan commitment (0.397**); Interest 
rate hedge (0.275*); Maintenance cost (0.331**). 
Net operating cost (0.273*); IRR 
(0.389**); NPV (0.318*); Repayment 
period (0.372**); DSCR (0.261*); ROE 
(0.263*); Principal payback (0.299*); 
LLCR (0.288*). 
Avoid winning 
an unprofitable 
project (PP – 9) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
PP – 8 (0.250*);  
PP – 2 (0.253*);  
PP – 6 (0.341**); 
PP – 1 (0.404**). 
Project time lines (0.259*); Refinancing (0.336**); 
Maintenance cost (0.258*). 
Operating margin (0.31*); EBITDA 
(0.342*); LLCR (0.275*). 
 Spearman’s rho PP – 2 (0.262**); 
PP – 6 (0.300*);  
PP – 1 (0.376**). 
Refinancing (0.33**); Maintenance cost (0.261*). Operating margin (0.282*); EBITDA 
(0.33*); LLCR (0.32*). 
Transparency (PP 
– 4) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
PP – 7 (0.485**); 
PP – 3 (0.584**). 
Initial working capital (0.289*); Target of equity (0.271*); Tax 
information (0.287*); Working capital (0.275*); Economic 
assumptions related to global and domestic inflation or foreign 
exchange parity (0.299*); Loan commitment (0.333*). 
Net operating profit (0.387**); NPV 
(0.256*); Repayment period (0.285*); 
EBITDA (0.262*); PLCR (0.347**); 
Revenue (0.315*); Operating cost 
(0.408**); Principal payback (0.382**). 
 Spearman’s rho PP – 7 (0.426**); 
PP – 2 (0.260*);  
PP – 3 (0.452**). 
Tax information (0.283*); Exchange rate parity (0.298*); 
Economic assumptions related to global and domestic inflation 
or foreign exchange parity (0.321*); Loan commitment (0.26*). 
Net operating profit (0.385**); NPV 
(0.256*); Repayment period (0.253*); 
PLCR (0.368**); Revenue (0.265*); 
Operating cost (0.335**); Principal 
payback (0.384**). 
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Table 7.6 Stakeholders’ expectations correlations at the pre-proposal stage (continued) 
Stakeholders’ 
Expectations 
Correlation Tests 
Stakeholders’ 
Expectations 
Input Output 
Competitive 
tender 
evaluation  (PP – 
7) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
PP – 4 (0.485**); 
PP – 3 (0.463**). 
General construction index (0.273**); Initial working capital 
(0.303*); Target of equity (0.271*); Refinancing (0.505**); Tax 
information (0.286*); Working capital (0.306*); Capital 
structure (0.327**); Tariff (0.286*); Economic assumptions 
related to global and domestic inflation or foreign exchange 
parity (0.504**). 
IRR (0.313**); Operating margin 
(0.389**); EBITDA (0.390*); PLCR 
(0.389**); Revenue (0.3*); Operating 
cost (0.285*); Principal payback 
(0.342*); LLCR (0.261*). 
 Spearman’s rho PP – 8 (0.247*);  
PP – 4 (0.426**); 
PP – 3 (0.378**). 
General construction index (0.333**); Refinancing (0.495**); 
Tax information (0.306*); Tariff (0.254*); Economic 
assumptions related to global and domestic inflation or foreign 
exchange parity (0.491*). 
IRR (0.355**); Operating margin 
(0.361**); EBITDA (0.293*); PLCR 
(0.345**); Revenue (0.26*); Principal 
payback (0.309*). 
Reducing time 
and cost 
(PP – 3) 
 
Pearson 
Correlation 
PP – 4 (0.584**); 
PP – 7 (0.463**); 
PP – 5 (0.334**). 
General construction index (0.332**); Initial working capital 
(0.515**); Target of equity (0.4**); Pre-defined ROE 
(0.354**); Tax information (0.309**); Working capital 
(0.397**); Inflation (0.254*); Exchange rate parity (0.353**);  
Interest and fees (0.271*); Interest or swap costs associated with 
the debt (0.304*);  Economic assumptions related to global and 
domestic inflation or foreign exchange parity (0.362*); Loan 
commitment (0.406**). 
Net operating profit (0.502**); NPV 
(0.438**); Operation Margin (0.421**); 
Repayment period (0.486**); PLCR 
(0.274*); Revenue (0.283*); ROE 
(0.283*); Operating cost (0.334**); 
Principal payback (0.525**). 
 Spearman’s rho PP – 1 (0.374**); 
PP – 4 (0.452**); 
PP – 7 (0.378**); 
PP – 5 (0.419**). 
General construction index (0.383**); Royalty (0.273*); Initial 
working capital (0.479**); Target of equity (0.354**); Pre-
defined ROE (0.34**); Tax information (0.353**); Working 
capital (0.32*); Inflation (0.254*); Exchange rate parity 
(0.355**); Tariff (0.264*); Interest and fees (0.28*); Interest or 
swap costs associated with the debt (0.257*);  Economic 
assumptions related to global and domestic inflation or foreign 
exchange parity (0.36*); Loan commitment (0.45**). 
Net operating profit (0.499**); NPV 
(0.438**); Operation Margin (0.397**); 
Repayment period (0.379**); ROE 
(0.278*); Principal payback (0.509**). 
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Table 7.6 Stakeholders’ expectations correlations at the pre-proposal stage (continued) 
Stakeholders’ 
Expectations 
Correlation Tests Stakeholders’ 
Expectations 
Input Output 
Attractive 
IRR (PP – 5) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
PP – 3 (0.334). Project time lines (0.373**); General construction index 
(0.307*); Royalty (0.295*);  Initial working capital (0.41**); 
Target of equity (0.35**); Pre-defined ROE (0.333**); Tax 
information (0.296*); Working capital (0.342**); Inflation 
(0.282*); Exchange rate parity (0.331*); Tariff (0.391**); 
Interest and fees (0.26*); Economic assumptions related to 
global and domestic inflation or foreign exchange parity 
(0.262*); Loan commitment (0.296*); Maintenance cost 
(0.318*). 
Net operating profit (0.292*); NPV (0. 
316*); ROE (0.265*); Principal 
payback (0.457**). 
 Spearman’s rho PP – 3 (0.419). Project cost (0.263*); Project time lines (0.392**); General 
construction index (0.318*); Royalty (0.292*);  Initial working 
capital (0.426**); Target of equity (0.337**); Pre-defined ROE 
(0.354**); Working capital (0.383**); Inflation (0.264*); 
Exchange rate parity (0.304*); Tariff (0.393**); Interest and 
fees (0.268*); Economic assumptions related to global and 
domestic inflation or foreign exchange parity (0.273*); Loan 
commitment (0.286*); Maintenance cost (0.297*). 
Net operating profit (0.266*); NPV (0. 
286*); ROE (0.305*); Principal 
payback (0.368**). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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7.5 Internal consistency reliability test 
After the relationship between stakeholders’ expectations and the preferred financial 
indicators was validated, the internal consistency or the repeatability of the agreement 
scale should be ensured at certain level. If the agreement scale (ranging from 1-6) for 
measuring the importance of each expectation and financial indicator yields relatively 
the same result over time, its measurement consistency is reliable. Therefore, Cronbach 
alpha is selected to test the internal consistency reliability of the agreement scale. The 
reliability coefficient is determined by the average correlation between stakeholders’ 
expectations and the number of stakeholders’ expectations.  
Although the higher value of Cronbach Alpha (above 0.6 or closed to 1) is better, yet 
the emergent value should be cautiously interpreted. Field (2009) stated that when the 
number of variables on the scale increases, Cronbach Alpha will also increase. In order 
to test the internal consistency reliability of the agreement scale, multiple tests must be 
applied with one of the variables deleted. When the results are below or slightly above 
the original Cronbach Alpha, and Corrected Item-Total Correlation test is higher than 
0.2 or 0.3, the internal consistency reliability is achieved (Everitt, 2002 and Field, 
2009). 
Table 7.7 Reliability Statistics 
Stage Cronbach's Alpha N of Items 
Pre-proposal and indicators .958 51 
Contract Negotiation and indicators .955 55* 
Finance-raising and indicators .968 52 
Construction and Operation and indicators .967 51 
*2 variables were dropped because the Corrected Item-Total Correlation test is lower than 0.2 or 0.3. 
The results, as summarised in table 7.7, show that Cronbach Alpha at all stages are 
higher than 0.6. However, the stakeholders’ expectations group and financial indicators 
at the contract negotiation stage failed to pass the Corrected Item-Total Correlation test. 
At the first test, two variables [Highest equity (CN – 7) and Credit committee 
requirement (CN – 15)] at corrected Item-Total Correlation are less than 0.2 or 0.3. 
Therefore, these variables should be removed to achieve internal consistency reliability. 
Again with the same procedure, the second test finally passed all the requirements (as 
illustrated in table 7.8) and the details are illustrated in appendix 3.  
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Table 7.8 Item-total statistics of stakeholders’ expectations and financial indicators at the contract 
negotiation stage 
Stakeholders’ Expectations 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Cost overrun anticipation (CN – 1) 247.5000 788.723 .484 .955 
Lowest equity (CN – 2) 247.6875 811.326 .227 .956 
Securing cash flow (CN – 3) 247.1250 798.324 .349 .956 
Fiscal incentive or tax benefits (CN – 4) 247.5417 798.849 .335 .956 
Transparency (CN – 5) 246.8958 792.308 .441 .955 
Attractive IRR (CN – 6) 247.1042 803.287 .379 .955 
High risk premiums for a low equity level 
(CN- 8) 
247.6875 797.794 .429 .955 
Project’s borrowing capacity (CN – 9) 246.6250 809.176 .286 .956 
Subordinate lender determination (CN – 
10) 
247.4167 813.270 .235 .956 
Agreement on CADS (CN – 11) 246.8333 804.184 .390 .955 
Agreements on risk allocation (CN – 12) 247.0625 797.762 .349 .956 
Assurance (CN – 13) 247.3750 802.324 .376 .955 
Insurance (CN – 14) 248.1458 790.297 .464 .955 
Input - Project costs 246.1250 796.707 .559 .955 
Input - Project timelines 246.4792 793.191 .569 .954 
Input - General construction index 247.0625 791.081 .524 .955 
Input - Royalty to Government / Revenue 
Share 
246.7917 790.849 .577 .954 
Input - Volume / Demand (Traffic) 246.2292 798.351 .495 .955 
Input - Initial working capital 246.9583 784.679 .718 .954 
Input - Target of equity 246.9375 787.039 .689 .954 
Input - Pre-defined ROE ratio 247.0625 777.507 .742 .954 
Input - Financing cost 246.3958 795.053 .642 .954 
Input - Refinancing 247.3750 785.814 .616 .954 
Input - Tax Information 246.7500 795.936 .512 .955 
Input - Working capital 246.7708 792.946 .600 .954 
Input - Capital structure of the project 
vehicle 
246.4375 797.570 .496 .955 
Input - Revenue forecasts 246.3333 797.121 .549 .955 
Input - Inflation 246.8125 790.453 .545 .955 
Input - Exchange rate parity 247.5000 795.787 .487 .955 
Input - Tariff reopeners 247.0417 789.275 .617 .954 
Input - Interest and fees 246.5625 790.464 .646 .954 
Input - Interest or swap costs associated 
with the debt 
246.8125 792.113 .595 .954 
Input - Economic assumptions related to 
global and domestic inflation or foreign 
exchange parity 
246.9167 791.397 .604 .954 
Input - Loan commitment 247.0208 801.851 .401 .955 
Input - Schedule of disbursement 246.6250 798.282 .534 .955 
Input - Loan repayment schedule 246.3958 803.563 .444 .955 
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Table 7.8 Item-total statistics of stakeholders’ expectations and financial indicators at the contract 
negotiation stage (continued) 
 
Stakeholders’ Expectations 
Scale Mean 
if Item 
Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach's 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
Input - Assumptions related to the interest 
rate hedge 
247.0000 790.809 .652 .954 
Input - Operating cost 246.2500 793.894 .677 .954 
Input - Maintenance cost 246.5417 792.126 .637 .954 
Output - Net operating profit 247.0417 796.381 .539 .955 
Output - Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 246.3750 789.814 .663 .954 
Output - Net Present Value (NPV) 246.7083 794.126 .586 .954 
Output - Margin/Operation Margin 247.1667 797.248 .521 .955 
Output - Repayment period 246.7083 784.041 .684 .954 
Output - Debt Service Cover Ratio 
(DSCR) 
246.2708 803.308 .428 .955 
Output - Interest Covering Ratio 246.8125 794.581 .532 .955 
Output - Earning Before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Amortization 
(EBITDA) 
246.7083 794.637 .472 .955 
Output - Project Life Cover Ratio (PLCR) 246.8958 792.861 .547 .955 
Output - Revenue 246.6667 788.355 .599 .954 
Output - Return on Equity (ROE) Ratio 246.7917 782.424 .615 .954 
Output - Operating Cost 246.9375 781.549 .613 .954 
Output - Cash Available for Debt Service 
(CADS) 
246.3958 800.329 .501 .955 
Output - Principal payback 247.0208 784.276 .603 .954 
Output - Loan Life Coverage Ratio 
(LLCR) 
246.4583 798.807 .478 .955 
Output - Net cash flow 246.4792 796.000 .578 .954 
 
7.6 Agreement analysis one-way ANOVA test, post hoc test and means plot 
As there are more than two groups of respondents, One-Way ANOVA test is selected to 
determine whether the mean significance of each expectation and each financial 
indicator are equal across all stakeholders in utilising PPP financial models. The 
hypotheses for comparing the importance upon expectations and financial indicators of 
two of the four independent stakeholders are described below: 
Hypothesis 1: All stakeholders agree on the importance of expectations in utilising PPP 
financial model. 
Ho: The mean significance of each expectation is equal between two stakeholder 
groups and within stakeholder groups. 
Ha: The mean significance of each expectation is different between two 
stakeholder groups and within stakeholder groups. 
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Hypothesis 2: Stakeholders’ preference on indicator of PPP financial model is equal. 
Ho: The mean significance of each indicator is equal between two stakeholder 
groups and within stakeholder groups. 
Ha: The mean significance of each indicator is different between two stakeholder 
groups and within stakeholder groups. 
If the significant variance of p value at some critical level is (less than 0.05), it defines 
that the null hypothesis (Ho) should be rejected in favour of the alternative hypothesis 
(Ha).  
The following procedure was considered before testing the hypothesis: 
The first step of variance analyses is calculating the number of responses, mean, 
standard deviation, standard error of the mean, minimum, maximum, and 95% 
confidence intervals for each dependent variable for each group. Typically, in the 
comparison procedures such as ANOVA or T-tests, the group sizes are assumed equal 
(or homogeneity of variance is assumed) to make sure that the resulting F-test is valid. 
However, when the homogeneity of group sizes is unknown, the homogeneity of group 
variance should be tested. 
Therefore, the second step is to test the homogeneity of group variances by using the 
Levene’s test44. This test shall confirm whether the variances of the group sizes are 
different or not. If Levene test is significant or the population variances are unequal (p-
value is less than 0.05), the alternative modified procedures (Welch and Brown-
Forsythe) should be also considered. 
The third step is ANOVA test to find the significant variance of p value. At this step, 
the significance of variance is tested with caution
45
.  
In the absence of homogeneity, the fourth step is to test the results of the p value 
associated with standard ANOVA F Statistic by using Robust Tests of Equality of 
                                                 
44
 Levene's test is frequently employed before conducting ANOVA and T-tests. It tests the equality of 
variances in different samples. 
45
 The validity selection of the standard ANOVA F Statistic depends on the homogeneity of group sizes. 
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Means (Welch and Brown-Forsythe). It is worth noting that, as with the standard F 
statistic, the Welch statistic is more powerful than the standard F or Brown-Forsythe 
statistics when sample sizes and variances are unequal. 
The fifth step is to identify which group differs from another group by using Post Hoc 
Test. When the sample sizes and variances are unequal or equal variances are not 
assumed, Dunnett’s T3 and Games-Howell are multiple comparison tests that mostly 
used. Note that when the sample sizes are small (i.e. fewer than 50 per group), 
Dunnett’s T3 should be chosen instead of Games-Howell procedure (Maxwell and 
Delaney, 2004). 
In order to test the aforementioned hypotheses, this procedure has been implemented in 
every stage of PPP financial model utilisations. Further details of ANOVA tests are 
shown in appendix 3. However, it is worth applying another method (Means Plot) to see 
the means variance of all stakeholders upon the variables (stakeholders’ expectations 
and financial indicators). Although the variance significance is determined in the 
ANOVA tests, the means plot is useful to identify visually which group differs from 
another group. 
7.6.1 Agreement analysis at the pre-proposal stage 
Since the homogeneity of group sizes was unequal because one of the variables failed in 
the Levene test (see table 7.9),  the findings from ANOVA test (see table 7.10) at the 
pre-proposal stage and the other stages
46
 were further followed by Robust Tests of 
Equality of Means (Welch statistic test) as shown in table 7.10. These results indicate 
that government authorities, sponsors, lenders, and consultant agencies consider all 
expectation variables in using PPP financial models (Ho1 is accepted) at the Pre-
proposal stage. Furthermore, Post Hoc test is no longer needed because there is no 
significant variance of p value at some critical level (less than 0.05) indicated in table 
7.10 and table 7.11. However, figure 7.3 shows plot of means that is useful to identify 
visually which group differs from another group. 
 
                                                 
46
 The findings of Lavene test at the proposal stage are enough to represent that the homogeneity of group 
sizes is unequal at all stages. 
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Table 7.9 Test of homogeneity of variances at the pre-proposal stage 
Stakeholders’ Expectations Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
PP – 1 1.012 4 67 .407 
PP – 2 .649 4 67 .630 
PP – 3 .478 4 66 .752 
PP – 4 1.060 4 67 .383 
PP – 5 1.551 4 67 .198 
PP – 6 .590 4 68 .671 
PP – 7 .755 4 67 .558 
PP – 8 1.175 4 68 .329 
PP – 9 2.673 4 66 .039 
 
Table 7.10 ANOVA test at the pre-proposal stage 
Stakeholders’ Expectations Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
PP – 1 
Between Groups 1.870 4 .467 .542 .705 
Within Groups 57.783 67 .862   
Total 59.653 71    
PP – 2 
Between Groups .940 4 .235 .321 .863 
Within Groups 49.060 67 .732   
Total 50.000 71    
PP – 3 
Between Groups 3.852 4 .963 .712 .586 
Within Groups 89.246 66 1.352   
Total 93.099 70    
PP – 4 
Between Groups 12.441 4 3.110 1.375 .252 
Within Groups 151.545 67 2.262   
Total 163.986 71    
PP – 5 
Between Groups 4.073 4 1.018 1.373 .253 
Within Groups 49.704 67 .742   
Total 53.778 71    
PP – 6 
Between Groups 7.026 4 1.757 1.975 .108 
Within Groups 60.481 68 .889   
Total 67.507 72    
PP – 7 
Between Groups 2.040 4 .510 .430 .786 
Within Groups 79.460 67 1.186   
Total 81.500 71    
PP – 8 
Between Groups 4.246 4 1.062 1.484 .217 
Within Groups 48.630 68 .715   
Total 52.877 72    
PP – 9 
Between Groups 1.774 4 .444 .547 .702 
Within Groups 53.550 66 .811   
Total 55.324 70    
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Table 7.11 Robust tests of equality of means at the pre-proposal stage 
Stakeholders’ Expectations Statisticª df1 df2 Sig. 
PP – 1 
Welch .767 4 26.778 .556 
Brown-Forsythe .597 4 49.959 .666 
 
PP – 2 
Welch .333 4 26.233 .853 
Brown-Forsythe .325 4 47.765 .860 
PP – 3 
Welch .883 4 24.738 .488 
Brown-Forsythe .726 4 42.264 .579 
 
PP – 4 
Welch 2.197 4 25.506 .098 
Brown-Forsythe 1.408 4 45.734 .246 
PP – 5 
Welch 1.145 4 26.337 .357 
Brown-Forsythe 1.494 4 50.938 .218 
 
PP – 6 
Welch 2.233 4 27.109 .092 
Brown-Forsythe 2.232 4 52.152 .078 
PP – 7 
 
Welch .291 4 25.960 .881 
Brown-Forsythe .437 4 43.751 .781 
 
PP – 8 
Welch 1.580 4 26.398 .209 
Brown-Forsythe 1.520 4 48.196 .211 
PP – 9 
 
Welch .881 4 25.675 .489 
Brown-Forsythe .585 4 44.587 .675 
ªAsymptotically F distributed. 
 177 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Means Plots of Stakeholders’ Expectations at the Pre-proposal Stage
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7.6.2 Agreement analysis at the contract negotiation stage 
Based on the previous Lavene test at the pre-proposal stage, it was decided that the 
homogeneity of group sizes was unequal. The findings from ANOVA test (table 7.12) at 
the pre-proposal stage were further followed by Robust Tests of Equality of Means 
(Welch statistic test) as shown in table 7.13.  
Table 7.12 ANOVA Test at the Contract Negotiation Stage 
Stakeholders’ Expectations Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
CN – 1 Between Groups 9.812 4 2.453 1.827 .135 
Within Groups 85.956 64 1.343   
Total 95.768 68    
CN – 2 Between Groups 7.520 4 1.880 2.213 .078 
Within Groups 52.660 62 .849   
Total 60.179 66    
CN – 3 Between Groups 11.265 4 2.816 2.451 .055 
Within Groups 73.546 64 1.149   
Total 84.812 68    
CN – 4 Between Groups 8.742 4 2.185 1.671 .168 
Within Groups 85.030 65 1.308   
Total 93.771 69    
CN – 5 Between Groups 6.864 4 1.716 1.406 .242 
Within Groups 78.093 64 1.220   
Total 84.957 68    
CN – 6 Between Groups 3.777 4 .944 1.187 .325 
Within Groups 51.708 65 .796   
Total 55.486 69    
CN – 7 Between Groups 12.584 4 3.146 3.044 .023 
Within Groups 67.187 65 1.034   
Total 79.771 69    
CN – 8 Between Groups 1.676 4 .419 .411 .800 
Within Groups 64.207 63 1.019   
Total 65.882 67    
CN – 9 Between Groups 8.287 4 2.072 3.245 .017 
Within Groups 41.499 65 .638   
Total 49.786 69    
CN – 10 Between Groups 1.128 4 .282 .451 .771 
Within Groups 40.644 65 .625   
Total 41.771 69    
CN – 11 Between Groups .612 4 .153 .203 .936 
 Within Groups 48.199 64 .753   
 Total 48.812 68    
CN – 12 Between Groups 9.982 4 2.495 1.684 .165 
 Within Groups 94.830 64 1.482   
 Total 104.812 68    
CN – 13 Between Groups 4.065 4 1.016 1.155 .339 
 Within Groups 55.406 63 .879   
 Total 59.471 67    
CN – 14 Between Groups 8.894 4 2.224 1.670 .168 
 Within Groups 83.870 63 1.331   
 Total 92.765 67    
CN – 15 Between Groups 3.672 4 .918 1.434 .233 
 Within Groups 40.966 64 .640   
 Total 44.638 68    
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These results indicate that not all stakeholders have the same expectations in using PPP 
financial models (Ho1 is rejected) at the contract negotiation stage. Furthermore, Post 
Hoc test is needed to identify group which differs from another group because there are 
some significant variances of p value at some critical level (less than 0.05) indicated in 
table 7.12 (CN – 7 and CN – 9) and table 6.13 (CN – 3, CN – 7, CN – 9, and CN – 12). 
Table 7.13 Robust Tests of Equality of Means at the Contract Negotiation Stage 
 Statisticª df1 df2 Sig. 
CN – 1  
Welch 1.821 4 24.765 .157 
Brown-Forsythe 1.998 4 48.057 .110 
CN – 2 
Welch 2.585 4 21.737 .066 
Brown-Forsythe 2.141 4 38.043 .095 
CN – 3 
Welch 3.230 4 24.953 .029 
Brown-Forsythe 2.489 4 34.461 .061 
CN – 4 
Welch 2.196 4 25.468 .098 
Brown-Forsythe 1.709 4 40.539 .167 
CN – 5 
Welch 2.119 4 25.804 .107 
Brown-Forsythe 1.683 4 47.347 .170 
CN – 6 
Welch 1.123 4 25.677 .368 
Brown-Forsythe 1.300 4 53.017 .282 
CN – 7 
Welch 2.852 4 24.940 .045 
Brown-Forsythe 3.048 4 43.413 .027 
CN – 8 
Welch .472 4 22.203 .756 
Brown-Forsythe .355 4 30.089 .838 
CN – 9 
Welch 3.775 4 25.439 .015 
Brown-Forsythe 3.502 4 45.553 .014 
CN – 10 
Welch .384 4 26.043 .818 
Brown-Forsythe .515 4 40.526 .725 
CN – 11 
Welch .167 4 24.094 .953 
Brown-Forsythe .207 4 46.557 .933 
CN – 12 
Welch 2.852 4 24.879 .045 
Brown-Forsythe 1.805 4 43.484 .145 
CN – 13 
Welch .911 4 23.466 .474 
Brown-Forsythe 1.151 4 45.606 .345 
CN – 14 
Welch 2.228 4 23.478 .097 
Brown-Forsythe 1.740 4 43.668 .159 
CN – 15 
Welch 1.511 4 24.541 .230 
Brown-Forsythe 1.536 4 41.548 .209 
a. Asymptotically F distributed. 
 
Since the number of responses from each stakeholder was less than 50 per group, 
Dunnett’s T3 procedure was selected for the post hoc test. However, Games-Howell 
was also included and a justification
47
 was made to identify the group that differs from 
another group based on the previous tests. Table 7.14 and figure 7.4 show a summary of 
group that significantly differs from another group. 
                                                 
47
 Although Welch statistic test indicates that the variance of CN – 12 is significantly different, the Post-
Hoc test did not indicate that there is no significant variance between the stakeholders upon CN – 12. 
Therefore, to identify which group that differs to another group on CN – 12, a justification is made by 
lowering the standard confidence level from 95 % to 90 %. 
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Table 7.14 Post hoc tests of stakeholders’ expectations at the contract negotiation stage 
Dependent Variable 
(I) 
Stakeholder 
(J) 
Stakeholder 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
CN – 2 (Games-Howell) Developer 
Anonymous .42857 .49395 .904 
Lender .51190 .39495 .698 
Consultant .78571 .33979 .218 
Authority 1.22857* .38815 .048 
CN – 3 (Dunnett’s T3) Consultant 
Anonymous -.59286 .29349 .395 
Lender .01623 .51675 1.000 
Developer -.44841 .39342 .929 
Authority -1.07468* .30302 .015 
CN – 4 (Games-Howell) Anonymous 
Lender .83333 .51689 .511 
Developer .38889 .38168 .843 
Consultant .85714** .30479 .065 
Authority .13636 .40503 .997 
CN – 5 (Games-Howell) Developer 
Anonymous -.33333 .35573 .878 
Lender -.22222 .47378 .989 
Consultant -.49603 .34887 .621 
Authority -1.07071** .37057 .065 
CN – 7 (Games-Howell) Lender 
Anonymous 1.31667 .49265 .101 
Developer .69444 .43317 .514 
Consultant 1.02381** .34733 .053 
Authority 1.09848* .36598 .049 
CN – 9 (Dunnett’s T3) Lender 
Anonymous .80000 .28885 .105 
Developer .61111 .36546 .640 
Consultant .96429* .25614 .008 
Authority .86364** .28143 .054 
CN – 12 (Games-Howell) Developer 
Anonymous -.91111 .52399 .438 
Lender -.38384 .57018 .960 
Consultant -.36111 .42815 .913 
Authority -1.20202** .40998 .071 
CN – 14 (Games-Howell) Anonymous 
Lender .77778 .47378 .492 
Developer .61111 .49646 .735 
Consultant 1.00397** .34120 .055 
Authority .29293 .41676 .953 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level 
**. The mean difference is justified to be significant at the 0.1 level 
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Figure 7.4 Means plots of stakeholders’ expectations at the contract negotiation stage 
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7.6.3 Agreement analysis at the finance-raising stage 
By following the same procedure of ANOVA test and Robust Tests of Equality of 
Means, the results (as shown in table 7.15 and table 7.16) indicate that all stakeholders 
have the same expectations in using PPP financial models (Ho1 is accepted) at the 
finance-raising stage. Although the variance tests do not show any significant 
difference, Means Plots as shown in figure 7.5 is useful to identify visually which group 
differs from another group. 
Table 7.15 ANOVA test at the finance-raising stage 
Stakeholders’ Expectations Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
FR – 1  Between Groups 1.665 4 .416 .633 .641 
Within Groups 42.103 64 .658   
Total 43.768 68    
FR – 2  Between Groups .695 4 .174 .218 .927 
Within Groups 50.246 63 .798   
Total 50.941 67    
FR – 3  Between Groups 5.892 4 1.473 1.751 .150 
Within Groups 52.990 63 .841   
Total 58.882 67    
FR – 4  Between Groups .804 4 .201 .336 .853 
Within Groups 37.710 63 .599   
Total 38.515 67    
FR – 5  Between Groups 2.705 4 .676 .915 .461 
Within Groups 47.295 64 .739   
Total 50.000 68    
FR – 6  Between Groups 1.980 4 .495 .572 .684 
Within Groups 54.535 63 .866   
Total 56.515 67    
FR – 7 Between Groups 5.020 4 1.255 1.182 .327 
Within Groups 67.966 64 1.062   
Total 72.986 68    
FR – 8  Between Groups 8.089 4 2.022 1.476 .220 
Within Groups 87.679 64 1.370   
Total 95.768 68    
FR – 9  Between Groups 5.891 4 1.473 1.677 .166 
Within Groups 55.329 63 .878   
Total 61.221 67    
FR – 10  Between Groups 9.418 4 2.355 1.947 .113 
Within Groups 77.393 64 1.209   
Total 86.812 68    
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Table 7.16 Robust tests of equality of means at the finance-raising stage 
Stakeholders’ 
expectations 
Robust Tests Statisticª df1 df2 Sig. 
FR – 1 
Welch .513 4 23.603 .727 
Brown-Forsythe .611 4 44.896 .657 
FR – 2 
Welch .264 4 24.704 .898 
Brown-Forsythe .234 4 46.929 .918 
FR – 3 
Welch 1.626 4 25.702 .198 
Brown-Forsythe 2.167 4 54.391 .085 
FR – 4 
Welch .274 4 22.987 .892 
Brown-Forsythe .307 4 43.955 .872 
FR – 5 
Welch 1.209 4 23.974 .333 
Brown-Forsythe .911 4 41.324 .467 
FR – 6 
Welch .565 4 21.999 .691 
Brown-Forsythe .491 4 36.784 .742 
FR – 7 
Welch 1.193 4 24.709 .339 
Brown-Forsythe 1.262 4 47.245 .298 
FR – 8 
Welch 2.267 4 24.231 .091 
Brown-Forsythe 1.529 4 42.500 .211 
FR – 9 
Welch 1.706 4 23.546 .182 
Brown-Forsythe 1.687 4 40.882 .172 
FR – 10 
Welch 2.319 4 24.656 .085 
Brown-Forsythe 2.072 4 39.345 .103 
a. Asymptotically F distributed. 
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Figure 7.5 Means plots of stakeholders’ expectations at the finance-raising stage 
 185 
7.6.4 Agreement analysis at the construction and operation stage 
The results of ANOVA test (see table 7.17), which are supported by Robust Tests of 
Equality of Means (see table 7.18), indicate that all stakeholders have the same 
expectations in using PPP financial models (Ho1 is accepted) at the construction stage, 
while not all stakeholders have the same expectations (Ho1 is rejected) at the operation 
stage. Thus, Post Hoc test is conducted to identify the group which differs from another 
group. Table 7.19 shows that O - 2 and O – 6 contain significant mean variance between 
Consultant and Authority. Moreover, figure 7.6 (Plot of Means) shows visually the 
mean difference of all stakeholders’ expectations at the construction and operation 
stages. 
 
Table 7.17 ANOVA test at the construction and operation stages 
Stakeholders’ Expectations Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
C – 1 Between Groups 2.918 4 .729 1.182 .328 
Within Groups 38.891 63 .617   
Total 41.809 67    
C – 2 Between Groups 4.001 4 1.000 .924 .456 
Within Groups 68.234 63 1.083   
Total 72.235 67    
O – 1 Between Groups 6.015 4 1.504 1.877 .125 
Within Groups 51.289 64 .801   
Total 57.304 68    
O – 2 Between Groups 10.302 4 2.575 3.986 .006 
Within Groups 41.351 64 .646   
Total 51.652 68    
O – 3 Between Groups 4.878 4 1.219 1.596 .186 
Within Groups 48.122 63 .764   
Total 53.000 67    
O – 4 Between Groups 1.261 4 .315 .447 .774 
Within Groups 45.174 64 .706   
Total 46.435 68    
O – 5 Between Groups 3.713 4 .928 1.160 .337 
Within Groups 50.405 63 .800   
Total 54.118 67    
O – 6 Between Groups 13.122 4 3.281 4.553 .003 
Within Groups 45.392 63 .721   
Total 58.515 67    
O – 7 Between Groups 3.433 4 .858 1.417 .239 
Within Groups 38.770 64 .606   
Total 42.203 68    
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Table 7.18 Robust tests of equality of means at the construction and operation stages 
Stakeholders’ expectations Robust Tests Statisticª df1 df2 Sig. 
C – 1 
Welch 1.204 4 22.679 .336 
Brown-Forsythe 1.149 4 42.593 .347 
C – 2 
Welch .904 4 23.591 .478 
Brown-Forsythe .971 4 44.509 .433 
O – 1 
 
Welch 2.415 4 24.727 .076 
Brown-Forsythe 2.099 4 49.343 .095 
O – 2 
Welch 3.721 4 23.210 .018 
Brown-Forsythe 3.703 4 44.818 .011 
O – 3 
Welch 1.308 4 23.440 .296 
Brown-Forsythe 1.604 4 43.397 .190 
O – 4 
Welch .439 4 25.009 .779 
Brown-Forsythe .475 4 44.933 .754 
O – 5 
Welch 1.180 4 24.165 .345 
Brown-Forsythe 1.181 4 48.757 .331 
O – 6 
Welch 3.471 4 23.449 .023 
Brown-Forsythe 4.611 4 41.259 .004 
O – 7 
Welch 1.627 4 22.487 .202 
Brown-Forsythe 1.189 4 35.283 .333 
a. Asymptotically F distributed. 
 
Table 7.19 Post hoc tests of stakeholders’ expectations at the construction and operation stages 
Dependent Variable 
(I) 
Stakeholder 
(J) Stakeholder 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 
O – 2 (Games-Howell) Consultant 
anonymous -.71429 .27147 .119 
Lender -.71429 .30643 .184 
Developer -.04762 .31855 1.000 
Authority -.89610** .29591 .055 
O – 6 (Dunnett T3) Consultant 
anonymous -.66071 .36055 .542 
Lender -.11905 .30436 1.000 
Developer -.36905 .22992 .683 
Authority -1.21753* .33569 .021 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
**. The mean difference is justified to be significant at the 0.1 level 
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Figure 7.6 Means plots of stakeholders’ expectations at the construction and operation stages 
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7.6.5 Agreement analysis of stakeholders’ preference on input assumptions 
The results of ANOVA test, which are supported by Robust Tests of Equality of Means, 
indicate that not all stakeholders have the same preferences on input assumptions (Ho2 
is rejected). Table 7.20 and table 7.21 show that Initial Working Capital, Target of 
Equity, Tax Information, Inflation, Exchange rate parity, Loan commitment, and 
Maintenance cost contain significant variance between stakeholders.  
Table 7.20 ANOVA test of stakeholders’ preference on input assumptions 
Input Assumptions Stakeholders 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Project costs Between Groups .718 4 .179 .236 .917 
Project time lines Between Groups 5.564 4 1.391 1.747 .152 
General construction index Between Groups 7.910 4 1.978 1.755 .150 
Royalty / Revenue Share Between Groups 7.041 4 1.760 1.945 .115 
Volume / Demand (Traffic) Between Groups 5.168 4 1.292 1.761 .149 
Initial working capital Between Groups 9.038 4 2.259 2.645 .042 
Target of equity Between Groups 11.437 4 2.859 3.929 .007 
Pre-defined ROE ratio Between Groups 7.371 4 1.843 1.393 .248 
Financing cost Between Groups 2.594 4 .649 1.023 .403 
Refinancing Between Groups 5.295 4 1.324 1.161 .337 
Tax Information Between Groups 9.600 4 2.400 3.218 .019 
Working capital Between Groups 4.384 4 1.096 1.434 .234 
Capital structure Between Groups 1.517 4 .379 .503 .734 
Revenue forecasts Between Groups 4.271 4 1.068 1.520 .208 
Inflation Between Groups 10.149 4 2.537 2.534 .050 
Exchange rate parity Between Groups 13.178 4 3.294 3.209 .019 
Tariff reopeners Between Groups 2.853 4 .713 .694 .599 
Interest and fees Between Groups 4.641 4 1.160 1.375 .254 
Interest or swap costs 
associated with the debt 
Between Groups 7.011 4 1.753 2.030 .102 
Economic assumptions Between Groups 4.393 4 1.098 1.354 .261 
Loan commitment Between Groups 12.979 4 3.245 4.809 .002 
Schedule of disbursement Between Groups .871 4 .218 .266 .898 
Loan repayment schedule Between Groups 1.179 4 .295 .437 .781 
Interest rate hedge Between Groups 2.376 4 .594 .738 .570 
Operating cost Between Groups 4.779 4 1.195 1.787 .144 
Maintenance cost Between Groups 9.080 4 2.270 3.545 .012 
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In order to identify how stakeholders differ from each other, Post Hoc tests are 
used to obtain the stakeholders’ preference on input assumptions as illustrated in 
table 7.22. Moreover, figure 7.7 (Plot of Means) shows visually the mean 
difference of stakeholders’ preference upon Input assumptions. Since the 
significance levels of all input assumptions are higher than neutral value (3.5), 
these assumptions are considered “important”. 
 
Table 7.21 Robust tests of equality of means of stakeholders’ preference on input assumptions 
 Statisticª df1 df2 Sig. 
Input - Initial working capital Welch 3.867 4 19.355 .018 
Input - Target of equity Welch 3.593 4 20.346 .023 
Input - Tax Information Welch 4.718 4 17.375 .009 
Input - Inflation Welch 2.688 4 20.135 .061 
Input - Exchange rate parity Welch 3.184 4 19.853 .036 
Input - Loan commitment Welch 3.742 4 15.862 .025 
Input - Maintenance cost Welch 4.661 4 20.032 .008 
a. Asymptotically F distributed. 
 
Table 7.22 Post hoc tests of stakeholders’ preference on input assumptions 
Dependent Variable 
(I) 
Stakeholder 
(J)  
Stakeholder 
Mean 
Difference  
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
Input - Initial working 
capital (Dunnett T3) 
Consultant 
anonymous -.33333 .36593 .975 
Lender -.33333 .42351 .993 
Developer .00000 .32577 1.000 
Authority -1.06667* .26773 .008 
Input - Target of equity 
(Dunnett T3) 
Consultant 
anonymous -.50667 .38303 .843 
Lender -1.00667* .30607 .029 
Developer -.28444 .30699 .981 
Authority -.94000* .30007 .046 
Input - Tax Information 
(Dunnett T3) 
Authority 
anonymous 1.00000 .53541 .556 
Lender .31667 .33071 .976 
Developer 1.06667 .33166 .059 
Consultant .91852* .23100 .005 
Input - Exchange rate parity 
(Dunnett T3) 
Consultant 
anonymous -.77778 .46756 .652 
Lender -.86111 .37241 .248 
Developer -.66667 .38180 .590 
Authority -1.14444* .32957 .022 
Input - Loan commitment 
(Dunnett T3) 
Consultant 
anonymous -.05385 .52166 1.000 
Lender -.73718 .28228 .159 
Developer .56838 .41548 .822 
Authority -.75385** .25802 .098 
Input - Maintenance cost 
(Dunnett T3) 
Consultant 
anonymous -.53704 .34714 .720 
Lender -.62037 .29760 .364 
Developer -.03704 .33075 1.000 
Authority -.97037* .22963 .002 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
**. The mean difference is justified to be significant at the 0.1 level. 
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Figure 7.7 Means plots of stakeholders’ preference on input assumptions 
 191 
7.6.6 Agreement analysis of stakeholders’ preference on financial model output 
The results of ANOVA test, which are supported by Robust Tests of Equality of Means, 
indicate that not all stakeholders have the same preferences on financial model output 
(Ho2 is rejected). Table 7.23 and table 7.24 show that Initial Working Capital, Target of 
Equity, Tax Information, Inflation, Exchange rate parity, Loan commitment, and 
Maintenance cost contain significant variance between stakeholders. Post Hoc tests are 
used to obtain the stakeholders’ preference on financial output indicators as illustrated 
in table 7.25. Moreover, figure 7.8 (Plot of Means) shows visually the mean difference 
of stakeholders’ preference upon Input assumptions. Since the significance levels of all 
financial model outputs are higher than neutral value (3.5), these assumptions are 
considered “important”. 
Table 7.23 ANOVA test of stakeholders’ preference on financial model output 
Financial Model Output Stakeholders 
Sum of 
Squares 
df 
Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Net operating profit Between Groups 10.969 4 2.742 3.816 .008 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) Between Groups 8.957 4 2.239 3.612 .011 
Net Present Value (NPV) Between Groups 13.316 4 3.329 5.532 .001 
Margin/Operation Margin Between Groups 2.805 4 .701 .871 .487 
Repayment period Between Groups 4.522 4 1.131 1.034 .398 
Debt Service Cover Ratio 
(DSCR) 
Between Groups 5.591 4 1.398 2.260 .074 
Interest Covering Ratio Between Groups 6.451 4 1.613 1.814 .139 
Earning Before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation and Amortization 
(EBITDA) 
Between Groups 2.740 4 .685 .636 .639 
Project Life Cover Ratio 
(PLCR) 
Between Groups 7.405 4 1.851 2.130 .089 
Revenue Between Groups 8.314 4 2.078 2.371 .063 
Return on Equity (ROE) Between Groups 9.545 4 2.386 1.934 .117 
Operating Cost Between Groups 11.406 4 2.851 2.363 .064 
Cash Available for Debt 
Service (CADS) 
Between Groups 3.279 4 .820 1.215 .315 
Principal payback Between Groups 17.638 4 4.410 4.199 .005 
Loan Life Coverage Ratio 
(LLCR) 
Between Groups 1.984 4 .496 .591 .671 
Net cash flow Between Groups 1.465 4 .366 .515 .725 
 
Table 7.24 robust tests of equality of means of stakeholders’ preference on financial model output 
 Statisticª df1 df2 Sig. 
Net operating profit Welch 4.527 4 15.689 .013 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) Welch 4.219 4 15.912 .016 
Net Present Value (NPV) Welch 8.739 4 14.803 .001 
Revenue Welch 3.331 4 15.773 .037 
Operating Cost Welch 2.936 4 18.696 .048 
Principal payback Welch 3.813 4 18.440 .020 
a. Asymptotically F distributed. 
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Table 7.25 Post hoc tests of stakeholders’ preference on financial model output 
Dependent Variable 
(I) 
Stakeholder 
(J) 
Stakeholder 
Mean 
Difference  
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 
Net operating profit 
(Games-Howell) 
Consultant 
anonymous -1.05769** .28464 .066 
Lender -.64103 .30291 .259 
Developer .08120 .37680 .999 
Authority -.90769 .34265 .120 
Internal Rate of Return 
(IRR) (Dunnett T3) 
Consultant 
anonymous -.73077 .33462 .405 
Lender -.73077 .28578 .151 
Developer -.23077 .33462 .998 
Authority -.93077* .22797 .003 
Net Present Value (NPV) 
(Dunnett T3) 
Authority 
anonymous .70000 .43589 .692 
Lender .61667 .32563 .490 
Developer 1.25556* .33129 .023 
Consultant 1.23846* .20617 .000 
Revenue (Dunnett T3) Consultant 
anonymous -.42308 .46522 .970 
Lender -.67308 .33506 .399 
Developer -.08974 .32453 1.000 
Authority -.92308* .27846 .022 
Operating Cost (Dunnett 
T3) 
Consultant 
anonymous -.93077 .43697 .401 
Lender -.48077 .45206 .955 
Developer -.17521 .37063 1.000 
Authority -1.13077* .34937 .035 
Principal payback (Dunnett 
T3) 
Consultant 
anonymous -.83846 .42960 .494 
Lender -1.03846 .38809 .124 
Developer -.37179 .35762 .960 
Authority -1.33846* .36682 .017 
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level. 
**. The mean difference is justified to be significant at the 0.1 level. 
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Figure 7.8 Means plots of stakeholders’ preference on financial model output
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7.7 Discussion of research findings 
From the above analyses, it is evident that the most important stakeholders’ 
expectations change slightly through the project stages. Meanwhile, the most important 
financial indicators were selected according to their rankings without considering the 
project stages, as shown in table 7.26 and table 7.27. However, in order to gain more 
interesting findings, the discussion will be limited to the disagreement between 
stakeholders, which is indicated by the significant mean variance from statistical 
analysis and visual identification of means plot.  
Table 7.26 Comparison of the top rank preferred input assumptions 
Stakeholder 
Input Assumptions 
Top 5 Mean Rank 
Sponsor(s) 
Project costs 5 1 
Volume / demand 
 
4.8889 2 
Revenue forecast 4.7778 3 
Operating cost 4.7778 3 
Loan repayment schedule 4.7778 3 
Financing cost 4.7778 3 
Authority 
Volume / demand 
 
5.6667 1 
Operating cost 5.6 2 
Maintenance cost 5.6 2 
Project timelines 5.6 2 
Revenue forecast 5.5 3 
Lender 
Volume / demand 
 
5.4167 1 
Project costs 5.3333 2 
Revenue forecast 5.3333 2 
Operating cost 5.3333 2 
Interest and fees 5.3333 2 
Consultant 
Project costs 
 
5.2222 1 
Volume / demand 5.1481 2 
Revenue forecast 5.1481 2 
Capital structure 5.1111 3 
Operating cost 5 4 
Loan repayment schedule 5 4 
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Table 7.27 Comparison of the top rank preferred financial model outputs 
Stakeholder 
Financial Model Outputs 
Top Rank Mean Rank 
Sponsor(s) 
IRR 5 1 
Net cash flow 5 1 
EBITDA 4.7778 2 
CADS 4.6667 3 
LLCR 4.6667 3 
Interest covering ratio 4.6667 3 
Repayment period 4.6667 3 
Revenue 4.6667 3 
Authority 
IRR 5.7 1 
NPV 
 
5.7 1 
Revenue 5.5 2 
Operating cost 5.4 3 
DSCR 5.3 4 
Lender 
IRR 5.5 1 
DSCR 5.5 2 
CADS 5.4167 3 
Net cash flow 5.25 4 
LLCR 5.25 4 
Revenue 5.25 4 
ROE 5.25 4 
Consultant 
DSCR 5.3077 1 
CADS 5.0769 2 
LLCR 5 3 
Net cash flow 4.9462 4 
IRR 4.7692 5 
 
In order to simplify the disagreement analysis, the following most financial indicators 
was selected: (1) Input assumptions (e.g. Project costs, Volume / Demand (traffic), 
Revenue forecast, Operating cost, Maintenance cost, Loan repayment schedule, 
Financing cost, Project timelines, Capital structure, and Interest and fees); and (2) 
output (e.g. IRR, Net cash flow, EBITDA, CADS, LLCR, Interest covering ratio, 
Repayment period, Revenue, NPV, Operating cost, ROE, and DSCR). 
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7.7.1  Lender vs. sponsor 
At the pre-proposal stage, although all private parties agreed on the importance of 
expectations in utilising PPP financial model, there is a rather interesting fact for a 
discussion if we look at the means plot as illustrated in figure 7.4. Whilst bankability 
was expected for commercial project, lenders and consultants agreed that bankability 
(PP-6) was the most important expectation. Sponsors and the authorities preferred to use 
PPP financial model in order to prove that the project would generate enough cash flow 
(PP-8). This implies that the project should generate enough cash flow so as to give 
lenders a margin of safety with respect to debt service obligations, and that it is 
bankable. Although Bankable and Generate enough cash flow essentially have similar 
meaning, the sponsors have different perceptions between bankability (PP-6) and 
generate enough cash flow (PP-8) [see figure 7.4]. The sponsors perceived that being 
bankable was not enough. Thus, the sponsors significantly expected that PPP financial 
models reflected the project and the financing terms (PP-2 at 4.8889) and proved that 
the project generated enough cash flow (PP-8 at 5) more than being merely bankable 
(PP-9 at 4.333, which is ranked fourth within this group). This empirical evidence 
supports the view that an efficient negotiation is possible if PPP financial models are 
used at the pre-proposal stage to examine the project’s ability in generating enough cash 
flow. As it has been reported that many planned PPP projects fail because their terms 
are negotiated without taking into account whether the project is bankable or not (World 
Bank and PPIAF, 2007).  
7.7.2 Lender vs. authority 
From the Post-Hoc analysis (see table 7.17) and visual identification of means plots at 
the contract negotiation stage, Authority group was not apt to pay much attention on the 
lender’s requirement of high equity level to minimise the debt repayment risk (CN-7 
rated at 3.8182). Contrary to Authority’s, lenders score CN-7 at 4.9167 because they 
require a high equity level as commitment of the sponsor to ensure the financial 
viability of the project (Zhang, 2005b). Due to its risky nature from the lender’s 
viewpoint, government regulation should stipulate that the level of equity ratio is not 
less than 20% (Yun et al., 2009). Furthermore, government authority in Turkey favours 
high equity because more equity means less total project cost (Bakatjan et al., 2003). 
Nevertheless, the requirement of high equity ratio can be lowered if the credit rating of 
the host country is upgraded.  
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The other mean significant difference between Lender and Authority groups is project’s 
borrowing capacity (CN-9). In line with the lenders’ most expectations at the pre-
proposal stage (PP – 6 and PP – 8), Lenders select CN – 9 as the most expectation at the 
contract negotiation stage as well (5.5). While authority scores this expectation only at 
4.6364. The statistic and means plots suggest that government must ensure that the 
project has enough borrowing power (or robust cash flow) for lenders to be interested in 
supporting the project. The support from the government could be a no competing 
clause for first 7 years or 5 years after completing the project as recommended by Task 
Force for Indian Seaports (Government of India, 2007). 
7.7.3 Lender vs. consultant 
At the contract negotiation stage, consultant group’s point of view was dominant at the 
authority side. This is reflected by the mean similarity scores of consultant and authority 
for both expectations (Highest Equity) CN – 7 and (Project’s borrowing capacity) CN – 
9 (see figure 7.5). Meanwhile, the disagreement of financial input assumption between 
consultant and lender is target of equity. Lender significantly preferred target of equity 
more than consultant. These results might explain why financial close period (at the 
finance-raising stage) took longer than the anticipated when consultant and authority did 
not anticipate the lenders’ requirements (e.g. high equity and high project’s borrowing 
capacity) at the contract negotiation stage. Therefore, these findings also empower that a 
PPP financial model plays an important role to assist in negotiating the best equity level 
for the project and also the other roles in forecasting the project cash flow, and 
allocating the risk sharing mechanism at the contract negotiation stage. 
7.7.4 Authority vs. sponsor 
Authority had several expectations that significantly differed from sponsor such as 
Transparency (PP – 4), Lowest equity (CN – 2), Securing cash flow (CN – 3), 
Transparency (CN – 5), Agreements on risk allocation (CN – 12), and Securing the 
operational cash flow (O - 1). Figure 7.4 and 7.5 show the preferred consistency of 
transparency expectation (PP – 4 and CN – 5) from both authority and sponsor. There is 
demand from the public to keep the procurement process transparent, while in the other 
side, sponsors need to protect their business in the competition. This expectation is 
regarded as the starting point in the contract negotiation process. Since transparency and 
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accountability are an integral part of PPP processes especially in the UK (Demirag and 
Khadaroo, 2011), the government authorities should maintain transparency of PPP 
procurement process. A transparent financial model should also show all calculation 
formulas. Any results from the financial model computation can be easily traced for 
auditing purposes. Once private parties are willing to be transparent in presenting their 
financial model, government must ensure that the project has enough borrowing power 
(or robust cash flow) for lenders to be interested in supporting the project.  
The other expectation is lowest equity commitment (CN – 2). As discussed earlier, only 
the group of authority rates CN – 2 as the least important expectation at 3.2 (close to 
“disagree). It implies that the authority requires a fair equity level for the sponsor at the 
contract negotiation stage.  
Although both authority and sponsor opted securing cash flow (CN – 3) higher than 
lender and consultant, the authority group significantly demanded more expectation 
than the sponsor in using PPP financial model to secure the project’s cash flow. This is 
also a sign that the authority group uses the financial model not solely to secure the 
project’s cash flow but also to negotiate risk sharing mechanism (CN – 12) in the 
contract negotiation stage. 
Meanwhile, sponsors preferred to use the financial model that can be updated easily (O-
3) and ‘ability of the SPV to meet conditions related to the payment of dividends’ (O-4) 
as their top expectations. Easy to update the financial model (O-3) means that sponsor 
(SPV company) does not have to think about how to update the model, but simply 
changing the input assumption with the real information in order to get the desired 
results instead. Once all information is replaced with the newest version, it is also 
crucial to ensure that all numbers are recalculated before reviewing the results (Tjia, 
2009). Otherwise, it will lead to a wrong judgement based on misleading information. 
Therefore, PPP financial model should not be overly used in making decision. Instead, it 
should be used with caution due to error-prone humans behind the equations. 
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At the operation stage, authority group also dominated the expectation in securing the 
operational cash flow (O - 1) because government authority had to make sure that PPP 
project should be able to demonstrate value for money throughout in the delivery of 
services by the sponsor (Robinson and Scott, 2009). In connection to value for money 
requirement, from the post hoc test, the authority also prefers NPV more than the 
sponsor does. 
7.7.5 Authority vs. consultant 
At the finance-raising stage, authority perceived that global and regional trends analysis 
(FR - 8) and Market analysis (FR - 10) were very important. The authority group used 
PPP financial model to review the current and future tariff structure of the facility and 
the corresponding tariff sensitivities of its consumers, including a fairly detailed study 
of demand and tariff elasticity before approving broad financing terms of the project 
(Khan and Parra, 2003). Meanwhile, the consultant rated financial close on acceptable 
terms and construction start (FR-1) because there is a tendency of the lenders to revisit 
issues previously agreed by sponsor and government authority for securing their interest 
on risk management (Cartlidge, 2006). Consequently, the sponsor cannot commence the 
construction until all the financing required by lenders are fully mobilised to 
commission the facility. Thus, at the finance-raising stage, consultant focused on using 
PPP financial model as a tool to assist in achieving financial closure as soon as possible. 
At the operation stage, it was important for the authority to understand how to use 
financial model properly (O – 2) so that a reasonable tariff (O – 6) could be achieved to 
maintain a healthy competition in delivering public services. Meanwhile, consultant 
rated reasonable tariff (O-6) as the least important expectation in using PPP financial 
model at the operation period. This was evidence that consultant should pay attention on 
what authority expected in using PPP financial model at the operation period. 
Consultant and authority disagreed on some financial input indicators (e.g. Initial 
working capital, Tax information, Exchange rate parity, Loan commitment, and 
Maintenance cost) and output indicators (e.g. IRR, NPV, Revenue, Operating Cost, and 
Principal Payback). Authority’s scores were higher than consultant on these financial 
indicators. The findings indicate that consultants have different preference on the most 
important output of PPP financial model (see figure 7.8 and 7.9). This is an interesting 
finding because consultants’ expectations on PPP financial model at contract 
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negotiation stage were dominant at the authority side. Since the authority needs 
recommendation from consultant, this finding suggests that the consultant preference on 
the most financial input and output indicators should be considered by the authority. 
7.8 Chapter summary 
In general, 40 stakeholders’ expectations passed all systematic analysis tests. And all 
preferred financial indicators (26 input assumptions and 16 output variables) also passed 
all tests of systematic statistical analyses, e.g. Principal component analysis (PCA), 
Pearson bivariate correlation (parametric) and Spearman’s rank correlation (non-
parametric) analyses, Cronbach alpha Internal Consistency Reliability Test, Agreement 
Analysis One-Way ANOVA test, Post Hoc Test and Means Plot. The summary of the 
systematic statistical analyses is illustrated in Figure 7.9. 
The systematic statistical analyses were designed to test two hypotheses that addressed 
in the earlier part of this chapter. The first hypothesis is related to the agreement among 
stakeholders upon their expectations in using PPP financial models. By using ANOVA 
test and Robust Tests of Equality of Means, the results indicated that government 
authorities, sponsors, lenders, and consultant agencies considered all expectation 
variables in using PPP financial models (Ho1 is accepted) at the pre-proposal and 
finance-raising stages. Meanwhile, not all stakeholders had the same expectations in 
using PPP financial models (Ho1 is rejected) at the contract negotiation, construction, 
and operation stages. In order to identify which stakeholder differed to another 
stakeholder, Post Hoc Tests were conducted. The stakeholders that had different 
expectations at the contract negotiation stage are (1) Developer Vs Authority (CN – 2, 
CN – 5, and CN – 12); (2) Consultant Vs Authority (CN – 3); (3) Lender Vs Authority 
(CN – 7 and CN – 9); (4) Lender Vs Consultant (CN – 7 and CN – 9). And the 
stakeholders that had different expectations at the operation stage are:  Consultant Vs 
Authority (O – 2) and (O – 6). 
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Survey findings 
(73 responses)
Sampling 
Adequacy 
Test
Pre-proposal Stage
KMO Test (0.661)
Contract Negotiation 
Stage
KMO Test (0.602)
Finance-raising 
stage
KMO Test (0.842)
Construction and 
Operation Stage
KMO Test (0.732)
KMO Test
Adequate
Sig. > 0.5
(Field, 2009)
Stakeholders’ 
Expectations
Financial 
Indicators
Input
KMO Test 
(0.827)
Output
KMO Test 
(0.818)
Principal 
Component 
Analysis
Total Variance Explained 
(%)
Large % of Variance
Eigenvalue > 1
(Field, 2009)
Rotated Component Matrix
Each component is 
represented by the highest 
correlation score 
(Field, 2009)
Pre-proposal Stage
Cumulative % of 
Variance (61.72 %)
Contract Negotiation 
Stage
Cumulative % of 
Variance (64.627%)
Finance-raising 
stage
Cumulative % of 
Variance (55.859 %)
Construction and 
Operation Stage
Cumulative % of 
Variance (60.412 %)
Pre-proposal Stage
Generate enough cash flow, 
Transparency, Attractive IRR
Contract Negotiation Stage
Transparency, Project’s borrowing 
capacity, Lowest equity, High equity, 
Subordinated lender determination.
Finance-raising stage
Details examination at the global or 
national level, formulae verification.
Construction and Operation Stage
Close to reality representation, claim 
anticipation, securing the 
operational cash flow.
Validity 
Analysis
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed) < 0.05
(Field, 2009)
Spearman
Sig. (2-tailed) < 0.05
(Field, 2009)
Reliability 
Analysis
Cronbach's Alpha
Alpha > 0.6 
or closed to 1
(Field, 2009)
Corrected Item-Total 
Correlation test
Higher than 0.2 or 0.3
(Everitt, 2002 and 
Field, 2009)
Every Stage (Pre-proposal, Contract 
Negotiation, Finance-raising, 
Construction and Operation Stages)
Stakeholders’ Expectations and 
Financial Indicators (Input and Output)
Agreement 
Analysis
One-Way ANOVA
Variance
Sig. < 0.05
(Field, 2009)
Levene test
Unequal Homogeneity 
Sig. < 0.05
(Field, 2009)
Welch statistic test
Variance
Sig. < 0.05
(Field, 2009)
Equal?
No
Yes
Post-Hoc test
Variance
Sig. < 0.05
(Field, 2009)
Significantly 
different
Financial Viability Module
1 2 3 4
Relationship between Stakeholders’ 
Expectations and Financial 
Indicators
Pre-proposal Stage
Cronbach’s Alpha (0.958)
Contract Negotiation Stage
Cronbach’s Alpha (0.955)
Finance-raising stage
Cronbach’s Alpha (0.842)
Construction and Operation Stage
Cronbach’s Alpha (0.774)
Figure 7.9 Systematic statistical analyses 
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The second hypothesis is proposed to test the agreement among stakeholders on 
financial indicators (input assumptions and output variables). The results indicate that 
not all stakeholders have the same preferences on input assumptions and financial 
model output (Ho2 is rejected). The stakeholders that have different preference on input 
assumptions are: (1) Consultant Vs Authority (e.g. Initial working capital, Tax 
Information, Exchange rate parity, Loan commitment, and Maintenance cost); and (2) 
Lender Vs Consultant (e.g. Target of equity). And the stakeholders that have different 
preference on financial model output are: (1) Consultant Vs Authority (e.g. Internal 
Rate of Return, Net Present Value, Revenue, Operating Cost, and Principal payback); 
and (2) Developer Vs Authority (e.g. Net Present Value). The links between 
stakeholders and financial indicators are presented in figure 7.10. These findings to be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Authority
Traffic
Revenue forecast
Operating & 
Maintenance costs
Project time lines
Sponsor
Project cost
Loan repayment 
schedule
Lender
Interest and fees
Consultant Capital Structure
Authority
IRR
NPV
DSCR
Net cash flow
Sponsor
CADS
Repayment period
Lender
LLCRConsultant
ROE
Most Preferred Input Indicators Most Preferred Output Indicators
Financing cost
EBITDA
Interest covering 
ratio
 
 
Figure 7.10 The links between stakeholders and financial indicators 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: DISCUSSION AND FRAMEWORK 
CONSTRUCTION 
- Research Paradigm: 
  Pragmatic Approach (Nominalist Ontology  
  and Objectivist Epistemology)
- Research Methodology: 
  Triangulation approach (Quantitative and 
  Qualitative Method)
Survey An
al
ys
is
Testing and 
Implementation
Literature 
review 
In
tro
d
u
c
tio
n
 
Research me
tho
do
log
y 
C
o
n
c
lu
s
io
n
 
- Aim: To explore the concept of PPP and
            the use of PPP financial models
- Sample:  3 PPP Seaports in India
- Technique: Cross case analysis 
-  Aim: To validate the findings from interview 
            and literature review
- Sample:  73 respondents from 38 countries 
- Technique: Systematic statistical analysis 
- Sample: 15 experts 
- Technique: Prototype  
                     Presentation  
                     and Online                  
                     Survey
Public-Private Partnership: Theories, Debates 
and Analyses
PPP financial model and the expectations of 
its stakeholders
Model
-  Aim: To develop an integrated project 
            evaluation tool fitted to PPP
            seaport project
- Sample: 3 financial model spreadsheets
Case Study A
na
lys
is
- Aim: To shape the preliminary findings
- Sample: 10 PPP Stakeholders India
- Technique: Content analysis 
Interview an
aly
sis
 
De
ve
lo
pm
en
t
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Chapter 8: Discussion and Framework Construction 
“We have to continually be jumping off cliffs and developing our wings on the way 
down.” 
(Kurt Vonnegut 1922 – 2007) 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter follows up the findings obtained from chapters five, six and seven. An 
integrated project evaluation tool (IPET) is developed based on the findings from 
literature review, interview, and questionnaire survey. This chapter also highlights the 
concept and development of the model. In order to assist government agencies in 
evaluating bids and making decisions efficiently, IPET considers the stakeholders’ 
expectations, financial risk variables, financial risks, and mitigation measures with the 
following modules: (1) Financial viability module; (2) Financial risk analysis module; 
and (3) Financial risk mitigation module. Therefore, this chapter contains two parts. The 
first part begins with the discussion of the methods used in developing IPET. And the 
second part presents and explains IPET into a framework of the three modules. Each 
module will be combined and then demonstrated diagrammatically. 
8.2 The approach used in developing IPET 
The implementation of PPP seaport was explored in chapter 5.  Typical procedures used 
for evaluating PPP seaport projects in Indian case gave some insight into the proposed 
tool. While chapter 6 and 7 corroborated the findings of stakeholders’ expectations and 
financial risk variables of PPP financial models to ensure that an effective evaluation 
method can be implemented efficiently. Stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP 
financial models including their preferred financial indicators have been explored 
through interview (see chapter 6). McNamara (2006) stated that interview as a method 
for qualitative technique is particularly useful for obtaining primary data such as the 
story behind a participant’s experiences (in utilising PPP financial models). The 
findings from the interview were validated quantitatively through world-wide 
questionnaire survey (see chapter 7). This triangulation method is deemed necessary to 
allow the proposed IPET to be effective and practical. Since a PPP financial model is 
used as the platform of financial viability module; the most important financial 
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indicators (e.g. input and output of financial model spreadsheet) gathered from literature 
review, interview and questionnaire are useful for constructing the financial viability 
module. The structure for an integrated project evaluation tool is illustrated in figure 
8.1. 
 
Figure 8.1 Integrated project evaluation tool framework 
The next section discusses the development of financial viability module by revisiting 
the general architecture of a financial model and relating it to the statistical findings 
from the survey.  
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All input data of financial model at: 
(1) Pre-proposal stage; (2) Contract negotiation stage; (3) 
Finance-raising stage; (4) Construction stage; and (5) 
Operation stage. 
Assessment of financial 
viability 
Risk Sharing Scenarios 
Basecase Scenario Analysis 
Financial Model 
Stakeholders’ 
Expectations 
Financial & Economic (Assumptions/Histories) 
Individual Risk Identification 
and Analysis 
Financial and Economic Outcomes with Information of 
Risks and Optimised Mitigation Measures 
Risk Response Analysis 
Financial & Economic 
Outcomes 
Influence Diagram 
Monte Carlo 
Simulation 
Risk Identification & 
Mitigation Tables 
Type and Level 
of Risks 
Primary and 
Secondary Risks 
Nash Equilibrium 
Risk Mitigation 
Principles 
Input Legend : Analysis Tool Output 
Preferred Indicators 
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8.3 The financial viability module 
A financial model which is used in capital budgeting (or investment appraisal) 
determines which project
48
 is worth pursuing in a capital expenditure. According to 
Baker and Powell (2005), “the capital budgeting process is a system of interrelated 
steps for generating long-term investment proposals; reviewing, analyzing, and 
selecting from them; and implementing and following up on those selected”. 
As a general principle, capital budgeting analyses such as discounted cash flow methods 
(e.g. NPV, IRR, MIRR, payback period and discounted payback period) require 
separating investment (capital budgeting) and financing decisions. Thus, a capital 
budgeting project should be evaluated independently of the source of funds used to 
finance the project. Operating cash flows (cash flows from the project’s operating 
activities) and investment cash flows (cash flows associated with acquiring or disposing 
of the project’s assets) should be included in the estimations, except financing cash 
flows that are associated with financing the project. Therefore, financing costs should be 
excluded from the cash flows used to evaluate projects (Baker and Powell, 2005). 
 
Although no universal consensus exists, Baker and Powell (2005) proposed a simple 
way to view capital budgeting into six-stage process as illustrated in figure 8.1. Based 
on the company goals and the business strategy, project proposals are developed and 
evaluated. The next step is to identify and estimate the incremental, after-tax cash flows 
for a proposed project. The project’s incremental after-tax cash flows are evaluated to 
determine the financial viability of projects. Once the most financially viable project 
that meets the selection criteria is determined, the next step is to identify the order of 
implementation, initiate, and track the selected projects. Then, a post-completion audit 
is performed periodically to compare the actual cash flows for the project to the prior 
estimates in the capital budgeting proposal. 
                                                 
48
 There are three project classifications such as: (1) expansion projects or replacement projects; (2) 
discretionary or mandated projects; (3) independent project or mutually exclusive projects (Baker and 
Powell, 2005). 
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Figure 8.2 An integrated view of the capital budgeting process 
Source: Baker and Powel (2005) 
 
Figure 8.2 also shows that financial model is used in the investment appraisal process, 
which is starting from project proposal identification up to post completion audit. 
Further, Chang and Chen (2001) stated that a complete financial model helps the 
government authority map out the best scheme for the best of public while developing 
policies and negotiating with the sponsor(s).  
The core aim of financial model contains economic and financial assumptions to predict 
project performance. Typically, a financial model is arranged in a spreadsheet with 
different worksheets. The architecture of a typical financial modelling of a project is 
illustrated in figure 8.3, showing the standard parts (or worksheets) of a financial model. 
The standard worksheets comprise three categories such as: (1) Input Worksheet, (2) 
Calculation Worksheet, and (3) Output Worksheet.  
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Figure 8.3 Architecture of a Financial Model 
Source: Modified from Khan and Parra (2003) 
Input worksheets. These worksheets generally comprise various assumptions (e.g. 
project timelines, economic assumptions, technical data, capital cost, loan commitment, 
tenor, grace, loan type, interest rate and fees, repayment structure, target of equity, 
ROE, tax information, working capital and reserves, etc.), which are derived from the 
project documents or from other relevant sources. These worksheets are designed to 
allow users to be able to change the numbers used in the model, but not the formulas. 
Furthermore, Swan (2008) suggested that the input worksheet should be made up of  
raw numbers instead of calculation. However, a link formula in the inputs sheet is not 
considered as calculation. 
According to Swan (2008), several considerations should be followed in developing 
input worksheet such as: 
1. Separated input sheet or assumption sheet 
2. The ability to track an assumption right back to its source (e.g. a data book or 
project document) 
3. User ability to change number without changing formula 
4. Absence of calculations 
5. Three types of data classification (publicly available information, commercially 
sensitive information and the ‘plug’ number (i.e. an imaginary or temporary 
number). 
6. The expression of unit consistency 
Assumptio
ns 
Economic projection 
Sources and uses of funds 
Operations and Maintenance 
Project revenue 
Loan repayment 
Miscellaneous Pro forma financial statements 
Key ratios 
Calculation 
worksheets 
Input 
worksheets 
Output 
worksheets 
Economic Financial 
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Calculation worksheets, as the most important part of a financial model, contain various 
calculations such as: economic projections, sources and uses of funds, operations and 
maintenance, project revenue, loan repayment, and miscellaneous calculations. 
However, these calculations are proven to be error-prone. Panko (2008) revealed that 
88% of 113 financial model spreadsheets which have been audited since 1995 contain 
errors due to formula inconsistency. Further, Swan (2008) addressed that calculations 
on multiple sheets increase the risk of error because it can be difficult to form a mental 
map of the relationships between various elements on different sheets. In order to 
reduce the error and to ease the formula audit, all the calculations should be placed on a 
single sheet. 
Output worksheets. An overall summary is shown from this worksheet to help the 
reader visualise the financial viability of the project, which includes pro forma financial 
statements (e.g. income statement, balance sheet and cash flow statement) and key 
ratios such debt service coverage ratio (DSCR), loan life cover ratio (LLCR), net 
present value (NPV), interest rate of return (IRR) and return on equity (ROE). In 
addition, three types of financial model outputs such as revenues, net profit and IRR 
will be enough to find the most suitable strategy for setting unit prices and adjusting 
them periodically. 
8.4 Comparison of PPP financial models 
The general architecture of PPP financial model has been described in the previous 
section. The most common financial model used in project appraisal is a discounted 
cash flow (DCF) based model (Khan and Parra, 2003). According to the literature 
review of developing a financial model, the comparison study is limited to input and 
output comparison
49
. Therefore, in order to identify the best practice of developing PPP 
financial models, three financial model spreadsheets of PPP seaport projects have been 
selected for comparison. The input and output of financial models were compared to 
find the similarity and develop the best practice of financial model. Since PPP projects 
have the same financial structure, the variable and the parameters of financial model 
comparison can be done by using any type of project.  The basic financial flows in a 
                                                 
49
 Besides considering the development methods of financial models (top-down and bottom-up 
approaches), it is also important to examine the capability of sensitivity analysis from both input and 
output (i.e. calculating new outputs based on one or a range of data variations).  
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PPP project are illustrated in figure 8.4. Although each financial model has different 
format, there are six input categories and two output categories that can be classified 
and compared as shown in table 8.1 and table 8.2.    
 
 
Figure 8.4 BOT Financial flows  
Source: Xenidis and Angelides, (2005) 
8.4.1 Background of the selected financial models 
The first financial model spreadsheet is taken from the World Bank and PPIAF (2007). 
The financial model was used for Concession Project in China for a new Container 
Terminal linked (2 years construction period and 20 years operation period) to an 
existing terminal (22 years operation period). The public partner is the Port Authority. 
Meanwhile, European Joint-venture formed by a Contractor and a port operator is the 
sponsor of the Special Purpose Company (SPC). The Port Authority is responsible for 
financing and constructing the maritime infrastructures (e.g. breakwater, dredging, 
beaconing, etc.) and ground accesses. The responsibility of SPC are financing and 
construction of infrastructures, buildings, superstructures & surfacing of the new 
terminal; financing and installation of port equipment (gantry cranes) in the new 
terminal; financing and rehabilitation of the existing terminal (civil engineering and port 
facilities); operating of the two terminals. 
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Table 8.1 Comparison of inputs of four financial models (Kulkarni and Prusty, 2007; World Bank and PPIAF, 2007; Khan and Parra, 2003) 
 
General 
Assumptions;
(1) Project timelines;
General 
Assumptions;
(1) Timeline Assumptions;
General 
Assumptions;
(1) Timeline Assumptions; (2) 
Construction Schedule;
General 
Assumptions;
(1) Timeline Assumptions;
Macro-
Economic 
Assumptions;
(2) Economic assumptions; 
Macro-
Economic 
Assumptions;
(2) Inflation index; (3) 
Construction index; (4) Salaries 
index; (5) Interest base rates; 
(6) Exchange rates;
Macro-
Economic 
Assumptions;
 (3) Base Interest;
Macro-
Economic 
Assumptions;
(2) Inflation rate; (3)Interest 
rate;
Capital 
Expenditures 
Assumptions; 
(3) Technical data; and (4) Capital 
cost.  
Capital 
Expenditures 
Assumptions; 
(7) Construction and Port 
equipment costs; (8) 
Development costs; 
Capital 
Expenditures 
Assumptions; 
(4) Project Costs;
Capital 
Expenditures 
Assumptions; 
(4) Project costs;  
Operating 
Assumptions;
(5) Tariff; (6) Demand; (7) Operation & 
Maintenance;  (8) Royalty to 
Government;  (9) Other Revenue; (10) 
Initial Working Capital;  (11) Repair & 
Maintenance;
Operating 
Assumptions;
(9) Traffic Forecasts; (10) Tarrif 
policy; (11) Operating costs; 
(12) Labour costs; (13) Other 
fixed expenses; (14) Lease 
payment;
Operating 
Assumptions;
(5) Tariff; (6) Demand; (7) 
Operation & Maintenance;  
(8) Royalty to Government;  
(9) Other Revenue; (10) Initial 
Working Capital;  (11) Repair 
& Maintenance;
Operating 
Assumptions;
(5) Operation, Maintenance, 
and Replacement; (6) Initial 
working capital; 
Financial 
Structuring 
Assumptions;
Certain suppositions related to debt: 
e.g. (12) Amount, (13) Tenor, (14) 
Grace, (15) Interest rate, (16) Loan 
type, (17) Repayment structure and 
fees; as well as equity , e.g. (18) 
Amount, (19) Target of equity and (20) 
ROE.
Financial 
Structuring 
Assumptions;
(15) Equity; (16) Financial Debt 
under Project Finance basis; 
(17) Export credit option (for the 
purchase of the port 
equipments); (18) Trustee 
account option (for the debt 
service); (19) Option for a 
dynamic management of the 
cash flow account; (20) revolving 
credit option; (21) cash-in / 
cash-out (contractor);
Financial 
Structuring 
Assumptions;
(12) Capital Structure; (13) 
Debt; (14) Equity;  
Financial 
Structuring 
Assumptions;
(7) Capital Structure; (8) 
Debt; (9) Equity;  (10) 
Repayment structure; 
Fiscal & 
Accounting 
Assumptions. 
(21) Tax information; working capital; 
and (22) Reserves.
Fiscal & 
Accounting 
Assumptions. 
(22) Fiscal assumptions 
(Corporate tax rate); (23) 
Accounting assumptions 
(Depreciation mode and period).
Fiscal & 
Accounting 
Assumptions. 
(15)  Income Tax 
Assumptions.
Fiscal & 
Accounting 
Assumptions. 
(11) Income Tax 
Assumptions. 
La Paz Container Terminal ProjectGeneral Architecture of financial model
In
p
u
t
In
p
u
t 
Indian PPP Seaport PPP Container Terminal in China
In
p
u
t 
In
p
u
t
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Table 8.2 Comparison of the outputs from four financial models (Kulkarni and Prusty, 2007; World Bank and PPIAF, 2007; Khan and Parra, 2003) 
(2) Cash flow statement. 
Cash Flow 
Statement
(3) Dividends Distribution 
Policy; (4) Cash Flow 
Statement; (5) Sources & Uses 
Statement; (6) Trustee Account 
for Debt Service; (7) Dynamic 
Management of Trustee 
Account;
Cash Flow 
Statement
(10) Net Income; 
Adjustments :  (11) 
Depreciation, (12) Principal 
Payments, (13)  Increase in 
working capital; (14) 
Netcashflow available to 
equity holders; (15) Cash 
balance;
Projected 
Cash Flow 
Statement
(7) Cash flow from operating 
activities; (8) Cash flow from 
investing activities; (9) Cash 
flow from Financing activities; 
(10) Closing balance of cash;
(3) Balance sheet; Balance Sheet
(8) Assets; (9) Liabilities; (10) 
Equity; (11) Balance Check;
Balance 
Sheet
(16) Assets; (17) Liabilities; 
(18) Equity; (19) Balance 
Check;
 Projected 
Balance 
Sheet.
(11) Liabilities; and (12) 
Assets;
Requirement 
for Financial 
Balance
(12) Annual Debt Service Cover 
Ratio; (13) Debt Cost & Loan 
Life Cover Ratio; (14) Financial 
Structure Ratios;
Requirement 
for Financial 
Return
(15) Payback; (16) Internal rate 
of Return of the Project;  (17) 
Return on Equity; (18) 
Shareholders Return; (19) Cash-
in /  Cash-Out Contractor;
Project 
Synthesis
(20) Traffic forecast (annual); 
(21) Cash Flow Statement 
(annual); (22) Annual Debt 
Service Cover Ratios; (21) 
"Endogenous" Financial Risk 
Analysis (Net Operating Cash 
Flow vs. Debt Service).
Other 
Important 
Ratios
(24) Current ratio; (25) Asset 
turnover ratio; (26) Operating 
margin; (27) Net profit margin; 
(28) Degree of operating 
leverage; (29) Interest 
coverage ratio.
General Architecture of financial model PPP Container Terminal in China La Paz Container Terminal Project Indian PPP Seaport 
(4) DSCR; (5) LLCR; (6) NPV; (7) IRR; 
and (8) ROE.
Key ratios
O
u
tp
u
t
Projected 
Profit & Loss 
Statement
(1) Income statement; 
O
u
tp
u
t
(20) IRR; (21) ROE; 
(22) DSCR; (23) Cover Ratio; 
(24) Historical DSCR; 
(25) Projected DSCR.
Pro forma 
financial 
statements
(1) Revenue; (2) Revenue 
share; (3) Net revenue, 
expenditure; (4) EBITDA; (5) 
EBT; (6) Net Income;
Income 
Statement
(1) Profit & Loss Statement; (2) 
Corporation Tax Calculation;
Profit & Loss 
Statement
(13) EBITDA; (14) Interest 
Expense; (15) Loan 
Repayment, Equity; (16) 
Debt; (17) Total Capital; (18) 
Tax Expense; (19) Project 
Cash flow (after tax); (20) 
Equity IRR (after tax); (21) 
Project IRR (post-tax); (22) 
Cash flow to equity (after tax); 
(23) DSCR;
IRR & DSCR 
Calculation
Output
O
u
tp
u
t
(1) Demand; (2) Tariff; 
(3) Revenue; (4) Expenses; 
(5) EBITDA; (6) EBIT; 
(7) EBT; (8) Net income; (9) 
Free Cash Flow to Equity;
O
u
tp
u
t
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The second financial model is derived from Khan and Parra (2003). An illustrative 
project of La Paz Container Terminal, with 2 years construction and 30 years operation 
periods, is used in the financial model. The SPC is a joint venture of international 
stevedoring company and a local firm with no borrowing history. The responsibilities of 
both the Port Authority and the SPC are similar to the first sample of concession project 
in China.  
The third project is a PPP seaport project in India with an assumption of 30 years 
concession period, which includes 2 years construction period and the remaining 28 
years of operation. The government authority has taken initiatives for private sector 
participation of Indian seaports since October 1996 (Kulkarni and Prusty, 2007). The 
sponsors comprise joint ventures by international marine terminal operators and local 
infrastructure developer holding companies. The responsibilities of both the Sponsor(s) 
and the government authority are relatively similar to the two abovementioned projects. 
8.4.2 Input assumptions 
There are six categories commonly used in the input of PPP financial models, such as: 
(1) General Assumptions; (2) Macro-Economic Assumptions; (3) Capital Expenditures 
Assumptions; (4) Operating Assumptions; (5) Financial Structuring Assumptions; and 
(6) Fiscal Accounting Assumptions. Each category has several detailed assumptions that 
may vary from one financial model to another. Hence, these numerous assumptions are 
complicated for the stakeholders, especially for the government authority, to evaluate 
PPP projects. In order to narrow-down the scope of analysis, only the most preferred 
financial model assumptions, which are based on each stakeholder, are compared to the 
three financial models. These financial indicators are available in all three financial 
models of the container terminal in China, La Paz container, and the Indian PPP seaport. 
Ten most preferred input assumptions stand out from various stakeholders’ preference 
on input assumptions, which are: (1) Project costs; (2) Volume / Demand (traffic); (3) 
Revenue forecast; (4) Operating cost; (5) Maintenance cost; (6) Loan repayment 
schedule; (7) Financing cost; (8) Project timelines; (9) Capital structure;  (10) Interest 
and fees. Therefore, these input assumptions were selected to be the input assumptions 
of the financial viability module. 
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8.4.3 The financial model output 
According to Khan and Parra (2003), there are two categories of the financial model 
outputs: (1) Pro-forma financial statements; and (2) Key ratios. Like the selection 
process for the input assumptions in the financial viability module, only the most 
preferred financial model outputs, based on each stakeholder, are compared to the three 
financial models. These financial indicators are also available in all the three financial 
models; i.e.: the container terminal in China, La Paz container, and Indian PPP seaport. 
 
Twelve most preferred outputs stand out from various stakeholders’ preference on 
financial model outputs, which are: (1) IRR; (2) Net cash flow; (3) EBITDA; (4) 
CADS; (5) LLCR; (6) Interest covering ratio; (7) Repayment period; (8) Revenue; (9) 
NPV; (10) Operating cost; (11) ROE; and (12) DSCR. Hence, 10 input assumptions and 
12 output indicators were selected in the financial viability module as shown in table 
8.3. 
Table 8.3 Financial risk variables of financial viability module 
Financial risk 
variables 
Yun, et al. (2009) 
Zhang and 
AbouRizk (2006) 
Zhang (2005b) 
Survey 
findings 
Project costs Total project cost Project development 
cost  
Construction cost,  
construction 
cost escalation rate 
√ 
Volume / 
Demand 
(traffic) 
Traffic demands Market demand Market demand √ 
Revenue forecast Annual revenue  Sale price Price √ 
Operating and 
Maintenance 
cost 
Operation and 
maintenance cost  
Project O&M costs O&M Cost √ 
Loan repayment 
schedule 
– – Loan repayment period √ 
Financing cost – – – √ 
Project timelines  Concession period 
and construction 
duration 
Construction period Construction duration √ 
Capital structure – – Required 
minimum ratio of 
equity at project risks 
√ 
Interest and fees Escalation rate, 
interest rate of the 
loan, discount rate 
Discount rate 
(combining interest 
rate and inflation 
rate). 
Base debt interest rate, 
currency exchange 
rate, and inflation rate  
√ 
IRR √ – √ √ 
Net cash flow – √ – √ 
EBITDA – – – √ 
CADS – – – √ 
LLCR – – √ √ 
Interest covering 
ratio 
– – – √ 
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Repayment 
period 
– – Loan repayment period √ 
Revenue √ √ √ √ 
NPV √ Project development 
cost NPV 
√ √ 
Operating cost √ √ √ √ 
ROE (Equity 
IRR) 
– – √ √ 
DSCR √ – √ √ 
 
8.4.4 Correlation framework of the financial viability module 
By knowing the most important expectations and the most preferred financial 
indicators, it is possible to highlight the correlation between them. Since the financial 
viability module is developed into five stages of PPP project, the correlation framework 
will be addressed at every stage. This will enable stakeholders to collaborate with the 
financial modeller in developing a comprehensive financial model.   
8.4.5 The financial viability module at the pre-proposal stage 
According to survey findings of the stakeholders’ agreement at the previous chapter, the 
most important expectations in utilising PPP financial model at the pre-proposal stage 
can be divided into two groups. The first group consists of Lenders and Consultants 
who mostly prefer to employ PPP financial models in order to assess the “Bankability” 
of projects. Meanwhile, the second group comprises Sponsors, Authorities, and also 
Lenders. At the pre-proposal stage, they perceived that PPP financial models should be 
used mostly for knowing the ability of the project to “generate enough cash flow”.  
Therefore, financial models should be able to demonstrate that the project generates 
enough cash flow and that it is bankable. It means that being bankable implies that the 
project is generating enough cash flow so as to give lenders a margin of safety with 
respect to debt service obligations. It has been reported that many planned PPP projects 
fail because their terms are negotiated without taking into account whether the project is 
bankable or not (World Bank and PPIAF, 2007). Although Bankable and Generate 
enough cash flow essentially have the same meaning, the sponsors had different 
perceptions between “bankability” and “generate enough cash flow” (see table 6.3). The 
sponsors perceived that being “bankable”, which was rated at 4.333 (close to agree), 
was not enough. Thus, the sponsors significantly expected that PPP financial models 
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proved that the project “generates enough cash flow”, which was rated at 5 (very agree), 
was more than being merely “bankable”.  
Once the most important expectations in utilising PPP financial models are identified 
from the stakeholders, it is essential to determine the correlation between stakeholders’ 
expectations and financial indicators of PPP financial models. Top five financial 
indicators (input and output) which are significantly correlated with each stakeholder’s 
expectation are presented in this analysis (see table 7.25 and table 7.26). Figure 8.5 
shows that “bankable” is significantly correlated with several input assumptions (e.g. 
volume/demand, revenue forecast, maintenance cost, and capital structure) and some 
financial model output (e.g. CADS, interest covering ratio, revenue, ROE, and DSCR). 
Figure 8.4 also illustrates that “generate enough cash flow” has strong correlation with 
several input assumptions (e.g. project costs, operating cost, financing cost, project 
timelines, volume/demand, revenue forecast, maintenance cost, and capital structure) 
and some outputs (e.g. IRR, LLCR, NPV, interest covering ratio, CADS, ROE, and 
DSCR). 
 
Figure 8.5 Correlation framework for financial viability module at the pre-proposal 
stage 
 
Correlation Framework for Financial Viability Module at Pre-
proposal Stage
Sponsor, Authority and Lender: 
Generate enough cash flow
Survey Findings (N=73)
Sponsor (12%); Authority 
(16%); Lender (17%); 
Consultant (40%); 
Anonymous (15%).
The Most Important Expectation 
at Pre-proposal Stage
Lender and Consultant: 
Bankable
Input
Project costs, Operating 
cost, Financing cost, 
Project timelines.
Output
IRR, LLCR, NPV.
Financial Viability Module
Input
Project costs; Volume/demand, 
Revenue forecast, Operating cost, 
Maintenance cost, Financing cost, 
Project timelines, Capital 
structure; 
Output
CADS, Interest covering ratio, 
Revenue, ROE, DSCR, IRR, 
LLCR, NPV
Volume/demand, 
Revenue forecast, 
Maintenance cost*, 
Capital structure; 
Interest 
covering ratio, 
CADS, ROE, 
DSCR 
Output
Revenue.
Note: *Contain significant variance between Consultant and Authority
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These financial indicators are useful for the stakeholders to evaluate projects at the pre-
proposal stage. Furthermore, among the aforementioned financial indicators, some 
indicators have significant correlations with two most important expectations (bankable 
and generate enough cash flow). They are categorised under input assumptions (e.g. 
volume/demand, revenue forecast, maintenance cost
50
, and capital structure) and 
financial model output (e.g. interest covering ratio, CADS, ROE, and DSCR). 
Therefore, these indicators are the core financial indicators that should be further 
analysed by all stakeholders at the pre-proposal stage. 
8.4.6 Financial viability module at the contract negotiation stage 
Based on the most important expectations at the contract negotiation stage (see figure 
8.6), sponsors and lenders expected that PPP financial model can be used to evaluate the 
“project’s borrowing capacity”. On the other hand, authority and consultant preferred 
“transparency” to be the most important expectation in utilising financial models. 
Authorities also use PPP financial model at the contract negotiation stage to “secure the 
project’s cash flow”. 
The “project’s borrowing capacity” has significant correlation with input assumptions 
(e.g. project cost, volume/demand, operating cost, maintenance cost, loan repayment 
schedule, financing cost, interest and fees, revenue forecast, project timelines, and 
capital structure) and financial model output (e.g. CADS, LLCR, DSCR, IRR, Net cash 
flow, repayment period, NPV, and ROE). Meanwhile, “transparency” has a strong 
correlation with some input assumptions (e.g. maintenance cost, revenue forecast, 
project timelines, and capital structure) and outputs (e.g. EBITDA, revenue, operating 
cost, IRR, net cash flow, repayment period, NPV, and ROE). The other most important 
expectation (securing cash flow) also has a significant correlation with some financial 
model outputs only (e.g. CADS, operating cost, IRR, net cash flow, repayment period, 
NPV, and ROE).  
 
                                                 
50
 Although maintenance cost has strong correlation with both expectations (bankable and generate 
enough cash flow), the findings of agreement analysis show that authority concerns significantly on 
maintenance cost more than consultant (see table 7.22 and figure 7.8). 
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Figure 8.6 Correlation framework for financial viability module at the contract 
negotiation stage 
There are some input assumptions (e.g. revenue forecast, project timelines, and capital 
structure) and financial model outputs (e.g. IRR, net cash flow, repayment period, NPV 
and ROE), which have significant correlation with three most important expectations 
(project’s borrowing capacity, securing cash flow, and transparency).  Although IRR 
and NPV are significantly correlated with the three most important expectations at the 
contract negotiation stage, authorities perceived that IRR and NPV were significantly 
more correlated than sponsors and consultants (see table 7.25 and figure 7.8). 
 
 
Correlation Framework for Financial Viab lity Module at Contra t 
Negotiation Stage
Notes: *Contain significant variance between Consultant and Authority
**Contain significant variance between Authority and Developer, Authority and Consultant.
Sponsor and Lender: 
Project’s borrowing capacity
Survey Findings (N=73)
Sponsor (12%); Authority 
(16%); Lender (17%); 
Consultant (40%); 
Anonymous (15%).
The Most Important Expectation 
at Contract Negotiation Stage
Authority and Consultant: 
Transparency
Input
Project cost, Volume/demand, 
Operating cost, Maintenance cost, 
Loan repayment schedule, 
Financing cost, Interest and fees
Output
CADS, LLCR,  
DSCR
Financial Viability Module
Input
Project cost, Volume/demand, Revenue 
forecast, Operating cost, Maintenance 
cost, Project timelines, Capital structure, 
Loan repayment schedule, Financing 
cost, Project timelines, Capital structure, 
Interest and fees.
Output
IRR, Net cash flow, EBITDA, 
Revenue, Operating cost, 
CADS, LLCR, Repayment 
period, NPV, ROE, DSCR.
Revenue forecast, 
Project timelines, 
Capital structure.
IRR*, Net cash 
flow,  Repayment 
period, NPV**, 
ROE, 
Output
EBITDA,  
Revenue, 
Operating cost.
Input
Maintenance cost
Authority: 
Securing cash flow
Output
CADS, Operating 
cost.
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8.4.7 Financial viability module at the finance-raising stage 
At the finance-raising stage as illustrated in figure 8.7, each main stakeholder had their 
own preference in using PPP financial model at this stage. The lender agreed with the 
sponsor in ranking “sensitivity analysis for key commercial issues” as the most 
important expectation.  
 
Figure 8.7 Correlation framework for financial viability module at the finance-raising 
stage 
Following the receipt of initial PPP financial model proposed by the sponsor, the 
lenders conducted due diligence for evaluating key technical, legal, insurance, 
environmental, market, modelling and other similar issues. During due diligence phase, 
sensitivity analysis is used for evaluating key commercial issues based on the project 
documents through the PPP financial model (Woodward, 1995). Once due diligence is 
launched, the sponsor’s PPP financial model can be converted into a lenders base case 
model (Khan and Parra, 2003). This was the underlying reason why the sponsor also 
 
Correlation Framework for Financial Viability Module at Finance-raising 
Stage
Sponsor and Lender: 
Sensitivity analysis for the key 
commercial issues
Survey Findings (N=73)
Sponsor (12%); Authority 
(16%); Lender (17%); 
Consultant (40%); 
Anonymous (15%).
The Most Important Expectation 
at Finance-raising Stage
Authority: 
Market analysis
Input
Volume/demand, 
Operating cost, 
Maintenance cost.
Output
IRR, EBITDA, 
LLCR.
Financial Viability Module
Input
Project costs, Volume/demand, Revenue 
forecast, Operating cost, Maintenance 
cost, Loan repayment schedule, 
Financing cost, Project timelines, Capital 
structure, Interest and fees.
Output
IRR, Net cash flow, EBITDA, 
Operating cost, Revenue, NPV, 
Interest covering ratio, ROE, 
LLCR, CADS, Repayment 
period, DSCR.
Revenue forecast.
Net cash flow,  
Repayment 
period. 
Output
IRR, Interest 
covering ratio, 
Revenue, NPV, 
Operating cost, 
ROE.
Input
Project costs,  Operating 
cost, Maintenance cost, 
Loan repayment schedule, 
Financing cost, Project 
timelines, Capital structure, 
Interest and fees
Consultant: 
Financial close on acceptable 
terms and construction start
Output
IRR, CADS, LLCR, 
Interest covering 
ratio, Revenue, 
NPV, Operating 
cost, ROE, DSCR.
Input
Project costs, 
Loan repayment 
schedule, 
Financing cost, 
Capital structure, 
Interest and fees.
Sponsor: 
Financial model modification
Output
EBITDA, CADS, 
LLCR, Interest 
covering ratio, 
Revenue, NPV, 
Operating cost,
DSCR. 
 220 
rated “financial model modification” as the most important expectation as well. 
Meanwhile, the authority at the finance-raising stage preferred “market analysis” as the 
most important expectation in utilising PPP financial model. This result is showing that 
the authority uses PPP financial model to review the current and future tariff structure 
of the facility and the corresponding tariff sensitivities of its consumers, including a 
fairly detailed study of demand and tariff elasticity before approving broad financing 
terms of the project (Khan and Parra, 2003). The consultant rates “financial close on 
acceptable terms and construction start” as the most important expectation because there 
is a tendency of the lenders to revisit issues previously agreed by the sponsor and the 
government authority for securing their interest on risk management (Cartlidge, 2006). 
Consequently, the sponsor cannot commence the construction until all the financing 
required by lenders are fully mobilised to commission the facility. Thus, at this stage, 
the consultant focuses on using PPP financial model as a tool to assist in achieving an 
agreement between sponsors and lenders.  
The “sensitivity analysis for the key commercial issues” had a significant correlation 
with input assumptions (e.g. project costs, loan repayment schedule, financing cost, 
capital structure, interest and fees, and revenue forecast) and financial model outputs 
(e.g. IRR, EBITDA, LLCR, net cash flow, and repayment period). The “financial model 
modification” and “financial close on acceptable terms and construction start” had a 
similar significant correlation with input assumptions (e.g. project costs, operating cost, 
maintenance cost, loan repayment schedule, financing cost, project timelines, capital 
structure, interest and fees, and revenue forecast). While some financial model outputs 
(e.g. EBITDA, CADS, LLCR, interest covering ratio, revenue, NPV, operating cost, 
DSCR, net cash flow, and repayment period) were significantly correlated with 
“financial model modification”, some other financial model output indicators (e.g. IRR, 
CADS, LLCR, interest covering ratio, revenue, NPV, operating cost, ROE, DSCR, net 
cash flow, and repayment period) were considerably correlated with “financial close on 
acceptable terms and construction start”. Furthermore, “market analysis” also had a 
significant correlation with several input assumptions (e.g. volume/demand, operating 
cost, maintenance cost, and revenue forecast) and financial output indicators (e.g. IRR, 
interest covering ratio, revenue, NPV, operating cost, ROE, net cash flow, and 
repayment period). 
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8.4.8 Financial viability module at the construction stage 
At the construction stage, overall, all stakeholders agreed that “debt service evaluation 
towards cost overrun” was the most important expectation except the sponsor (see 
figure 8.8). The main purpose of debt service evaluation towards cost overrun through 
PPP financial model is to ensure that no defaults occur for failure to meet debt service 
cover and that the project vehicle is able to pay dividends, if other conditions for doing 
so are met. While sponsors preferred “claim anticipation” as the most important 
expectation, they needed to select an appropriate financing strategy to mitigate any 
construction risks or claims. Sponsors use PPP financial models to maintain debt service 
coverage ratio (DSCR) above a certain level (in practice is set a level that is greater than 
1.0), so that declaration of loan agreement breach by Lenders, which is based on a 
material adverse change (MAC) or some other similar covenant, can be avoided (Khan 
and Parra, 2003). 
The Sponsors’ most important expectation (claim anticipation) had significant 
correlations with several input assumptions (e.g. operating cost, loan repayment 
schedule, financing cost, interest and fees) and financial model outputs (e.g. CADS, 
LLCR, IRR, Net cash flow, EBITDA, interest covering ratio, repayment period, 
revenue, operating cost, and ROE). Meanwhile, “Debt service evaluation toward cost 
overrun” had strong correlation with some input assumptions (e.g. project cost, 
volume/demand, operating cost, maintenance cost, loan repayment schedule, financing 
cost, interest and fees, revenue forecast, project timelines, and capital structure) and 
outputs (e.g. EBITDA, revenue, operating cost, IRR, net cash flow, interest covering 
ratio, CADS, LLCR, DSCR, NPV, and ROE). 
There were some input assumptions (e.g. operating cost, loan repayment schedule, 
financing cost, interest and fees) and financial model outputs (e.g. EBITDA, revenue, 
operating cost, IRR, net cash flow, interest covering ratio, CADS, LLCR, and ROE), 
which had significant correlations with two most important expectations (claim 
anticipation and debt service evaluation toward cost overrun).  
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Figure 8.8 Correlation framework for financial viability module at the construction 
stage 
8.4.9 Financial viability module at the operation stage 
At the operation stage, Consultants and Authorities agreed that “securing operational 
cash flow” was the most important expectation (see figure 8.9). They considered that 
performance monitoring was very important in PPP projects as it ensured (a) value for 
money; and (b) credit and operational risks are anticipated earlier, so that the risks 
would be kept manageable. In this regard, the purposes of a PPP financial model during 
the operation stage are to assist in ensuring that no defaults have taken place for failure 
to meet performance standards, debt service cover and dividend’s obligations. This 
expectation had significant correlation with input assumptions (e.g. revenue forecast, 
 
Corr lation Framework for Financial Viability Module at Construction Stage
Notes: *Contain significant variance between Consultant and Authority.
Sponsor: 
Claim anticipation
Survey Findings (N=73)
Sponsor (12%); Authority 
(16%); Lender (17%); 
Consultant (40%); 
Anonymous (15%).
The Most Important Expectation 
at Construction Stage
Input
Project costs, Volume/
demand, Revenue forecast, 
Maintenance cost, Project 
timelines, Capital structure.
Output
Repayment 
period.
Financial Viability Module
Input
Project costs, Volume/demand, Revenue 
forecast, Maintenance cost, Project 
timelines, Capital structure, Operating 
cost, Loan repayment schedule, 
Financing cost, Interest and fees.
Output
NPV, IRR, Net cash flow, 
EBITDA, CADS, LLCR, Interest 
covering ratio, DSCR, 
Repayment period, Revenue, 
Operating cost, ROE.
Operating cost, Loan 
repayment schedule, 
Financing cost, Interest 
and fees.
IRR*, Net cash flow,   EBITDA, 
CADS, LLCR, Interest covering 
ratio, Revenue, Operating cost, 
ROE.
Output
NPV, DSCR.
Authority, Lender, Consultant: 
Debt service evaluation 
toward cost overrun
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capital structure, volume/demand, and operating cost) and outputs (repayment period, 
revenue, NPV, operating cost, DSCR, and IRR). 
Lenders rated “understandable financial model” as the most important expectation at the 
operation stage because it is imperative to allow stakeholders to understand the 
mechanism of financial model utilisation at the operation stage. Tjia (2009) suggested 
that a financial model should be built from the user’s point of view, which is accurate, 
robust, fast, easy to debug, and easy to use. Thus it implicitly defines that the 
stakeholders do not have to think about how to run it, but simply use it in order to get 
the desired results. This expectation correlates significantly with some input 
assumptions (e.g. maintenance cost, loan repayment schedule, financing cost, interest 
and fees, volume/demand, and operating cost). 
Sponsors had two identical scores for the most important indicators, both “easy to 
update” and “ability of the SPV to meet conditions related to the payment of dividends” 
are rated at 4.5556. “Easy to update” means that sponsor (SPV company) does not have 
to think about how to update the model, but simply replacing the input assumption with 
the real information in order to obtain the desired results instead. At the operation stage, 
all assumptions have to be updated based on real information of project input. Once all 
information are replaced with the newest version, it is also crucial to ensure that all 
numbers are recalculated before reviewing the results (Tjia, 2009). Otherwise, it will 
lead a wrong judgement based on misleading information. Therefore, PPP financial 
model should not be overly used in making decision. Instead, it should be used with 
cautious because anything can be wrong. “Easy to update” has significant correlation 
with input assumptions (e.g. project costs, project timelines, financing cost, loan 
repayment schedule, maintenance cost, interest and fees) and financial model outputs 
(e.g. EBITDA, LLCR, repayment period, revenue, interest covering ratio, net cash flow, 
DSCR, and IRR).   
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Figure 8.9  Correlation framework for financial viability module at the operation stage 
 
Correlation Framework for Financial Viabi ity Module at Operation Stage
Notes: *Contain significant variance between Consultant and Authority.
Sponsor: 
Ability of the SPV to meet conditions related to the payment of dividends
Survey Findings (N=73)
Sponsor (12%); Authority (16%); Lender (17%); 
Consultant (40%); Anonymous (15%).
The Most Important Expectation 
at Operation Stage
Lender: 
Understandable financial model
Input
Maintenance cost, 
Loan repayment 
schedule, Financing 
cost, Interest and 
fees.
Output
EBITDA, CADS, 
LLCR, Repayment 
period, Revenue, 
DSCR.
Financial Viability Module
Input
Project costs, Volume/demand, Revenue forecast, Operating cost, 
Maintenance cost, Loan repayment schedule, Financing cost, Project 
timelines, Capital structure, Interest and fees.
Output
IRR, EBITDA, CADS, LLCR, Repayment 
period, Revenue, Operating cost, Net cash 
flow, NPV, DSCR.
Volume/demand, 
Operating cost.
IRR* 
Output
Net cash flow, 
EBITDA, LLCR, 
NPV. 
Input
Revenue forecast, 
Capital structure.
Authority and Consultant: 
Securing operational cash flow
Output
Repayment period, 
Revenue, NPV, 
Operating cost, 
DSCR.
Input
Project costs, Revenue 
forecast, Maintenance cost, 
Loan repayment schedule, 
Financing cost, Project 
timelines, Capital structure, 
Interest and fees.
Input
Project costs, project 
timelines, financing cost, 
loan repayment schedule, 
maintenance cost, interest 
and fees.
Sponsor: 
Easy to update
Output
EBITDA, LLCR, Repayment 
period, Revenue, Interest 
covering ratio, Net cash 
flow, DSCR.
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Sponsors expected that PPP financial model could be used to monitor the ability of the 
SPV to meet conditions related to the payment of dividends and repayment of debt. 
Hence, this result also corresponds with Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut’s (2003) 
statement that Lenders and Investors (including Sponsors) consider the revenues 
generated from projects as the source of dividends on equity and repayment of debt. 
However, there is a question concerning how to assure both investors and lenders that 
their dividends and money will be remitted. Proper mitigation measures should be 
considered and negotiated before reaching financial closure. This expectation correlates 
significantly with several input assumptions; such as: project costs, revenue forecast, 
maintenance cost, loan repayment schedule, financing cost, project timelines, capital 
structure, interest and fees, volume/demand, and operating cost; and some financial 
model outputs; such as: EBITDA, CADS, LLCR, repayment period, revenue, DSCR, 
and IRR. 
8.5 Financial risk analysis module 
Although advanced standardised PPP contracts have been introduced by the government 
in the UK in order to reduce bid costs and negotiations (Yule, 2001), the conditions in 
the contract can be renegotiated from time to time, through renegotiations can be costly 
and lengthy (Ng et al., 2007). Therefore, when PPP financial models are used as tools 
for evaluating PPP projects (e.g. cash flow estimation) and negotiating PPP contract and 
financial terms (e.g. concession period and tariff rate), it is imperative to identify the 
expected risks from the most important financial indicators
51
 or financial risk variables. 
This section describes the development of the financial risk analysis module, identifies 
the potential risks attributed to financial risk variables, and discusses the outcome of the 
module. 
8.5.1 Developing financial risk analysis module 
The first step in developing the second module is identifying the financial risk variables 
(see Figure 8.10). These variables were derived from the component of the first module 
(financial viability module). The components of the first module are divided into two  
                                                 
51
 In this research, the most important financial indicators are defined as the variables used in the 
financial viability module. Since these indicators are used to explore the expected risks, these indicators 
are called as financial risk variables. The definition of financial risk variables was introduced by Yun et 
al., (2009). 
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Figure 8.10 Hierarchy diagram of financial risk variables
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parts, such as: (1) Input assumptions (i.e. Project costs, Volume / Demand (traffic), 
Revenue forecast, Operating cost, Maintenance cost, Loan repayment schedule, 
Financing cost, Project timelines, Capital structure, and Interest and fees) and (2) output 
(i.e. IRR, Net cash flow, EBITDA, CADS, LLCR, Interest covering ratio, Repayment 
period, Revenue, NPV, Operating cost, ROE, and DSCR).  
The second step is exploring the risks in PPP projects, including their causes and 
financial consequences, from an extensive literature review. In this research, the risk 
identification is limited to the risks related to the financial risk variables. Liu and Yue 
(2009) explored several methods and tools which have collective functions of risk 
description, analysis and calculation in the engineering field such as: active network or 
program evaluation and review technique (PERT), fault tree analysis (FTA), influence 
diagram, etc. Further, among the risk analysis tools, they argued that influence diagram 
in the perfect analysis tool for dynamic risk management because it represents the 
combination and transfer of risk elements from the two aspects of time and logic, and is 
good at analyzing the sensitivity and control value of risk elements. Ashley and Bonner 
(1987) also stated that the influence diagram method provides an very useful picture of 
a project and its inherent risks. Influence diagram is a convenient communication tool 
between experts, managers and owners as well, to make the decision of risk 
management more timely and accurate. Hence, the links between the financial risk 
variables and the related risks are identified by the Influence diagram method.  
Several influence diagrams that were developed in this research can be considered as 
representing financial risk analysis for PPP projects. One of these influence diagrams 
can be seen in figure 8.12. Although the developed influence diagrams are relatively 
wide-ranging in structure, they should encompass critical factors and their influences. 
When these influence diagrams are used continuously from the pre-proposal stage to 
operation stage, it would invariably lead to enhancements and refinements of the 
decision making process.  
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8.5.2 Systematic analysis 
Systematic analysis of construction financial risk variables requires a uniform language 
for communication
52
. Figure 8.11 shows the notations used for state variables, decision 
variables, fixed (or nominal) values calculations (or value models), and influence 
relationships. State variables as used in this context represent risks or uncertainties. 
Each element represents possible nodes in an influence diagram. Combining nodes with 
interrelationships yields a joint cause-effect and time-sequence mapping of risks, 
decisions, and outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.11 Influence diagram notation and conventions: 
(a) notation; (b) relationships. 
Source: Ashley and Bonner (1987) 
The sources of financial risk were supplemented through literature review and 
conversations with experts. The next section addresses the connection between financial 
risks and financial risk variables.  
8.5.3 Risks related to input assumptions and output indicators 
Since the identification of financial risk and consequence variables is derived from the 
financial risk variables, this section attends to the connection between financial risk 
variables and financial risks, including the decision rules to avoid the risks. It is worth 
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 The language of influence diagram notation and conventions is adopted from Ashley and Bonner 
(1987). 
Nominal (or given) Quantity 
Calculated quantity (value model) 
G 
D 
F 
A 
C 
B 
E 
H 
Decision Variable 
State Variable 
The probabilities associated with random variable “B” depend on the 
outcome of random variable “A”. 
The probability of random variable “D” depends on decision “C”. 
The decision maker knows the outcome of random variable “E” when 
decision “F” is made. 
The decision maker knows decision “G” when decision “H” is made. 
(a) 
(b) 
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recalling that financial risk variables are divided into two categories (input assumptions 
and financial model output). Any calculation of new outputs is based on one or a range 
of input data variations. Furthermore, the information to be provided in the input 
worksheet is raw numbers (of assumptions) instead of calculations. The output 
worksheet of the financial model is an overall summary of pro forma financial 
statements and key ratios that help the reader to understand the financial viability of the 
project. Therefore, financial risk variables are divided into two categories. 
The importance of financial risk variables were identified from the literature review and 
then consolidated into five most important indicators of each input and output of PPP 
financial model (based on each stakeholder’s point of view). These indicators were 
further analysed by conducting another literature review to identify the related risks as 
shown in table 8.4 and table 8.5. 
Table 8.4 Input assumptions and financial risks 
Input Assumptions Decision Rules Financial risk 
Project costs PFI should not be used for individually 
procured projects under £20m (HM 
Treasury, 2004). 
High bidding costs, prolonged 
negotiation period, cost 
overruns, and financing risks 
(Xenidis and Angelides, 2005). 
Volume / Demand 
(traffic) 
Traffic forecast should serve several 
purposes (leics.gov.uk, 2011):  
A background for estimating future traffic 
levels in the design and appraisal of 
infrastructure improvement schemes, 
and of traffic policies and initiatives 
aimed at changing the use of the 
network.   
A basis for predicting many of the 
environmental impacts of the traffic 
both at the national and local levels;  
An indicator for informing regarding how 
much the traffic can be expected to 
grow under present policies 
An indicator of the effect of measures that 
they might propose to influence the 
growth. 
Competitive risk (World Bank 
and Public-Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility, 
2007), project approval risk 
(HM Treasury, 2004), and 
revenue risk (Aziz, 2007; Jun, 
2010, Kuffler and Leung, 1998; 
Yun, et al., 2009, Bonnafous, 
2010; and Vajdic et al., 2012). 
Revenue forecast "If there is no off-take agreement, and the 
revenue forecast is subject to price, 
demand, business cycle, inflation, 
currency parity and other operating 
risks" (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
Bidding risk (Kulkarni and 
Prusty, 2007), traffic risk 
(Soehodho et al., 2003; 
Bakatjan, et al., 2003; and Ng, 
et al., 2010), competitive risk 
(World Bank and Public-Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility, 
2007), project approval risk 
(HM Treasury, 2004), revenue 
risk (Aziz, 2007; Jun, 2010, 
Kuffler and Leung, 1998; Yun, 
et al., 2009, Bonnafous, 2010; 
and Vajdic et al., 2012), and 
funding risk (Bradley and 
Whelan, 1997; and Singh and 
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Kalidindi, 2009.). 
Operating cost A general estimate of operating costs 
should include estimates of the services 
required to operate the completed 
facility and will alter in line with the 
nature of the project, such as: (1) human 
resource costs, staffing, pension 
liabilities, redundancy costs etc; (2) 
consumables; (3) repairs, maintenance 
and cleaning; (4) administrative 
overheads; (5) insurance costs; (6) in-
house management costs (Cartlidge,  
2006). 
Market risk (Soehodho et al., 
2003; Ahadzi and Bowles, 
2004; and Bonnafous, 2012), 
and cost overruns (Xenidis and 
Angelides, 2005). 
Loan repayment 
schedule 
Loan repayment profile must be tailored 
to the project for which it was set up 
(i.e. Greenfield or Brownfield project in 
developed or developing country, etc.) 
(World Bank and PPIAF, 2007). 
Construction risk (Zhang, 2005b; 
and (Özdoganm and Birgönül, 
2000), revenue risk (Aziz, 2007; 
Jun, 2010, Kuffler and Leung, 
1998; Yun, et al., 2009, 
Bonnafous, 2010; and Vajdic et 
al., 2012), and funding risk 
(Bradley and Whelan, 1997; 
(Singh and Kalidindi, 2009; and 
Zhang, 2004). 
Financing cost Higher transaction and financing costs 
should be off-set through efficiency 
gains (e.g. low financial service 
charges, fixed and low interest rate 
financing, long-term loan financing and 
low costs from fluctuations of currency 
and exchange rates) (Quium, 2011, 
Yuan et al., 2009). 
Financial risk (World Bank, 1999; 
Zhang and Kumawaswamy, 
2001; and Baker and Powell, 
2005), agency cost risk (Jobst, 
2009), legislative & government 
risk (HM Treasury, 2004), and 
construction risks (Özdoganm 
and Birgönül, 2000). 
Project time lines The length of the concession period 
should be determined based on project 
conditions, whole life cycle cost, likely 
term of senior debt, and financial 
analyses (Aziz, 2007). 
Time overrun (Soehodho et al., 
2003; (Wibowo and Mohamed, 
2010; and Xenidis and 
Angelides, 2005), market risk 
(Zhang, 2005b; Schaufelberger 
and Wipadapisut, 2003; and 
Khan and Parra, 2003), 
prolonged negotiation period, 
and cost overrun (Xenidis and 
Angelides, 2005). 
Capital structure The Korean government regulates that the 
level of equity ratio should not be less 
than 20% (Yun et al., 2009). 
Revenue risk (Aziz, 2007; Jun, 
2010, Kuffler and Leung, 1998; 
Yun, et al., 2009, Bonnafous, 
2010; and Vajdic et al., 2012) 
and funding risk (Bradley and 
Whelan, 1997; (Singh and 
Kalidindi, 2009; and Zhang, 
2004). 
Interest and fees The interest rate and fees should be tested 
to ensure that they are reasonably close 
to market for the type of project being 
considered (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
Market risk (Soehodho et al., 
2003; Ahadzi and Bowles, 
2004; and Bonnafous, 2012), 
traffic risk (Cheng, 2010b), and 
credit risk (Xenidis and 
Angelides, 2005). 
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Table 8.5 Output indicators and financial risks 
Financial Outputs Decision Rules Financial risk 
IRR IRR must be greater than the required rate 
or discount rate (Bakatjan et al., 2003). 
The Government authority should 
implement a project if the expected IRR 
covers the market interest rate plus a risk 
premium which takes account of the 
uncertainties (Bonnafous, 2012). 
Violation of flat payment profile 
assumption (Cuthbert and 
Cuthbert, 2012), cost overrun 
(Xenidis and Angelides, 2005), 
revenue risk (Aziz, 2007; Jun, 
2010, Kuffler and Leung, 1998; 
Yun, et al., 2009, Bonnafous, 
2010; and Vajdic et al., 2012), 
high risk premium (Bonnafous, 
2012), traffic risk (Cheng, 
2010b), and market risk 
(Soehodho et al., 2003; Ahadzi 
and Bowles, 2004; and 
Bonnafous, 2012). 
Net cash flow Positive and higher net cash flows are 
preferred (Schmidt, 2012). 
Market risk (Soehodho et al., 
2003; Ahadzi and Bowles, 
2004; and Bonnafous, 2012), 
cost overrun (Xenidis and 
Angelides, 2005), tariff risk, 
(Soehodho et al., 2003; 
Bakatjan, et al., 2003; and Ng, 
et al., 2010), and decision risk 
(Engle, 2010; Faulkenberry, 
2006; and Boussabaine, 2006). 
EBITDA Higher is better Decision risk (Engle, 2010; 
Faulkenberry, 2006; and 
Boussabaine, 2006). 
CADS Higher is better Funding risk (Bradley and 
Whelan, 1997; (Singh and 
Kalidindi, 2009; and Zhang, 
2004), revenue risk (Aziz, 2007; 
Jun, 2010, Kuffler and Leung, 
1998; Yun, et al., 2009, 
Bonnafous, 2010; and Vajdic et 
al., 2012), cost overrun (Xenidis 
and Angelides, 2005), and 
calculation risk (Warnelid, 
2012). 
LLCR The minimum LLCR generally should be 
greater than 1.2 (Querioz, 2011) 
Market and cross-currency risk 
(Zhang, 2005b; Schaufelberger 
and Wipadapisut, 2003; and 
Khan and Parra, 2003), revenue 
risk (Aziz, 2007; Jun, 2010, 
Kuffler and Leung, 1998; Yun, 
et al., 2009, Bonnafous, 2010; 
and Vajdic et al., 2012), cost 
overrun (Xenidis and Angelides, 
2005), and funding risk 
(Bradley and Whelan, 1997; 
(Singh and Kalidindi, 2009; and 
Zhang, 2004). 
Interest coverage ratio “When a project's interest coverage ratio is 
1.5 or lower, its ability to meet interest 
expenses may be questionable. An 
interest coverage ratio below 1 
indicates the project is not generating 
sufficient revenues to satisfy interest 
expenses” (Loth, 2012). 
 
Funding risk (Bradley and 
Whelan, 1997; (Singh and 
Kalidindi, 2009; and Zhang, 
2004), revenue risk (Aziz, 2007; 
Jun, 2010, Kuffler and Leung, 
1998; Yun, et al., 2009, 
Bonnafous, 2010; and Vajdic et 
al., 2012), and cost overrun 
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(Xenidis and Angelides, 2005). 
Repayment period A project is acceptable if its payback is 
less than the maximum cost recovery 
time established by the analyst. 
The investment should proceed if the 
payback period exceeds a specified 
period. 
When using payback period as a ranking 
method between projects, the project 
with the shortest payback period should 
be selected (Boussabaine, 2006). 
Liquidity risk (Malini, 2011), 
tariff risk (Soehodho et al., 
2003; Bakatjan, et al., 2003; and 
Ng, et al., 2010), and decision 
risk (Engle, 2010; Faulkenberry, 
2006; and Boussabaine, 2006). 
Revenue Higher is better Bidding risk (Kulkarni and 
Prusty, 2007), traffic risk 
(Cheng, 2010b), competitive 
risk (Soehodho et al., 2003), 
project approval risk (HM 
Treasury, 2004), revenue risk 
(Aziz, 2007; Jun, 2010, Kuffler 
and Leung, 1998; Yun, et al., 
2009, Bonnafous, 2010; and 
Vajdic et al., 2012), and funding 
risk (Bradley and Whelan, 1997; 
(Singh and Kalidindi, 2009; and 
Zhang, 2004). 
NPV Higher is better Discount rate risk (Vassallo, 
2010; Grout, 2003; and Shaoul, 
2005), decision risk (Engle, 
2010; Faulkenberry, 2006; and 
Boussabaine, 2006), 
unprofitable project risk 
(Bonnafous, 2010), and high 
social margin cost (Evenhuis 
and Vickerman, 2010). 
Operating cost Lower better Market risk (Soehodho et al., 
2003; Ahadzi and Bowles, 
2004; and Bonnafous, 2012) and 
cost overruns (Xenidis and 
Angelides, 2005). 
ROE (Equity IRR) The project sponsor should use less 
borrowing than the level that maximizes 
the debt market value, when the project 
sponsor chooses to maximize the ROE 
(Wibowo, 2005). 
Tariff risk (Soehodho et al., 2003; 
Bakatjan, et al., 2003; and Ng, 
et al., 2010), and cost overrun 
(Xenidis and Angelides, 2005). 
DSCR Government of India prefers that the 
minimum ADSCR should be above 1.30 
in all years of the loan period (DOA, 
2012). 
Revenue risk (Aziz, 2007; Jun, 
2010, Kuffler and Leung, 1998; 
Yun, et al., 2009, Bonnafous, 
2010; and Vajdic et al., 2012), 
cost overrun (Xenidis and 
Angelides, 2005), calculation 
risk (Warnelid, 2012), and 
decision risk (Engle, 2010; 
Faulkenberry, 2006; and 
Boussabaine, 2006). 
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8.5.4 Monte Carlo Analysis 
After identifying the link between the financial risk variables and the related risks for 
the second module, the module will also analyse the project risk level through Monte 
Carlo simulation. The Monte Carlo method of computation was invented by Stanislaw 
Ulam (Proctor, 2012). This simulation is known as a useful technique for financial 
modelling that utilises random inputs to represent uncertainty. Forecasting future project 
performance is always a problem because there will clearly be a number of inputs into 
the model that are unknown. Monte Carlo simulation provides better estimate with the 
probability distribution of the inputs. Since random inputs are generated by using the 
probability distribution, one of the five probability distributions (normal, logarithm 
normal, uniform, triangle, and beta) should be chosen for each input to better reflect  
real life project conditions (Yun et al., 2009). Varying the input parameters in the 
financial model (e.g. traffic, tariff, debt-equity ratio, O&M costs, and project costs) is 
also part of sensitivity analysis (Kulkarni and Prusty, 2007). Another Monte Carlo 
simulation of input variables (e.g. construction period, project development cost, market 
demand, sale price, O&M price, discount rate, exchange rate, interest rate, and inflation 
rate) can be used to determine the distribution of NPV (Zhang and AbouRizk, 2006). 
Table 8.6 shows the selected probability distribution of each input.  
 
Table 8.6 Input Assumptions and Probability Distribution 
Input Assumptions Probability Distribution 
Container Terminal Capacity Beta (Yun et al., 2009) 
Composite Tariff  Uniform (Yun et al., 2009) 
Land acquisition cost Beta (Wibowo and Kochendorfer, 2005) 
Construction Cost Normal (Yun et al., 2009) 
Financing cost Normal (Yun et al., 2009) 
Interest rate  Normal (Yun et al., 2009) 
Construction period Beta (Netmba, 2010) 
Inflation Rate Normal (Yun et al., 2009) 
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The second financial risk analysis allows the base case scenario to be randomly 
simulated. According to Chee and Yeo (1995), performing Monte-Carlo simulation up 
to 500 iterations is sufficient to make the sampling bias insignificant. Therefore, it is 
intended to limit the simulation up to 500 iterations. Every iteration result is recorded up 
to 500 times. The probability distribution of the iteration results, then, could be 
estimated. Each output (e.g. ROA, ROE, NPV, IRR, DSCR min, LLCR min, Interest 
Covering Ratio, and Payback Period) will have different standard deviation, mean, 
upper and lower value with 95% confidence level. This simulation provides information 
on which output is affected by a random simulation of financial risk variable input.  
Then, the last module (financial risk mitigation module) will arrange the alternative 
mitigation measures toward the identified type and level of risks based on the financial 
risk variables. 
8.6 Financial Risk Mitigation Module 
At the end of preliminary evaluation with an IPET, the financial and economic 
outcomes will be accompanied by the information of source(s) and consequence(s) of 
risks, and optimised mitigation measures. Since the outcome of an integrated project 
evaluation tool (IPET) provides the output of a PPP financial model linked with the risk 
management information, the government authority or the other stakeholder will be able 
to determine the best option for the project. The sponsor(s) will also have greater 
confidence to facilitate the submission of a convincing proposal or unsolicited proposal. 
Table 8.7 shows alternative mitigation measure(s) for each financial risk. 
Table 8.7 Financial risks and mitigation measures 
No. Financial risk Mitigation Measures 
1 Violation of flat 
payment profile 
assumption 
IRR should be accompanied with a statistic based on an average 
outstanding debt over the period of the relevant transaction 
(Cuthbert and Cuthbert, 2012) 
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2 Cost overrun Construction cost reduction will minimise the impact of the overall 
costs (Xenidis and Angelides, 2005); 
Contract negotiation (Ahadzi and Bowles, 2004); 
An incentive to incur additional construction cost if it reduces future 
operating and maintenance cost (Burger and Hawkesworth, 2011); 
Government intervention to negotiate with the lenders (Cheng, 
2010a); 
Efficient operation, better preventive maintenance, and optimal 
utilisation of manpower resources (Kulkarni and Prusty, 2007); 
Subsidies from the public authority (Bonnafous, 2012); 
Project vehicle should procure timely permits and consents that 
obviate unnecessary delays (Khan and Parra, 2003); 
Reimbursement to the contractor on the basis of costs incurred can be 
applied (HM Treasury, 2004); 
The project sponsor should use less borrowing than the level that 
maximise the debt market value (Wibowo, 2005). 
Penalty (Özdoganm and Birgönül, 2000). 
3 Revenue risk A tariff level reduction, as initiative to leverage the project revenue 
(Aziz, 2007); 
Revenue cap agreement (Jun, 2010); 
Tariff regulation by government authority (World Bank and Public-
Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, 2007); 
Government intervention to negotiate with the lenders (Cheng, 
2010b). 
Differed repayment or a grace period (World Bank and Public-Private 
Infrastructure Advisory Facility, 2007) 
Debt service reserve is set to 6 months debt’s service of the rated 
obligation (Kuffler and Leung, 1998); 
Establish an appropriate capital structure (Yun et al., 2009); 
Government subsidy and not to levy any toll (Bonnafous, 2010); 
Tariff to be set for the private operator by government  (Bonnafous, 
2010); 
Minimum tariff should be calculated based on the annual average 
daily traffic and construction cost scenarios (Vajdic et al., 2012). 
4 High risk premium Subsidies from the public authority (Bonnafous, 2012). 
5 Traffic risk Government intervention to negotiate with the lenders (Cheng, 
2010b). 
6 Market risk Guarantee of periodical adjustment tariff (Soehodho et al., 2003); 
Contract negotiation (Ahadzi and Bowles, 2004); 
Subsidies from the public authority (Bonnafous, 2012); 
Project’s revenue (either from unitary payment or toll/tariff) should 
be linked to inflation fluctuation in order to minimised negative 
cash flow period (Al-Sharif, 2007) 
7 Tariff risk Guarantee of periodical adjustment tariff (Soehodho et al., 2003); 
Upgrading credit rating of the host country (Bakatjan, et al., 2003); 
Users’ projection for the planned facility should be collected based 
on the statistical data from similar projects (Ng, et al., 2010) 
8 Decision risk EBITDA should not be the only indicator used to assess the value of 
a company (Engle, 2010); 
Net cash flow should be seen from operating activities (Faulkenberry, 
2006); 
A project is acceptable if its payback is less than the maximum cost 
recovery time established by the analyst (Boussabaine, 2006); 
NPV should not be used as a primary VFM methodology (Shaoul, 
2005); 
The level of debt to equity ratio should be considered in such a way  
to meet lender’s interest (Boussabaine, 2006) 
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9 Funding risk Minimum Revenue Guarantee agreement (Bradley and Whelan, 
1997) 
Subordinated debts are treated as equity investment (Singh and 
Kalidindi, 2009); 
Providing up-front equity during the development and construction 
phases (Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut, 2003); 
Higher levels of equity from 40 to 50% (Zhang, 2004); 
Upgrade country’s credit rating (Bakatjan et al., 2003); 
Average DSCR should be at least equal to 1.5 (Bakatjan et al., 2003); 
Each shareholder should be committed to jointly and seriously 
guarantee the others contribution (Khan and Parra, 2003); 
Fixed interest rate or interest rate swap arrangement (Khan and Parra, 
2003); 
Debt hybrid arrangement (Khan and Parra, 2003) 
10 Calculation risk Since Project Finance focuses on actual cash flow, CADS should be 
used in DSCR calculation (Warnelid, 2012); 
DSCR calculation should be checked carefully (Warnelid, 2012). 
11 Market and cross-
currency risk 
An offshore account establishment (Zhang, 2005b); 
Government guarantees on preferential access of the project to 
foreign exchange, conversion. And transfer (Zhang, 2005b); 
Guarantee of interest rate fluctuation (World Bank and Ministry of 
Construction Japan, 1999); 
Fixed rate swap (Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut, 2003); 
Subordinate debt is required by lenders (Khan and Parra, 2003) 
12 Liquidity risk Debt service terms should be determined comprehensively, 
particularly with reference to the grace and loan repayment periods 
(Malini, 2011). 
13 Bidding risk Proven expertise requirement (Kulkarni and Prusty, 2007). 
14 Competitive risk Tariff regulation by government authority (World Bank and Public-
Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, 2007); 
Planning integrated transportation network system to improve traffic 
volume (Soehodho et al., 2003). 
15 Project approval risk Reimbursement to the contractor on the basis of costs incurred (HM 
Treasury, 2004); 
Subsidies from the public authority (Bonnafous, 2012).  
16 Discount rate risk The discount rate should never be higher than the WACC estimated 
by the concessionaire (Vassallo, 2010); 
The selection of discount rate should be based on investment 
decisions between public and private finance instead of political 
decision (Grout, 2003; and Shaoul, 2005) 
17 Unprofitable project 
risk 
Government subsidy and not to levy any toll (Bonnafous, 2010) 
18 High social margin 
cost 
Price regulation should not be based on SMCP but on some second 
best alternative to SMCP (Evenhuis and Vickerman, 2010). 
19 High bidding costs Prioritising domestic companies / stakeholders (Xenidis and 
Angelides, 2005). 
20 Prolonged negotiation 
period 
Providing solid evidence that a successful deal can be reached in a 
short period of time (Xenidis and Angelides, 2005). 
21 Legislative & 
government risk 
Reimbursement to the contractor on the basis of costs incurred; 
Change in Unitary Charge (HM Treasury, 2004) 
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22 Construction risks High equity ratio; 
Turnkey contracts by experienced and financially strong contractors; 
Contractor performance bonds/ third party guarantees; 
Cost estimation by an independent party (Zhang, 2005b). 
Penalty if it is caused by contractor breach (Özdoganm and Birgönül, 
2000) 
Refinancing or debt rescheduling (HM Treasury, 2004) 
23 Financing risks The investment portfolio of each sponsor shall include long- and 
short-term investment (Xenidis and Angelides, 2005); 
Encouraging domestic funds in the financing scheme (Xenidis and 
Angelides, 2005); 
Government subsidies for the SPV’s interest payment that should be 
set in such a way as to keep overall financing costs at the 
predetermined levels (World Bank and Ministry of Construction 
Japan, 1999); 
Capital incentive should be provided in the network (Zhang and 
Kumaraswamy, 2001); 
The SPV should rely on internal equity (retained earnings) to provide 
the equity portion of their capital structure target (Baker and Powel, 
2005) 
24 Agency cost risk Islamic securitisation (Jobst, 2009) 
25 Time overrun. Investor has to pre-finance as long as certainty of time and price 
settled (Soehodho et al., 2003); 
A “capped” land acquisition cost by the government  (Wibowo and 
Mohamed, 2010); 
Providing solid evidence that a successful deal can be reached in a 
short period of time (Xenidis and Angelides, 2005). 
26 Credit risk A protected loan system against all risks (Xenidis and Angelides, 
2005) 
 
The influence diagram of each financial risk variable that includes its alternative 
mitigation measures will be further discussed in the next section. 
 
8.6.1.1 Project costs 
Project costs are predominantly used to determine the price proposal at pre-proposal 
stage. Kulkarni and Prusty (2007) argued that the price proposal is taking an important 
role of the entire bidding process for final selection of the project sponsor. 
Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut (2003) also posited that three of the sponsor’s major 
challenges such as: estimation of project costs, projection of revenues during the 
concession period, and selection of an appropriate financing strategy. In the context of 
PFI projects in the UK, HM Treasury (2004) stipulated that PFI should not be used for 
individually procured projects under £20m. Coulson (2008) re-emphasised that PFI 
should pass two aspects, ‘qualitative evaluation’ and ‘quantitative analysis’. Both 
aspects consider costs as a subject of analyses. The main difference is at the qualitative 
evaluation, the costs are associated with project costs, and at the quantitative analysis, 
 238 
they mainly analyse the costs of risk transferred to the private sector (capital costs and 
operating costs). Furthermore, according to World Bank and PPIAF (2007), the 
inventory of project costs especially in the port sector must also take into account 
“nonmarket” economic costs; these are included but are not limited to: 
• The costs related to transferring traffic from one transport route to another (for 
example, if several ports are competing within the same country). 
•  Possible effects of the project on town planning (particularly traffic congestion). 
• The impact of the project on the environment and safety (for example, marine 
pollution, nuisance to locals, and pollution resulting from handling bulk cargoes). 
The assessment of these economic costs is a particularly difficult exercise, but is 
essential to determine the economic rate of return of a project. 
Figure 8.12 illustrates the relationship of how financial risks are related to project cost. 
There are four type of risks identified in this research, such as: high bidding costs, 
prolonged negotiation period, cost overruns, and financing risks.  
High bidding cost in PPP project is generally caused by long project preparation (e.g. 
preparation of RFQ and RFP documents). The financial consequence of this risk is non-
competitive of PPP bid and high probability of cost overruns at early project stage. In 
order to mitigate this risk, the proposed strategy is prioritising domestic companies / 
stakeholders (Xenidis and Angelides, 2005). Should no domestic companies / 
stakeholders are fully qualified for the project, alternatively, a joint venture company 
between international and domestic companies will reduce high bidding cost 
probability.  
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Project costs
Cost 
overruns
Cause
Variation orders
Financial consequences
More expensive project 
cost, lesser profit, fewer 
demand, and difficult in the 
debt arrangement.
Mitigation Measures
Penalty (Ozdoganm and 
Birgonul, 2000)
Cause
Worse economic 
conditions in the host 
country
Financing 
risks
Cause
Delay to raise funds on 
time
Cause
Failure to address or 
underestimate the life 
cycle costs
To what extent of project costs can meet 
acceptable Project NPV and IRR, and 
ROE?
Cause
Unexpected technical 
problems or even 
failures
Financial 
consequences
Loss of profit during 
the construction 
phase. 
Mitigation Measures
Minimized construction 
costs will have a 
reduced impact on the 
overall costs (Xenidis 
and Angelides, 2005) 
Financial consequences
Any delay directly affects 
the construction schedule 
and generates additional 
costs
Mitigation Measures
The investment portfolio 
of each sponsor shall 
include both long- and 
short-term investments 
(Xenidis and 
Anngelides, 2005)
Cause
Connecting financing with 
the project’s progress due 
to unavailability of 
domestic financing 
Mitigation Measures
Encouraging domestic 
funds in the financing 
scheme (Xenidis and 
Angelides, 2005)
Mitigation Measures
Contract negotiation 
(Ahadzi and Bowles, 
2004)
High 
bidding 
costs
Cause
Request for Qualification 
(RFQ) and Request for 
Participation (RFP) 
preparation
Financial 
consequences
Non-competitive
tender and cost 
overruns at very early 
stage of the process
Mitigation Measures
Prioritizing domestic 
companies / 
stakeholders (Xenidis 
and Angelides, 2005) 
Cause
Inaccurate estimates
Prolonged 
negotiation 
period
Cause
Uncertainty concerning 
the negotiation period
Mitigation Measures
Providing solid evidence 
that they can reach a 
successful deal in a 
short period of time 
(Xenidis and Angelides, 
2005)
Financial 
consequences
Proposal withdrawal 
by potential 
concessionaires
Most Interested Stakeholders:
1. Sponsor
2.Lender
3.Consultant
Mitigation Measures
Contract negotiation 
(Ahadzi and Bowles, 
2004)
Financial consequences
More expensive project 
cost and lesser profit.
Cause
Change of law 
Financial consequences
More expensive project 
cost and lesser profit.
Mitigation Measures
Reimbursement to the 
contractor on the basis 
of costs incurred (HM 
Treasury, 2004)
 Figure 8.12 Influence diagram of project costs, risks, and mitigation measures 
Prolonged negotiation period is mainly due to uncertainty concerning the negotiation 
period. The consequence of this risk is proposal withdrawal by potential bidder. This 
risk also influences the bidding cost. Government authority should provide solid 
evidence that the negotiation process can be achieved in a certain time manner (Xenidis 
and Angelides, 2005). Without solid evidence from government authority in view of 
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negotiation period (i.e. negotiated procedure is selected instead of open procedure), it is 
likely that the probability of prolonged negotiation period is higher. As Solino and De 
Santos (2010) studied that the negotiated procedure in PPPs is proven to be more 
expensive and lengthy.  
Cost overrun risk might be triggered by several factors such as technical problems, life 
cycle cost underestimation, variation orders, change of law and regulations and other 
government macroscopic economic policies, and uncertain economic conditions. The 
fact that delay in traditionally procured project costs has increased on average by 47% 
from the original design phase to completion (HM Treasury, 2003). In general, cost 
overrun causes lesser profit or even loss of profit during the construction and operation 
stages. The proposed risk mitigation strategy is based on each triggered factor. As 
illustrated on figure 8.12.  According to Xenidis and Angelides (2005), cost overrun can 
be mitigated by minimising construction cost, which will have a reduced impact on the 
overall costs. When cost of overrun is caused by change of law, reimbursement to the 
contractor on the basis of costs incurred can be applied (HM Treasury, 2004). Penalty is 
also considered as an alternative mitigation measure for anticipating cost overrun due to 
inaccurate estimates (Özdoganm and Birgönül, 2000). 
Financing risk due to inability the project sponsor to raise fund on time might affect the 
construction schedule. To anticipate an additional project cost incurred due to 
construction delay, the investment portfolio of each sponsor should include both long- 
and short-term investments (Xenidis and Anngelides, 2005). There is another issue 
related to financing risk that should be anticipated when the funding is connected to 
progress of the project because of unavailability of domestic financing. Xenidis and 
Angelides (2005) suggested that domestic funds should be encouraged in the financing 
scheme. 
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8.6.1.2 Volume / demand (traffic) 
When the traffic demand is increasing significantly, there is a need for developing the 
existing infrastructure facilities that could not capture the considerable traffic demand. 
This (Brownfield) project has a more self-financing ability because stable revenue 
stream and demand of particular services are historically proven. But, when a new 
(Greenfield) project is initiated to capture the market demand, over optimistic traffic 
projections commonly happened, e.g. inaccurate traffic forecast model (Lam and Tam, 
1998). Therefore, it is essential to pay attention on how traffic forecast can serve several 
purposes: (1) as a background for estimating future traffic levels in the design and 
appraisal of infrastructure improvement schemes, and of traffic policies and initiatives 
aimed at changing the use of the network; (2) to analyse problems on a reasonably 
disaggregated basis; (3) as a basis for predicting many of the environmental impacts of 
the traffic both at the national and local levels; (4) to inform how much the traffic can 
be expected to grow under present policies and give an indication of the effect of 
measures that they might propose to influence this growth (Department for Transport, 
1997). 
The risks related to traffic assumption were identified as follows: competitive risk, 
project approval risk, and revenue risk. The influence diagram of these risks and 
mitigation measures is illustrated in figure 8.13. 
When port operator(s) are seeking to increase their market share, it is possible that they 
will use destructive pricing strategy.  Ship owners or shippers as customers who are also 
sensitive to the quality of service supplied and the rates charged are directly affected by 
the extent of competition confronting the operator. Since these risks are affected by the 
operator’s pricing decisions and by any price regulation imposed by government, 
competitive risks can be anticipated by: (1) enforcing a fair tariff regulation and 
competition policy (World Bank and PPIAF, 2003); and (2) planning integrated road 
network system to improve traffic volume (Soehodho, et. el., 2003).  
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Traffic
Revenue 
risk
Financial consequences
Revenue insufficient to 
cover debt servicing
Mitigation Measures
Planning integrated road 
network system to 
improve traffic volume 
(Soehodho et al., 2003)
Cause
Failure in forecasting 
realistic traffic volume
Change of 
law
Cause
Introduction of regulatory 
controls (e.g. fares, 
competition policy)
Competitive 
risk
To what extent of traffic can meet 
acceptable project NPV and IRR, DSCR, 
LLCR, and ROE?
Financial consequences
Destructive pricing
Cause
Practices of other port 
operators seeking to 
increase their market 
share
Mitigation Measures
Tariff regulation by 
government authority 
(World Bank and PPIAF, 
2007)
Mitigation Measures
A tariff level reduction, 
as an initiative to 
leverage the project 
revenues (Abdel Aziz, 
2007)
Most Interested Stakeholders:
1. Sponsor
2.Lender
3.Authority
Financial consequences
Excessive revenue
Mitigation Measures
Revenue Cap (RCP) 
agreements (Jun, 2010)
Mitigation Measures
Tariff regulation by 
government authority 
(World Bank and PPIAF, 
2007)
Financial 
consequences
Financial pressure in the 
form of a large interest 
burden on loans
Mitigation Measures
Government intervention 
to negotiate with the 
lenders (Cheng, 2010)
Financial consequences
Revenue insufficient to 
cover debt servicing
Mitigation Measures
Subsidies from the 
public authority 
(Bonnafous, 2012)
Figure 8.13 Influence diagram of traffic, risk, and mitigation measures 
An introduction of regulatory controls, e.g. fares and competition policy, is not always 
deemed as a fair policy. The consequence of any change of law or policy might be 
insufficient revenue of the project to cover debt servicing. “Regulation also has a direct 
impact on the extent of the revenue risk for the operator and on its ability to manage 
this risk” (World Bank and PPIAF, 2007). To prevent the revenue risk due to change of 
law, Bonnafous (2012) suggested that the project gets subsidies from the public 
authority.  
Under revenue risks, there are three consequences due to failure in forecasting traffic 
volume, such as: Insufficient revenue to cover debt servicing, excessive revenue, and 
financial pressure in the form of a large interest burden on loans.  
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"The more accurate and reliable the traffic and financial forecasts are perceived to be 
by prospective investors, the higher the probability that a port authority or port 
operator will be able to attract risk capital and obtain loans" (World Bank and PPIAF, 
2007). However, high degree of uncertainty associated with medium- or long-term 
projections of port activity contributes potential shortfalls in projected traffic. Abdel 
Aziz (2007) suggested that a tariff level reduction can be applied to leverage the project 
revenues.  
It is also possible that the project sponsor generate excessive revenue due to failure in 
forecasting traffic volume. JNPT is an example for this case (see chapter 5).  
Government intervention is also sought to negotiate with the lenders upon financial 
pressure in the form of interest rate burden (Cheng, 2010a). Two solutions can be 
applied in order to minimise this risk. The first is revenue cap agreement (RCP) 
between government authority and project sponsor to allow the project sponsor gain an 
acceptable revenue (Jun, 2010). The second is tariff regulation by government agency to 
control a fair tariff level (World Bank and PPIAF, 2003).   
8.6.1.3 Revenue forecast 
Pantelias and Zhang (2010) stated that the investment risk is directly influenced by the 
relationship between the infrastructure-generated revenue and costs. The project 
revenue is depending on the nature of revenue stream of each type of project. Most of 
infrastructure projects have low demand price elasticity except toll road (Bult-Spiering 
and Dewulf, 2006). When the project revenue is driven by the traffic, improving the 
project revenue is not an easy task when the actual revenue is far behind the projection. 
For an example, Land Cove Tunnel and Eastlink projects in 2008, failed to meet their 
forecasted revenue (Regan et al, 2011). Generally, to become finance-able, riskier 
projects require the most robust revenue forecasts (Khan and Parra, 2003). According to 
Ashley, et al (1998), prospective investors pay special attention to traffic and toll 
revenue forecasts.  
A tariff level reduction, as an initiative to leverage the project revenues, is necessary but 
not always sufficient to generate enough revenues. And one of the alternative remedies 
for this failure is extending the concession period (Abdel Aziz, 2007). However, the 
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revenue sources from other than volume or demand traffic (ancillary revenues) are also 
playing an important role to sustain the project. Doll  and Karagyozov (2010) defined 
the examples of ancillary revenues such as retail, car parking or intermodal facilities. 
The risks related to revenue forecast assumption were identified as follows: bidding 
risk, tariff risk, competitive risk, project approval risk, revenue risk, and funding risk. 
The influence diagram of these risks and mitigation measures is illustrated in figure 
8.14. 
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Revenue 
forecast
Revenue 
risk
Cause
Inflexible price 
Adjustment (Restriction 
policy on profit and tariff)
Financial consequences
Revenue insufficient to 
cover debt servicing
Mitigation Measures
Planning integrated road 
network system to 
improve traffic volume 
(Soehodho et al., 2003)
Cause
Failure in forecasting a 
realistic traffic volume
Project 
approval 
risk
Cause
Introduction of regulatory 
controls (e.g. fares, 
competition policy)
Competitive 
risk
Tariff risk
Cause
Low initial tariff toll and 
no guarantee for 
periodical tariff 
adjustment
Financial 
consequences
Revenue insufficient to 
cover debt servicing
Mitigation Measures
Guarantee of periodical 
adjustment on tariff 
(Soehodho et al., 2003)
To what extent of revenue forecast can 
meet acceptable project NPV and IRR, 
DSCR, LLCR, and ROE?
Financial consequences
Destructive pricing
Cause
Practices of other port 
operators seeking to 
increase their market 
share
Mitigation Measures
Tariff regulation by 
government authority 
(World Bank and PPIAF, 
2007)
Mitigation Measures
A tariff level reduction, 
as an initiative to 
leverage the project 
revenues (Abdel Aziz, 
2007)
Cause
Speculative offer or 
unreasonable proposal 
(e.g. High MGA/Royalty)
Financial 
consequences
Inability to meet the 
minimum guaranteed 
share of income (MGA)
Mitigation Measures
Proven expertise 
requirement (Kulkarni 
and Prusty, 2007)
Bidding risk
Financial consequences
Excessive revenue
Mitigation Measures
Revenue Cap (RCP) 
agreements (Jun, 2010)
Mitigation Measures
Tariff regulation by 
government authority 
(World Bank and PPIAF, 
2007)
Cause
Unprofitable project
Financial consequences
Revenue insufficient to 
cover debt servicing
Financial consequences
Delayed financial closure
Funding 
risk Mitigation Measures
Minimum Revenue 
Guarantee (MRG) 
agreements (Jun, 2010)
Most Interested Stakeholders:
1. Authority
2.Consultant
Mitigation Measures
Ancillary revenues 
optimsation (Doll and 
Karagyozov, 2010) 
Financial consequences
Revenue insufficient to 
cover debt servicing
Mitigation Measures
Subsidies from the 
public authority 
(Bonnafous, 2012)
Figure 8.14 Influence diagram of revenue forecast, risk, and mitigation measures 
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8.6.1.4 Operating cost 
In the context of PFI/PPP projects, the estimation of maintenance and operating (O&M) 
costs are very important because these costs include the costs of risk transferred to the 
private sector. According to Cartlidge (2006), a general estimate of operating costs
53
 
should include estimates of the services required to operate the completed facility and 
will alter in line with the nature of the project, such as: (1) human resource costs, 
staffing, pension liabilities, redundancy costs etc; (2) consumables; (3) repairs, 
maintenance and cleaning; (4) administrative overheads; (5) insurance costs; (6) in-
house management costs. 
Since an average concession period of PPP projects is ranging from 20 years up to 40 
years, beside maintenance costs have to be considered, life cycle costs also become 
prominent to be anticipated in the project assumptions. Failure to address or 
underestimate the life cycle costs will damage an entire project. 
8.6.1.5 Maintenance cost 
Although financial robustness of bids is crucial, strong contracts to suitable 
counterparties have to be prepared for a long term PPP project. One of the most 
common risks in a long term contract is operating and maintenance cost overrun. In this 
case, O&M contractor is supposed to be aware and responsible to this risk. Nonetheless, 
there is a chance that the O&M contractor abandoning the contract. To anticipate this 
residual risk, Grimsey and Lewis (2004) suggested that sensitivity tests for the operating 
expenditure (OPEX) and capital expenditure (CAPEX) are intended to reflect this 
residual risk. So that the sponsor company could decide that it was in its best interests to 
share the pain with the O&M contractor by agreeing to a price increase to absorb some 
of the increased cost. 
Maintenance and major repair costs are also one of the major parameters
54
 used in the 
economic viability of PPP projects (Zou et al., 2008). Maintenance cost also contributes 
                                                 
53
 The effect of inflation is excluded from PSC calculations except where the one element of the project is 
expected to rise more quickly than other factors (Cartlidge, 2006). 
54
 There are seven parameters used in the economic viability of PPP projects such as: (1) Construction 
cost; (2) Maintenance and major repair cost; (3) Managerial cost of toll-system; (4) Sales tax; (5) 
Income tax; (6) Depreciation; (7) Accumulative funds and public welfare (Zou et al., 2008). 
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important roles in determining the ability of PPP in delivering greater value for money 
(VFM). From accounting perspective, Shaoul (2005) criticised that the VFM 
methodology used for PFI projects in the UK falls short of demonstrating the VFM 
goals. The VFM analysis compares the net present cost (NPC) of the project between 
public sector comparator (PSC) and PFI. Maintenance cost as one of the project cost 
elements for the NPC comparison has different accounting treatment between PSC and 
PFI. In PFI option, the availability fee does not include the costs of energy, water, 
computers, software, etc., this is because the government authority retain some of their 
existing assets. Meanwhile, these costs are included in the maintenance cost of PSC.  
As a PPP project ages, the project maintenance cost will gradually increase; thus the net 
cash flows and the annual NPV can be declined, and IRR can be lower (Shen et al, 
2002). Therefore, a better preventive maintenance strategy will reduce the maintenance 
cost, thus the net cash flows and the annual NPV can be maintained at the expected 
level, and IRR becomes higher (Kulkarni and Prusty, 2007). 
The risks related to operation and maintenance costs assumption were identified as 
follows: market risk and cost overrun. The influence diagram of these risks and 
mitigation measures is illustrated in figure 8.15. 
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Operating 
and 
maintenance 
cost
Cost 
overruns
Mitigation Measures
Efficient operation, 
better preventive 
maintenance,
and optimal utilization of 
manpower resources 
(Kulkarni and Prusty, 
2007)
Market 
risk
Cause
Failure to address or 
underestimate the life 
cycle costs
To what extent of operating and 
maintenance cost can meet acceptable 
Project NPV and IRR,  DSCR, and 
LLCR?
Cause
Poor design or poor 
quality of works
Financial 
consequences
Difficult to achieve the 
expected debt 
arrangement
Mitigation Measures
Contract negotiation 
(Ahadzi and Bowles, 
2004)
Mitigation Measures
An incentive to incur 
additional construction 
cost if it reduces
future operating and 
maintenance cost 
(Burger and 
Hawkesworth, 2011)
Financial 
consequences
Higher operating and 
maintenance cost
Most Interested Stakeholders:
1. Authority
2. Sponsor
3.Lender
4.Consultant
Mitigation Measures
Penalty (Ozdoganm and 
Birgonul, 2000)
Financial 
consequences
More expensive project 
cost and lesser profit.
Financial 
consequences
Lower net cash flow
Cause
Inflation fluctuation
Mitigation Measures
Government intervention 
to negotiate with the 
lenders (Cheng, 2010)
Financial 
consequences
More expensive project 
cost and lesser profit.
Mitigation Measures
Guarantee of periodical 
adjustment on tariff 
(Soehodho et al., 2003)
Mitigation Measures
Agreeing to a price 
increase to absorb some 
of the increased cost 
with O&M contractor  
(Grimsey and Lewis, 
2004).
Financial 
consequences
Profit loss because 
O&M contractor 
abandoning the 
contract
 
Figure 8.15 Influence diagram of operating and maintenance cost, risk, and mitigation 
measures 
 
8.6.1.6 Loan repayment schedule 
World Bank and PPIAF (2007) suggested that the repayment of a loan must be tailored 
to the project for which it was set up
55
. The ability of Greenfield port projects to 
                                                 
55
 Theoretically there are three types of loan repayment profiles: (1) Equal instalments of principal; (2) 
Equal instalments of interest and principal; (3) Instalments depending on the availability of cash flow 
(World Bank and PPIAF, 2007). 
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generate revenue at the initial operating period usually lags behind the project costs. 
Therefore, deferred repayment or a grace period, which allows the sponsor company to 
pay only interest to lender over a certain period, is needed especially for the loan 
repayment profile is dependent on available cash flow (e.g. Greenfield BOT port 
projects). The lenders (modelling bank) also want to make sure that the proposed 
repayment schedule is amortizing in structure, preferably level principal rather than 
annuity, with final maturity, grace period(s), and average loan life falling within 
acceptable internal guidelines (Khan and Parra, 2003). However, ADB (2000) stated 
that the PPP projects in developing countries with high and volatile inflation rates 
cannot be solved simply by using inflation-adjusted interest rates and/or compressing 
the loan repayment schedule.   
The risks related to loan repayment schedule were identified as follows: construction 
risk, revenue risk, and funding risk. The influence diagram of these risks and mitigation 
measures is illustrated in figure 8.16. 
8.6.1.1 Financing cost 
Financing cost is the cost of raising funds to finance the project; principally the cost of 
interest payments (World Bank and the Ministry of Construction of Japan,1997; Kelly, 
2009). Further, financing cost encompasses: (a) Interest, fees, commissions and costs 
payable by the borrower under the finance documents. (b) Amounts payable by the 
borrower in respect of tax gross-up, market disruption and increased costs. (c) Stamp 
duties and indemnities. (d) Net amounts payable by the borrower under any hedging 
agreement. (e) Any value-added or other taxes payable by the borrower in respect of the 
above (Khan and Parra, 2003).  Financing cost also covers cost of debt issuance 
including underwriting, agency, trustee fees (Wibowo, 2005). 
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Loan 
repayment 
schedule
Revenue 
risk
Cause
Failure in forecasting a 
realistic traffic volume
To what extent of loan repayment 
schedule can meet acceptable DSCR 
and LLCR?
Cause
Unprofitable project
Financial consequences
Revenue insufficient to 
cover debt servicing
Financial consequences
Delayed financial closure
Funding 
risk
Mitigation Measures
Minimum Revenue 
Guarantee (MRG) 
agreements (Jun, 2010)
Most Interested Stakeholders:
1. Sponsor
Financial consequences
Ability to generate 
operating income
significantly lags behind 
project costs
Mitigation Measures
Deferred repayment or a
grace period (World 
Bank and PPIAF, 2007)
Construction 
risk
Cause
Construction cost 
overrun
Financial consequences
Delayed loan repayment
Mitigation Measures
* High equity/debt ratio
* Turnkey contracts by
experienced and financially 
strong contractors
* Contractor performance 
bonds/third-party guarantees
* Cost estimation by an 
independent party (Zhang, 
2005c)
Mitigation Measures
Subsidised loan (e.g. 
Revolving loan funds, 
Municipal development 
funds) [World Bank, 
1999]
Cause
Low credit rating
Financial consequences
Higher cost of borrowing
Mitigation Measures
Average DSCR should 
be at least equal to 
1.50 (Bakatjan, et al., 
2003)
Mitigation Measures
Upgrade country’s 
credit rating (Bakatjan, 
et al., 2003)
Financial consequences
Higher equity requirement
Financial consequences
Shorter loan maturity
Figure 8.16 Influence diagram of loan repayment schedule, risk, and mitigation 
measures 
A PPP project may be more costly unless additional costs (due to higher transaction and 
financing costs) can be off-set through efficiency gains (Quium, 2011). For instance, an 
efficient financing cost refers to low financial service charges, fixed and low interest 
rate financing, long-term loan financing and low costs from fluctuations of currency and 
exchange rates (Zhang, 2005b cited in Yuan et al., 2009).  
The risks related to financing cost were identified as follows: financial risk, agency cost 
risk, legislative & government risk, and construction risk. The influence diagram of 
these risks and mitigation measures is illustrated in figure 8.17. 
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Figure 8.17 Influence diagram of financing cost, risk, and mitigation measures 
 
Financing 
cost
Agency 
cost risk
Cause
Cost overruns
Mitigation Measures
Refinancing or debt 
rescheduling (HM 
Treasury, 2004)
Legislative & 
Government 
risk
Cause
Authority breach (e.g. 
delay in giving an 
approval)
To what extent of financing cost can 
meet acceptable Project NPV and IRR, 
and ROE?
Cause
Various conflicts of interests 
among the borrowers, 
originators, issuers, 
arrangers, and investors
as well as additional agents, 
such as servicers, credit
rating agencies, and third-
party guarantors
Financial 
consequences
Higher funding costs
Mitigation Measures
 The SPV should rely on 
internal equity (retained 
earnings) to provide the 
equity portion of their 
target capital structure 
(Baker and Powell, 
2005)
Financial consequences
Any delay directly affects 
the construction schedule 
and generates additional 
costs
Mitigation Measures
Reimbursement to the 
contractor on the basis 
of costs incurred (HM 
Treasury, 2004)
Mitigation Measures
Change in Unitary 
Charge (HM Treasury, 
2004)
Financial 
risks
Cause
Interest rate fluctuations
Mitigation Measures
Government subsidies 
for the SPV's interest 
payments that should be 
set in such a way as to 
keep overall financing 
costs at predetermined 
levels (World Bank, 
1999)
Cause
Delay in construction 
completion
Cause
No capital incentive in 
the network
Mitigation Measures
Capital incentive should 
be provided in the 
network (Zhang and 
Kumaraswamy, 2001)
Financial consequences
Increased financing costs 
Most Interested Stakeholders:
1. Sponsor
Mitigation Measures
Penalty if it is caused by 
contractor breach 
(Ozdoganm and 
Birgonul, 2000)
Financial consequences
Construction and financing 
costs increase
Cause
Foreign direct 
investment (FDI)
Financial consequences
Since the required returns 
(to cover the cost of 
capital) are benchmarked 
in foreign currencies, 
financing cost is higher
Financial consequences
Increased financing costs 
Construction 
risks
Financial consequences
Any delay directly affects 
the construction schedule 
and generates additional 
costs
Mitigation Measures
Islamic Securitization 
(Jobst, 2009)
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8.6.1.2 Project timelines 
Project timelines consist of construction time and operation time, which are often 
included in one term as concession period. The length of concession period should be 
determined based on project conditions, whole life cycle cost, likely term of senior debt, 
and financial analyses. For an example, the concession is determined to end once the 
private debt repayment is fully recovered (Aziz, 2007). There are also many factors that 
influence the decision in determining the length of the concession period such as a 
change in inflation rate, traffic flow, and operating cost (Ng et al., 2007). Therefore, 
based on the expected return, decision makers should seek a balance between expected 
costs and revenues of the projects to achieve an optimal concession period.   
The risks related to project timelines were identified as follows: time overrun, market 
risk, prolonged negotiation period, and cost overrun. The influence diagram of these 
risks and mitigation measures is illustrated in figure 8.18. 
8.6.1.1 Capital structure 
PPP projects generally are funded with both equity and debt. Equity financing typically 
covers only 10–30% of total project costs, while debt financing is obtained for the 
remaining 70–90% (Levy, 1996 cited in Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut, 2003). The 
common strategy in PPP is to utilise as much debt as the project cash flows can justify 
providing an attractive rate of return to equity investors. The proportion of debt to 
equity in a project can be signified by using Debt to Equity Ratio. Higher the ratio 
means that there is more debt being used to finance the project. According to DEA 
(2012), the most commonly used ratio to ascertain the financing structure in India is: 
Debt to Equity Ratio = Total Long Term Liabilities / (Equity + Quasi-equity) 
Notes: 
Long Term Liabilities include all liabilities in the nature of loans and debts that the SPV 
undertakes. Please note that the Long Term Liabilities do not include share capital, 
reserves and surplus, and current liabilities. 
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Project time 
lines (e.g. 
Concession 
Period, 
Construction 
period, etc.)
Cause
Inflation during 
concession period
Cause
Changes in market 
conditions or credit 
unavailability
Cause
Uncertainty concerning 
the negotiation period
Cost 
overrun
Market risk
Cause
Uncertainty concerning 
the negotiation period Financial consequences
Huge advisory cost 
overrun
Mitigation Measures
Providing a solid 
evidence that they can 
reach a successful deal 
in a short period of time 
(Xenidis and Angelides, 
2005)
To what extent of project time lines can 
meet acceptable project NPV and IRR, 
DSCR, LLCR, and ROE?
Cause
Construction delay
Mitigation Measures
Penalty (Ozdoganm and 
Birgonul, 2000)
Cause
Land acquisition 
uncertainty
Financial 
consequences
Uncertain time and cost 
estimates
Mitigation Measures
Investor has to pre-
finance as long as 
certainty of time and 
price settled (Soehodho 
et al., 2003)
Time 
overrun
Most Interested Stakeholders:
1. Authority
Financial consequences
Proposal withdrawal by 
potential concessionaires
Financial consequences
Loan repayment default 
due to increased interest 
rate
Mitigation Measures
Guarantee of periodical 
adjustment on tariff 
(Soehodho et al., 2003)
Financial consequences
More expensive project 
cost and lesser profit
Prolonged 
negotiation 
period
Financial consequences
Delayed financial closure
Mitigation Measures
Contract negotiation 
(Ahadzi and Bowles, 
2004)
Financial consequences
Delayed financial closure
Mitigation Measures
A ‘capped’ land 
acquisition cost by the 
government (Wibowo 
and Mohamed, 2010)
Figure 8.18 Influence diagram of project time lines, risk, and mitigation measures 
 
However, Korean government regulates that the level of equity ratio should not be less 
than 20% (Yun et al., 2009). Furthermore, government authority in Turkey favours high 
equity because more equity means less total project cost (Bakatjan et al., 2003). 
Although the company success depends on investment decisions, not how it funds them 
(i.e. with equity only, or with equity and debt), it is important that the debt equity ratio 
be balanced for win–win results between public and private sectors.   
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The risks related to capital structure were identified as follows: revenue risk and 
funding risk. The influence diagram of these risks and mitigation measures is illustrated 
in figure 8.19. 
 
Figure 8.19 Influence diagram of capital structure, risk, and mitigation measures 
Capital 
Structure
Revenue 
risk
Financial consequences
Revenue insufficient to 
cover debt servicing
Mitigation Measures
Higher levels of equity
(40 to 50%) [Zhang, 
2004]
Cause
Failure in forecasting a 
realistic traffic volume
Mitigation Measures
Subordinated debts are 
treated as equity 
investment (Singh and 
Kaladini, 2009)
To what extent of capital structure can 
meet acceptable project NPV and IRR, 
DSCR, LLCR, and ROE?
Financial consequences
Difficult and expensive 
project financing
Cause
Potential lenders and 
investors hesitate
to participate
Mitigation Measures
Providing up-front
equity during the 
development and 
construction phases 
(Schaufelberger and 
Wipadapisut, 2003)
Mitigation Measures
Debt service reserve 
(DSR) is set to 6 months 
debt’s service
of the rated obligation 
(Kuffler and Leung, 
1998)
Funding 
risk
Cause
Low credit rating
Financial consequences
Higher cost of borrowing
Mitigation Measures
Average DSCR should 
be at least equal to 
1.50 (Bakatjan, et al., 
2003)
Mitigation Measures
Upgrade country’s 
credit rating (Bakatjan, 
et al., 2003)
Financial consequences
Higher equity requirement
Financial consequences
Low profitability
Mitigation Measures
Establish an appropriate 
capital structure of the 
project (Yun, et al., 
2009)Financial consequences
High-risk project
Financial consequences
Difficult in raising the 
required equity
Cause
Low DSCR at early 
years of the project
Cause
Low project’s DSCR
Most Interested Stakeholders:
1. Consultant
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8.6.1.2 Interest and fees. 
Horcher (2005) stated that most companies and governments perceive the importance of 
interest rates, which are the key ingredient in the cost of capital, because they require 
debt financing for expansion and capital projects. Any changes on interest rate will have 
significant impact on many organizations, both borrowers and investors, and other 
financial markets. Interest rates consist of the real rate plus a component for expected 
inflation. The interest rate and fees should be tested to ensure that they are reasonably 
close to market for the type of project being considered. Khan and Parra (2003) asserted 
that interest rate and fees in the financial model should follow the convention in the 
Project Finance market such as: (1) compound semi-annually and be payable for the 
first time six months after the commissioning of the project, or at some interval after 
that; (2) the interest is payable in terms of a rate per annum should be calculated as if 
each year had 360 days, rather than 365 days. 
The risks related to interest and fees were identified as follows: market risk, traffic risk 
and credit risk. The influence diagram of these risks and mitigation measures is 
illustrated in figure 8.20. 
8.6.1.1 IRR 
Fischer, et. al (2010) identified that IRR is one of the key indicators for measuring the 
equity provider's expectation. Since the equity provider expects an adequate return of 
their investment, IRR can be used to measure the potential impact of their investment 
over the project lifetime. Some parameters affecting project IRR and equity IRR are 
capital structure of the firm, tariff rates, traffic levels, operation and maintenance costs, 
and project costs (Kulkarni and Prusty, 2007). Bakatjan, et al (2003) cited from 
Lohmann (1988) also stated that IRR and NPV are the most common and essential 
economic decision measure used in evaluating a project. Chang and Chen (2001) 
defined that IRR is the discount rate that makes the NPV value of a project to be zero. 
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Figure 8.20 Influence diagram of interest and fees, risk, and mitigation measures 
 
 
 
 
Interest and 
fees
Cause
Fall of demand
Financial consequences
Imposition of heavier loan 
conditions (e.g. such as 
additional guarantees, 
stricter supervision 
measures, higher interest 
rates, faster debt 
amortization, restrictions in 
dividends and stricter 
requirements for balanced 
liquidity)
Credit 
risk
Cause
Difficulties of the 
concessionaire in 
serving the debt
Traffic 
risk
Cause
Over optimistic traffic 
forecast
Financial consequences
Financial pressure in the 
form of a large interest 
burden on loans
To what extent of interest and fees can 
meet acceptable IRR, DSCR, LLCR, 
ROE, and ROA?
Mitigation Measures
A protected loan system 
against all risks (Xenidis 
and Angelides, 2005) 
Cause
Inflation fluctuation
Mitigation Measures
Fixed rate swap 
(Schaufelberger and 
Wipadapisut, 2003)
Financial consequences
In extreme cases, lenders 
could even claim to 
undertake the project
Mitigation Measures
An offshore account 
establishment (Zhang, 
2005c)
Cause
Interest rate fluctuation
Financial consequences
Depreciation in the revenue 
currencies reduces the 
value of revenues in the 
operation period
Market 
risk
Mitigation Measures
Government guarantees 
on preferential access of 
the project to foreign 
exchange, conversion, 
and transfer (Zhang, 
2005c)
Financial consequences
Loan repayment default 
due to increased interest 
rate
Cause
Foreign-exchange rate 
fluctuation
Mitigation Measures
Government intervention 
to negotiate with the 
lenders (Cheng, 2010)
Most Interested Stakeholders:
1. Lender
Mitigation Measures
Guarantee of interest 
rate fluctuation (World 
Bank, 1999)
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According to Ye and Tiong (2000) and Bakatjan, et al (2003), the decision rule is IRR 
must be greater than the required rate or discount rate. Therefore, IRR can be used to 
evaluate the desirability of the project. The higher a project’s IRR, the more attracting 
the project is. Theoretically, a project with IRR that exceed the cost of capital should be 
considered. The Project IRR is the rate which satisfies the following formula: 
………………………………..……(8.1) 
Where:   i: number of tranches, 1< i < 3  
OCFBF  = Operating Cash - Flows Before Financing 
= Operating revenue + Subsidy - Construction costs - Fixed operating 
costs - Variable operating costs  - Corporate tax paid - Other tax. 
However, decision makers have to be cautious when using IRR as an investment 
decision tool. IRR should be used only for evaluating a single project rather than 
comparing mutually exclusive projects. Higher IRR does not guarantee that the project 
is more attractive than the other project is (Kelleher and MacCormack, 2004). Further, 
IRR should not be used alone in relation to PPP projects.  Cuthbert  and Cuthbert (2012) 
argued that IRR utilisation understates the true opportunity cost of PPP finance to public 
sector and the potential profit earned by private sector. Alternatively, an average 
outstanding debt over the period of the relevant transaction has to be reviewed by the 
public sector negotiators as an indicator of potential excess profits in PPP schemes.  
 
The risks related to IRR were identified as follows: violation of flat payment profile 
assumption, cost overrun, high risk premium, market risk, revenue risk, and traffic risk. 
The influence diagram of these risks and mitigation measures is illustrated in figure 
8.21. 
 
 258 
Figure 8.21 Influence diagram of IRR, risk, and mitigation measures 
8.6.1.2 Net cash flow 
Net cash flow is the difference between cash inflows and outflows of SPV Company 
(revenue minus expenditures) in certain period. It is also known as the "change in cash 
and cash equivalents" in a cash flow statement. It is worth noting that net cash flow is 
not the same with net income, free cash flow, or EBITDA. Under discounted cash flows 
(DCF) analysis, an estimation of net cash flows during the project’s life is required to 
calculate the NPV, IRR, ROI, and payback period (Arboleda and Abraham , 2006; and 
Schmidt, 2012). Therefore, the estimation of net cash flow is very important as basic 
information for evaluating the project with various techniques and alternative solutions.  
IRR
Violation 
of flat payment 
profile 
assumption
Financial consequences
Serious underestimation of 
the actual level of profit 
available to the equity
holders
Mitigation Measures
Government subsidy 
and not to levy any toll 
(Bonnafous, 2010)
Mitigation Measures
Subsidies from the 
public authority 
(Bonnafous, 2012)
To what extent of IRR can meet 
acceptable DSCR, LLCR, and ROE?
Financial consequences
The required rate of an 
acceptable IRR becomes 
higher
Cause
Variation order
Mitigation Measures
IRR should be 
accompanied with a 
statistic based on an 
average outstanding 
debt over the period of 
the relevant transaction 
(Cuthbert and Cuthbert, 
2012)
Market 
risk
Financial consequences
Low IRR
Financial consequences
Low IRR due to more 
expensive project cost 
(lesser profit)
Cause
IRR is used on its own 
as an indicator of
the return on risk capital
Cost 
overrun
Most Interested Stakeholders:
1. Authority
2. Sponsor
3.Lender
4.Consultant
High risk 
premium
Revenue 
risk
Cause
Uncertainties about 
the stability of the 
host country
Mitigation Measures
The value of the toll/tariff 
should be set by 
government (Bonnafous, 
2012)
Cause
Revenue can no 
longer cover over half 
of the cost 
(unprofitable project)
Financial consequences
The maximum revenue of 
the project falls between 
half
and all of the total cost
Cause
Destructive pricing 
practice
Cause
Poor quality of 
infrastructure network
Financial consequences
Revenue can no longer 
cover over half of the cost 
(unprofitable project)
Traffic risk
Mitigation Measures
Government subsidy 
and not to levy any toll 
(Bonnafous, 2010)
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At project feasibility study, a positive total net cash flow of PPP project is preferred. 
However, higher project’s total net cash flow does not guarantee that the PPP project is 
more attractive than PSC. Other considerations such as financial output indicators (e.g. 
NPV, IRR, payback period, etc.), risk, and social benefits should be taken into account 
in determining the best value for money (Schmidt, 2012). Meanwhile, at the operation 
stage, net cash flow allows an analyst to evaluate the financial performance and to see 
the entire picture of the options available
56
 based on how much cash a PPP project is 
generating from operations. In addition, the priorities depend on annual net cash flow 
which changes over time.  
Kulkarni and Prusty (2007) stated that net cash flow is influenced by several factors 
(where revenues and expenses are the main drivers). For examples, higher net cash 
flows are influenced by increasing the traffic or tariff levels. And when operating and 
maintenance costs and project costs are increasing, the net cash flows are declining. In 
addition to the above factors, Al-Sharif (2007) argued that net cash flow is also sensitive 
to discount rate and inflation rate. The variance of annual net cash flow can be seen 
from three activities: (1) operating activities or business activities; (2) investment 
activities; and (3) financing activities. The net cash flow is best viewed from operating 
activities because it gives better information of how the project will generate cash from 
operation (Faulkenberry, 2006).  
The risks related to net cash flow were identified as follows: discount rate risk, cost 
overrun, decision risk, market risk, and tariff risk. The influence diagram of these risks 
and mitigation measures is illustrated in figure 8.22. 
8.6.1.1 EBITDA 
EBITDA is earning before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortisation of intangibles, 
which is useful in examining and comparing profitability between companies and 
industries, because this figure does not include the effects of financing and accounting 
decisions, such as interest (from different capital structures), taxes (from different tax 
treatments), depreciation (from different fixed asset bases), and amortization (from 
different holdings of intangibles) [Engle, 2010; Tjia, 2009]. EBITDA is “cash 
                                                 
56
 Three choices available, which are seen from net cash flow: invest for future growth (buildings, 
equipment, inventory, etc.), pay off debt, or return money to shareholders (Faulkenberry, 2006). 
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earnings”, the amount of cash generated by the operations. Since depreciation and 
amortization are non cash expenses, there is no actual cash expensed by the company. 
Thus EBITDA can give a good indication of a company’s absolute ability to pay 
interest (Tjia, 2004). 
 
Figure 8.22 Influence diagram of net cash flow, risk, and mitigation measures 
 
Net Cash 
Flow
Market 
risk
Financial consequences
The higher inflation rate the 
higher project cost
Mitigation Measures
The discount rate  
should never be higher 
than the WACC 
estimated by the 
concessionaire 
(Vassallo, 2010)
To what extent of Net Cash FLow can 
meet acceptable project IRR, DSCR, 
LLCR, and ROE?
Financial consequences
There is a chance to 
prejudice private provision
and favour too much 
public sector provision.
Mitigation Measures
Project’s revenue (either 
from unitary payment or 
toll/tariff) should be 
linked to inflation 
fluctuation in order to 
minimise negative cash 
flow period (Al-Sharif, 
2007)
Cost 
overrun
Mitigation Measures
Net cash flow should be 
seen from operating 
activities (Faulkenberry, 
2006)
Financial consequences
Longer negative cash flow 
period
Financial consequences
The concessionaire will 
not have an incentive to 
attract more traffic to the 
concession
Financial consequences
Misleading net cash flow
Discount 
rate risk
Most Interested Stakeholders:
1.Sponsor
2.Consultant
Cause
Inflation fluctuation
Cause
Misuse of discount rate 
for computing NPV
Cause
Using a single discount 
rate to achieve two
quite different purposes 
(Net Present Cost 
comparison and Net 
Cash Flow comparison)
Mitigation Measures
The selection of 
discount rate should be 
based on investment 
decisions between 
public and private 
finance instead of 
political decision (Grout, 
2003 and Shaoul, 2005)
Cause
Failure to address or 
underestimate the life 
cycle costs
Mitigation Measures
Government intervention 
to negotiate with the 
lenders (Cheng, 2010)
Decision 
risk
Cause
Net cash flow is seen 
from all resources
Financial consequences
Longer payback period
Tariff 
risk
Cause
Inflexible price 
Adjustment (Restriction 
policy on profit and tariff)
Cause
Low initial tariff toll and 
no guarantee for 
periodical tariff 
adjustment
Mitigation Measures
Guarantee of periodical 
adjustment on tariff 
(Soehodho et al., 2003)
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However, from the investor’s perspective, Engle (2010) suggested that EBITDA should 
not be the only indicator used to assess the value of a company. Other measures such as 
market growth, competition, the quality of management and the workforce also play an 
important role to assess the value of a company. Furthermore, investors should 
recognize how a company achieved a particular EBITDA level especially if dramatic 
improvements took place in a short span of time. King (2001) also argued that EBITDA 
is used merely because companies hide something in their finances (e.g. net income 
lower than expected). 
The risk related to EBITDA was identified as follows: decision risk. The influence 
diagram of this risk and mitigation measure is illustrated in figure 8.23. 
 
Figure 8.23 Influence diagram of EBITDA, risk, and mitigation measures 
 
8.6.1.2 CADS 
The project’s finance-ability can be determined by the ability of the project to generate 
enough cash flow so that lenders have a safety margin in terms of its debt service 
obligations. However, it is a difficult call for project sponsor to determine the finance-
ability of the project when project agreements have not been negotiated at the pre-bid 
stage or project development (Khan and Parra, 2003). Nevertheless, project sponsor can 
EBITDA
Financial consequences
The SPV company appears 
more attractive so that the 
investment bankers can sell 
the project
Cause
EBITDA overlooks the 
importance of interest 
payment and taxes that 
should be paid before 
anything else
To what extent of EBITDA can meet 
acceptable project IRR, DSCR, LLCR, 
and ROE?
Mitigation Measures
EBITDA should not be 
the only indicator used 
to assess the value of a 
company (Engle, 2010). 
Cause
EBITDA does not count 
interest, tax, depreciation 
and amortisation of 
tangible asset
Financial consequences
When the project is making 
profit, it is unknown whether 
the project either pays tax 
or faces penalty due to tax 
evasion
Cause
EBITDA is used to cover 
the fact that net income 
is lower than expected
Most Interested Stakeholders:
1. Sponsor
Decision 
risk
Financial consequences
When net cash flow is 
negative, EBITDA appears 
to be positive cash flow
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use two measurement ratios (DSCR and LLCR) that are commonly employed by 
lenders to evaluate the project’s ability to meet its debt service (Lamb and Merna, 
2004). Since cash available for debt service (CADS) is used to calculate both ratios, it is 
prominent to predict and control CADS. Project sponsor should consider all fallback 
possibility in predicting project cash flow and CADS. Further, lenders consider CADS 
metric to determine debt sizes and repayment criteria (Warnelid, 2012). Lenders also 
have to make sure whether the project requires a subordinated loan. 
An agreement on forecast for cash available for debt service (CADS) over project loan 
life is expected by the lenders to be reached during contract negotiation stage. 
Therefore, the sponsor and the authority have to find a way of complying with the 
lender’s requirement. There are two options available in order to improve the 
predictability of CADS estimation. First option is an arrangement of interest rate swap 
through a broker or commercial bank, which “fixes” the interest rate for the life of the 
loan. The second is persuading the lenders to arrange a debt hybrid instead of extending 
straight loan. 
The risks related to CADS were identified as follows: funding risk, cost overrun, 
calculation risk and revenue risk. The influence diagram of these risks and mitigation 
measures is illustrated in figure 8.24. 
 
 263 
Figure 8.24 Influence diagram of CADS, risk, and mitigation measures 
 
CADS
Financial consequences
Difficult to predict CADS
Cause
Source of debt is 
exposed to interests rate 
fluctuation
Mitigation Measures
EPC contract clauses 
that specify fixed price, 
fixed schedule, agreed 
performance 
specifications, liquidated 
damages, and 
acceptable warranties 
(Khan and Parra, 2003)
To what extent of CADS can meet 
acceptable project IRR, DSCR, LLCR, 
and ROE?
Cause
Construction cost 
overrun, delay, or 
failure to meet 
performance
Mitigation Measures
Project vehicle should 
procure timely permits 
and consents that 
obviate unnecessary 
delays (Khan and Parra, 
2003) 
Mitigation Measures
Each shareholder 
should be committed to 
jointly and seriously 
guarantee the others’ 
contribution (Khan and 
Parra, 2003)
Revenue 
risk
Cause
Reduced demand due 
to competing facilities 
or competition
Mitigation Measures
Tariff to be set for the 
private operator by 
government 
(Bonnafous, 2010)
Financial consequences
Difficult to predict and 
control CADS
Mitigation Measures
Fixed interest rates or 
interest rates swap 
arrangement (Khan and 
Parra, 2003)
Financial consequences
CADS is lower than 
anticipated
Cause
Insufficient funding
Cost 
overrun
Most Interested Stakeholders:
1. Lender
2.Consultant
Funding 
risk
Cause
Prolonged issuance of 
permits and consents
Financial consequences
CADS is lower than 
anticipated
Financial consequences
CADS is lower than 
anticipated
Mitigation Measures
Debt hybrid 
arrangement (Khan and 
Parra, 2003)
Mitigation Measures
Since Project Finance 
focuses on actual cash 
flow, CADS should be 
used in DSCR 
calculation (Warnelid, 
2012)
Calculation 
risk
Cause
EBITDA is used to 
calculate DSCR
Mitigation Measures
DSCR calculation 
should be checked 
carefully (Warnelid, 
2012)
Financial consequences
Taxes and timing of cash 
flows are ignored
Cause
Incorrect items (e.g. 
Depreciation; Cash 
Balances; Reserve 
Accounts etc.) are 
included in CADS 
calculation
Financial consequences
Misleading CADS
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8.6.1.3 LLCR 
Loan life coverage ratio (LLCR) is defined as the NPV of project cash available for debt 
service (CADS) over loan life to the remaining term of the debt. In this case, the 
numerator comprises the project CADS over the outstanding loan discounted by the 
average cost of debt in the project debt plan divided by the amount of senior debt (Khan 
and Parra, 2003).  
LLCR = NPV of CADS over the Debt Period / Total Debt…………………….(8.2) 
Notes: 
 The discount rate used in calculating the NPV is that of the average interest 
rates of the financial debts. 
 The period over which the NPV is calculated, is the length of the financing 
cycle, in other words the duration of the total loan period. 
The purpose of calculating LLCR is to estimate the ability of the project to repay an 
outstanding debt balance. In other words, LLCR is used to ensure that no defaults have 
taken for failure to meet debt service cover and that the project vehicle is entitled to pay 
dividends to the sponsor, if other conditions for doing so are met. And if a very huge 
cost overrun is anticipated earlier, the declaration of the loan agreement breaching may 
be able to be claimed by lenders, based on a material adverse change or some other 
similar covenant. The lenders also want to know whether the project needs a 
subordinated lender or not. Their minimum range of required LLCR for a container port 
is between 1.50 and 1.90 in order to determine subordinated loan. Queiroz (2011) also 
stated that the minimum LLCR generally should be greater than 1.2. Government of 
India considers a good project’s capital structure, if it shall enable a LLCR above 1.70. 
Nevertheless, there is no single rule for an optimum ratio (DEA, 2012). 
The risks related to LLCR were identified as follows: market and cross curency risk, 
cost overrun, revenue risk, and funding risk. The influence diagram of these risks and 
mitigation measures is illustrated in figure 8.25. 
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LLCR
Market 
and cross-
currency 
risk
Financial consequences
Higher LLCR requirements 
between 1.75 and 2
To what extent of LLCR can meet 
acceptable project IRR, DSCR, and 
ROE?
Mitigation Measures
Subordinate debt is 
required by lenders 
(Khan and Parra, 2003)
Financial consequences
LLCR is lower than 1
Revenue 
risk
Most Interested Stakeholders:
1. Sponsor
2.Lender
3.Consultant
Cause
Reduced revenue due 
to low tariff or unitary 
charge
Financial consequences
LLCR is lower than 1
Cost 
overrun
Mitigation Measures
The project sponsor 
should use less 
borrowing than the level 
that maximizes the debt 
market value (Wibowo, 
2005).
Financial consequences
LLCR is less than 1  due 
to high operation and 
maintenance cost
Cause
Variation orders
Cause
Worse economic 
conditions in the host 
country
Cause
Technical or managerial 
errors
Mitigation Measures
Subsidies from the 
public authority 
(Bonnafous, 2012)
Financial consequences
LLCR is less than 1 due 
to high construction cost
Mitigation Measures
Government intervention 
to negotiate with the 
lenders (Cheng, 2010)
Financial consequences
LLCR is lower than 1due 
to inflation and interest 
rate fluctuation during 
operation period
Cause
Revenue is exposed to 
foreign-exchange rate 
and interest rates 
fluctuation
Mitigation Measures
Fixed interest rates or 
interest rates swap 
arrangement (Khan and 
Parra, 2003)
Mitigation Measures
Subsidies from the 
public authority 
(Bonnafous, 2012)
Cause
Source of debt is 
exposed to interests rate 
fluctuation
Mitigation Measures
Fixed interest rates or 
interest rates swap 
arrangement (Khan and 
Parra, 2003)Funding 
risk
Mitigation Measures
Debt hybrid 
arrangement (Khan and 
Parra, 2003)
Financial consequences
LLCR is lower than 1 due to 
higher interest rate
Figure 8.25 Influence diagram of LLCR, risk, and mitigation measures 
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8.6.1.4 Interest coverage ratio 
The interest coverage ratio, also called times interest earned, is used to determine how 
easily a company can pay interest expenses on outstanding debt. This ratio is calculated 
by dividing a project's earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) by its interest expense. 
Baker and Powel (2005) argued that an acceptable interest coverage ratio is largely 
depends on the expected level of the project’s future operating income (EBIT), as well 
as the volatility of EBIT. Projects with stable revenue (e.g. DBFO/PFI projects) can 
typically borrow more because of the lower probability of operating earnings falling 
below the level of interest expenses (i.e. revenue is generated from the annual unitary 
charges paid by government). Meanwhile, projects with more volatile and unpredictable 
operating earnings (e.g. BOT projects) should rely less on debt financing to avoid 
potential financial distress and bankruptcy. “The lower the ratio, the more the project is 
burdened by debt expense. When a project's interest coverage ratio is 1.5 or lower, its 
ability to meet interest expenses may be questionable. An interest coverage ratio below 
1 indicates the project is not generating sufficient revenues to satisfy interest expenses” 
(Loth, 2012). 
The risks related to Interest Coverage Ratio were identified as follows: funding risk, 
cost overrun, and revenue risk. The influence diagram of these risks and mitigation 
measures is illustrated in figure 8.26. 
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Figure 8.26 Influence diagram of Interest Covering Ratio, risk, and mitigation measures 
8.6.1.5 Repayment period 
Chang and Chen (2001) referred the debt repayment period to the time, after the grace 
period, needed for the loan borrower to pay off all the interest and principal. The loan 
repayment period usually does not exceed 10 years following completion of basic 
facilities, but longer repayment periods are possible if the project is very long-lived 
(e.g., an infrastructure project). If the cash flow from the project is inadequate to wholly 
amortize the principal debt within this period, the sponsors must bear the risks of 
refinancing the loan (Finnerty, 2007).  
Although Construction, operation, and repayment periods are initially set under the 
agreed contract (Yun et al., 2009), the debt repayment period is still possible to be re-
Interest 
Covering 
Ratio
To what extent of Interest Covering Ratio 
can meet acceptable project IRR, DSCR, 
LLCR, and ROE?
Cause
Construction cost 
overrun, delay, or 
failure to meet 
performance
Mitigation Measures
Project vehicle should 
procure timely permits 
and consents that 
obviate unnecessary 
delays (Khan and Parra, 
2003) 
Revenue 
risk
Cause
Volatile and 
unpredictable 
operating earnings
Mitigation Measures
The project should rely 
less on debt financing 
to avoid potential 
financial distress and 
bankruptcy (Baker and 
Powel, 2005)
Financial consequences
Interest covering ratio is 
less than 1
Cost 
overrun
Most Interested Stakeholders:
1. Sponsor
Cause
Prolonged issuance of 
permits and consents
Financial consequences
Interest covering ratio is 
less than 1
Financial consequences
Interest covering ratio is 
less than 1
Mitigation Measures
EPC contract clauses 
that specify fixed price, 
fixed schedule, agreed 
performance 
specifications, liquidated 
damages, and 
acceptable warranties 
(Khan and Parra, 2003)
Financial consequences
Difficult and expensive 
project financing
Cause
Potential lenders and 
investors hesitate
to participate because 
the project’s ability to 
meet interest 
expenses is 
questionable (Interest 
covering ratio is 1.5 or 
lower)
Funding 
risk
Mitigation Measures
Government intervention 
to negotiate with the 
lenders (Cheng, 2010)
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negotiated under refinancing clause (Cartlidge, 2006). Furthermore, Malini (2011) 
asserted that the debt service terms should also be determined comprehensively, 
particularly with reference to the grace period (or moratorium period) and the loan 
repayment period. When the repayment is started too early or if the repayment period is 
too short, the project may face cash flow (liquidity) problems. Thus, the particular terms 
of debt service in the future will depend on the economic and monetary climate. 
Alternatively, repayment period might be still the same if government guarantees a 
periodical adjustment of tariff (Soehodho et al., 2003). 
The risks related to repayment period were identified as follows: tariff risk, liquidity 
risk, and decision risk. The influence diagram of these risks and mitigation measures is 
illustrated in figure 8.27. 
 
Figure 8.27 Influence diagram of repayment period, risk, and mitigation measures 
Repayment 
Period
Financial consequences
Longer payback period
To what extent of Repayment Period can 
meet acceptable project IRR, DSCR, 
LLCR, and ROE?
Financial consequences
There is bias against 
longer-term projects
Cause
Too early repayment 
start or too short 
repayment period
Mitigation Measures
A project is acceptable if 
its payback is less than 
the maximum cost
recovery time 
established by the 
analyst (Boussabaine, 
2006)
Mitigation Measures
Debt service terms 
should be determined 
comprehensively, 
particularly with 
reference to the grace 
and loan repayment 
periods (Malini, 2011)
Financial consequences
The project may face 
cash flow (liquidity) 
problems
Liquidity 
risk
Most Interested Stakeholders:
1. Lender
Tariff risk
Cause
Inflexible price 
Adjustment (Restriction 
policy on profit and tariff)
Cause
Low initial tariff toll and 
no guarantee for 
periodical tariff 
adjustment Mitigation Measures
Guarantee of periodical 
adjustment on tariff 
(Soehodho et al., 2003)
Decision 
risk
Cause
The payback method 
does not show value 
enhancing results
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8.6.1.6 Revenue 
Since PPP projects are financed on a project finance basis, lenders only rely on the 
project’s revenue generation capacity for the repayment of debt service (Özdoganm and 
Birgönül, 2000). Although source of revenue in PPP can be either from government or 
users, sponsor company is the one who responsible for debt repayment. From the 
operating revenues, sponsor has to allocate the money not only to the outstanding debt 
but also to all project costs, including tax, royalty or even revenue-sharing to 
government. On the other hand, at some BOT projects, government authority prefers to 
select a bidder with the highest percentage of revenue share (Kulkarni and Prusty, 2007; 
Handley, 1997). Accordingly, the revenue as financial model output is deemed to be an 
important indicator by three main stakeholders such as sponsor, lender, and authority.  
8.6.1.7 NPV 
“NPV is the present value of a project’s future cash flows minus its cost. It is the 
technique of finding the PV of all cash flows (both inflows and outflows) associated with 
an investment. Operating firms, acquisitions or divestitures, are appraised generally 
using NPV technique” (Khan and Parra, 2003). NPV is the most common measure for 
evaluating a project. NPV is the total project’s value, with considering time value of 
money, which calculated by summing all project’s cash flows. The operating cash-flows 
before project financing are discounted at the average rate on the three tranches of debt 
using the following formula: 
………………………(8.3) 
Where: 
 t is the weighted average of the three rates on the tranches of debt; 
 The NPV is calculated for the first year of the construction period. 
Wibowo (2005) argued that the project’s NPV can be improved if the project sponsor 
uses less borrowing than the level that maximizes the expected ROE. Since cost of 
equity is quite sensitive to the leverage, any increase in cost of equity should be 
sufficiently balanced by an increase in the expected ROE. 
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Ye and Tiong (2003a) introduced NPV-at Risk to analyse the influence of different 
concession period structures so that both government and the concessionaires can 
understand their risk exposure and rewards as illustrated in figure 8.28. 
 
Figure 8.28 Relationship between the concession period and NPV 
Source: Ye and Tiong (2003a) 
The risks related to NPV were identified as follows: discount rate risk, decision risk, 
unprofitable project risk and high social margin cost. The influence diagram of these 
risks and mitigation measures is illustrated in figure 8.29. 
8.6.1.8 Operating cost 
Khan and Parra (2003) defined that operating cost is all costs and expenses sustained or 
to be sustained by sponsor in connection with the operation, maintenance, repair and 
reinstatement of the project in the ordinary course of its business including but not 
limited to: 
a. Operating costs and expenses set out in the operating budget. 
b. Liabilities of the borrower under the project agreements. 
c. Insurance premia. 
d. Maintenance expenditure (which shall include the funding of the major 
maintenance reserve account). 
e. Fees, commissions, charges, administrative, legal, management, accounting, 
other consulting and all other overhead and employee costs. 
f. All other costs and expenses which the inter-creditor agent (acting reasonably) 
agrees may be classified as operating costs. 
NPV 
Concession period 
Operation period Construction period 
Payback period 
Time 
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NPV
Discount 
rate risk
Financial consequences
Project NPV appears lower 
when discount rate is 
increased
Mitigation Measures
Government subsidy 
and not to levy any toll 
(Bonnafous, 2010)
Cause
Using a single discount 
rate to achieve two
quite different purposes 
(Net Present Cost 
comparison and 
sensitivity test of project
outcomes)
Mitigation Measures
 NPV approach should 
not be used as a primary 
VFM methodology 
(Shaoul, 2005)
To what extent of NPV can meet 
acceptable project IRR, DSCR, LLCR, 
and ROE?
Cause
Reliance on single 
criterion of NPV in 
assessing project 
costs and benefits
Mitigation Measures
Use different discount 
rates for different risk 
level at certain time 
period [i.e. Higher 
discount rate at the first 
five years and then 
lower discount rate 
afterwards] (Gallant, 
2006)
Financial consequences
Capital
investment decisions are 
ignored when projects 
become unattractive.
Mitigation Measures
The selection of 
discount rate should be 
based on investment 
decisions between 
public and private 
finance instead of 
political decision (Grout, 
2003 and Shaoul, 2005)
Financial consequences
NPV rule is not 
appropriate when the 
government has not or
will not provide the cash
Cause
Misuse of discount rate 
for computing project 
NPV
Most Interested Stakeholders:
1. Authority
Decision 
risk
Cause
Major environmental 
benefits or an over-
weighted user surplus 
justified by a 
redistribution policy
Unprofitable 
project risk
Financial consequences
Whatever the toll, the 
revenue cannot cover over 
half of the cost 
Mitigation Measures
Price regulation should  
not be based on SMCP 
but on some second 
best alternative to 
SMCP (Evenhuis and 
Vickerman, 2010)
Cause
Social margin cost 
(e.g. Recovery cost 
due to pollution or any 
social problems) is 
linked to the tariff
High social 
margin cost 
Financial consequences
Higher social marginal cost 
price (SMCP) will increase 
the tariff charged to the 
user, thus increase project 
NPV
 Figure 8.29 Influence diagram of NPV, risk, and mitigation measures 
8.6.1.9 ROE (Equity IRR) 
Annual return on equity is calculated as annual net profits after taxes divided by 
shareholders’ equity (Khan and Parra, 2003). Fischer, et. al (2010) stated that the equity 
provider expectation is maximising their return and long-term current income. Thus, 
ROE can be used to measure how much total equity needed, according to the pre-
defined ROE ratio, over a free defined period. Wibowo (2005) stated that the project 
sponsor should use less borrowing than the level that maximizes the debt market value, 
when the project sponsor chooses to maximize the ROE. However, for project financing 
purposes, Lynch (2005) argued that equity returns are calculated as an internal rate of 
return to equity (IRRE) rather than annual return on equity (ROE). 
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The following formula is used to calculate the IRRE: 
………………………………...(8.4) 
Where: 
 Equity injected(i) is the equity provided by the sponsors in year (i); 
 Dividends(i) are the dividends distributed to shareholders in year (i); 
 ROE is calculated in real terms through deflated flow (equity - dividends). 
The risks related to ROE were identified as follows: tariff risk and cost overrun. The 
influence diagram of these risks and mitigation measures is illustrated in Figure 8.30. 
ROE
Tariff risk
Financial consequences
Combination between 
higher ROE and shorter 
debt tenor may result 
higher tariff for the users
Mitigation Measures
The project sponsor 
should use less 
borrowing than the level 
that maximizes the debt 
market value (Wibowo, 
2005).
To what extent of ROE can meet 
acceptable project IRR, DSCR, and 
LLCR?
Mitigation Measures
Upgrading credit rating 
of the host country 
(Bakatjan et al., 2003)
Financial consequences
Low ROE because the tariff 
adjustment could not cover 
the operation and 
maintenance expenses and 
principal payment
Mitigation Measures
Users’ projection for the 
planned facility should 
be collected based on 
the statistical data from 
similar projects (Ng, et 
al, 2010) 
Financial consequences
Low ROE ratio due to 
high operation and 
maintenance cost
Cause
Requirement of high 
equity level and shorter 
debt tenor by lender
Most Interested Stakeholders:
1. Lender
Cost 
overruns
Cause
Variation orders
Cause
Worse economic 
conditions in the host 
country
Cause
Technical or managerial 
errors
Mitigation Measures
Subsidies from the 
public authority 
(Bonnafous, 2012)
Financial consequences
Low ROE ratio due to 
high construction cost
Mitigation Measures
Government intervention 
to negotiate with the 
lenders (Cheng, 2010)
Financial consequences
Low ROE ratio due to 
inflation and interest rate 
fluctuation during 
operation period
Cause
Users’ fluctuation
 Figure 8.30 Influence diagram of ROE, risk, and mitigation measures 
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8.6.1.10 DSCR 
“At any time, the ratio of available cash flow to the aggregate of senior debt service and 
subordinated debt service due to (or projected to fall due) in that period” (Khan and 
Parra, 2003). This ratio signifies the ability of project’s cash flow to meet the annual 
debt service requirements. This requirement is based on the terms of the loan that a 
lender is providing to the project. Fischer, et. al (2010) mentioned that debt funder use 
DSCR to ensure their debt will not be interrupted over a given loan term. Therefore, the 
promotion of development objectives by development banks can be achieved. 
ADSCR = CADS / (Principal + Interest Payment)……………………………….(8.5) 
This ratio is calculated each year and therefore provides a continuous view of the 
project’s ability to service its debt. Higher Debt Service Coverage Ratio reduces risks 
for lenders. Bakatjan, et al (2003) cited from Koh et al (1999) mentioned that the range 
of 1.10 to 1.25 for DSCR is bankable, the range between 1.30 and 1.50 is satisfactory, 
and above 1.50 is preferable. Government of India prefers the minimum ADSCR should 
be above 1.30 in all years of the loan period (DOA, 2012). An indication of the strength 
of different DSCR levels is shown in Table 8.8. 
Table 8.8 DSCR strength criteria (DOA, 2012). 
Strength DSCR assessment 
Very 
Strong 
Very strong ability to pay interest and principal with Minimum DSCRs above 2x and 
remaining above 1.5x during periods of project stress (i.e. in sensitivity analysis). 
Strong Strong ability to pay interest and principal with Minimum DSCRs above 1.5x throughout 
life of project and remaining above 1.3x during periods of project stress (i.e. in sensitivity 
analysis). 
Modest Modest ability to pay interest and principal with minimum DSCRs above 1.3x throughout 
life of project and remaining above 1.1x during periods of project stress (i.e. in sensitivity 
analysis). 
Poor Highly likely to miss scheduled debt service payments during some periods of project life 
with minimum DSCRs as low as 1.0x throughout life of project and falling below this if 
projects faces any financial stress (i.e. in sensitivity analysis). 
 
The inter-creditor agent uses the financial model (lenders base case model) to monitor 
cost overruns and other events that may have a material and unfavourable effect on the 
DSCR or the LLCR during construction period (Khan and Parra, 2003). Bakatjan, et al 
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(2003) also concluded that the DSCR requirement is influenced by how much equity 
provided in the project. The more equity provided, the lesser debt obligation is. Thus, a 
high equity in the project is resulted from a high DSCR that required by lenders. Or in 
other word, DSCR should be higher than the minimum level of annual DSCR. 
The risks related to DSCR were identified as follows: revenue risk, cost overrun, 
calculation risk, and decision risk. The influence diagram of these risks and mitigation 
measures is illustrated in figure 8.31. 
Figure 8.31 Influence diagram of DSCR, risk, and mitigation measures 
DSCR
Revenue 
risk
Financial consequences
Actual DSCR lower than 1
Mitigation Measures
Since Project Finance 
focuses on actual cash 
flow, CADS should be 
used in DSCR 
calculation (Warnelid, 
2012)
To what extent of DSCR can meet 
acceptable project IRR, LLCR, and 
ROE?
Mitigation Measures
Minimum tariff should be 
calculated based on the 
annual average daily 
traffic and construction 
cost scenarios (Vajdic, 
et al., 2012)
Calculation 
risk
Cause
EBITDA is used to 
calculate DSCR
Mitigation Measures
DSCR calculation 
should be checked 
carefully (Warnelid, 
2012)
Financial consequences
Taxes and timing of cash 
flows are ignored
Financial consequences
Low DSCR even after first 
five years
Most Interested Stakeholders:
1. Authority
2. Lender
3.Consultant
Cause
Low revenue due to 
failure in forecasting a 
realistic traffic volume
Cost 
overruns
Cause
Failure to address or 
underestimate the life 
cycle costs
Cause
Low revenue due to 
poor quality of 
infrastructure network
Financial consequences
Actual DSCR lower than 1
Cause
Incorrect items (e.g. 
Depreciation; Cash 
Balances; Reserve 
Accounts etc.) are 
included in CADS 
calculation
Financial consequences
Misleading DSCR
Mitigation Measures
Subsidies from the 
public authority 
(Bonnafous, 2012)
Mitigation Measures
Government intervention 
to negotiate with the 
lenders (Cheng, 2010)
Cause
DSCR is used solely 
without considering 
project’s gearing 
levels (the level of 
debt to equity ratio)
Decision 
risk
Financial consequences
Although DSCR appears 
very attractive, lenders are 
reluctant to fund the project
Mitigation Measures
The level of debt to 
equity ratio should be 
considered in such a 
way to meet lender’s 
interest (Boussabaine, 
2006)
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8.7 Chapter summary 
This section summarises the concept and development of the IPET. Financial model 
was used as the platform of financial viability module. The input and output of three 
financial models were compared to find the similarity and develop the best practice of 
financial model. Since financial viability module was developed into five stages of PPP 
project, the correlations between the most important expectations and the most preferred 
financial indicators were highlighted into five project stages.  
The most preferred financial indicators of financial viability module are adopted as 
financial risk variables for financial risk analysis module. This module is designed to 
help the user to identify the possible risks from the financial risk variables. The link 
between the financial risk variables and the related risks was identified by Influence 
diagram method. This module also analyse the project risk level through Monte Carlo 
simulation with maximum of 500 iterations. 
At the end of preliminary evaluation with an IPET, under financial risk mitigation 
module, the financial and economic outcomes are accompanied by the information of 
source(s) and consequence(s) of risks, and optimised mitigation measures. The 
influence diagram of each financial risk variable that includes its alternative mitigation 
measures was also discussed. In order to ensure that the proposed tool meets 
stakeholders’ expectations, the next chapter will discuss the verification and validation 
of IPET. 
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CHAPTER NINE: VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION 
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Chapter 9: Verification and Validation 
“And do not accept any information, unless you verify it for yourself. I (God) have given 
you the hearing, the eyesight, and the heart, and you are responsible for using them.” 
(Quran 17: 36) 
9.1 Introduction 
The findings generated from triangulation method (e.g. multiple case literature review, 
interview, and questionnaire survey) are not necessary applicable to other cases. This 
chapter will verify and validate the proposed IPET into a framework that can be 
generalised for the construction industry. As mentioned earlier in the chapter four, once 
IPET was developed, it was verified and validated by two means. This chapter begins 
with discussion of the methods used to verify and validate the research findings. The 
first strategy was testing IPET with a sample financial model to verify the model 
consistency. Secondly, experts who have experience in the field of PPP projects 
reviewed the effectiveness and the applicability of the framework.  Opinion from expert 
practitioners and academics has been gathered to evaluate applicability and 
effectiveness of the framework in the construction industry. This validation process is 
presented at the end of this chapter. 
9.2 Verification  
An integrated project evaluation tool is dedicated to accommodate the knowledge gap 
between public and private parties in evaluating financial viability of PPP project. 
However, this research is limited to the utilisation of PPP financial model as a tool for 
evaluating the project and negotiating risk sharing mechanism. Therefore, the first 
verification process is to check the formula and output consistency of IPET against any 
error or discrepancies with a sample financial model from Khan and Parra (2003). In 
this research, only the financial viability module was tested individually. The other two 
modules are complimentary to the first module; testing and validation of the proposed 
tool was done in an integrated manner.  
Al-Sharif (2007) suggested that financial model in a computer-based spreadsheet has to 
be chased for each entry and output. Moreover, precedents and dependent relationships 
of each equation should be traced carefully and judged according to the required results 
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and the right entries. These activities are intended to find and fix errors in a model, it is 
often called debugging (Sengupta, 2004). Figure 9.1 shows the opening screen of IPET. 
 
Figure 9.1 Screenshot of integrated project evaluation tool cover 
9.2.1 The Financial Viability Module 
The financial viability module was debugged by entering different sets of data to check 
the consistency of the module in the Excel spreadsheets. During the development 
process, several errors and discrepancies were found in the outputs between the 
financial viability module and a sample financial model by Khan and Parra (2003). It 
took a few months, but eventually, they were all fixed. A sample for consistency check 
of the module is illustrated in table 9.1.  
The introduction part of IPET is designed to provide information to the user about the 
structure of IPET and how to use the tool, as illustrated in figure 9.2. In order to find out 
how IPET can be used to evaluate a PPP seaport project, hypothetical data from a 
financial model by Khan and Parra (2003) was used to demonstrate the tool’s utility. 
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The first part of financial viability module provides information
57
 to the user about the 
most important expectation of using PPP financial model at certain stage. 
Table 9.1 Sample of output consistency between financial viability module and La Paz container 
financial model (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
Input Assumption 
(Value) 
Output 
Parameter 
(Value) 
Equation 
Financial Viability 
Module 
Financial Model 
La Paz Container 
(Khan and Parra, 2003) 
Terminal Capacity  
(350 Million TEU) 
IRR (25%) 
=Output!B11  
=IRR(F9:AK9)  
=Output!B9  
=IRR(F8:AK8) 
Composite Tariff 
(US$219.94/TEU) 
ROE (60%) 
=Output!B20  
=IRR(F18:AJ18) 
=Output!B15  
=IRR(F14:AJ14) 
Construction cost 
(US$231.12 Million) 
DSCR min 
(1.75) 
=Output!D32  
=MIN(H32:V32) 
=Output!D25  
=MIN(H25:V25) 
It is assumed that this tool is used by “government authority” at the “pre-proposal 
stage”. Then, the authority is informed that PPP financial model is used at this stage to 
“evaluate the estimated cost of two procurement alternatives: PPP or public sector 
comparator (PSC)”. During the evaluation process at the pre-proposal stage, the 
authority is also reminded that the most important expectation in using PPP financial 
model is “ensuring that the project must generate enough cash flow to give lenders a 
margin of safety with respect to its debt service obligations”. Furthermore, the authority 
agency is advised to consider the other stakeholder’s expectation to have an efficient 
risk sharing negotiation for an example: “There is a demand from the public to keep the 
procurement process transparent, while on the other side, the sponsors need to protect 
their business in the competition”. 
After considering several issues related to stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP 
financial model, the authority is given several preferred financial indicators (Input 
Assumptions: Volume / Traffic, Revenue Forecast, Operating and Maintenance cost, 
and Project timelines; Output: IRR, Revenue, Project NPV, and Operating cost) to 
evaluate the project at the pre-proposal stage as shown in figure 9.3. The authority is 
advised to concentrate on these preferred financial indicators including the possible 
risks and its mitigation measures.  
                                                 
57
 This information is validated from interviews and worldwide questionnaire survey with PPP experts. 
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Figure 9.2 Screenshot of introduction of integrated project evaluation tool 
1
2
3
4 Go to the second part of financial risk analysis module (Monte Carlo Simulation), modify the selected cells in order to achieve the preferred output;
5 Run a monte carlo simulation to analyse the project based on random combination of financial input assumptions; 
6 Go to project synthesis, run another simulation to see which financial risk variables need to be negotiated;
7
8 Repeat the step No. 2 to find out the best scenario for the project.
Go to financial risk mitigation module, select the financial risk variables in order to see alternative mitigation measures;
Please follow the instruction below to start using this tool as a demo :
Go to the first part of financial viability module (Stakeholders' Expectations), fill all the requested instructions according to your organisation and 
project stage;
Go to the second part of financial viability module (Financial Viability Analysis), modify the selected cells in order to achieve the preferred output;
Go to the first part of financial risk analysis module (Risk Identification), select type of project and financial risk variables to identify possible risks;
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The idea behind this presentation is to guide a government authority to use PPP 
financial model effectively since some interviewees have admitted that PPP financial 
model is being treated as a formal administrative requirement rather than the main focus 
for making decision. 
The second part of the financial viability module contains selected financial indicators 
to be used for evaluating project financial viability. Input data in the financial viability 
module can be generated from any financial model of a seaport project. In order to test 
this tool, the input data and its assumptions were generated from La Paz Container 
Financial Model (Khan and Parra, 2003). Several output indicators are presented in a 
graph (see figure 9.4) to help the authority understand key constraints to bankability 
during the concession period and to make better project structuring decisions.   
9.2.2 Financial risk analysis module 
Financial risk analysis module comprises two parts, risk identification and Monte Carlo 
simulation. The verification process of this module is divided into two strategies. The 
first strategy was verified by undertaking a thorough literature review about risks in PPP 
projects and Monte Carlo Simulation. Debugging strategy was used to verify the second 
part of the financial risk analysis module (Monte Carlo Simulation). 
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Figure 9.3 Screenshot of financial viability module and stakeholders’ expectations 
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Figure 9.4 Screenshot of second part of financial viability module: financial viability analysis  
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The next verification step is explaining how to use the second module from the 
assumptions adopted in the previous module. Although the financial viability module 
shows that the project is financially viable, the government authority has to consider 
possible risks related to the input assumptions used in the financial evaluation. 
Therefore, the financial risk analysis module is designed to help the authority identify 
the possible risk based on the base case provided in the previous module. The first part 
of financial risk analysis module is risk identification sheet (see figure 9.5). In this 
sheet, the authority is given an option to visualise the possible risks based on the 
financial indicators used in the first module. In this example, container terminal capacity 
has five possible risks (e.g. revenue risk due to nature of Greenfield project, revenue 
risk due to over estimated forecast, revenue risk due to excessive revenue, competition 
risk, and project approval risk) that the authority must consider in the evaluation and 
negotiation processes. 
 
Figure 9.5 Screenshot of financial risk analysis module: risk identification 
The next financial risk analysis step is conducting Monte Carlo Simulation to the base 
case financial model used in the first module. Some financial input assumptions 
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considered uncontrollable are randomly simulated. The assumption of each probability 
distribution is derived from various literatures. For an instance, the probability 
distribution of container terminal capacity is assumed to be beta distribution (Yun et al., 
2009). Based on this assumption, the user can modify the minimum and maximum 
standard deviation to simulate the variable. However, the other financial risk variables 
that are not randomly simulated can be modified in the first module. The input sheet to 
be simulated by using Monte Carlo Simulation is illustrated in figure 9.6.  
 
Figure 9.6 Screenshot of financial risk analysis module: input simulation 
After updating all information needed for Monte Carlo Simulation, the user is given an 
option to run the simulation up to a maximum of 500 iterations. In this example, 500 
iterations were used to simulate all financial risk variables randomly. The output of the 
 286 
simulation is shown in figure 9.7. The authority as the user of this demonstration tool 
has advantage to predict the project financial viability under various combinations of 
random scenarios. According to the authority agency’s perspective, the simulation 
results show that the Project’s NPV and IRR are considered acceptable with 95% 
confidence level (e.g. Project NPV’s 95% confidence level between US$106.39 and 
US$122.20 million; and Project IRR’s 95% confidence level is 19%). However, it is 
important that the Authority agency should consider the other stakeholders’ interests of 
having minimum DSCR not less than 1. Figure 9.7 shows that DSCR minimum with 
upper 95% confidence level is 0.7 below 1. It implies that the Authority should 
anticipate the risk of DSCR minimum below 1.  
 
Figure 9.7 Screenshot of financial risk analysis module: output simulation 
Furthermore, another possible risk can be identified by running a single iteration of 
Monte Carlo Simulation. A single random simulated scenario allows the user to identify 
which input assumption(s) might generate unfavourable financial output(s) as shown in 
Figure 9.8. In this single simulation, several financial input indicators are significantly 
higher than the base case such as: Total project cost (US$ 297.73 million), and Land 
start-up costs (US$65.39 million). The demand is also lower than the projected 
(327926TEU/year). This simulation shows several unfavourable outputs such as: DSCR 
min (-0.47), Project IRR before Tax (11%) and after Tax (7%), Project NPV (-100.12 
Million), and Payback period (15 years). The simulation is also presented in a dynamic 
graph as shown in Project Synthesis sheet (see figure 9.9).  
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Figure 9.8 Screenshot of project synthesis: base case vs. single random simulated scenario 
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Figure 9.9 Screenshot of project synthesis: a single random simulated scenario result in a graph 
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9.2.3 Financial risk mitigation module 
Since the user (the authority agency) has sufficient information about which financial 
risk variables he/she anticipates, the next step is identifying the mitigation measures of 
each financial risk variable including its cause and consequences. This evaluation 
process is presented in the Financial Risk Mitigation module as illustrated in figure 
9.10. The user of this tool is able to visualise all possible risks and its mitigation 
measures by selecting each financial risk variable on the combo box. Once the authority 
understands the other stakeholders’ expectations by knowing the possible risks and 
alternative mitigation measures, it is expected that the authority agency can negotiate 
the best financial and risk sharing mechanism scenario. This can be done by repeating 
the evaluation process from the initial step of using this tool with different or improved 
financial assumptions and strategies. 
9.3 Validation  
This section presents the validation process for IPET. After verifying each module by 
testing it individually, several experts with experience in the field of PPP projects were 
invited to review the effectiveness and the applicability of IPET. Swan (2008) stated 
that a good model is tested by knowing how users respond to it. To validate IPET, four 
categories were adopted from (Al-Sharif, 2007) such as: (1) Applicability to PPP 
Seaport Projects, (2) Comprehensiveness, (3) Practical relevance, and (4) Intelligibility. 
The experts were also asked for their opinions about the strength and weaknesses of  
IPET by using online survey. Survey invitations were sent through Linkedin.com, a 
social network for professionals under several groups of PPP community, such as ‘PPPs 
IN EMERGING MARKETS’, ‘Project Finance International (PFI)’, ‘Public Private 
Partnership Research’, ‘Global Infrastructure & Project Finance’, etc. Refer to 
appendix 4 to view the questionnaire form. 
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Figure 9.10 Screenshot of financial risk mitigation module
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9.3.1 Response to the prototype presentation and online survey invitation 
After the prototype of IPET and the online survey were sent to each participant, some 
respondents replied giving feedback on the research findings. The feedbacks received 
from experts are in the list below:  
 “Thank you very much for sharing this brilliant tool with me”. 
 “Due to my limited experience with PPP and the short time I spent on the 
testing, I am not 100% convinced that I fully understood the model, but it seems 
that all variables respond in an expected manner to a change in inputs”. 
 “My comments were mostly focused on the user-friendliness of the model rather 
than the technical performance. I hope my feedback was helpful”. 
 “Fredy, I will look into this and respond with feedback. I have been looking at 
software for similar highway/rail projects, and am pleased that our young 
researchers are developing new tools to solve our infrastructure problems”. 
 “Hi, I have also downloaded and will test. Looks like it has covered all the 
bases”. 
 “Congratulations for your PhD work on this important and useful topic. I will 
look in details at your tool and get back to you with comments”. 
 “I'll certainly do my feedback on your model. At the first view, it looks like a 
tremendous work! Personally, I am working on a financial model for P3 prior 
valuation for a French Authority. I will be interested in discussing your risk 
simulation. Unfortunately, I'm not an actuary and I think my risk modelling 
could be improved”. 
 “I am particularly interested in your research and in its application in complex 
infrastructure projects. I would be interested in talking to you further about it”. 
 “Congratulations on this initiative, Fredy. This is a very innovative and 
comprehensive model, with potential to be extended to other sectors. Best of 
luck in finalizing it. Please keep me posted on progress”. 
The following section presents the results of respondents’ feedback related to the 
questions asked in online survey. 
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9.3.2 Results 
This section presents the findings of validation process. A prototype of IPET was given 
along with the questionnaire survey to each participant. Respondents were asked to 
indicate their score of the proposed IPET ranging from 1 (low) up to 5 (high). Figure 
9.11 shows the average score for the categories. The rating of the proposed tool 
applicability to PPP seaport projects was 3.69, which was the highest score. 
Comprehensiveness of IPET was rated 3.60 out of 5, practical relevance is 3.26 and 
intelligibility was 3.53.  
 
Figure 9.11 Concept rating for integrated project evaluation tool 
9.3.2.1 Applicability of IPET 
The survey was not intended to predict that IPET was applicable to projects of 
undertaking by the participating experts; but rather to obtain the opinions regarding 
applicability of IPET to PPP seaport projects and PPP projects in general. Respondents 
were asked to indicate their score on applicability of IPET ranging from 1 (low) up to 5 
(high). The analysis of their responses revealed that the levels of applicability were 
considered high. The mean value of IPET’s applicability to PPP seaport projects was 
3.69 with standard deviation of 0.751 as shown in table 9.2. Figure 9.12 shows that all 
respondents scored above 3 for IPET’s applicability. Evaluating IPET’s applicability 
alone was deemed insufficient; however, because an applicable tool does not necessary 
mean it would add value. Therefore, comprehensiveness tested was needed to validate 
this tool.  
3.69 
3.6 
3.26 
3.53 
3 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.8
Applicability to PPP seaport projects (N=13)
Comprehensiveness (N=15)
Practical relevance (N=15)
Intelligibility (N=15)
Mean 
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9.3.2.2 Comprehensiveness of IPET 
An examination of IPET’s comprehensiveness was needed to ensure that it covered all 
important areas in evaluating financial viability of a PPP project. Respondents were 
asked to give scores of comprehensiveness ranging from 1 (incomprehensive) up to 5 
(comprehensive). The analysis of their responses revealed that IPET was comprehensive 
enough in evaluating a PPP seaport project. The mean value of IPET’s 
comprehensiveness to PPP seaport projects was 3.6 with standard deviation of 0.9856 
(see table 9.3). Despite the comprehensiveness score of IPET not being 100%, it did 
indicate that it was likely to be more comprehensive than incomprehensive.  Figure  9.13 
also shows that the majority (33% and 33%) of experts gave a 3 and 4 rate respectively 
on comprehensiveness to IPET. Notwithstanding, 13% of respondents gave scores 
under 3, twenty percent of participants thought that IPET was very comprehensive with 
the highest score of 5. 
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Figure 9.12 Frequency of the applicability  
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9.3.2.3 Practical Relevance 
Since the proposed tool was developed by an academician, it was considered necessary 
to test the practical relevance of the tool. Some experts and practitioners were asked for 
their opinion on the practical relevance of IPET. The average score of practical 
relevance was 3.26 with standard deviation of 0.5936. Figure 9.14 shows that ninety-
three percent of respondents rated it 3 and above. In spite of practical relevance was 
rated by respondents as the least category, these findings indicated that the respondents 
agreed with the practical relevancy of the proposed tool to PPP seaport projects. 
 
 
 
9.3.2.4 Intelligibility 
In order to evaluate the clarity and understandability of IPET, respondents were given 
options to rate under the intelligibility category.  Figure 9.15 shows that 47% and 33% 
respondents rated 3 and 4 for intelligibility. The average rank was 3.53 and the standard 
deviation was 0.6952 as shown in table 9.5. These findings indicated that IPET was clear 
and easy to understand. 
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Figure 9.14 Frequency of the practical relevance  
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9.3.3 Strength 
The next part of the questionnaire survey was asking the respondent to give written 
opinions about the strong points of the IPET concept. Some comments compliments 
and suggestion were given for strengthening IPET. Their feedbacks on the model's 
strengths are presented in the list below:  
1. “Limitation of mistake with only one input data place. Same way, 
OUTPUT data are centralized in only spreadsheet. Model is very simple 
to handle, surely, it should guarantee a good use of it”. 
2. “It covered most of all the important factors necessary for any P3 seaport 
project evaluation irrespective of place or country”. 
3.  “Good and very comprehensive model”. 
4. “- Easy to navigate; - Separate inputs page; - Comprehensive coverage 
of financial ratios; - good flexibility of the model; - Well summarised 
results; - good explanation of the various risks associated with the 
different financial ratios / metrics”. 
5. ”Good model to start with. Financial aspects have been taken fairly”. 
6. “Very well structured!”. 
7. “CLEAR”. 
8. “Built on an easy-to-use software platform allows easy handling from 
users. A practical tool that provides a consistent integration of previous 
work in PPP's appraisal”. 
9. “Logical”. 
10. “I think it is a very useful tool. I don't understand how you can define the 
risk assignment. Is it an exogenous decision? Or you have a decision rule 
for the assignment?” 
The respondents gave strong points of the IPET concept for its simplicity, 
comprehensiveness, intelligibility and applicability in evaluating PPP seaport projects. 
The comments given in point (1) and (4) highlighted the effort of minimising mistake 
by providing only one input data place in a separate page. As suggested by Swan 
(2008), a separated input sheet should be made up of raw numbers instead of 
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calculation. IPET was designed to help the user to use a complex financial model in a 
simple way. This simplicity is reflected by feedbacks given in points (1), (4), (5), (7), 
(8), and (9). Further, a good financial model should be comprehensive enough to 
evaluate a complex PPP project. Respondents confirmed that the proposed IPET 
covered most of all important factors necessary for any PPP seaport project evaluation 
irrespective of place or country in points (2), (3), (4), and (5). Last but not least, the 
main idea of building an integrated project evaluation tool was integrating a practical 
tool with previous work in PPP's appraisal. This was acknowledged in point (8). 
9.3.4 Weakness 
In order to ensure a fair validation process and better improvement, the questionnaire 
survey asked feedback on the possible weak points of IPET. Eight respondents were 
willing to give feedback on the weak points and suggestions to improve IPET. Their 
feedbacks on the model's weakness are presented in the list below: 
1. “Model seems to be very automatised. It could be anticipated by 
providing some "blank cells" in order to add some input data and adapt 
easily your model without having to re-built it entirely”. 
2.  “Too simplified from an operator’s point of view, much more detailed 
revenue and cost modelling would be needed”. 
3. “On reviewing, there always are chances for improvements and in my 
opinion 8 out of 10”. 
4.  “- initially difficult to follow; - not clear as to what type of project / 
company the model refers (until I looked at the input's page); - it is not 
clearly defined what is the final output of the model and which pages are 
just summary of results (i.e. your dashboards); “Too many buttons and 
macros”. 
5. “This model which is specific to specific container terminal cannot be a 
generic tool for evaluating other kind of ports as calculations in deriving 
capital costs, tariff, O&M costs etc would change completely for a dry 
cargo terminal, Oil jetties and others. The bases for deriving the 
assumptions are not provided and would change from port to port. 
Derivation of the peak capacity of 0.35 million TEUs is not clear as in a 
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port the capacity of any berth can be determined in 3 different ways - (i) 
capacity of the cranes deployed at jetty; (ii) capacity of backup area 
provided; (iii) capacity based on the movement of ships (in case of 
natural ports) considering high tide and low tide. 25% of the capital cost 
taken has no breakups - Contingency cost of 15% and other yard 
equipment - 10% which is very high. Construction costs of any berth 
depend purely on the technical studies undertaken at the site based on 
which the depth of piling, strength of steel required etc will be derived. 
This would vary substantially from port to port. No consideration of 
dredging which is a major component in ports and costs high. Likewise 
there are many technical aspects which are missed out in the model”. 
6. “There could be extenuating factors not accounted for”. 
7. “Risk analysis of PPPs involves issues, which are not addressed in the 
model. Comprehensiveness is always an issue with such type of 
analyses”. 
8. “Financial viability module (1): is there only one financial model? or 
there should be more options for the comparison? General: sometimes 
too academic – e.g. Nash equilibrium - I'm wondering how big is the 
number of administration officers that know the idea of Nash equilibrium 
model :) neither I know:) - is it possible to use more descriptive 
language?”. 
Since the proposed tool was designed with a limited time and budget, there always are 
chances for improvements. The feedbacks given by the respondents were straight to the 
point. The above important points should be taken into consideration, such as the 
comprehensiveness, clarity, flexibility and so on. Although some respondents 
complimented the comprehensiveness of IPET, several feedbacks in comment numbers 
(2), (5), and (7) point to issues related to the model’s comprehensiveness. Since the 
IPET prototype was presented to demonstrate the idea of integrating financial model 
with other risk analysis tools, it was decided to use a simple financial model. One 
should be aware that this tool was not for a real PPP seaport project. Some alterations 
are definitely needed to evaluate a real PPP seaport project.  
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Responding to comment (1), IPET was designed to help the user, especially government 
agency who has limited knowledge and experience in using financial model, evaluate 
PPP projects. Automatisation with transparent formula was needed to simplify the 
calculation process without undermining the importance of auditing requirement. 
Should any modification be needed in the future; the proposed tool was designed and 
built in a (Microsoft Excel) spreadsheet platform which is easy to modify. 
Although some of the respondents praised the model's clarity, an issue related to clarity 
of the final output of the model was still raised in comment (4). This is something not 
uncommon in building financial model. Therefore, a manual of use and insight into the 
tool's assumptions and building details should be provided in order to minimise the 
clarity issue. 
The issues related to extenuating factors as raised in point (6), actually, have been 
addressed in the financial risk analysis module. A Monte Carlo simulation for various 
input variables is designed to replicate the uncertainty of the future events. 
Responding to point (8), IPET is a decision making tool that utilise a financial model in 
evaluating a PPP seaport project. It is assumed that each bidder will bring their own 
financial model. Should several financial models are available for comparison; IPET 
can be used to determine the best proposal according to their financial model. Another 
issue raised in point (8) was the presentation of "Nash equilibrium" term in the model's 
framework. Since the work was undertaken by academia, it was deemed necessary to 
include this term. Nevertheless, for the sake of applicability, IPET should use more 
descriptive language. 
9.3.5 General Comments 
General feedbacks on the concept and prototype of IPET were given by respondents. 
Seven participants gave comments that were constructive and encouraging in general. 
Their general feedbacks are presented in the list below: 
1. “As project finance consultant for public authorities, our clients are always asking 
for an itemized presentation of NPV : - Rentals NPV, - Amort. NPV, ... In this way, 
public authorities could better understand the total cost of the project. I don't know 
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if your model allows this type of presentation”. 
2. “A very good IPET to apply within Seaport P3 projects and this will also help in 
assessing during my work”. 
3. “I do not have experience in working on PPP, however I have had exposure to 
seaport companies in the past. The model is comprehensive and easy to navigate. It 
is also easy to run scenario and sensitivity analysis”. 
4.  “From banking prospective there are too many button, the principal rule in banking 
financial model is" keep the things simple", no macro (or just a copy and paste 
macro) no button. Overall it's a great job!” 
5. “A thorough judgement of this work from an independent expert requires a 
considerable time period to be justified and accurate. A first glance indicates a good 
and useful work but one should study in depth the architecture and content of this 
tool to provide meaningful comments. Consider developing a manual of use and 
insight into the tool's assumptions and building details. For sure, it worths the 
effort!” 
6. “If there is only one option - PPP - it is ok. But what if we are still considering 
other options?” 
7. “I haven’t been able to comment much further as I do not know anything about 
Seaport projects. I would say that, for PPP projects I have worked on, there tends to 
be a profile of maintenance payments rather than a real amount that increases with 
inflation each year. This means that maintenance reserve accounts are used and this 
creates complexity and makes the cost of a project higher”. 
Overall, the respondents gave positive feedbacks in various ways. Some participants 
sent e-mails and comments describing that they were interested in learning further or 
having an update for the final IPET. Point (1) suggested that the manual of use and 
insight into the tool's assumptions and building details should be considered. 
Nonetheless, a pertinent feedback (6) asked for other options if the authority is still 
considering other options for PPP. IPET was proposed to help a government authority 
to decide whether the project should use PPP or not. According to the findings from 
literature and interview, it is suggested that PPP should be used when the project is 
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profitable. It means that when the demand is higher than port capacity it is 
recommended to invite private partners to participate. Should an authority decide to use 
traditional procurement, government could use the proposed IPET from both points of 
view (authority and the sponsor). All risks that belong to the sponsor would be 
absorbed by the authority. 
9.3.6 Information about respondents 
Respondents were asked again for some simple information to check their background, 
work experience, and their knowledge about PPP financial management. Among 15 
respondents, the majority (66.7%) have worked on PPP projects, while 33.3% are 
undertaking research/studies on PPP projects. Only one respondent has some knowledge 
on PPP project (see figure 9.16). 
 
Figure 9.16 Screenshot of respondents’ background 
Respondents were working for various organisations with various designations / 
positions as seen in table 9.6. Two lecturers from Poland and Greece also participated in 
this validation survey. The rest of the participants were from industry. 
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Table 9.6 Respondent’s designation and organisation 
No. Designation / Position Organisation Country Origin 
1 Project Finance Consultant  Public Sector Adviser  France 
2 Assistant Audit Officer  Federal Auditor of 
Government of India  
India 
3 Regional head of infrastructure 
projects, APM Terminals  
Building and operating ports  UEA 
4 Senior analyst Financial advisory Malta 
5 Senior Associate Consultant Management Consultancy 
Firm 
India 
6 Managing Director  Equity Fund  France 
7 Project finance professional Banker Italy 
8 Financial Researcher Private Equity Media UK 
9 Lecturer (Faculty member) University Greece 
10 Lecturer (Faculty member) University  Poland 
11 Evaluation Manager PPP Unit – State Uruguay 
12 Head of Project Finance Construction 
Industry/Sponsor 
Austria 
13 Associate Director Financial Advisers UK 
14 Senior Associate Financier USA 
 
Respondents from different countries participated in the validation survey, such as 
UK, India, France, Spain, Poland, United Arab Emirates, Malta, Italy, Greece, 
Austria, Uruguay, and USA. Figure 9.17 shows the distribution of respondent’s 
country origin. It is clear that many participants from different countries were 
interested in IPET. 
 
 
Figure 9.17 Distribution of respondent’s country origin 
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9.4 Summary 
The IPET was tested before distributing the prototype to experts. IPET was checked and 
tested in computer-based spreadsheet for each entry and output. The precedents and 
dependent relationships of each equation were traced carefully and judged according to 
the required results and the right entries. Once errors were found and fixed, IPET was 
ready to be distributed to the experts for validation and comments. 
The concept and prototype of IPET was validated and commented. The participants, the 
majority of whom were experts and practitioners, rated the IPET’s applicability, 
comprehensiveness, practicality, and intelligibility as relatively acceptable. The rating 
scale was from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest). The average score for applicability of the 
proposed IPET to PPP seaport projects was 3.69. The mean value of IPET’s 
comprehensiveness was 3.6. The average score of practical relevance was 3.26 and the 
respondents rated the model intelligibility as 3.53. These scores gave the proposed IPET 
a positive overall evaluation. 
Some pertinent comments were received. The respondents gave positive feedbacks in 
various ways. Some participants replied by e-mails and gave comments describing that 
they were interested in learning further or having an update for the final IPET.  
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CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
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Chapter 10: Conclusions and Recommendation 
“Reasoning draws a conclusion, but does not make the conclusion certain, unless the 
mind discovers it by the path of experience.” 
(Roger Bacon 1214 – 1294) 
10.1 Introduction 
Referring to the aim of the research, an attempt to minimise the knowledge gap between 
public authority and private entities in PPP project has been made. A PPP financial 
model has been selected as the object of this study because it is one of the most 
common tools used for evaluating a new project and facilitating negotiations among 
lenders, sponsor(s) and a government agency. This chapter synthesises the research 
findings related to the development of an integrated project evaluation tool for PPP 
seaport projects. It concludes the research and elaborates on the achievements of the 
research objectives. Limitation of this research and recommendations for future research 
are presented in this chapter. Contributions to the body of knowledge are also 
highlighted at the end of the chapter. 
10.2 Research background 
When large infrastructure projects require huge capital investments, public-private 
partnership (PPP) is an alternative in cases of shortage of public funds. However, the 
complexity of PPP arrangement has created a dilemma for government authorities to 
balance the interests between public and private parties (stakeholders). Toor and 
Ogunlana (2009) asserted that different stakeholders from diverse socio-economic and 
cultural backgrounds have their own motivation to accomplish project objectives. In the 
case of PPP projects, the uncertainties with long-term agreement and the complexity of 
project financing arrangement generate additional risks to all stakeholders (Zhang, 
2005a). By considering the higher level of risks, their expectations mostly converge on 
the ability of the project to generate enough cash flow over the concession period in 
order to attract or to comfort investors regarding their capital investment (Kurniawan, 
2010).  
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Meanwhile, PPP scheme projects, believed to deliver better value for money, have been 
criticised by many as the highest influence level from either political patronage or 
corporate political power (Heald and Georgiou, 2000; Crane and Matten, 2004; Beh, 
2010; Siemiatycki, 2010). Therefore, it is anticipated that the reconciliation from 
financial models have potential in helping to achieve value for money in PPP projects. 
A financial model is a tool (typically arranged in a spreadsheet format in different 
worksheets that have three major categories: input worksheet, calculation worksheet, 
and output worksheet) employed by the stakeholders to conduct negotiations and to 
prepare project appraisal. Furthermore, a financial model can be used for preliminary 
due diligence, negotiations, and project performance monitoring (Kurniawan, 2010). 
Since each stakeholder employs a financial modeller to develop a model based on own 
expectations, stakeholders sometimes have different financial models derived from their 
own assumptions. The discrepancies among stakeholders’ expectations need to be 
further negotiated. Nevertheless, there are some challenges (i.e. the effectiveness of PPP 
as an alternative of procurement strategies to deliver better value for money is still open 
to question, the existence of risk in PPP project is inevitable, and the uncertainties due 
to long-term agreement and the complexity of the project financing arrangement have to 
be allocated in a simple and error-prone PPP financial model) that have to be considered 
in achieving the aim of this study. 
10.3 Methodology  
Knowledge gap was identified as a problem that might be minimised when PPP 
financial model is properly utilised. This problem (ontologically) belongs to nominalism 
reality because knowledge gap is related to human’s cognitive abilities. Meanwhile, the 
proposed strategy in minimising the knowledge gap through proper use of financial 
model has to be verified and validated, which adopts objectivist epistemology. 
Consequently, both positivism and interpretivism approaches were considered. This 
combination is called a pragmatic paradigm, which utilises a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative techniques or triangulation technique (Jupp, 2006). A triangulation 
strategy has been adopted to meet the research objectives. In order to develop an 
integrated project evaluation tool in the right direction, several research questions were 
produced (i.e. what is the best PPP approach and how is the effectiveness of partnership 
concept evaluated? who are the stakeholders using PPP financial models? how to 
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develop an understandable financial model with minimum error? And what are the most 
important stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP financial models?).  
10.4 Achievement of the aim and objectives  
This research aims to ascertain the rationale of the public sector authority in evaluating 
PPP projects through an integrated project evaluation tool (IPET). This tool is expected 
to assist the stakeholders in utilising PPP financial models at different project stages. 
This will take place by developing a reliable and valid tool for project evaluation and 
risk sharing negotiation in PPP seaport projects. The aim has been achieved through 
assembling four objectives. As shown in Figure 10.1, the first and second objectives are 
addressed in several chapters, while the third and fourth objectives are presented in a 
specific chapter. 
Objective 1
Exploring the 
concept of PPP 
and use of PPP 
financial models
Literature 
Review, Case 
Study, Interviews 
& Survey 
Objective 2 
Exploring risks 
and their 
mitigation 
measures in PPP 
projects
Literature 
Review, Case 
Study & 
Interviews
Objective 3 
Developing an 
integrated 
project 
evaluation tool 
Inductive 
Objective 4 
Verifying and 
validating IPET
Experts’ 
evaluation 
Aim
Reliable and 
valid integrated 
project 
evaluation tool 
for government 
authority to 
evaluate PPP 
project and 
negotiate risk 
sharing 
mechanism by 
using PPP 
financial model. 
Chapter 2, 3, 5, 6, 
& 7
Chapter 5, 6 & 8 Chapter 8 Chapter 9
 
Figure 10.1 Research objectives in relation to thesis chapters 
10.4.1 Achievement of objective one:  exploring the concept of ppp and the use of 
ppp financial models 
The concept of Public-Private Partnership has been explored from the perspective of 
infrastructure approach in chapter 2. The roles exchange and risk sharing mechanism 
between public and private over long-term concession period have been debated and 
criticised by researchers. The public expects that PPP is preferred due to efficient 
services promised by the private party. Meanwhile, private company is mostly 
motivated by profit maximisation. Therefore, the public authority has to choose the best 
approach based on their policy and economic conditions. This suggestion raises up a 
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research question that needs to be addressed in this study. Since the effectiveness of 
PPP as an alternative procurement strategy to deliver better value for money is still open 
to question, then, what is the best PPP approach and how is the effectiveness of the 
partnership concept evaluated?   
To find out the best approach, two main PPP approaches and some theories related to 
PPPs have been discussed. The PPP approaches can be viewed from the revenue 
mechanism. The first approach is service-based approach, and the second is finance-
based approach. While revenue mechanism of service-based approach is derived from 
annual unitary charge, the revenue mechanism of finance-based approach is generated 
from tariff operation and ancillary revenues. Finding the best approach for a particular 
PPP project requires an extensive evaluation process. Several considerations related to 
large project evaluation (e.g. problems in evaluating large project, project evaluation 
tools and techniques, and risk management in PPP) were also discussed in chapter 2. 
Agency theory addresses goal conflict between agent and principal commonly called the 
agency problem. The agency problem exists in PPPs because the private companies as 
an agent receives residual revenues, which triggers conflict of interest with the public 
interest of maximising consumer surplus. Other theories (e.g. Stakeholder Theory, 
Incomplete Contract Theory, Transaction Cost Economics Theory and Positive Theory 
Perspective of PPPs) have been reviewed in order to mitigate the problems related to the 
Agency Theory.  
Besides exploring the concept of PPP from theoretical perspectives, the implementation 
of PPP seaport projects in India has been studied and discussed in chapter 5. The study 
shows that there have been major drawbacks in the evaluation and implementation 
process of PPP projects as influenced by some important actors in India. With the use of 
cross case study for in-depth investigation, some commonality patterns have emerged 
from the study. First, the independent regulator played an important role in protecting 
lenders‘interest by scrutinising the capital expenditure of port terminals for the purpose 
of tariff setting. Second, unrealistic traffic projections resulted in cancellation of 
tendering and tariff setting issues in the operation phase. Third, concessionaires could 
not achieve the required financial closure within 180 days (plus a grace period of 120 
days) from the date of the agreement due to poor project preparation at the pre-bid 
stage. Therefore, it is suggested that PPP stakeholders devote sufficient time to pre-
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project planning as a means of ensuring success in early project closure. Fourth, the 
three cases reviewed have successfully demonstrated the ability to deliver value for 
money in terms of time efficiency, cost overrun anticipation, traffic performance, 
attractive interest rates and tenor of debt. These lessons can be learned by other 
developing economies. The study also shows that the Indian government has 
successfully developed a PPP toolkit based on the experience from previous PPP 
projects. 
In order to answer the second part of the first objective, stakeholders’ expectations in 
utilising PPP financial models and the most important financial indicators were 
identified by undertaking literature review in chapter 3. Evaluating a large infrastructure 
project requires extensive collaboration among project stakeholders. A financial model 
has been identified as one of the most common tools used for evaluating a new project 
and facilitating negotiations among lenders, sponsor(s) and a government agency. 
However, the complexity of project financing transactions and the diversity of 
stakeholders’ interests are the major reasons that make financial models hard to 
understand and error prone. These problems have been discussed to formulate research 
questions about PPP financial models and the stakeholders who are using them: Who 
are the stakeholders using PPP financial models? And what are the most important 
stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP financial models? 
Although these research questions were addressed and discussed chapter 3, a further 
research investigation is still needed to confirm its validity. Semi-structured interviews 
was conducted in India and discussed in chapter 6. Content analysis technique was 
employed in analysing the interview findings. Contents regarding different aspects of 
stakeholders’ expectations and PPP financial indicators were interpreted and 
corroborated in a similar and progressive fashion where construct validity was used to 
ground the findings. This chapter also addresses the answers to the two research 
questions stated earlier. The first question is: who are the stakeholders going to manage 
the risks related to developing large infrastructure projects? This question is limited to 
the stakeholders who are using PPP financial models. Ten participants gave their answer 
as follows: Sponsor, Authority, Other potential sponsor, Investor, Lender, Independent 
Engineer, Advisory Agency, Modelling bank, Inter-creditor Agent, Consultant, and 
Transaction adviser. And the second question is: what are the stakeholders’ 
expectations in utilising PPP financial models? To answer the second question, the 
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importance of the pre-determined 64 expectations in five project stages was analysed. 
The most important financial input assumptions and output indicators were identified in 
Table 6.8. A further validation process with a structured questionnaire survey was 
conducted and discussed in chapter 7. 
In general, 40 stakeholders’ expectations passed all systematic analysis tests. And all 
preferred financial indicators (26 input assumptions and 16 output variables) also passed 
all tests of systematic statistical analyses, e.g. Principal component analysis (PCA), 
Pearson bivariate correlation (parametric) and Spearman’s rank correlation (non-
parametric) analyses, Cronbach alpha Internal Consistency Reliability Test, Agreement 
Analysis One-Way ANOVA test, Post Hoc Test and Means Plot.  
The systematic statistical analyses were designed to the test two hypotheses addressed 
in the earlier part of this chapter. The first hypothesis is related to the agreement among 
stakeholders on their expectations in using PPP financial models. Results using 
ANOVA test and Robust Tests of Equality of Means indicate that government 
authorities, sponsors, lenders, and consultant agencies considered all expectation 
variables in using PPP financial models (Ho1 is accepted) at the pre-proposal and 
finance-raising stages. Meanwhile, not all stakeholders had the same expectations in 
using PPP financial models (Ho1 is rejected) at the contract negotiation, construction, 
and operation stages. In order to identify how stakeholders differ from each other, Post 
Hoc Tests were conducted. The stakeholders that had different expectations at the 
contract negotiation stage are (1) Developer Vs Authority (CN – 2, CN – 5, and CN – 
12); (2) Consultant Vs Authority (CN – 3); (3) Lender Vs Authority (CN – 7 and CN – 
9); (4) Lender Vs Consultant (CN – 7 and CN – 9). And the stakeholders that had 
different expectations at the operation stage are:  Consultant Vs Authority (O – 2) and 
(O – 6). 
The second hypothesis is proposed to test the agreement among stakeholders on 
financial indicators (input assumptions and output variables). The results indicate that 
not all stakeholders have the same preferences on input assumptions and financial 
model output (Ho2 is rejected). The stakeholders that have different preference on input 
assumptions are: (1) Consultant Vs Authority (e.g. Initial working capital, Tax 
Information, Exchange rate parity, Loan commitment, and Maintenance cost); and (2) 
Lender Vs Consultant (e.g. Target of equity). And the stakeholders that have different 
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preference on financial model output are: (1) Consultant Vs Authority (e.g. Internal 
Rate of Return, Net Present Value, Revenue, Operating Cost, and Principal payback); 
and (2) Developer Vs Authority (e.g. Net Present Value). The links between 
stakeholders and financial indicators are presented in figure 7.10.  
10.4.2 Achievement of Objective Two: Exploring risks and their mitigation measures 
in PPP projects 
The risks and their mitigation measures in PPP projects were identified through 
literature review, case study and interviews. The possible risks including their causes 
and financial consequences in PPP projects were explored through an extensive 
literature review. Cross case studies were also undertaken to study the implementation 
of PPP seaport projects in India. Major drawbacks and the suggested mitigation 
measures in the evaluation and implementation process of PPP projects in India were 
discussed in chapter 5. Since financial model is the object of this study, the risk 
identification is limited to the risks related to the financial risk variables. The 
connections between financial risk variables and financial risks, including the decision 
rules for avoiding risks are discussed in chapter 8 and presented in table 8.4 and table 
8.5. The alternative mitigation measure(s) for each financial risk are presented in table 
8.7. Several influence diagrams that were developed in this research can be considered 
as representing financial risk analysis for PPP projects. One of these influence diagrams 
can be seen in figure 8.12. 
10.4.3 Objective three: develop an integrated project evaluation tool (IPET) fitted to 
PPP seaport project  
In order to develop an integrated project evaluation tool (IPET), the concept and 
development of the IPET were discussed in chapter 8. IPET comprises three modules: 
- Financial viability module to evaluate the decision of selecting the best PPP 
strategy. 
- Financial risk analysis module to identify the potential risks that affect the 
best scenario and to analysis the level of project at risk. 
- Financial risk mitigation module to determine the response strategy based 
on the level of risk and the condition of the project. 
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Financial model was used as the platform of financial viability module. The input and 
output of three financial models were compared to find the similarity and develop the 
best practice of financial model. Since financial viability module was developed into 
five stages of PPP project, the correlations between the most important expectations and 
the most preferred financial indicators were highlighted through the five project stages.  
The most preferred financial indicators of financial viability module are adopted as 
financial risk variables for financial risk analysis module. This module is designed to 
help users in identifying the possible financial. The link between financial indicators 
and financial risks was identified by Influence diagram method. This module also 
analyses risks at the project level through Monte Carlo simulation with a maximum of 
500 iterations. The outcome of the simulation are the upper and lower values of 
financial indicators at 95% confidence level (e.g. ROA, ROE, NPV, IRR, DSCR min, 
LLCR min, Interest Covering Ratio, and Payback Period). A single simulation with 
random probability of future events can also be used in the second module in order to 
reveal the possible financial risks. In other words, a single simulation randomly creates 
different combination of financial input indicators (i.e. when land acquisition cost is 
significantly increased while traffic volume is also below the projection, it is possible 
that DSCR min, IRR, and NPV fall below the acceptable rates). 
At the end of the preliminary evaluation with IPET, under the financial risk mitigation 
module, the financial and economic outcomes are accompanied by the information of 
source(s) and consequence(s) of risks, and optimised mitigation measures. The 
influence diagram of each financial risk variable that includes its alternative mitigation 
measures was also discussed in chapter 8.  
10.4.4 Achievement of objective four: evaluating IPET and its applicability 
In order to ensure that the proposed tool would be applicable to PPP seaport projects, 
verification and validation of IPET were needed to achieve the fourth research 
objective. The IPET was tested before distributing the prototype to experts. IPET was 
checked and chased in computer-based spreadsheet for each entry and output. The 
precedents and dependent relationships of each equation were traced carefully and 
judged according to the required results and the right entries. Once errors were found 
 312 
and fixed, IPET was ready to be distributed to the experts to be validated and 
commented on. 
The participants who were mainly experts and practitioners rated IPET’s applicability, 
comprehensiveness, practicality, and intelligibility as relatively acceptable. The rating 
scale was from 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest). The average score for applicability of the 
proposed IPET to PPP seaport projects was 3.69. The mean value of IPET’s 
comprehensiveness was 3.6. The average score of practical relevance was 3.26 and the 
respondents rated the model intelligibility as 3.53. These scores gave the proposed IPET 
a positive overall evaluation. 
Some pertinent comments were received. The respondents gave positive feedbacks in 
various ways. Some participants replied by e-mails and gave comments describing that 
they were interested in learning further or having an update for the final IPET.  
10.5 Limitations of the research 
A comprehensive research is reflected by the achievement of its aim and objectives 
within reasonable time and budget constraints. Meanwhile, developing a project 
evaluation tool can be a long process depending on the number of variables involved 
and the range of assumptions considered. The final IPET presented in this research has a 
number of constraints: 
 This research is limited to the infrastructure approach, where private investment 
is involved, and where different elements such as construction, operation and 
maintenance are integrated. 
 The proposed IPET is limited to PPP seaport projects. 
 IPET is designed to be used with financial model, hence will require actual PPP 
financial model. 
 Financial models are selected as the object of the study for identifying, 
evaluating, and managing risks in PPP projects. Hence, the context of managing 
risks in this study is limited to the quantitative perspective. 
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 The definition of stakeholders is also limited to the actors (e.g. sponsor(s), 
lenders, government authority, consultant companies, insurance company, 
contractor, operator, etc.) who use financial models as tools for project 
evaluation, contract negotiation, appraisal report, tariff adjustment, and project 
performance monitoring.      
 Although this research benefits from previous case studies on the identification 
of various risks in general PPP projects (e.g. Bing et al, 2005; Schaufelberger 
and Wipadapisut 2003; Wang et al, 2000; Xenidis and Angelis, 2005; Askar and 
Gab-Allah, 2002; Zhang, 2005c; etc.), it specifically reviews financial indicators 
of PPP financial model which are associated with the risks especially for PPP 
seaport projects. The exploration of the risks is attributed to the identification of 
financial risk variables from PPP seaport financial models. 
 A real PPP project data was not available to meet the research requirements; 
therefore, a hypothetical project data was used in the IPET's development. 
10.6 Value of the findings   
There are some empirical evidences to support the argument that knowledge gap 
between government authority and private partners in evaluating a PPP project can be 
minimised by linking financial model indicators, financial risks, and mitigation 
measures with an integrated project evaluation tool. A list of empirical evidences is 
shown as follows: 
 The empirical evidence from the statistical analysis supports the view that an 
efficient negotiation is possible if PPP financial models are used at the pre-
proposal stage to examine a project’s ability in generating enough cash flow. It 
has been reported that many planned PPP projects fail because their terms are 
negotiated without taking into account whether the project is bankable or not 
(World Bank and PPIAF, 2007).  
 There was a mean significant difference between Lender and Authority groups 
for the project’s borrowing capacity expectation (CN-9) at the contract 
negotiation stage. Whereas lenders selected CN – 9 as the most expectation 
(5.5), authority scored CN – 9 lower at 4.6364. The statistic and means plots 
suggest that government must ensure that the project has enough borrowing 
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power (or robust cash flow) for lenders to be interested in supporting the project. 
The support from the government could be a no competing clause for first 7 
years or 5 years after completing the project as recommended by the Task Force 
for Indian Seaports (Government of India, 2007). 
 Authority had several expectations that significantly differed from sponsor such 
as Transparency (PP – 4), Lowest equity (CN – 2), Securing cash flow (CN – 3), 
Transparency (CN – 5), Agreements on risk allocation (CN – 12), and Securing 
the operational cash flow (O - 1). There is demand from the public to keep the 
procurement process transparent, while in the other side, sponsors need to 
protect their business in the competition. This expectation is regarded as the 
starting point in the contract negotiation process. Since transparency and 
accountability are an integral part of PPP processes especially in the UK 
(Demirag and Khadaroo, 2011), government authorities should maintain 
transparency of the PPP procurement process. A transparent financial model 
should also show all calculation formulas. Any results from the financial model 
computation can be easily traced for auditing purposes. Once private parties are 
willing to be transparent in presenting their financial model, government must 
ensure that the project has enough borrowing power (or robust cash flow) for 
lenders to be interested in supporting the project.  
 Among all stakeholders, only the group of authority rated CN – 2 (Lowest 
equity) as the least important expectation at 3.2 (close to “disagree). It implies 
that the authority requires a fair equity level for the sponsor at the contract 
negotiation stage.  
 Although both authority and sponsor opted for securing cash flow (CN – 3) 
higher than lender and consultant, the authority group significantly demanded 
more expectation than the sponsor in using PPP financial model to secure the 
project’s cash flow. This was also a sign that the authority group expected the 
financial model not solely to secure the project’s cash flow but also to negotiate 
risk sharing mechanism (CN – 12) in the contract negotiation stage. 
 At the operation stage, authority group also dominated the expectation in 
securing the operational cash flow (O - 1) because government authority had to 
make sure that PPP project should be able to demonstrate value for money 
throughout in the delivery of services by the sponsor (Robinson and Scott, 
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2009). In connection to value for money requirement, from the post hoc test, the 
authority also preferred NPV more than the sponsor. 
 It was important for the authority to understand how to use financial model 
properly (O – 2) so that a reasonable tariff (O – 6) could be achieved to maintain 
healthy competition in delivering public services. Meanwhile, consultants rated 
reasonable tariff (O-6) as the least important expectation in using PPP financial 
model at the operation stage. This is evidence that consultants should pay 
attention to what authority expected in using PPP financial model at the 
operation stage. 
 Consultant and authority disagreed on some financial output indicators, such as: 
IRR, NPV, Revenue, Operating Cost, and Principal Payback. Authority’s scores 
were higher than consultant on these financial output indicators. The findings 
indicated that consultants had different preference on the most important output 
of PPP financial model. This is an interesting finding because consultants’ 
expectations on PPP financial model at contract negotiation stage were dominant 
at the authority side. Since the authority needs recommendation from 
consultants, this finding suggests that the consultant preference on most 
financial output indicators should be considered by the authority. A summary of 
the research findings is shown in table 10.1. 
10.7 Originality of the proposed IPET and contribution to knowledge 
An original research paper is built on the existing research. Many researches mostly 
concentrate on identification of general expectations in PPP projects and on how 
stakeholders’ interests in PPP projects are managed. Since there is no specific research 
on identification of stakeholders’ expectations in utilising PPP financial models, this 
research bridges the gap. An integrated project evaluation tool was developed and tested 
as part of a PhD research project aimed at contributing to the body of knowledge. 
Furthermore, this research engages different stakeholders into the selected expectations; 
thereby allowing further information on mutual and opposing expectations for the 
stakeholders to be identified. Original contributions to stakeholder management in PPP 
projects are presented as follows: 
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 Developing an integrated project evaluation tool for evaluating financial 
viability of PPP project. It is the first project evaluation tool to be undertaken in 
academia and industry for integrating financial model and risk management 
tools for PPP projects. 
 The integration between PPP financial model and the risk management tools is 
established in order to assist the user (especially government authority) in 
evaluating the financial viability of a PPP project and controlling the project 
continuously at five project stages. This shows the possibility of developing 
such an integrated project evaluation tool to be used for assessing project 
financial viability through the project life cycle. 
 Long financial closure is seen as a sign that financial model has not been used 
efficiently in a PPP project. When financial closure is longer than the 
anticipated, the sponsor cannot commence the construction until all the 
financing required by lenders are fully mobilised to commission the facility. 
Although some lender’s financial requirements such as loan commitment, 
schedule of disbursement, loan repayment schedule, interest and fees, 
assumptions related to the interest rate hedge, LLCR, and DSCR are not directly 
influenced by government authority, these requirements have to be negotiated 
between sponsor and lender. In the negotiation process, the sponsor is not only 
subjected to the requirements and policy of the host government, but also will be 
affected the commitment of the government in supporting PPP. The proposed 
IPET helps government authority understand the other stakeholders’ point of 
views when it comes to negotiation between the sponsor and the lender, so that 
government authority could effectively support and make better policy in PPP. 
 One argued that a good financial model is not the main consideration in making 
decision; nevertheless, any decision will have impact on the financial viability of 
the project. IPET shows all possible risks related to financial indicators in PPP 
financial model and their mitigation measures. Thus, it allows government 
authority to make better decisions.  
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10.8 Recommendations for further research 
Recommendations for further research have been identified during the progress of this 
research. The following areas are related to either the proposed IPET or to PPP projects 
and modelling issues that can be done for further research:  
 The proposed IPET was designed to be used at five project stages. However, due 
to time constraints, the final IPET was built for evaluating PPP project at the 
pre-proposal stage. Further studies are needed to develop a complete IPET for 
five project stages.  
 There is always room for improvement of the IPET. As suggested by some 
experts, much more detailed revenue and cost modelling would be needed, a 
feature for an itemized presentation of NPV (e.g. Rentals NPV, Amort. NPV, 
etc.), a manual of use and insight into the tool's assumptions and building details 
would be worth the effort, and financial model without macro and button would 
keep things simple. 
 UIPET was acknowledged by Cesar Queiroz, a former World Bank Highways 
Adviser, as being very innovative and comprehensive, with the potential to be 
extended to other sectors. As such, extending IPET to focus on other sectors 
besides seaport development would be a worthwhile exercise.  
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Table 10.1a Summary of the findings from authority perspective 
Stakeholder 
Function of PPP 
Financial Models 
Stage 
The most important expectations in 
utilising PPP Financial model 
Financial risk variables related to stakeholders’ 
expectations 
The most preferred 
financial  indicators 
Authority Evaluate the estimated 
cost of two 
procurement 
alternatives either PPP 
or public sector 
comparator (PSC) 
Pre-proposal 
stage  
Generate enough cash flow (Zhang, 2005a) Concession period, tariff, demand (traffic), etc. (Zhang, 2005) Input: 
 Traffic 
 Revenue forecast 
 Operating and 
Maintenance costs 
 Project time lines 
 
Output: 
 IRR 
 NPV 
 DSCR 
Bankable (Lamb and Merna , 2004; Khan 
and Parra, 2003) 
DSCR, LLCR, repayment cover ratio, drawdown cover ratio, 
etc. (Lamb and Merna, 2004) 
Transparency of the award process (World 
Bank and PPIAF, 2007; Coulson , 2008) 
Tax information, transaction costs, lifecycle and residual costs, 
cost of capital, returns to holders of equity, and issues relating 
to the discount rate (Coulson, 2008) 
Authority Negotiate risk sharing 
mechanism with 
bidders and evaluate 
bidders’ competitive 
proposals 
Bidding and 
contract 
negotiation 
stages 
Transparency during negotiation process 
(Demirag and Khadaroo, 2011) 
Financing costs such as: financial service charges, interest rate 
financing, loan financing period and costs from fluctuations of 
currency and exchange rates (Zhang, 2005b) 
Securing the project cash flow from the 
risks (Wibowo, 2006; Kong et al., 2008) 
Cost of debt, cost of equity, ROE, and the project’s NPV 
(Wibowo, 2006). Total project cost, annual revenue, operation 
& maintenance cost, escalation rate, interest rate, discount rate, 
concession period, and construction time (Yun et al., 2009) 
Risk allocation through all project 
agreements (Jun, 2010) 
IRR, revenue, and traffic volume (Jun, 2010) 
Authority Ensure that the PFI 
projects built to budget 
and on time 
Construction 
stage 
Ensuring the impact of cost overrun and 
other events does not have adverse effect 
on DSCR or LLCR (Khan and Parra, 
2003) 
DSCR, LLCR, construction period, project cost, financing 
cost, and premium (Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut, 2003; 
Khan and Parra, 2003; Shaoul et al. 2006) 
Authority Evaluate a new tariff. Operation stage Securing the operational cash flow 
(Farrell, 2003; Robinson and Scott, 2009) 
Capex and Opex (Scott and Robinson, 2009) 
Reasonable tariff (HM Treasury, 2007; Ng 
et al., 2010; Zhang, 2005b; Tiong, 1996) 
Construction costs and its associated financing cost (payment 
of interests on loans) during the economic life of the asset, 
tariffs, concession period (Trujillo and Nombela, 1999). 
Understandable financial model (Tjia, 
2009; Shaoul et al., 2010) 
Unitary charges, capital and revenue costs (Shaoul et al., 
2010). 
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Table 10.1b Summary of the findings from consultant perspective 
Stakeholder 
Function of PPP 
Financial Models 
Stage 
The most important expectations in 
utilising PPP Financial model 
Financial risk variables related to stakeholders’ expectations 
The most preferred 
financial  indicators 
Consultant 
Develop and audit 
the financial models. 
 
Assist the sponsor, 
the lender and the 
government 
authority in 
evaluating the 
project. 
Pre-proposal 
stage 
Bankable (Lamb and Merna , 2004; Khan 
and Parra, 2003). 
DSCR, LLCR, repayment cover ratio, drawdown cover ratio, etc. 
(Lamb and Merna, 2004). 
Input: 
 Project cost 
 Revenue forecast 
 Traffic 
 Capital structure 
 Operating and 
Maintenance costs 
 
Output: 
 DSCR 
 LLCR 
 CADS 
 Net cash flow 
 IRR 
Reflects the project and the financing 
terms (Hucknall, 2010; Khan and Parra, 
2003). 
Financing options, loan amounts, tenors, interest rate, grace 
period, upfront fees, payback structure, etc. (Khan and Parra, 
2003). 
Consultant 
Develop and audit 
the financial models. 
 
Assist the sponsor, 
the lender and the 
government 
authority in 
evaluating the 
project 
Bidding and 
contract 
negotiation 
stage 
Transparency during negotiation process 
(Demirag and Khadaroo, 2011) 
Financing costs such as: financial service charges, interest rate 
financing, loan financing period and costs from fluctuations of 
currency and exchange rates (Zhang, 2005b). 
Credit Committee requirement for 
approving the sponsor’s credit application 
(Asenova and Beck, 2003). 
Operational cost, inflation, construction cost, construction 
period, life-cycle costs, senior debt, and equity (Asenova and 
Beck, 2003). 
Knowing how much senior debt that the 
project is able to carry (Khan and Parra, 
2003). 
Project costs, equity, loan tenor, discount rate, CADS, DSCR, 
and LLCR (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
Consultant 
Develop and audit 
the financial models. 
 
Assist the sponsor, 
the lender and the 
government 
authority in 
evaluating the 
project 
Finance-raising 
stage 
Achieving financial closing on acceptable 
terms and construction start (Cartlidge, 
2006; World Bank and Ministry of 
Construction Japan, 1999) 
Unitary charge or tariff, project cost, capital expenditures, 
operational expenditures, concession period, construction period, 
and operation period (Cartlidge, 2006). 
Conducting sensitivity analysis for key 
commercial issues as needed (Woodward, 
1995) 
Construction cost, construction period, operation period, 
inflation rates, operating costs, etc. (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
Consultant 
Develop and audit 
the financial models. 
 
Assist the sponsor, 
the lender and the 
government 
authority in 
Construction 
stage 
Ensuring the impact of cost overrun and 
other events does not have adverse effect 
on DSCR or LLCR (Khan and Parra, 
2003) 
DSCR, LLCR, construction period, project cost, financing cost, 
and premium (Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut, 2003; Khan and 
Parra, 2003; Shaoul et al. 2006). 
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evaluating the 
project 
Consultant 
Develop and audit 
the financial models. 
 
Assist the sponsor, 
the lender and the 
government 
authority in 
evaluating the 
project 
Operation stage 
Securing the operational cash flow 
(Farrell, 2003; Robinson and Scott, 2009) 
Capex and Opex (Scott and Robinson, 2009) 
Making the model to represent reality 
(Derman, 2009) 
Dividends payment, repayment of debt, equity, debt, operational 
cost, revenue, tariff, demand (Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut, 
2003) 
 
Table 10.1c Summary of the findings from sponsor perspective 
Stakeholder 
Function of PPP 
Financial Models 
Stage 
The most important expectations in 
utilising PPP Financial model 
Financial risk variables related to stakeholders’ expectations 
The most preferred 
financial  indicators 
Sponsor 
Facilitate the 
submission of 
proposal. 
Pre-proposal stage 
Generate enough cash flow (Zhang, 
2005a) 
Concession period, tariff, demand (traffic), etc. (Zhang, 2005). Input: 
 Project cost 
 Loan repayment 
schedule 
 Traffic 
 Operating and 
Maintenance 
costs 
 Revenue forecast 
 
Output: 
 Net cash flow 
 IRR 
 Repayment 
period 
 CADS 
 LLCR 
 EBITDA 
 Interest Covering 
Ratio 
 
Reflects the project and the financing 
terms (Hucknall, 2010; Khan and Parra, 
2003). 
Financing options, loan amounts, tenors, interest rate, grace 
period, upfront fees, payback structure, etc. (Khan and Parra, 
2003). 
Competitive pricing (Tiong , 1996; World 
Bank and PPIAF, 2007). 
Tariff, project capacity or throughput, demand, revenue share, 
project costs, tax, etc. (Kulkarni and Prusty, 2007; World Bank 
and PPIAF, 2007; and Tiong, 1996) 
Sponsor 
Negotiate risk 
sharing mechanism 
and capital 
structure of the 
project with other 
potential 
sponsor(s), lenders 
and government 
authorities. 
Bidding and 
contract 
negotiation stages 
Knowing how much senior debt that the 
project is able to carry (Khan and Parra, 
2003). 
Project costs, equity, loan tenor, discount rate, CADS, DSCR, 
and LLCR (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
Reaching an agreement on forecast for 
CADS (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
CADS, Net operating profit, interest, revenue, operating cost and 
loan tenor (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
Attractive IRR (Zou et al., 2008). IRR, concession period, tariff rate and demand (Zou et al., 2008). 
Sponsor 
Negotiate risk 
sharing mechanism 
and capital 
Finance-raising 
stage 
Conducting sensitivity analysis for key 
commercial issues as needed (Woodward, 
1995) 
Construction cost, construction period, operation period, inflation 
rates, operating costs, etc. (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
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structure of the 
project with other 
potential 
sponsor(s), lenders 
and government 
authorities. 
Amending the model to reflect the results 
of the negotiation of commercial issues 
(HM Treasury, 2007). 
a. Capital structure: Senior debt, equity, project costs, project 
borrowing capacity. 
b. Loan profile: The loan availability period, first repayment date, 
grace period, final maturity, repayment schedule, percentage of 
equity to be infused by sponsor(s) before first loan draw, and 
pace of subsequent equity draws.  
c. Quantitatively driven covenants: DSCR, LLCR, and CADS 
(Khan and Parra, 2003). 
Assessing the issues that affect price, 
availability, quality, or transportation 
thereof (Mols, 2010) 
Tariff, demand, and project cost (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
Sponsor 
Monitor and track 
the performance of 
the project. 
Construction stage 
Ensuring the impact of cost overrun and 
other events does not have adverse effect 
on DSCR or LLCR (Khan and Parra, 
2003) 
DSCR, LLCR, construction period, project cost, financing cost, 
and premium (Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut, 2003; Khan and 
Parra, 2003; Shaoul et al. 2006). 
Anticipating to claim the declaration of 
the loan agreement breaching 
(Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut, 2003) 
Construction cost, construction period, senior debt, equity, loan 
availability period, and DSCR (Khan and Parra, 2003).   
Sponsor 
Monitor and track 
the performance of 
the project. 
Operation stage 
Monitoring the ability of the SPV to meet 
conditions related to the payment of 
dividends (Schaufelberger and 
Wipadapisut, 2003) 
Dividends payment, repayment of debt, equity, debt, operational 
cost, revenue, tariff, demand (Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut, 
2003) 
Easy to update the financial model (Tjia, 
2009) 
Dividends payment, repayment of debt, equity, debt, operational 
cost, revenue, tariff, demand (Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut, 
2003) 
Sponsor 
Negotiate a new 
tariff with the 
government 
authority. 
Operation stage 
Reasonable tariff (HM Treasury, 2007; 
Ng et al., 2010; Zhang, 2005b; Tiong, 
1996) 
Construction costs and its associated financing cost (payment of 
interests on loans) during the economic life of the asset, tariffs, 
concession period (Trujillo and Nombela, 1999). 
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Table 10.1d Summary of the findings from lender perspective 
Stakeholder 
Function of PPP 
Financial Models 
Stage 
The most important expectations in 
utilising PPP Financial model 
Financial risk variables related to stakeholders’ expectations 
The most preferred 
financial  indicators 
Lender 
Determine the 
project’s 
borrowing power, 
which is based on 
the results of 
negotiation and 
project 
agreements along 
with the financial 
model.   
Bidding and 
contract 
negotiation stages 
Knowing how much senior debt that the 
project is able to carry (Khan and Parra, 
2003). 
Project costs, equity, loan tenor, discount rate, CADS, DSCR, and 
LLCR (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
Input: 
 Traffic 
 Revenue forecast 
 Operating and 
Maintenance 
costs 
 Project cost 
 Interest and fees 
 
Output: 
 DSCR 
 IRR 
 CADS 
 ROE 
 LLCR 
High equity level to minimise the 
repayment debt risk (Zhang, 2005a; Yun 
et al., 2009; Bakatjan et al., 2003 ) 
Equity and project cost (Bakatjan et al., 2003) 
Credit Committee requirement for 
approving the sponsor’s credit application 
(Asenova and Beck, 2003). 
Operational cost, inflation, construction cost, construction period, 
life-cycle costs, senior debt, and equity (Asenova and Beck, 2003). 
Lender 
Modify the initial 
model into lender 
base case financial 
model in order to 
test the project’s 
financial viability. 
Finance-raising 
stage 
Conducting sensitivity analysis for key 
commercial issues as needed (Woodward, 
1995) 
Construction cost, construction period, operation period, inflation 
rates, operating costs, etc. (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
Assessing the issues that affect price, 
availability, quality, or transportation 
thereof (Mols, 2010) 
Tariff, demand, and project cost (Khan and Parra, 2003). 
Amending the model to reflect the results 
of the negotiation of commercial issues 
(HM Treasury, 2007). 
a. Capital structure: Senior debt, equity, project costs, project 
borrowing capacity. 
b. Loan profile: The loan availability period, first repayment date, 
grace period, final maturity, repayment schedule, percentage of 
equity to be infused by sponsor(s) before first loan draw, and pace of 
subsequent equity draws.  
c. Quantitatively driven covenants: DSCR, LLCR, and CADS (Khan 
and Parra, 2003). 
Lender 
Maintain financial 
model and 
monitor project 
costs. 
Construction stage. 
Ensuring the impact of cost overrun and 
other events does not have adverse effect 
on DSCR or LLCR (Khan and Parra, 
2003) 
DSCR, LLCR, construction period, project cost, financing cost, and 
premium (Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut, 2003; Khan and Parra, 
2003; Shaoul et al. 2006). 
Lender 
Assess the impact 
of any annual 
operations budget 
submitted by the 
project vehicle to 
lenders. 
Operation stage 
Understandable financial model (Tjia, 
2009; Shaoul et al., 2010) 
Unitary charges, capital and revenue costs (Shaoul et al., 2010). 
Making the model to represent reality 
(Derman, 2009) 
Dividends payment, repayment of debt, equity, debt, operational cost, 
revenue, tariff, demand (Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut, 2003) 
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